LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND LEONARDA VDA. DE HAYSON, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the decision dated July 16, 1973 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission en banc in WCU Case No. ROXII-602-70 affirming the WCC
Referee’s award of compensation benefits in favor of the widow and children of
the late Pantaleon Hayson,
an employee of petitioner corporation.

The facts as found by WCC Referee Conchita
Martinez of Regional Office No. XII, Department (now Ministry) of Labor, Davao City,
after the case was heard on the merits, are:

“That the deceased (Pantaleon Hayson) was employed by the respondent Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation as a Gang Boss or capataz with a daily
wage of P9.00.  That
the nature of the business of the respondent is stevedoring and lightering.  On February
16, 1970 at about 9:00 o’clock
in the evening, he was on duty as such capataz on
board the M/V President Aguinaldo.  While the deceased and his co-workers,
Segundo “Nonoy” Catalan, Felimon Caparas, Francisco Toralba and another laborer were waiting for the cargoes
and telling stories to pass the time, the 3rd Officer of the M/V President Aguinaldo approached them. 
Since there was a party on board the boat at that time and since it was
a cold night, the deceased asked for something to drink from the 3rd
Officer.  So, the 3rd Officer left them
for a while and when he returned the latter gave them
a half-filled bottle of pocket-size Tanduay Rhum.  The group then
took turns in drinking from the said bottle with the deceased taking the first
drink.  After his co-workers drank from
the supposed bottle of Tanduay Rhum
they found out that the contents of the said bottle was not liquor but oil of
wintergreen.  About an hour after that
the late Pantaleon Hayson
complained of stomach pain and he was immediately brought to the San Pedro
Hospital where he died on February 17, 1970 at around 4:40 A.M. due to
poisoning according to the findings of the attending physician, Dr. Alex Panuncialman, and which was confirmed by the autopsy
performed by Dr. Juan M. Abear, Jr., Medico Legal
Officer, City of Health Office, Davao City (Exhibit
“E”).

“It was also established that the deceased was not a heavy
drinker as testified to by Segundo Catalan also an employee of the respondent and who was present at the
incident because he was on duty together with the deceased.  He was presented as witness for the
respondent.  x x
x

“It was further established that claimant Leonarda
Vda. de Hayson
was legally married to the deceased (Exhibit “B”), and that out of
their union they begot two children, namely: 
Epifania Hayson and
Norma Hayson (Exhibits “C” and
“D”).”^[1]

From the facts as established, the Referee ruled that the death
of Pantaleon Hayson arose
out of and in the course of his employment as capataz,
and ordered Luzon Stevedoring Corporation to pay:

“1.  To claimant Leonarda
Vda. de Hayson and to minors, Epifania
and Norma, both surnamed Hayson, thru this Office,
the sum of FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P5,200.00), as compensation, plus
the further sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS P200.00), as burial expenses or the total
of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P5,400.00);

 2.  To
Atty. Jose B. Guyo, Jr., thru this Office, the sum of
TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P270.00), as attorney’s fees, pursuant to Section 31
of the Act; and

 3.  To this Office, the sum of FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P55.00), as fee pursuant
to Section 55 of the Act.”

Respondent (now herein
petitioner) filed on March 9, 1971 a motion for reconsideration of the
Referee’s decision raising as sole ground the allegation that Pantaleon Hayson was notoriously
negligent, hence, his death is not compensable under Section 4 of Act 3428, as
amended.  Referee Martinez, in a resolution dated March
26, 1971, denied the
motion for reconsideration.  The entire
record of the case was thus elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
for review.

In the decision dated July 16,
1973, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission affirmed the decision appealed from.^[2]

Resolving the sole issue raised by respondent Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation that the deceased was notoriously negligent for which reason his
death falls outside the compensatory coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, the WCC defined the concept and degrees of negligence, thus:

“In the case of Soriano v. Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation, WCC Case No. 84, this
Commission had the occasion to construe notorious negligence as something more
than a simple or contributory negligence. “By
notorious negligence is meant such entire want of care as to raise a
presumption that a person at fault is conscious of the probable consequences of
his carelessness and is indifferent to the danger of injury to himself and other persons. 
The negligence necessary to exempt an employer must amount to reckless
disregard of the safety of persons and property.  Notorious negligence is practically equivalent
to the doing of an intentional wrong.”

Accordingly, the WCC held that the deceased could not have been
notoriously negligent because he was unaware of the probable consequences of
his act.  Nowhere was there an iota of
proof evidencing his intent to put an end to his life.  If at all, his attitude constituted simple
negligence which thus brings this claim within the compensatory coverage of the
beneficient provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, as amended.  Hence, the WCC’s stamp of affirmance on the award made by Referee Martinez in favor
of Pantaleon Hayson’s widow
and children.

Not satisfied with the WCC decision, Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation on September 8, 1973
sought reconsideration thereof but the WCC, failing to find sufficient
justification to warrant reversal or modification of its decision, denied on October 11, 1973 the motion for
reconsideration.  Hence, the instant
recourse to Us on a petition for review on certiorari.

The sole issue now before Us for
resolution is whether this claim for compensation benefit on account of Pantaleon Hayson’s demise due to
accidental poisoning when he mistook oil of wintergreen for Tanduay
Rhum falls within the coverage of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended.

