G.R. No. L-24559. July 22, 1981
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH VIII, FLORENCIO DEUDOR, ANIANA DEUDOR, PEDRO DEUDOR AND …
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for preliminary injunction filed on May 24, 1965 by J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. against Honorable Guillermo E. Torres, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, and Florencio Deudor, Aniana Deudor, Pedro Deudor and Maria Deudor, seeking
the following relief:
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Pending this proceeding and upon the filing
of a bond by your petitioner, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining the respondent court from proceeding with and acting in Civil Case
No. 8080 aforesaid;
2. After hearing, the order of the respondent
court dated 23 January 1965
be annulled and set aside and consequently that Civil Case No. 8080 be
dismissed;
3. All the orders hereto attached as Annexes
“G”, “K”, “K-1” to “K-32”,
“L-2” and “P” be annulled and set aside;
4. The respondent court be permanently
enjoined from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 8080 and proceeding with the
said case;
5. Petitioner be granted such other relief and
remedy as may be just and equitable in the premises.
“Manila,
Philippines, May 13, 1965.”[1]
The petition alleges that
the petitioner is the absolute owner of several parcels of land with an area of
fifty (50) quiñones situated at Quezon
City, included in and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37685,
37686, 37678, 37679, 37680 and 37683 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in its name; that the petitioner and its
predecessors have been in continuous possession thereof since 1914 up to the
present; that on April 10, 1953, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV, in
Civil Case Nos. Q-135, (Florencio Deudor,
et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.), Q-139 (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Agustin de Torres), Q-177 (Agripino Pascual vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.), and Q-186 (Macaria
Fulgencio vs. J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc.) rendered a decision declaring the petitioner the absolute owner
of the parcels of land with an area of fifty (50) quiñones
more or lets involved in said cases and covered by the said titles; that
likewise in a compromise agreement dated 16 March 1953 entered into between
petitioner and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., on the one
hand, and the respondents surnamed Deudor on the
other, and duly approved by the Court in its decision in the aforementioned civil cases, the
respondents surnamed Deudor, after admitting that
they were “under a mistaken impression of the nature of their rights in
said property,” and after examining the various documents evidencing the ownership to the said
property, voluntarily and unequivocably recognized
the “complete, absolute and indefeasible title in fee simple of the OWNERS
(J.M Tuason & Co., Inc.) over said property, and
hereby renounce, cede and quitclaim unto and in favor of the OWNERS (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.) any right, title or interest of
whatever nature that they may have had in the past, or may now or may have in
and to the said property in the future”; that the Supreme Court in its
decision promulgated on 30 May 1961, in G.R. NO. L-13768 entitled “Florencio Deudor, et al. vs. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., et al.”, upheld the
validity of the said decision (Annex “A”) and compromise agreement
(Annex “B”); that on 16 February 1962, or nine (9) years after the
compromise agreement (Annex “B”) was executed and the decision (Annex
“A”) was rendered, the same respondents surnamed Deudor
filed a complaint to annul and rescind the compromise agreement (Annex
“B”) before the Court of First Instance of Manila and docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 49657 entitled “Florencio
Deudor, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., et al.”; that the parcels of land involved in this Civil
Case No. 49657 are the same fifty (50) quiñones
involved in the aforementioned Civil Case Nos. Q-135, Q-139, Q-174, Q-177 and
Q-186; that the Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated 25 March
1962 dismissed said Civil Case No. 49657 on the ground of no cause of action
and on the ground of improper venue; that the same respondents surnamed Deudor
appealed the said order to the Supreme Court and the appeal was docketed as
G.R. NO. L-20105; that the Supreme Court on October 31, 1963 rendered a decision in said G.R. NO.
L-20105 sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No. 49657 by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on the grounds of no cause of action and improper venue and
the Supreme Court further ruled that the complaint filed by the same
respondents surnamed Deudor over the fifty (50) quiñones, subject matter of the compromise agreement in
Civil Case Nos. Q-135, etc., is already barred by the decision in G.R. NO.
