G.R. No. 51151. July 24, 1981

PAZ G. ROMUALDEZ, BELEN A. GUECO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, JOSE TINSAY, AND CATALINA A. GUECO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND JOSE SIOPONGCO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. ANTONIO P. TIGLA…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 24, 1981 SECOND DIVISION ABAD SANTOS, J.:
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ABAD SANTOS, J.:


This is an appeal by the Estate of Felisa
Tiglao from a decision in Civil Case No. Q-14424 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal which revived a
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. Q-5055 also of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal.

Originally appealed to the Court of Appeals,
that court certified the case to us on the ground that it involves questions of law only.

The relevant facts are the following:

On March 15, 1960,
Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a
hacienda and its sugar quota.  Included
in the suit were Felisa Tiglao
and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao.  The suit was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-5055 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.  On May
31, 1960, a decision was rendered with the following dispositive portion:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, by ordering said defendants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the sum of P22,767.17 representing the
unpaid rentals on the sugar quota, to pay P5,000.00 as liquidated damages and the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus
costs.”

The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of
execution to enforce it.  Accordingly, on
May 18, 1970, Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed Civil Case No. Q-14424 in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and  his sureties in order to revive the
judgment above quoted.

It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was
filed, Felisa Tiglao had
died and her estate was being settled
in
Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
  Accordingly, the one who was made defendant
was her estate represented by the Special Administratrix
Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat.  In her Motion to Dismiss, dated October 5,
1970, Answer dated April 5, 1971, and still another Motion to Dismiss, dated
September 25, 1973, the administratrix questioned the
jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the suit to revive
judgment.  She invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87
of the Rules of Court that, “No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; x x
x.”

Brushing aside the posture of the administratrix,
the court a quo rendered a decision on January 21, 1974, with the following dispositive
portion:

“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs ordering the revival of the judgment of this court in Civil Case No. 5055, which runs as
follows:

‘IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, by ordering the said defendants to pay jointly and severally
the plaintiffs the sum of P22,767.17 representing the
unpaid rental on the sugar quota, to pay P5,000.00 as liquidated damages and
the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus costs.’

without
pronouncement as to costs.”

The Estate of Felisa Tiglao filed a separate appeal which is now before us.

The decision reviving the judgment states:  “For the estate of Felisa Tiglao,
no evidence was presented, it having been declared in default previously.” But as can be gleaned from the facts
stated above, the Estate of Felisa Tiglao filed an Answer, dated April 1, 1971, and a second Motion to Dismiss, dated September 25, 1973.  The reason for the mistake is that the case
was handled by several judges (Judges Lorenzo Relova
and Santiago O. Tañada) before it was decided by
Judge Augusto L. Valencia.  However, the mistake is not fatal for the
Estate of Felisa Tiglao did
not raise any factual issue in the court below. 
It raised a question of law only which we now resolve in this appeal.

The appellant argues that the present action is one for the
recovery of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court and that the remedy of the appellees
is to present their claim in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.

This argument is simply answered thus:  the original judgment which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has become stale
because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years.  (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.)
Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa
Tiglao unless it is first revived by action.  This is precisely why the appellees
have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of
money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so
that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate in
Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment insofar as the
Estate of Felisa Tiglao is
concerned, its appeal is hereby dismissed
with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and
De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., see attached concurrence.


Clean
Clean

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CONCURRING OPINION

AQUINO, J.:

I concur.  Felisa Tiglao died on December 4, 1966.  Special Proceeding No.
Q-10731 of Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of her estate, was filed
on January 18, 1967 (p. 3,
Appellant’s brief).

It is a fact that when the ten-year period for enforcing the
judgment of Judge Nicasio Yatco
dated May 31, 1960 against the Tiglao defendants was about to expire, there was as yet no
notice to creditors in Special Proceeding No. Q-10731 and no regular
administrator had been appointed.  Hence, the judgment creditors could
not file a claim against the testate estate for the amount of the unsatisfied
judgment.

The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file an action for revival of
judgment to prevent its extinguishment by prescription.

It is true that, as a general rule, “no action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator” because the creditor’s remedy is to
file the proper claim in the proceeding
for the settlement of the deceased debtor’s estate within the period fixed in
the Statute of Nonclaims (Secs.
2 and 5, Rule 86 and sec. 1,
Rule 87, Rules of Court).

But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances
recounted above, is an exception to that general rule.

At any rate, the judgment creditors filed on August 20, 1971 in the testate proceeding already
mentioned the corresponding claim (p. 44, Record on Appeal).

The lower court’s judgment in this case, which is being assailed
on appeal, is simply a confirmation of that claim which was based on Judge Yatco’s 1960 judgment. 
The con­firmation was necessary to forestall extinctive prescription of
the judgment.