Petitioner insists that the deceased was notoriously negligent
because he drank from the bottle containing oil of wintergreen not only once
but continued to do so despite the unanimous opinion of his companions.  We agree, however, with the ruling of the WCC
which is fully justified and supported by clear, competent, and substantial
evidence, to wit:

“Quoting from the testimony of the companions of the deceased,
respondent pointed out that the deceased drank the contents of the bottle of Tanduay Rhum, knowing well that
it contained oil of wintergreen, hence his attitude constituted notorious
negligence that brought out his death from the coverage of the Act.  This pretense of respondent is far from being
tenable.  In the case at bar, it was
established that the deceased was not a heavy drinker and at the time they
asked something to drink from the 3rd Officer of the boat, the deceased or his
companions were not shown to have drunk any liquor or anything that could have
affected the mental state of the deceased at the time he asked a drink from the
said Officer.  Nor was it shown that
previous to the incident, the deceased was so despondent that there was an
intention on his part to end his life. 
All that they did in asking for a drink from the Officer is what
ordinary persons would do under the circumstances.  It was a cold night on board the boat and
they were waiting for work, then, it was but natural that they want to do
something to alleviate the cold.  In the
nature of their job, occasional drinking is quite ordinary and does not in any
way violate standard rules and regulations, unless of course the same is done
to the extent of causing drunkenness. 
Being not a drinker as he was, the deceased could not be expected to
know the different tastes of wines.  That
what he drank contained oil of wintergreen made no difference to him because as
stated, he was not a drinker and could not have distinguished the taste of the
kind of wine, so much so, that when his companions tasted the wine later, and
told him that it contained oil of wintergreen, he even bragged that it was stateside, an act which projected his
innocence.  And even if he drank after he
was told that the bottle contained oil of wintergreen, still the same could not
constitute notorious negligence on his part, because there was no showing that
he admitted knowledge that the contents of the bottle was oil of wintergreen,
nor was there a warning made by his companions that drinking the same could be
fatal to him.  To constitute notorious
negligence, it must be shown that the act of the deceased entirely wants in
care as to raise a presumption that he was conscious of the probable
consequences of his carelessness and indifferent to the danger of injury
to himself and other persons.  It must be equivalent to the doing of an
intentional wrong.  Certainly, this
Commission cannot consider the attitude of the deceased in the case at bar to constitute
notorious negligence, because he
was not aware of the probable consequences of his act, nor was it shown that there was an intent on his part to
end his life.  If at all, his attitude simply
constitutes simple negligence, which is well within the compensatory coverage
of the Act.”^[3]

On the matter of
notorious negligence, this Court in the case of Paez
v. WCC, et al., L-18438, March 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 588, 594, said:

“It is finally
contended that the res­pondent WCC erred in not finding that the
accident was caused through the notorious negligence of the deceased (Sec. 4 of
Act No. 3428).  x x
x That defense should be
proven by the party invoking it. 
Notorious negligence is something more than mere or simple negligence,
or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety.  In
the case at bar, there is no showing at all that deceased Barawid
had deliberately disregarded his safety; no intention was attributed to him to
end his life or that he wantonly courted death.  The deceased wanted to return home as
it was getting late, and even helped in the loading and unloading of the palay to the banca and truck, to
finish the work that day.  It is claimed
that the deceased wanted to return home, because he was to drive the new truck
of his brother-in-law, and he was in such a hurry that he unheeded the suggestion
of his companion not to embark anymore, as it was dark and the banca was fully loaded. 
Conceding this to be true, for the purpose of argument, (Barawid can no longer contradict it, his lips having been sealed by death),
still the disregard of the warning cannot be considered as notorious
negligence.  Disobedience to rules,
orders and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious negligence,
if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.  And if in the case at bar, there was any
negligence at all, the case cannot be considered notorious or evidence.  The deceased did not act with the full
knowledge of the existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would counsel him
to avoid such a case.  x x x“

The above doctrine is clearly applicable to the instant case.

In A.
L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. v. WCC, et al.,
No. L-20219, September 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 27, 30, the Supreme Court set down the conditions for compensability of
death claims, as follows:

“Considering the philosophy behind the requirement that to be compensable
the death must occur while the worker is performing some work in the course of
his employment, the authorities are to the effect that to come within the
purview of such requirement, three things must concur:  the injury must be received during the period
covered by the employment; the worker must be shown to have been injured at the
time and place where the performance of his work requires him to be; and the
worker must have been doing something in pursuance of his work.”

In the instant case, We hold and rule
that the above conditions have been established and met.

Indeed, acts reasonably necessary to health and comfort of an
employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other
physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are incidental to
the employment and injuries sus­tained in the performance of such acts are
compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment (58 Am. Jur. sec. 236, p. 742, citing numerous cases).

And further reviewing the
decision appealed from in the light of the rule emphasized in Cuyno, Jr. vs. WCC, et al., No. L-44271, September 22, 1977, 79 SCRA 100,
106, declaring that when an employee dies in line of duty, or when actually at
work as in this case, his death is presumed to be service-connected and is
compensable and that when doubts on the cause and/or aggravating factors of
illness of the claimant arise, they must be resolved in favor of the claimant
and his heirs, the affirmance of the respondent
Commission’s judgment is clearly inevitable and justifiable.

The law presumes that a claim is compensable, absent substantial
evidence to the contrary.  So this Court
has consistently and resolutely adhered to the doctrine that even where the
cause of death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists, the underlying
philosophy being that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social legislation
formulated in obeisance to the social justice guarantee of the Constitution,
its raison d’etre being to alleviate and
ameliorate the plight of the workingman, and thus uplift the quality of life of
the laboring class.  And so, it has been
reiterated in a long chain of workmen’s compensation cases elevated to and
resolved by this Court that the Workmen’s Compensation Law should be construed
fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of and for the benefit of employees
and their dependents and all doubts as to the right of compensation as well as
all presumptions resolved in their favor.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision under
review is hereby AFFIRMED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “A”, Records, pp. 22-23.

^[2]
Annex “C”, Records, pp.
28-32.

^[3]
Annex “C”, Records, pp.
30-32.