L-13768; that after the compromise agreement was rescinded insofar as the
obligation of the petitioner and Gregorio Araneta,
Inc., to pay the respondents surnamed Deudor the
amounts stipulated in the compromise agreement is concerned, the petitioner
herein obtained the possession of the fifty (50) quiñones
occupied by squatters through the filing of various ejectment
suits; that in spite of the foregoing two (2) decisions of the Supreme Court,
the same respondents surnamed Deudor assisted by the
same counsel, filed an action against the same defendant who is now the
petitioner in this case for the same cause of action over the same parcels of
land involved in Civil Case No. 49657 particularly 29.5 quiñones
thereof; that the complaint which is the same as that of Civil Case No. 49657
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII, presided by the respondent Judge and docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 8080 and that said complaint principally seeks to annul the decision
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IV; that this is the
third case involving the same cause of action and subject matter filed by the
respondents surnamed Deudor against the same
petitioner; that immediately after the filing of Civil Case No. 8080 and more
particularly on 19 March 1964, the respondent court issued an order restraining
the enforcement of the decision dated 10 April 1953 rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch IV, and restraining the petitioner and its agents from ejecting or
threatening to eject the respondents surnamed Deudor
and all persons deriving rights from said respondents; that on 2 April 1964,
the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 8080 on the following
grounds:
(a) That the complaint states no cause of
action;
(b) That the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment;
(c) That the cause of action is barred by the
statute of limitations; and
(d) That there is non-joinder
of an indispensable party in the person of Gregorio Araneta,
Inc.;
that
on 28 October 1964, and prior to the resolution of the petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss, the petitioner filed a pleading entitled “COMMENTS AND/OR
DISCUSSION, ETC.”, challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent court
over the subject matter of the action or suit in Civil Case No. 8080, citing as
authority therefor, the decision of the Supreme Court
in G.R. NO. L-16252 entitled “Rosario Mas versus
Elisa Dumara-og, et al.”, promulgated on 29
September 1964; that on 23 January 1965, the respondent Judge issued a
one-paragraph order denying the aforesaid motion to dismiss; that on 23
February 1965, the petitioner filed its answer to the complaint of the
respondent surnamed Deudor; that from and after the
filing of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8080 up to the present, the
respondent court in violation of and contrary to the provisions of Rule 12,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court, has issued and continues to issue orders ex–parte
granting various complaints in intervention filed by persons who do not
have any interest whatsoever in the subject matter of the litigation and
against whom final and executory judgments for
eviction have been rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branches IV
and V and at the same time has issued and continues to issue orders ex–parte restraining the enforcement of the said final
and executory judgments without requiring the filing
of bonds as directed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court; that under date of 8
February 1965 the respondents surnamed Deudor filed a
Petition to Allow the Director of Lands and his duly authorized representative
and/ or any private land surveyor to survey and relocate the boundaries
of the land in litigation, to which petition the petitioner filed, its
corresponding opposition; that notwithstanding the opposition of the petitioner
and the fact that the court has no jurisdiction the respondent court issued an
order on 20 February 1965 in Civil Case No. 8080 authorizing the respondents
surnamed Deudor “to request the Director of
Lands and/or any private surveyor to make the necessary relocation and survey
of the parcels of land involved x x x and to employ the services of a duly licensed surveyor to
make the necessary survey and relocation”; that pursuant to said order,
the respondents surnamed Deudor are threatening or
about to cause the survey and relocation of the parcels of land involved in
said Civil Case No. 8080 in violation of and to the great prejudice of the
rights of petitioner as owners of the land and of its buyers; that 80% more or
less of the 29.5 quiñones involved in Civil
Case No. 8080 have already been sold by petitioner to third persons for
valuable consideration and for which certificates of title have already been
issued in their names; that under date of 15 February 1965, certain persons
namely, Cirilo del Rosario, Eustaquio
Alquiros, Donato Fajardo, Rosario de Torres, Tomas dela
Cruz and Hilario Andaya,
claiming to have rights and interests over an area of 9.5 quiñones
indicated in orange shade of Annex “A” of their motion and which does
not form part of the 29.5 quiñones involved in Civil
Case No. 8080 filed an Amended Motion for Intervention in said Civil Case No.
