FIDEL TEODORO, PETITIONER, VS. FELIX MACARAEG AND COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, SECOND REGIONAL DISTRICT, SALA II, RESPONDENTS.

Before us for review, upon a petition for certiorari, are the
decision of the respondent Court of Agrarian Relations of Sep­tember 7, 1962 in
CAR case 558-Gba.’68 (Nueva Ecija),
ordering the herein petitioner Fidel Teodoro to
reinstate the herein private respondent Felix Macaraeg
(the petitioner in the agrarian court) to
his “former landholding … and to keep him
as the true and law­ful tenant in accordance with law,” and the resolution
of the same court of November 27, 1962 condemning Teodoro
to pay or deliver to Macaraeg as damages “82 cavans of play or its equivalent va­lue in the amount of
P820.00 computed at the rate of P10.00 per cavan,
plus interest at 10% until fully paid.”

We turn to the factual milieu.

On June 7, 1961 Macaraeg filed a
petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations (Second Regional District, sala II, Guimba, Nueva Ecija), praying, inter
alia, that (1) an interlocutory order be
issued to restrain Teodoro and Jose Niegos (the respondents below) from ejecting him from his
landholding pending resolution of his
petition; and (2) after due trial, he be maintained as the law­ful tenant in
the disputed landholding.

Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold
tenant of Teodoro cultivating a farmholding
situated in the municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four
(4) hectares devoted to rice culture, and that he has worked said land “as
a tenant for the last seven years;” that on March 2, 1961 he received a
letter from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the aforesaid landholding will be
given to another tenant, on the pretext that he (Macaraeg)
“is con­tracting to be a tenant of another in said landholding;” that
forthwith, Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land; that subsequently, Niegos repeatedly forbade him from working on said riceland; that in order to avoid trouble, he refrained from
forcibly entering the landholding, but with the advent of the planting season,
it became imperative that the agrarian court or­der his reinstatement and
restrain Teodoro and Niegos
from com­mitting further acts of dispossession.

In his answer with counterclaim dated June 19, 1961, Teo­doro categorically denied that Macaraeg
was his tenant, claiming that “ever since he became the owner of around 39
hectares of riceland in Kalisitan,
Talugtug, N. Ecija, he had
always leased all of it under civil lease and he had never given any portion of
it under tenancy.” He further alleged that after the expiration of his
lease contract with Macaraeg in January, 1961, his
wife twice notified Macaraeg to renew his contract
for the then incoming agricultural year 1961-62, but the latter “verbally
told Mrs. Teo­doro that he was no longer interested
to work on the land and he was giving it up as he had left the place
already.” Teodoro also claims that it was only
after Macaraeg had abandoned the farm­land that he
decided to lease it to Niegos.

On his part, Niegos seasonably
answered, disclaiming any knowledge that Macaraeg is
the tenant of Teodoro, and averring that he
“entered the landholding in good faith clothed with the pro­per authority
from the other respondent (Teodoro) and with the
consent and confirmity of the petitioner (Macaraeg) who allowed him to work on the same;” and
that Macaraeg “has no more inte­rests in the
cultivation of the landholding as could be gleaned from his actuations, like
the failure to clean the land during the months of March and April, and his
failure to prepare his seedbed in the month of May which is the period for
broadcasting seedling in the community.”

On February 6, 1962, when the hearing of the present con­troversy
was nearing completion in the respondent agrarian court but before the case was
submitted for decision, Macaraeg filed a
“supplemental petition,” claiming damages as a result of his dis­possession.  Said petition was given due course by the
court com­missioner and the requisite hearing was set for March 9, 1962.  Both Teodoro and Niegos interposed
their respective answers, identically asserting that the same was filed out of
time and that the failure of Macaraeg to claim
earlier his alleged damages amounted to a fatal neglect which could no longer
be cured at that very late stage of the proceedings.  Nonetheless, hearing on the said petition was
held at which it was disclosed that as “a result of his (Macaraeg’s) ejectment, he became
destitute” since he had “income except from those derived from
transplanting and reap­ing wherein he earned the amount of P30.00.” It was
further proved that “for the agricultural year 1961-62, Jose Niegos realized a gross harvest of 110 cavans
out of which he paid his rental to Fidel Teodoro in
the amount of 42 cavans and 23 kilos.”

