G.R. No. L-22228. February 27, 1969
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, ALFREDO FAJARDO AND ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL S…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to
restrain respondents, the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations
and the Registrar of Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of
cancellation of the registration certificate of the Social Security System
Employees Association – hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA which is
affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions – hereinafter
referred to as PAFLU – as well as to annul all proceedings in connection with
said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 875. Petitioners,
likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final
determination of this case. In their
answer, respondents traversed some allegations of fact and the legal conclusions
made in the petition. No writ of
preliminary injunction pendente lite has been issued.
It appears that on September
25, 1963, the Registrar of Labor Organizations – hereinafter referred to as the Registrar – issued a notice of hearing, on October 17, 1963, of the matter of
cancellation of the registration of the
SSSEA, because of:
“1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations
with copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly verified by
affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and its
members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961
and September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of
the 2 respective latter dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and
“2. Failure
to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive
affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their election in
October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV(1) of its
constitution and by-laws.”
in violation of Section 23 of Republic
Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA moved
to postpone the hearing to October
21, 1963, and to submit then a memorandum, as well as the
documents specified in the notice. The
motion was granted, but, nobody appeared for the SSSEA on the date last
mentioned. The next day, October 22, 1963, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA, filed, with
the Office of the Registrar, a letter dated October 21, 1963, enclosing the following:
1.
Joint non-subversive affidavit of the officers
of the SSS Employees’ Association – PAFLU;
2. List
of newly elected officers of the Association in its general elections held on April 29, 1963; and
3. Copy
of the amended constitution and by-laws of the Association.
Holding
“1. That the joint non-subversive affidavit and
the list of officers mentioned in the letter of Mr. Manuel Villagracia
were not the documents referred to in the notice of hearing and made the
subject matter of the present proceeding; and
“2. That
there is no iota of evidence on records to show and/or warrant the dismissal of
the present proceeding.”
on October 23, 1963, the Registrar rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA’s
Registration Certificate No. 1-1P-169, issued
on September 30, 1960. Soon later, or on October 28, 1963, Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a
reconsideration of said decision and prayed for time, up to November 15, within
which to submit the requisite papers and data.
An opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino
Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that
the latter had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said
motion was heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order
declaring that the SSSEA had “failed to submit the following requirements
to wit:
“1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with others on January 30,
1962.
“2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive
affidavits of all the officers who were supposedly elected on October (1st
Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws.”
and granting the SSSEA 15 days from
notice to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in
abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.
Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA,
Alfredo Fajardo “and all the officers and
members” of the SSSEA commenced the present action, for the purpose stated
at the beginning of this decision, upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic
Act No. 875 violates their freedom of assembly and association, and is
inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly
delegates judicial power to an administrative agency; that said Section 23
should be deemed repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating, on November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond
the 30-day period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that
“there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law”; that the decision complained of had not been
approved by the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA’s certificate
of registration would cause irreparable injury.
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875
unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights is devoid of factual basis.
The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section[1]
is not a limitation to the right of
assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without
said registration.2 The latter is merely a condition sine
qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor
organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the “rights
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.” The
Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality,
which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of
which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against
abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the
police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations
and union of workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be
protected.3 Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a
condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a
reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization,
considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as
oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to
them or to the organization.4
For the same reasons, said Section 23 does not impinge upon the
right of organization guaranteed in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run
counter to Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of Article 8 of the ILO-Convention
No. 87, which provide that “workers and employers, x x shall have
the right to establish and x x join
organizations of their own choosing, without previous authorization;” that
“workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved
or suspended by administrative authority;” that “the acquisition of
legal personality by workers’ and employers’ organizations, x x shall not be made subject to conditions of such
a character as to restrict the application of the provisions” above
mentioned; and that “the guarantees provided for in” said Convention
shall not be impaired by the law of the land.
In B.S.P. v. Araos5, we held
that there is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA’s registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension.
The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by
said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights
and privileges – as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution –
would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23 (b) of Republic Act No.
875, a labor organization, association or union of workers must file with the
Department of Labor the following documents:
“(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the
organization together with a list of all officers of the association, their
addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization;
‘”(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the
said organization, association or union to the effect that they are not members
of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method; and
“(3) If
the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy
of its last annual financial report.”