8080; that this Amended Motion for Intervention was opposed by the petitioner
as well as by the respondents surnamed Deudor on the
ground that the aforenamed persons do not have any
interest in the subject matter of the litigation; that on the day following the
filing of the said Amended Motion for Intervention and more particularly on 16
February 1965, the respondent Judge without any notice to petitioner and
without requiring the filing of a bond, issued an order ex–parte enjoining the petitioner, its agents or
representatives from “selling or in any way disposing of any portion of
the x x x lands”
claimed by the said intervenors Cirilo
del Rosario, Eustaquio Alquiros,
Donato Fajardo, Rosario de
Torres, Tomas dela Cruz, and Hilario
Andaya, and indicated in orange shade of Annex
“A” of their motion, although said parcels of land are not involved
in Civil Case No. 8080; that by reason of the issuance of the foregoing illegal
orders by the respondent judge, and of the use of force, violence and
intimidation employed by the respondents surnamed Deudor,
including Cirilo del Rosario, Eustaquio
Alquiros, Donato Fajardo, Rosario de Torres, Tomas dela
Cruz and Hilario Andaya,
together with the squatters in the area and against whom final and executory judgments for their eviction have been rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and in
whose favor injunctions have been issued by the respondent court, the
petitioner and its managing partner, Gregorio Araneta,
Inc., have been prevented from entering, developing and subdividing the land and from maintaining and repairing
the existing roads in the subdivision to the great prejudice not only of the
petitioner but also of those buyers residing therein; that buyers of lots from
the petitioner have likewise been prevented from constructing their homes
and/or continuing with the construction of their homes already began prior to
the issuance of the orders of injunction; that unless and until respondents and
their agents are restrained the petitioner will suffer substantial and
irreparable injury in its subdivision business; that the respondent court in
issuing all the foregoing orders has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; that there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that
the petitioner is ready, willing and able to post a bond in such amount as may
be fixed by the Supreme Court for damages in case the petitioner is finally
adjudged not to be entitled to the relief prayed for.[2]
On June 11,
1965, the respondent
judge was enjoined from further proceeding with, and acting in, Civil Case No.
8080.[3]
After the filing of the
petition with this Court separate motions for intervention were filed by the
following persons: Rafael Ramos, Antonio
Estabillo and Pedro Deudor,
Jose Yolo, Jose C. de Jesus, Maria de Vera, Ricardo Remigio,
Martin Garcia, Lydia Jaba, Mariano Ramirez Locsin, Teresa Santos, Correa S. Torres, Luis C. Flores, Dominador Dacanay, Pelagio Balonan, Juan Lubiano, Pedro Licardo, Marcelo Licardo, Martin de Jesus, Raymundo
Familara, Simeon F. Monzon,
Leonardo Ramos, Leonardo Alim, Teresita
Jose, and Candido Cruz, Prospero Feliciano, Teresita R. Cruz and Edgardo Espiritu, Marcelo Profeta,
Beatriz Manalo, Cirilo del Rosario, Donato Fajardo,
Rosario de Torres, Tomas de la Cruz, Manuel Ruiz, Ceferina
D. Valeriano, Xavier Apostol,
Leopoldo Francisco, Arsenio
de Leon and Bienvenido Zaragoza.[4]
The motion for
intervention of Rafael Ramos, Antonio Estabillo and
Pedro Deudor was granted on August 2,
1965.[5] The motions for intervention of Jose
Yolo, Jose C. de Jesus, Maria de Vera, Ricardo Remigio,
Martin Garcia, Lydia Jaba, Mariano Ramirez Locsin, Teresa Santos, Correa S. Torres, Luis C. Flores, Dominador Dacanay, Pelagio Balonan, Juan Lubiano, Pedro Licardo, Marcelo Licardo, Martin de Jesus, Raymundo
Familara, Simeon F. Monzon,
Leonardo Ramos, Leonardo Alim, Teresita
Jose, Candido Cruz, Prospero Feliciano, Teresita R. Cruz, Edgardo Espiritu, Marcelo Profeta and
Beatriz Manalo, Cirilo del
Rosario, Donato Fajardo,
Rosario de Torres and Tomas de la Cruz were granted with the qualification that
only one of them shall prosecute the intervention in the Court for and in
behalf of all, pursuant to Rule 5, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.[6]
The motions for intervention of Ceferina Valeriano, Xavier Apostol, Manuel
Ruiz, Leopoldo Francisco, Arsenio
de Leon, and Bienvenido Zaragoza
were denied by this Court.[7]
The intervenors
