NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL SHIPYARDS EMPLOYEES & WORKERS ASSOCIATION, AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

National Shipyards and Steel Corporation versus National Shipyards Employees and Workers Association

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the National Shipyards and Steel Corporation, commonly called NASSCO, against the National Shipyards Employees and Workers Association and the Court of Industrial Relations. NASSCO asks the Supreme Court to set aside two orders of the industrial court that directed the reinstatement of the union president, Melanio Capellan, with backwages from the first of March 1963 until he is actually reinstated. The case matters because it is the classic Philippine ruling on the effect of an absolute and unconditional pardon on a worker's right to return to his job, and on the distinction between a forfeited office and a merely suspended right to hold office.

Procedural History

The dispute began as Case Number 12-IPA in the Court of Industrial Relations, an offshoot of a strike staged by the union in November 1956. On the thirteenth of November 1958, the industrial court ordered Capellan's reinstatement and the payment of his backwages, but the writ issued was returned unsatisfied. On the thirtieth of May 1959, the court denied the union's motion for contempt, finding that the company's refusal to reinstate Capellan was justified by his conviction for slight physical injuries. On the sixth of July 1959, the court ruled that the conviction did not take away his backwages and ordered payment up to May 1959, which NASSCO paid. After the President granted Capellan an absolute and unconditional pardon on the first of March 1963, Capellan moved again for reinstatement with backwages. That motion was denied on the twelfth of September 1963 on the ground that the court could no longer alter its earlier order under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, more than three years having elapsed. On the twenty-ninth of December 1963, the union filed an urgent motion for execution of the order of the thirteenth of November 1958. On the twenty-third of May 1964, the industrial court granted the motion and provided for reinstatement with backwages from the first of March 1963 until actual reinstatement, and this was affirmed en banc on the twenty-ninth of June 1964. NASSCO then filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

On the fifth of November 1956, the union staged a strike against NASSCO over terms and conditions of employment. After the President certified the labor dispute as one involving an industry indispensable to the national interest, NASSCO petitioned the industrial court for a return-to-work order or for authority to replace the striking workers. Labor and management later reached an amicable settlement, which included the reinstatement of the union president, Melanio Capellan, and the payment of his backwages. The partial settlement was reduced to writing, submitted to the court, and embodied in a partial decision on the twenty-ninth of July 1957.

Capellan was later convicted by the Court of First Instance of Bataan of slight physical injuries, with a penalty of twenty days imprisonment. The conviction became final in June 1959. Because of that conviction, the industrial court found NASSCO justified in refusing to reinstate him, but still ordered the payment of his backwages up to May 1959, which NASSCO paid.

On the first of March 1963, the President granted Capellan an absolute and unconditional pardon for the crime and restored him to full civil and political rights. Capellan then moved for reinstatement with backwages. The industrial court ultimately granted the motion on the twenty-third of May 1964, ordering his reinstatement with backwages from the first of March 1963 until actually reinstated, and affirmed itself en banc on the twenty-ninth of June 1964. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the industrial court erred in issuing an alias writ of execution for the portion of the order of the thirteenth of November 1958 which, according to NASSCO, had been modified or altered by the orders of the thirtieth of May 1959 and the sixth of July 1959.
• Whether or not the industrial court erred in holding that the absolute pardon restored to Melanio Capellan the office forfeited by reason of his conviction.

Applicable Provisions

Article 44 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of arresto menor shall carry the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

This provision is decisive because it shows that Capellan's penalty of twenty days imprisonment carried only a suspension of the right to hold office, not a forfeiture of the office itself.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the order of the thirteenth of November 1958 was not modified or altered by the orders of the thirtieth of May 1959 and the sixth of July 1959. The order of the thirtieth of May 1959 dealt only with the motion for contempt, and its dispositive portion stated:

The Court, finding the refusal of the Company to reinstate Melanio S. Capellan to be well-taken, denies the motion for contempt of Court.

The order of the sixth of July 1959 dealt only with the question of backwages, which the court resolved in the negative as to forfeiture, and directed:

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders the petitioner to pay union president Melanio S. Capellan his backwages corresponding from the date of his dismissal to May 30, 1959.

Thus, the first assignment of error rested on an assumption that was neither true nor correct.

On the second issue, the Court rejected NASSCO's argument that the pardon did not restore a forfeited office. The Court held that Capellan's conviction did not forfeit his office. His penalty of twenty days imprisonment was arresto menor, which under Article 44 of the Revised Penal Code carries only the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. He was therefore merely suspended for that period, and upon serving the sentence the suspension was lifted even without executive clemency. The limitation on the effects of a pardon, as mentioned in the Lontok case and the American cases cited by NASSCO, did not apply, because the present case involved not a forfeited office but a suspended right to hold office. The Court added that the presidential pardon may be considered a reiteration of the termination of the suspension of Capellan's right to hold office, and as such erased all doubts as to his reinstatement, since it expressly provided for the restoration of his political rights, which includes his right to hold office.

Doctrine

An absolute and unconditional pardon does not restore an office that was forfeited, but that limitation applies only where the office was actually forfeited. Where the penalty imposed is arresto menor, the accessory penalty is merely suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence, and upon service of the sentence the suspension is lifted even without executive clemency. A presidential pardon that expressly restores full civil and political rights removes all doubt as to the reinstatement of the offender to his former position, because the right to hold office is included in political rights. Finally, an order denying a motion for contempt, or an order resolving only the question of backwages, does not modify or alter an earlier order of reinstatement and backwages.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order and resolution under review, with costs against NASSCO. The union prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an absolute pardon does not restore a forfeited office, but where the penalty is arresto menor, the office is not forfeited, only the right to hold office is suspended, and the pardon restores that right. Examiners use this case to test the effects of pardon on public office and employment, and the distinction between forfeiture and suspension of the right to hold office under Article 44 of the Revised Penal Code.