NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL SHIPYARDS EMPLOYEES & WORKERS ASSOCIATION, AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari the order of 23 May 19 64 and
the resolution en banc of 29 June 1964 of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in its Case, No. 12-IPA.

The said case No. 12-IPA was an off-shoot of a strike staged by
the respondent National Shipyards employees’ and Workers’ Association on 5
November 1956 for failure of the petitioner National Shipyards and Steel
Corporation (NASSCO for short) to accede to their demands concerning terms and
conditions of employment.  After the
President of the Philippines had certified the labor dispute as one involving
an industry indispensable to the national interest, the NASSCO filed a petition
with the Industrial Court, docketed as Case No. 12-IPA, praying for a
return-to-work order or for authority to replace the striking workers.

Labor and management later reached an amicable settlement on
certain demands and conditions, among which was the re­instatement of the union
president, Melanio S. Capellan,
and the payment of his backwages.  The partial settlement was reduced to writing
and submitted to the court and, on the basis thereof, the court rendered a
partial decision on 29 July 1957
enjoining the parties to comply with the said agreement.

The herein respondent union on 17 December 1957 Moved for
reinstatement of CapeIlan with backwages,
and for contempt of court because of petitioner’s refusal to do so, followed on
27 January 1958 by another motion for execution of the partial decision and for
contempt of court (Rollo, p. 178).  The petitioner company opposed both
motions.  In an order on 13 November 1958
the court a quo directed the reinstatement of union president Capellan and the computation and payment of his backwages.  But the
writ Issued pursuant thereto was returned unsatisfied.  On 30 May 1959, the court denied the motion
for contempt because the company’s refusal to reinstate Capellan
was found by the court to be justified by the latter’s conviction for slight
physical injuries, with a penalty of 20 days imprisonment, by the Court of First
Instance of Bataan in its Criminal Case No.
4802.  Capellan
had appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals, but was unsuccessful; the
Judgment became final in June 1959.

On 6 July 1959, the court, on motion of took the position that
even if CapeIlan had lost his right to reinstate
merit by reason of his conviction, such loss did not include his backwages, and so, ordered the payment of said backwages up to May 1959, when the Court below found the
NASSCO justified in its refusal to reinstate CapeIlan.  NASSCO duly complied and paid as ordered.

On 1 March 1963
the President of the Philippines
granted “an absolute and unconditional pardon” to Melanio
Capellan for the crime committed by him and
“restored” him to “full civil and political rights.” (Rollo, p. 210 being Annex ‘A’ to
respondent, Answer).

On 7 May 1963, Capellan again moved for
his reinstatement with backwages.  This was denied by the court on 12 September
1963 (Rollo, pp. 94-98, being Annex “K” to Petition)
on the ground that the motion seeks to set aside, alter modify the order of 30
May 1959 which the court, in its opinion could no longer do under Section 17 of
Commonwealth with Act 103 since more than three years was elapsed from the date
of the order.

On 29 December 1963, the union filed again an urgent motion for
execution of the order of 13 November 1958. 
The company again opposed the motion. 
This time, on 23 May 1964, the labor court granted the motion, and provided
for Capellan’s reinstatement with backwages
from 1 March 1963 until actually reinstated. 
The order was affirmed en banc on 29 June 1964.

The aforesaid order of 23 May 1964 and the subsequent
confirmatory resolution en banc are the subjects of the present
petition for review, wherein the petitioner NASSCO assigned the following
errors:

1.  The lower court erred in
issuing an alias writ of execution for the portion of the order dated November
13, 1958 which was subsequently modified or altered by the orders of May 30,
1959 and July 6, 1959, and which orders modifying the order of November 13,
1958, were appealed and are already final and executory.

2.  The respondent CIR erred
in holding that absolute pardon restored to Melanio Capellan the office forfeited by reason of his conviction.

The order dated 13 November 1959 was not modified or altered by
the orders of 30 May 1959 and 6 July 1959. 
This is so because the matter considered by the industrial court in its
order of 10 May 1959 was not the reinstatement and backwages
of Capellan (which reinstatement and backwages were the matters adjudicated in the order of 13
November 1958), but the motion for contempt. 
The order of 30 May 1959 plainly states in its dispositive
portion the following:

“The Court, finding the refusal of the Company to reinstate Melanio S. Capellan to be well-taken,
denies the motion for contempt of Court.” (Rollo, p. 69 being the last page of Annex “F” to Petition.)

The same thing may be said of the order
of 6 July 1959 because what was considered is as stated in the order as
follows:

“The question now to be resolved is whether­ Melanio S. Capellan’s loss of
right to reinstatement as per Court order quoted above carries with it the loss
of his right to backwages.” (Rollo,
p. 72, being on p. 3 of Annex “G” to Petition) —

which the court
resolved in the negative and accordingly directed:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby orders the petitioner
to pay union president Melanio S. Capellan
his backwages corresponding from the date of his
dismissal to May 30, 1959.

“Xxx       xx         xxx.”
(Rollo, p. 74).

It is, therefore, clear that the orders of 10 May 1959 and 6 July 1959 did not modify the order of 13 November 1958; hence, the first
assignment of error makes an assumption that is neither true nor correct.

Petitioner NASSCO admits that the absolute and unconditional pardon
extended by the President to Maximo Capellan blotted out of existence his guilt, but argues,
quoting In Re Lontok, 43 Phil. 203 and 37 Am. Jur. 554, that the pardon did not restore to him the office
that was forfeited as a consequence of his conviction; that the pardon did not
expressly provide for his restoration to his former job in the company.

There is this flaw in the foregoing arguments of the petitioner:
it is assumed that by Capellan’s conviction, his
office was forfeited.  It was not.  Capellan was
convicted of the crime of slight physical injuries, with the penalty of 20 days
imprisonment.  The penalty, which is arresto menor,
carries the accessory penalty of “suspension of the right to hold office
and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.” (Rev. Penal
Code, Art. 44).  Capellan,
by reason of his 20-day sentence was therefore, merely suspended for the
said period of time from the right to hold office Upon serving the sentence,
his suspension was lifted, even with out the grant of executive clemency.

The limitation upon the effects of a pardon, as
mentioned in the Lontok case, supra
(decided before the adoption of the Constitution) and the American cases cited
by the petitioner (Illinois C.R. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S.
92, 33 L. ed. 550, 10 S; Ct. 231; Ex. Parte Garland,
4 Wall. [US] 333, 18 L. ed. 366; Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192
So. 205, 126 A.L.R. 249: State ex rel. Webb v.
Parks, 122 Tenn. 230, 122 S. W.
977, 19 Ann. Cas. 291; and
State of Washington v. Linda Burfield Pazzard, 46 A.L.R. 538-544) that the power does not restore
offices forfeited does riot apply, since the present case does not involve a
forfeited office, but a suspended right to hold office.

We may, however, consider the presidential pardon as a
reiteration of the termination of the suspension of the union president’s right
to hold office.  As such, it has erased
all doubts as to Capellan’s reinstatement, for had
expressly provided for the restoration of his political rights, and this
includes his right to hold office.  (Cf. Flora vs. Oximana, L-19745, 31 Jan.
1964).

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the order and resolution under
review are hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.