alleged that the parcels of land owned by them and in their actual physical
possession were portions and/or parts of the entire parcel of agricultural land
consisting of fifty (50) quiñones situated in the
Barrio of Tatalon, Quezon
City (formerly part of Rizal Province) embraced in
and covered by a possessory information title duly registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law in the name of the late Telesforo
Deudor; that the said agricultural land had always
been in the actual physical possession of the original owners, the late Telesforo Deudor and his
successors-in-interest; that the herein intervenors
constructed their respective houses on the lots sold to them by the parties
collectively designated as Florencio Deudor, et al.; that the intervenors,
after conducting a thorough investigation and inquiry, have discovered for the
first time, after a decision had been rendered by the Hon. Eulogio
Mencias on January 18, 1965 in the case of
Victor Benin, et al. vs. Mariano Severo Tuason y dela Paz, et al., Civil
Case No. 3621 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3622 and 3623; that the land purchased by
them from the parties collectively designed as Deudors,
et al., had been illegally usurped by the petitioner herein, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and/or its predecessors-in-interest,
Mariano Severo Tuason y dela Paz, et al., and that the said land claimed by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and its predecessors-in-interest
had been fraudulently included in paragraph 1 (known as the Sta. Mesa Estate)
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the land records of the
province of Rizal in the registration case wherein
the then applicants were Mariano Severo Tuason y dela Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y dela Paz, Juan Jose Tuazon y dela Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y dela Paz and Augusto Huberto Tuason y dela Paz, before the
Court of Land Registration in case No. 7681; that a portion of the San
Francisco del Monte Estate LRC No. 3563, has been illegally usurped by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 contrary to the warning of the Chief of the
Surveyor’s Division GLRO; that the registrants mentioned in LRC No. 7681 whose
names now appear in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of
land known as the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates
situated in the Municipalities of Caloocan and San
Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal; that the
application in LRC No. 7681 containing the boundaries, technical description
and area of Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and Parcel 2 (Diliman
Estate) were duly published in the Official Gazette; that the technical
description, boundaries and area of Parcel 1 (Sta. Mesa Estate) as well as of
Parcel 2 (Diliman Estate) in LRC No. 7681 were
amended and altered during the course of the proceedings; that the amendments
and alterations were never published or readvertised;
that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the
amended plan; that pursuant to the decision dated March 7, 1914 a Decree of Registration was issued on July 6, 1914
adjudicating to the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y dela Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y dela Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y dela Paz, the two parcels of land known as the Sta. Mesa
and Diliman Estates applied for registration; that
the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the
court had no jurisdiction to render a decision for lack of publication; that
the Decree No. 17431 issued in LRC No. 7681, is likewise null and void from the beginning because of lack of
publication and because the boundaries, technical description and area in the
decree are different from and not identical with, the boundaries, technical
description and area in the application as published in the Official Gazette;
that the areas of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 adjudicated by said Decree No. 17431 are bigger than the areas of Parcel 1
and Parcel 2 in the application as originally published in the Official
Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal particularly that
referring to Parcel 1 known as the Santa Mesa Estate and Parcel 2 known as Diliman Estate, are null and void from the beginning as the
Court that issued the decree of registration had never acquired jurisdiction