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said Section ordains that:
“The registration and permit of a legitimate labor
organization shall be cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the
Department has reason to believe that the labor organization no longer
meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails
to file with the
Department of Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of
the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with
their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph; (b) above within
sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order
the cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing,
as provided under paragraph (c) above, and the affected labor organization
shall have the same right of appeal to the courts as previously provided.”6
The determination of the question whether the requirements of
paragraph (b) have been met, or, whether or not the requisite financial report
or non-subversive affidavits have been filed within the period above stated, is
not judicial power. Indeed, all officers
of the government, including those in the executive department, are supposed to
act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is specially true as regards
administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and render
decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement
of which is entrusted thereto. Hence,
speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) had occasion to say:
“The objections of the appellees to
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for
being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056)
merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was
anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public
property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
“It is true that the exercise of the Secretary’s power under
the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact,
such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character;
but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental
to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that
they are validly conferable upon executive officials
provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.”7
It should be noted, also, that, admittedly, the SSSEA had not
filed the non-subversive affidavits of some of its officers – “Messrs. Sison, Tolentino, Atienza, Zalameda, Sabino and Pefianca” –
although said organization avers that these persons “were either resigned
or out on leave as directors or officers of the union,” without specifying who had resigned and who were on
leave. This averment is, moreover, controverted
by respondents herein.
Again, the 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to
the decision complained of. Said period
is prescribed in paragraph (c)8 of
Section 23, which refers to the proceedings for the “registration” of
labor organizations, associations or unions not to the
“cancellation” of said registration, which is governed by the
above-quoted paragraph (d) of the same section.
Independently of the foregoing, we have repeatedly held that
legal provisions prescribing the period within which a decision should be
rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature – in the sense that, a judgment
promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void, although
the officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence
of his delays9 – unless the intention to the
contrary is manifest. Such, however, is not the import of said
paragraph (c). In the language of Black:
“When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act
is to be done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and
not mandatory, unless time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the
language of the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation
of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right.”10
Then, again, there is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary
of Labor, of the decision of the Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a
registration certificate. In fact, the
language of paragraph (d) of Section 23 suggests that, once the conditions
therein specified are present, the office concerned “shall” have no
choice but to issue the order of cancellation.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there is nothing, as yet, for the
Secretary of Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the Registrar’s decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending resolution. In fact, this circumstance shows, not only
that the present action is premature11, but,
also, that petitioners have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available
to them.12 Indeed, they could ask the
Secretary of Labor to disapprove the Registrar’s decision or object to its execution
or enforcement, in the absence of approval of the former, if the same were
necessary, on which we need not and do not express any opinion.
In view of the foregoing, the petition herein should be,
as it is hereby dismissed, and the writs prayed for denied, with costs against
the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
“Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized
for the material, intellectual and moral well-being of its members shall
acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing
with the office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and
existence and the following documents, together with the amount of five pesos
as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph of this section.”
2
Ex parte R. J. Thomas, 174 S.W. 2d, 958-960.
3
167 A.L.R. 700-701.
4
160 A.L.R. 894-895.
5
G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958.
6
Underscoring ours.
7
Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, Nov. 29,
1963. Underscoring ours.
8
“If in the opinion of the Department of Labor the applicant
organization does not appear to meet the requirement of this Act for registration,
the Department shall, after ten (10) days of notice to the applicant organization,
association or union, and within thirty (30) days of receipt of the
above-mentioned documents, hold a public hearing in the province in which the
principal office of the applicant is located at which the applicant
organization shall have the right to be represented by attorney and to
cross-examine witnesses; and such hearing shall be concluded and a decision
announced by the Department within thirty days after the announcement of said hearing;
and if after due hearing the Department rules against registration of
the applicant, it shall be required that the Department of Labor state
specifically what data the applicant has failed to submit as a prerequisite of registration. If the applicant is still denied, it
thereafter shall have the right within sixty days of formal denial of registration
to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which shall render a decision within thirty
days, or to the Supreme Court.”
9
Tanseco v. Arteche,
57 Phil. 227; Querubin v. Court of Appeals, 82
Phil. 226; Gutierrez v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-14252,
Feb. 28, 1959; Estrella v. Edaño, G.R.
No. L-18883, May 18, 1962.
10
Black on the Construction and Interpretation of Laws, p. 545. Underscoring ours.
11
Herrera v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245; Uy Chu v. Imperial, 44
Phil. 27; Manila Post Publishing Co. v. Sanchez, 81 Phil. 614; Alvarez v.
Ibañez, 83 Phil. 104; Ricafort
v. Hon. Wenceslao Fernan,
101 Phil. 575; Cueto v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-11555,
May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery
at mga Kasangay v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. L-12999, July 26,
1960.
12
Montes v. Civil Service Board of
Appeals, 101 Phil. 490; Ang Tuan Kai v.
Import Control Comm., 91 Phil. 143; Coloso v.
Board, 92 Phil. 938; Miguel v. Reyes, 93 Phil. 542; Calo
v. Fuertes, G.R. No. L-16537, June 29, 1962.