On September
7, 1962 the decision
under review was ren­dered, with the following dispositive
portion:

“IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING CON­SIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in fa­vor of
petitioner Felix Macaraeg and against respon­dents Fidel Teodoro
and Jose Niegos in the tenor and disposition hereinbelow provided, to wit:

“1.  Jose Niegos is
hereby ordered to vacate the landholding in question with an approximate area
of four (4) hectares, situated at Barrio Kalisitan, Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, in favor of herein petitioner and to refrain from
molesting or in any manner dis­turbing his peaceful possession and cultivation
there­of, subject to the condition that said respondent shall have harvested
and threshed his crop which he plant­ed for the current agricultural year;

“2.  Conformably with the preceding para­graph,
Fidel Teodoro is hereby ordered to reinstate said
petitioner to his former landholding aforestated and
to keep him as the true and lawful tenant in accordance with law;

“3.  Declaring Exhibit A as a leasehold tenan­cy
contract between the parties for the
agricultural year 1960-61 as the term is understood under our te­nancy law; as
a consequence hereof, Exhibit 4-Teo­doro and Exhibit 5-Niegos, i.e. contract of
leas between Fidel Teodoro
and Jose Niegos is hereby declared void and of no
legal effect; and

“4.  Dismissing petitioner’s claim for damages as
embodied in his supplemental petition.”

Teodoro and Niegos
filed separate motions for reconside­ration which were denied by the respondent
agrarian court in its resolution of November
27, 1962.  However, in the
same resolution, the court a quo reconsidered, upon motion of Macaraeg,
its ruling denying the latter’s prayer for damages, thus:

“With respect to petitioner’s claim for damages as embodied in
his supplemental petition, wherein evidence was adduced in support thereof, we
believe that its admission is in accordance with Section 2, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court of the Phi­lippines, same not being for the purpose of delay­ing
the proceedings.  And, the fact that the
Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence but ‘shall act according to justice
and equity and substantial me­rits of the case,’ we believe that the evidence
to support the claim for damages received during the hearings before the court
commissioner is merito­rious (Secs. 10 and 11, RA
1267, as amended).  Hence, petitioner is
entitled to recover damages claimed by him from his landholder in the amount of
85 cavans of palay which is
equal to the two years rental of his landholding less his earnings during the
same period in the amount of P30.00 only or is equivalent to 3 cavans of palay.  In fine, Fidel Teodoro
is liable to pay to petitioner the amount of 82 cavans
of palay or its cash value of P820.00, computed at
P10.00 per cavan plus interest at 10% until fully
paid.”

After Teodoro’s motion to reconsider
the foregoing resolution was denied, he interposed on January 5, 1963 the present peti­tion, imputing to
the court the following errors:

1.   
In holding that Macaraeg
became a tenant of Teo­doro by virtue of the
“Contract of Lease” which they executed in April, 1960;

2.    Assuming
that the foregoing contract was in effect – a leasehold tenancy agreement
making Macaraeg a tenant of Teodoro,
in not finding the former guilty
of abandonment, an act which terminated their tenancy relation; and

3.   
In condemning Teodoro
to pay, damages to Macaraeg for the alleged
dispossession, despite the fact that the claim for damages embodied in the
abovementioned “Supplemental Petition” was interposed out of time or
when the proceedings below were about to be terminated.

The pertinent provisions of the disputed “Contract of
Lease” between Teodoro and Macaraeg
read as follows:

“That the LESSOR is the registered owner of a certain
parcel of land situated at Talugtug, Nueva Ecija containing an area of
THIRTY NINE (39) HECTARES, more or less;

“That for and in consideration of the rental of Nine (9) cavans of palay hectare for one agricultural year, the LESSOR hereby lets and leases
and the LESSEE hereby accepts an undivided portion of 4-1/2 Hectares of
the abovementioned property under the following terms and conditions:

“1.  That this contract of lease shall only be for
the agricultural year 1960-61;