over the persons interested in the subject matter of the registration; that the
Deudors and others had not been notified of such
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew or could have known by
the exercise of necessary diligence the names and addresses of the herein
claimants (Deudors) and their predecessors in
interest who were then and up to now the owners, possessors and cultivators of
the land hereinabove described; and that during, before and even after the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the herein petitioner
had tacitly recognized the ownership of the Deudors
over their respective lands because said petitioner had never disturbed the
possession and cultivation of the land by the plaintiffs until the year 1951;
that on the basis of all the foregoing, the herein petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., has absolutely no cause of action
to file and bring this original special action for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, for such proceeding has no leg upon
which to stand.[8]
According to the
petitioner, the respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
thus:
“a) x x x in not dismissing Civil Case No. 8080 inspite of the fact that it has no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action and that this same Civil Case No. 8080 between the
same parties for the same cause of action has been twice litigated and twice decided by the Supreme Court adversely against the
respondents surnamed Deudor on the ground that the
respondents surnamed Deudor have no cause of action
against the petitioner and that the cause of action, if any, alleged in Civil
Case No. 8080 is already barred by the judgments of the Supreme Court in L?13768
and L-20105;
“b) That the respondent court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in enjoining
the execution of final judgments rendered by another branch of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branches IV and V, which judgments have been affirmed either by the
Supreme Court or by the Court of Appeals and which have long since become final
and executory;
“c) That the respondent court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, in issuing restraining orders against your
petitioner and the Sheriff of Quezon City in favor of
intervenors who admittedly have no interest
whatsoever in the subject matter of Civil Case No. 8080;
“d) That the respondent court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the intervention of parties who have no interest on the land subject
matter of Civil Case No. 8080.”[9]
The respondents denied
the allegations of the petition and alleged that:
“(1) Civil Case No. 8080 is an action for
‘Restitution’; ‘Nullity of Title’; ‘Nullity of Decision and Stay in the Execution
of the Decision in Q-135′; ‘Recovery of possession‘ ‘Accounting‘ and ‘Damages,’ while the case
involved in L-13768 and L-20105 is
an action for RESCISSION of the Compromise Agreement.
“(2) The causes of action in Civil Case No. 8080
are now litigated for the FIRST TIME. The action for ‘restitution,’ nullity of
title, enjoining the enforcement of the Decision have been presented for the first
time in Civil Case No. 8080 as a result of the rescission of the
Compromise Agreement mentioned in L-13768
and L-20105 previously
decided by this Honorable
Tribunal.
“(3) The causes of action in Civil Case No. 8080
are totally different from the causes of action involved in the cases
covered by the Supreme Court in L-13768
and L-20105.
“(4) (b)
The Respondents deny the truth of the misleading allegations in the
Petitioner’s Paragraph 4(b) that
the Respondent Court is
enjoining the execution of final judgments rendered by Branches IV and V of the
Court of First Instance of the Province
of Rizal. The Petitioner’s allegations have no foundation
in fact. It is misleading. The Restraining Order dated March 19, 1964 of the Respondent
Court merely enjoins the execution of the judgment
in Civil Case No. Q-135 of
Branch IV which had been rescinded or annulled as a result of the rescission
of the Compromise Agreement which was the subject of said Decision in
Q-135. As a matter of fact, no execution
can be issued on the ‘judgment by consent‘ in Q-135 of Branch IV, as the
Compromise Agreement and the Decision have already been rescinded. The rescission of the Compromise Agreement is
also recognized by the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-16836
entitled ‘J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. B. Sanvictores‘ (January 20, 1962).
