G.R. No. L-20351. February 27, 1969
IN RE: LOT NO. 4098 ZAMBOANGA CAD. NO. 123 CASE NO. 3., TRANSFER OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-8883 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, MAXIMINO VICENTE, PETITIONER-APP…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal from an Order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City acting as a Court of Land Registration on a
petition filed under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
Petitioner-appellee Maximino
Vicente originally filed his petition in the Court a quo alleging that he has one of the registered owners of
Lot No. 4098 of the Zamboanga Cadastre, evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8883 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City, which he and his co-owners had mortgaged on
July 14, 1959 to the Zamboanga City Rural Bank for
the amount of P2,000.00; that for nonpayment of the mortgage debt, the said
mortgage had been foreclosed and the land was sold at public auction by the
City Sheriff on September 15, 1960 to Oppositor-Appellant
Benito de los Santos as the highest bidder, and in
whose favor the City Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was duly
annotated on said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8883; that on September 5, 1961 and within the redemption
period, he tendered the redemption price and interest to de los
Santos, who refused to accept the same, and consequently, he deposited the
redemption amount and interest in the total sum of P3,360.00 with the City Sheriff, who issued a Certificate of Redemption
which was likewise duly annotated on the said Certificate of Title. Petitioner Vicente, therefore, asked the
Court a quo to issue an order to the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8883 and in lieu thereof to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in his favor.
His petition dated October 28, 1961 carried a notice to Messrs. Marcelino Vicente, Abundia
Vicente, Salvina Vicente, Emilia
Vicente, Rodrigo Vicente, Hilario Ventura and Ceferino Ventura, purportedly his co-owners of the land,
and to the City Register of Deeds that he would present the petition for the
Court’s approval on the following Saturday, November 4, 1961; and below said
notice, said co-owners affixed their thumb marks, with the exception of Rodrigo
Vicente and Ceferino Ventura, who affixed their signatures,
manifesting that they “have no objection to the granting of the
petition.”[1]
Oppositor De los
Santos, apparently having learned of Vicente’s petition although he was not
served with notice thereof; timely filed his Opposition thereto. He alleged that after his purchase of the
land in question as the highest bidder at the public auction sale, Vicente’s
co-owners had for consideration transferred to him their redemption rights for
the repurchase of the land and that Vicente could therefore redeem only his own
share therein, to the exclusion of the shares of his co-owners. More importantly, De los
Santos questioned the jurisdiction of the Court a quo, acting as a Court
of Land Registration to take cognizance of Vicente’s petition, citing
jurisprudence of this Court that the remedy provided in Section 112 of Act 496
is summary and not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an
ordinary civil action, and that controversial issues properly pertain to the
general jurisdiction of the Court in ordinary civil actions and should not be
brought to them as Courts of Land Registration with the limited and special
jurisdiction characteristic of such Courts.[2]
The petition, after several postponements, was submitted to the
Court a quo on January 13, 1962.
According to its Clerk of Court’s letter of transmittal of the records
to this Court, “there is no exhibit presented by both parties in this
case.”[3] The Court a quo
thereafter issued its disputed Order of
February 22, 1962, wherein after a mere recital of the fact of the filing of
the petition and the opposition thereto, he ruled that:
“After a careful consideration of the petition and the
opposition thereto, the Court believes that the petition is proper and in order and the opposition is not
well founded.”
and granted the petition for the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8883 and the issuance of a
new certificate of title in favor of petitioner Vicente, by the City Register
of Deeds.
On Appeal, Oppositor De los Santos has
raised anew the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Court a quo
to render its disputed Order,
without reception of evidence, notwithstanding the serious controversial
issues raised in his Opposition, which took the case out of the scope of
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
The appeal must be sustained.