“2.  That the Lessee shall give a guaranty to
answer for the payment of the lease consideration of this contract;

“3.  That the rental of 38.7 cavans
of palay per hectare shall be paid unto the LESSOR
not later than January, 1961;

“4.  That the corresponding rental must be brought
to the Poblacion of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, to be deposited to
any bonded Warehouse at the expense of the LESSEE and in the name of the
LESSOR;

“5.  That the rental must be of the same va­riety
as that produced by the LESSEE;

“6.  That the LESSOR shall pay for the real
property taxes corresponding to the property leased;

“7.  That violation of any of the terms of this
contract shall, be sufficient ground to termi­nate the same with damages
against the guilty party;

“8.  That the property leased shall be used or
utilized for agricultural enterprise only;

“9.  That in case of default on the part of the
LESSEE to pay the lease consideration when the same becomes due and payable and
the collec­tion for the same reaches the court, the LESSEE hereby binds himself
to pay the cost of the suit in­cluding reasonable attorney’s fees.”
(emphasis supplied)

I.   Teodoro
contends that the language and tenor of the afore­said contract clearly
manifest the intention of the parties to enter into an ordinary civil lease
contract, not a leasehold tenancy agree­ment as alleged by Macaraeg
and sustained by the agrarian court.  To
start with, Teodoro stresses, the parties denominated
the said covenant as a “Contract of Lease,” which assigned title discloses their mutual intention to execute
an ordinary lease contract, for, otherwise, if they had intended to create a
leasehold tenancy rela­tion, they could have accordingly captioned their
agreement “with the word tenancy or some other word of, similar
import.” More­over, Teodoro points out that
“in the contract of lease in question it is significant to note that the
words landlord and tenant were conspicuous by their complete absence.”

The foregoing stance assumed by Teodoro is patently unte­nable, in
the face of the principal feature
s and stipulations of the contract in controversy and the pertinent provisions
of existing law on leasehold tenancy.  It
bears emphasis that the title, label or ru­bric given to a contract cannot be
used to camouflage the real im­port of an agreement as evinced by its main
provisions.  Moreover, it is basic that a
contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting parties.^[1]

As correctly expressed by the respondent court, “viewed from
the four corners of Exhibit A, we have no doubt that the lease con­tract
entered into between petitioner (Macaraeg) and Fidel Teodoro is a pure and simple leasehold tenancy contract as the term is understood under our tenancy laws.” This observation of the agrarian
court finds anchor in the pertinent provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act.  Thus, section 4 of Rep. Act 1199,
as amended by Rep. Act 2263, provides that

“Leasehold tenancy
exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor
avail­able from members of his immediate farm house­hold, undertakes to
cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single
person to­gether with members of his immediate farm house­hold, belonging to or
legally possessed by another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both.”

Furthermore, section 42 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act defines a landlord-lessor as

“Any person, natural or juridical, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, who
lets, leases or rents to ano­ther said property for purposes of agricultural
pro­duction and for a price certain or ascertainable ei­ther in an amount of
money or produce;”

while a tenant-lessee is defined as

“any person who, with the consent of the for­mer (landlord-lessor), tills, cultivates or operates said land,
susceptible of cultivation by one individual, personally or with the aid of
labor available from among his own immediate farm household.”

Gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the following could be
synthesized as the principal elements of a leasehold tenancy contract or
relation:

1.                
The object of the contract or the relationship
is an agricultural land which is leased or rented for the
purpose of agricultural production;

2.                
The size of the landholding must be such that it
is susceptible of personal
cultivation by a single person with assistance from the members of his
immediate farm household;

3.                
The tenant-lessee must actually and
personally till, cultivate or operate said land, solely or with the
aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and

4.                
The landlord-lessor,
who is either the lawful own­er or the legal possessor of the land, leases
the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an
amount of money or produce.

Reverting to the controverted
“Contract of Lease,” we are of the consensus that it indubitably
contains the foregoing essential elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement.