“(4) (c) The Respondents deny the Petitioner’s
allegations contained in Paragraph 4(c) of the Petition that the Respondent
Court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing the restraining orders against the Petitioner and the
Sheriff of Quezon City in favor of the INTERVENORS in
Civil Case No. 8080. The Respondents
deny the misleading and untruthful allegations of Petitioner’s allegations in
Paragraph 4(c) that the intervenors have no interest
whatsoever in Civil Case No. 8080.
Petitioner failed to include in his Petition the Motions and/or
Complaints in Intervention of the intervenors in
accordance with Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which will show
this Honorable Court whether or not these intervenors
have rights involved in Civil Case No. 8080.
The Petitioner’s allegations that the intervenors
admittedly have no interest is gratuitous and have no foundation in fact. The truth of the Petitioner’s allegations can
only be verified by this Honorable Court by reading the intervenor’s
Motion and/or Complaints in Intervention which the Petitioner conveniently
omitted to include in the Petition.
“(4) (d) The Respondents deny the Petitioner’s
allegations contained in Paragraph 4(d) of the Petition that the Respondent
Court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its
discretion in allowing the intervenors to
intervene in Civil Case No. 8080. The
Petitioner’s allegations that the intervenors
have no interest is gratuitous and have no foundation in fact. The interest of the intervenors
can only be shown to this Honorable Court by reading the Motions and/or
Complaints in Intervention which were conveniently omitted in the
Petition.”[10]
The basic issue in this
case is whether or not the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8080 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal filed by the
respondents surnamed Deudor is barred by the judgments of this Court in G.R.
Nos. L-13768 and in L-20105.[11]
The petitioner contends that the cause of action and subject
matter in Civil Case No. 8080 had been twice litigated and had been decided
twice by this Court in G.R. Nos. L-13768 and L-20105. The respondents argue that Civil Case No.
8080 is an action for restitution, nullity of title, nullity of decision and
stay in the execution of the decision in Q-135, recovery of possession,
accounting and damages while the cause of action involved in L-13768 and
L-20105 is for the rescission of the compromise agreement.
In G.R. NO. L-13768, this Court affirmed the orders of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal dated February 28, 1957
and January 10, 1958 rescinding the compromise agreement entered into by the
petitioner J.M. Tuason and the respondents, all
surnamed Deudor in so far as the obligation of the
defendant and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. to make further
payments to the Deudors is concerned.[12]
In affirming the orders, this Court recognized the ownership of J.M. Tuason & Co. over the disputed lands, the latter, being
the holder of a Torrens title. In fact, this Court observed that
“considering that the appellees had a Torrens
title, they had no reason to agree on paying P614,925.74 to the Deudors, except upon the expectation of delivery of said
area without unreasonable delay.”[13]
The complaint for restitution of the Deudors is based
on the premise that they, not J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., are the owners of the disputed land.
In the complaint in Civil Case No. 8080, some of the reliefs
prayed for are:
“x x x x x
“(2) Ordering the herein Defendant to restore and
return to the herein Plaintiffs the physical possession of the twenty (20) quiñones of land (Parcel A, Annex “D”) delivered
by the Plaintiffs to the herein Defendant by virtue of the Compromise Agreement
which is now rescinded, the value of which is not now capable of exact
pecuniary estimation;
“(3) Ordering the Defendant to vacate and restore
the possession to the Plaintiffs over those portions of the land consisting of
9.5 quiñones (Parcel B, Annex “D”) now being
illegally occupied by the defendant, the value of which is not now capable of
exact pecuniary estimation;
“(4) Enjoining the enforcement and setting aside,
and declaring as null and void and of no effect, the Decision dated April 10, 1953 in Civil Case No.