As far back as 1933, this Court has consistently held that
controversial issues, such as the question of cancellation of annotation of a
second mortgage, which necessarily involves the question of validity of such
mortgage, can be adjudicated by the Court of First Instance only in an ordinary
action, and not under the summary proceedings provided in Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act for erasure, alteration
or amendment of a certificate of title, entry of a new certificate or entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate.[4]
Time and again, this Court under reiterated the well settled doctrine that
summary relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act “can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim
or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case
becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the
case where the incident properly belongs.”[5]
In Enriquez v. Atienza,[6]
this Court again pointed out that “(T)he proceedings under (Sec. 112 of
the Land Registration Act) have been aptly described as summary in nature, and
are allowed when a scrutiny of the allegations discloses that the issues
presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently
unsubstantial as not to be genuine issues.” This Court, reviewing all its
decisions dealing with the application
of said Section 112, went on to state clearly that “by ‘unanimity among
the parties’ is meant the absence of serious controversy between the parties in interest as to the title of the party seeking relief under said section.”
A long line of cases was again cited by this Court in its latest decision in
1968, where it again explained that it is in cases when there is no
disagreement as to the facts alleged in the pleadings, such as to rule out the
existence of a personal action between
the parties, that the petition may be considered a mere incidental matter in
the land registration case, which is an in rem action operating directly on the land, and
may be validly acted upon by the Land Registration Court.[7]
In the case at bar, the pleadings readily show the existence of
a controversion of facts and issues between
petitioner and oppositor. Petitioner alleged that he had validly
redeemed the land subject of the public action sale with no objection on the
part of his co-owners. Oppositor disputed petitioner’s claim, alleging in turn
that petitioner’s co-owners had for consideration transferred their redemption
rights in his (oppositor’s) favor, and that
petitioner could only redeem his own share of the land. Both petitioner’s Certificate of Redemption
as well as the Oppositor’s
Certificate of Sale, as issued by the City Sheriff, were annotated on the
Certificate of Title. None of the
pertinent documents supporting the conflicting claims of the parties was submitted,
for as earlier stated, the parties did not present any evidence at all, and the
records support oppositor’s statement in his brief
(pages 3 and 9) that the Court a quo received no evidence whatever.[8]
The Court a quo, without any finding of fact or statement of the law,
merely issued a summary pro-forma
Order, expressing his belief in the propriety of the petition and granting the
same.
We hold that the Court a
quo erred in so doing
and that it did not have jurisdiction in the summary proceedings under Section
112 of the Land Registration Act to order the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8883 and the issuance of a new certificate of title
in favor of petitioner as against
the adverse claim of oppositor.
Parties litigants and
their counsels should bear in mind that while the summary proceeding under Section 112
of the Land Registration Act where the Court is vested with limited and special
jurisdiction as a land registration court, is certainly more expeditious in
appropriate non-controversial matters
than an ordinary civil action, to insist on such summary procedures when there
exists a genuine controversy between the parties would be productive of the
opposite result, as shown in this case and other numerous similar cases heretofore
decided by this Court; it would ultimately be to their advantage and benefit to
ventilate controversial issues and personal actions in the proper courts of general jurisdiction, where proofs may
be duly adduced at a regular trial and
damages and attorney’s fees may
be awarded, where warranted. Here, while
there may be merit in petitioner’s assertion of his right as a co-owner to redeem the
property in its totality, and not merely his original share therein, the Court a
quo lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy between him and oppositor in the summary proceeding under Section 112 of
the Land Registration Act, as timely and correctly raised by oppositor, and this Court, in the absence of any facts or
evidence in the record, likewise lacks jurisdiction in this instance to put an end
to the controversy.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is set aside, without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rec. On Appeal, pp. 2-6
[2]
Castillo v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-1031, July 31, 1947, 78 Phil. 809, Rec. on Appeal, pp. 6-13.
[3]
Rollo, page 1
[4]
Bank of P.I. vs. Ty Camco Sobrino, 57 Phil. 801 (February 6, 1933).
[5]
Tangunan vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 94 Phil. 171, 175 and cases cited.
[6]
100 Phil. 1072 (March 29, 1957) and
cases cited.
[7]
Mabilin v.
Millar, G.R. No. L-24146, February 22, 1968.
[8]
No brief was filed for petitioner-appellee.