The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land
devoted to agricultural production.  More
specifically, the par­ties stipulated that “the property leased shall
be used or utilized for agricultural enterprise only.” (emphasis
supplied) Further­more, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be used
for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation that “the
rental of nine (9) cavans of palay
per hectare for one agricultural year … must be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE.” (emphasis
supplied)

The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single
person as it is of an area of only four and a half (4-1/2) hectares.  This Court has held^[2]
that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or
with the help of the members of his immediate farm household.

From the stipulation that “the rental must be of the same
variety as that produced by
the LESSEE,” it can reasonably be in­ferred that the intention of the parties
was that Macaraeg perso­nally work the land, which he
did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: 
“In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg)
cultivated the landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agri­cultural year 1960-61 in consideration
of a fixed annual rental.” (emphasis supplied) Moreover, there is no
evidence that Maca­raeg did not personally cultivate
the land in dispute.  Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg
availed of out­side assistance in the cultivation of the said riceland.

Teodoro is the registered owner of the
disputed landhold­ing and he delivered the possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in
produce.  Evidently, there was a valid
leasehold tenancy agreement.  Moreover,
the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce – 9 cavans per hec­tare – is an unmistakable earmark,
considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually enter into a
leasehold tenancy re­lation.

Teodoro further argues, however, that
the aforesaid, “Con­tract of Lease” cannot possibly be construed as
establishing a leasehold tenancy relation because the parties themselves
ignored and repudiated the very essence of tenancy – security of tenure – when
they stipulated that “this agreement shall only be for the agri­cultural
year 1960-61.”

This argument is unacceptable. 
The mere fact that the par­ties fixed and limited the duration of their
lease contract to only one agricultural year, does not remove the relationship
which they created from the purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the ge­neral
import of their agreement which irreversibly leads to and clearly justifies
tenancy coverage.  It is fundamental that
the tenant-lessee’s security of tenure subsists notwithstanding the termina­tion
of the contract which initially established the tenancy relation.  In the language of the law, the
“expiration of the period of the con­tract as fixed by the
parties … does not of itself extinguish the re­lationship.”^[3]
This is a “practical consequence of the distinction between the tenancy contract which is fixed by the parties, and the tenancy relationship which is maintained and governed by
law.”^[4]
Furthermore, section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides that

“Notwithstanding
any agreement or provision of law as to the period of future
surrender of the land, in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural
purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the te­nant shall not be
dispossessed of his holdings by the landholder except for any of the causes
hereinafter enumerated and only after the sane has been proved before, and the
dispossession is authorized by, the court.” (emphasis supplied)

The abovecited
provision does not permit the parties to stipulate at what future time the
tenant shall leave or surrender the land. 
Thus, this Court has held^[5]
that an agreement whereby the tenant was required to return to the landlord his landholding
after one crop year cannot justify the tenant’s dispossession after the
said period because such agreement is expressly proscribed by law.

Still vehemently contending that he never intended to enter into any tenancy relation with Macaraeg, Teodoro finally argues
that construing the abovementioned “Contract of Lease” as a lease­hold
tenancy agreement would amount to a judicial negation of his freedom to
contract.

Needless to stress, this Court frowns upon and rejects any
attempt to nullify the legitimate exercise of the right to contract.  We agree
with Teodoro that as a landholder he has full liberty to
enter into a civil lease contract covering his property.  What we want to indelibly impress, however, is that
once a landowner en­ters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be
devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of per­sonal
cultivation by the lessee, solely or with the help of labor coming from his
immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold
agreement, and perforce comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy
laws.  Otherwise, it would be easy to
subvert, under the guise of the liberty to con­tract, the intendment of the law
of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the
unscrupulous schemes and pernicious
practices of the landed gentry.

II.  We now come to the
second assignment of error.  Teo­doro posits that granting the establishment of a
leasehold tenancy relation between him and Macaraeg
by virtue of the aforesaid “Contract of Lease,” the agrarian court
nevertheless erred in not finding Macaraeg, guilty of
abandonment, an act which terminates the tenancy relation and justifies the ejectment of the te­nant. 
In support of his thesis, Teodoro points out
that Macaraeg committed a positive act of abandonment
when he offered to vacate his leasehold in favor of a certain Luciano Claus, and only after “he could not have his
own way of placing Luciano Claus as his suc­cessor”
did he try to “recover the landholding.” Assuming the ve­racity of
the foregoing allegation, a tenant’s offer or intention to surrender his
leasehold on the condition that the person named by him should be accepted as
his successor, does not of itself consti­tute abandonment of his farmland.