Q-135;”[14]
The complaint in Civil
Case No. 8080 can not prosper. A
judgment is conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto.[15]
In affirming the order rescinding the compromise agreement only in so far as
the obligation of J.M. Tuason, INc.
to make further payments, this Court necessarily decided that the land in
dispute was owned by J.M. Tuason as possessor of a
valid title. That this Court considered
the Deudors as mere physical possessors of the fifty
(50) quiñones of land and that the delivery of the
first twenty (20) quiñones was a delivery from one in
physical possession to another who is the rightful owner can further be
inferred from the Court’s statement that the obligation to deliver the other
thirty (30) quiñones of land arose from the fact that
the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is the owner and the
promise made by the Deudors in the Compromise
Agreement.[16]
Thus it was an error for the Deudors to conclude that
there should be restitution as a result of the rescission mentioned in G.R. NO. L-13768 and G.R. NO. L-20105. To accept this theory will again put in issue
the matter as to who is the real owner of the lands in dispute – a matter
necessarily involved and resolved in G.R. NO. L-13768.
In G.R. NO. L-20105, this Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the action instituted by the Deudors for the purpose of rescinding the compromise agreement mentioned in
L-13768 on the ground of fraud. In
affirming the order of dismissal this court held that the “question of validity of said agreement was necessarily involved in the proceedings
aforementioned and that the decision and orders issued in said case G.R.NO.
L-13768 bar plaintiffs herein from now raising the same question in the present
case.”[17]
The question of the validity of the compromise agreement is
likewise necessarily included in this third case (Civil Case No. 8080) between
the Deudors and J.M. Tuason,
Inc. In the compromise agreement, the Deudors
admitted that the land in dispute is owned by J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. To prove their
allegation now that they, not J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., are the real owners of the fifty (50) quiñones
of land, the Deudors must inevitably repudiate their
declaration in the compromise agreement by claiming that the latter is
invalid. Indeed in Paragraph VIII of
their complaint, the Deudors alleged that “thru
deceit and misrepresentation on the part of J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., they were induced to execute a compromise agreement with J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.”[18] It is obvious then that if Civil Case No.
8080 is allowed to prosper, the question of the validity of the compromise
agreement which was already settled in G.R. Nos. L-13768 and L-20105 will again
be raised anew.
The complaint for restitution is barred by the judgments in G.R. Nos. L-13768 and L-20105, both entitled
Deudor et al. vs. J.M. Tuason
and Co., Inc., where the issues of ownership of the fifty (50) quiñones of land and validity of the compromise agreement
were necessarily involved.
In their answer to the present petition, the Deudors
denied the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of the petition that the fifty
(50) quiñones owned by the plaintiffs involved in Civil Case No. 8080 is covered by
a valid Torrens title.
They allege that up to the present, the fifty (50) quiñones
owned by the plaintiffs and involved in Civil Case No. 8080 are still unregistered
lands; that the alleged Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned in Paragraph 6
of the Petition have been declared null and void, ab
initio, in a decision rendered in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II;
that a copy of said decision declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735
and all transfer certificates of title derived or emanating from said Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, was attached as Annex 2 and made an
integral part of the answers.[19]
The Deudors rely on the decision of
Judge Eulogio Mencias of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch II declaring Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 and all transfer certificates derived or emanating therefrom
null and void ab initio. This decision was appealed to, and reversed by, the Supreme Court en banc on June 28, 1974.[20]
In upholding the validity
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, this Court found and held that:
“The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No.
735 null and void ab initio because, according to said court,
that title was based on Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that
was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision of the
Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render
said decision.
“As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735
covers two big parcels of land: Parcel
1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The
records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous
lots, and most of those lots had been sold to numerous parties-Parcel 1 having
been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision,
and the lots had been sold to private individuals and entities, such that in
that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station
of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco),
Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes
Church and others.
Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1
was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of
the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer
certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The trial court declared null and
void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735.
“The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area
included in Parcel 1-which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also
the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of
8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246
square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or
less. In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs is only a little over two per
cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified
Original Certificate of Title No.735, without any qualification.
“The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had
no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the
registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing
had been duly published, the
plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and
description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical
with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the
Official Gazette. The trial court
stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for registration
and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496
(Land Registration Act).
“We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land
Registration Court was without jurisdiction to
render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order,
an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court
that the amendment is necessary and proper.
Under Section 24 of the same fact the court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking out one
or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application
or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go
together. If the amendment consists in
the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land
not previously included in the original application, as published, a new
publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give
notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration
court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is
added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the
registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the
newly included land. The reason is
because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the
publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who
have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in
their rights because of failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area
covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published a new publication is not necessary.
In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining
area is not affected by the failure of a new publication.
“In the case at bar We
find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied
the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to
exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the
subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of
the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended
plan included lands or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the
registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no
new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan.”
x x x x x
“Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of
Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in
the application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference
in area is only 27.10 square meters.
We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to
be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. It was
error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and
made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this
increase in area as compared to the appearing in the application as published,
the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision
decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court
of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not
include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance
with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913
in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court “si los nuevos planos
incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales.” That
report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor “despues
de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos
a los expedientes.”
Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10
square meters was already included in the original plan, and that the computation
of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was
corrected in the recomputation of the area when the
amended plan was prepared. We made a
careful study and comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing
in the application as published, and the technical description appearing in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and
Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this
seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought about ‘by the fact
that when the amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a
few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh.
19) were brought to the nearest millimeter and to the nearest second
respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was
to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute only.’ We believe that this
very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of
the lower court that ‘the amended plan x x x included additional lands which were not originally
included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette.’ It being undisputed
that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86
hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the
computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of
the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial
as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.”[21]
The respondent Judge should have dismissed Civil Case No. 8080.
The complaints in intervention should likewise be dismissed. An intervention is regarded as collateral or
accessory or ancillary to the original action and not an independent
proceeding. Thus the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 8080 necessarily includes that of the complaints in intervention. Moreover, the records show that the intervenors were allowed to intervene because of their
legal interest in the proceeding which consists in the possible declaration of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 as null and void. In other words, if Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 is found by this Court to be null and void then petitioner J.M. Tuason will lose all claims of ownership over the lands
they are occupying. The intervenors, in alleging that Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 is void also invoked the decision of Judge Eulogio
Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case Nos. 3621, 3622, 3623. As mentioned earlier, this decision has been
reversed by the Supreme Court and consequently there is no more doubt as to the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No.735. Therefore, the intervenors
no longer have any interest in the principal case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, all the orders
assailed are declared null and void and the respondent court is hereby ordered to
dismiss Civil Case No. 8080 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the petitioner, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 24.
[2]
Ibid., pp. 2-10.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 200-201.
[4]
Ibid., pp. 207-208; 210-218; 311-312; 326-327; 340-341; 354-356;
371-372; 385-386; 407-408; 423-424; 436-437; 457-458; 477-478; 493-494;
512-513; 530-531; 556-557; 572-573; 588-589; 607-608; 627-629; 648-649;
654-655; 669-670; and 709-710.
[5]
Ibid., p. 309.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 399, 644.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 659, 692, 721.
[8]
Ibid., pp. 665-668.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[10]
Ibid., pp. 227-229.
[11]
G.R. Nos. L-13768 and L-20105
both entitled Deudor et al. vs. J.M. Tuason were decided by this Court on May 30, 1961, and October 31, 1963 respectively. See 2 SCRA 129 and 9 SCRA 444.
[12]
2 SCRA 129. In the compromise agreement
the Deudors agreed to give up their possessory rights over 50 quiñones
of land in favor of the OWNERS, J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. and in consideration of the renunciation, cession and quitclaim, and
of the improvements which the Deudors had made on
said property, and of their undertaking to help maintain the owner’s possession
of said property and other obligations assumed by the Deudors
under said agreement, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
promised to pay the Deudors the amount of
P1,201,063.00. (Rollo, pp. 34-35)
[13]
2 SCRA 139.
[14]
Rollo, p. 100.
[15]
Sec. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court.
[16]
2 SCRA 141.
[17]
9 SCRA 452.
[18]
Rollo, p. 92.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 230-231.
[20]
Benin, et al. vs.
J.M. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.
[21]
Ibid., pp. 550-552; 556-557.