“The word ‘abandon,’ in its ordinary sense, means to for­sake
entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. 
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of ‘putting under a
ban.’ The em­phasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is
thus put in the control of another and hence the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent over again to resume or claim one’s rights or interests.“^[6] In
other words, the act of aban­donment constitutes actual, absolute and
irrevocable desertion of one’s right or property.  In the case at bar, Macaraeg
merely intended to vacate his leasehold possession on the condition that a
certain Claus be taken as his successor. 
Hence, his act did not constitute desertion of his leasehold as I was a
mere intended sur­render of the same. 
And as correctly espoused by the counsel for the respondent court, it is
“only through the actual surrender of the land that tenancy relation
terminates no amount of intention to surrender severs the relationship.”
Furthermore, the said act of Macaraeg was not an
absolute renunciation of his leasehold posses­sion, as it was in fact clearly
conditional.

However, Teodoro also claims, with characteristic certitude, that Macaraeg did actually abandon work on the land in dis­pute and that even the decision under review contains a finding to this
effect.  We find no statement in the
agrarian court’s decision sustaining Teodoro’s
view.  On the country, we perceive truth
in the respondent court’s counsel’s manifestation that

“The only times that the tenant herein did not work the land
were (1) during
the time it was undergoing its regular dry season fallow, and, … (2) after he
was prohibited from Plowing the land by
a certain Niegos, an agent of Petitioner.  Failure to cultivate during the dry season
fallow definitely does not amount to abandonment (Cf. De la Cruz vs. Asociacion Zangera Casilan, et al., 83 Phil. 214).  Likewise, failure to cultivate the land by
reason of the forcible prohibition to do so by a third party cannot also amount
to abandonment, for abandonment presupposes free will.”

Anent the charge of abandonment, it is also pertinent to note
that four days after Macaraeg received a letter from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the landholding in
question will be given to another tenant, he lost no time in inquiring from the
Tenancy Mediation Commission at Cabanatuan
City about his rights as a
leasehold tenant.  It would appear
therefore that Macaraeg’s immediate reaction to his
landlord’s design to dispossess him negates the act of abandonment imputed to him.

Moreover, Teodoro’s pretension that Macaraeg
had aban­doned the disputed landholding was squarely rejected by the agra­rian
court, thus:

“In the instant case, while petitioner had intentions
to surrender his landholding to respondent after the harvest for the
agricultural (year) 1960-61 which led the latter to advise the former not to
give his landholding to Luciano Claus, yet that
surrender did not materialize because said petitioner had apparently
changed his mind.  For as early as March 6, 1961, petitioner went to the
Office of the Tenancy Mediation Commission, Cabanatuan City
for con­sultation.  As a matter of fact,
said Commission wrote a letter to Fidel Teodoro and
his wife advis­ing them to enjoin their overseer, Benito Ismael,
from ejecting petitioner.

“During the intervening period, Fidel Teo­doro
and his wife entered into another lease contract of tenancy with Jose Niegos.  For this
reason, Ma­riano Niegos, son of Jose Niegos, prevented petitio­ner from plowing his landholding when he found him in
the premises on June 1, 1961.  However, notwith­standing this incident,
Fidel Teodoro opened the door for negotiations.  In fact, as late as June 23, 1961, when petitioner went to the house
of Fidel Teodoro in Manila,
a conference was set for that purpose at the house of Benito Ismael in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija which did not take
place because of the absence of petitioner. 
Under these circumstances, it appears to our mind that while
negotiations for settlement were still pending, yet petitioner has not, in
truth and in fact, surrendered his landholding.” (empha­sis
supplied)

We are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing finding of fact in
the absence of any proof that it is unfounded or was arbitra­rily arrived at or
that the Court had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary.^[7]
This Court has consistently
ruled that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal where there is
substantial evidence to sup­port them.^[8] In the case at bar, the finding of fact by
the respondent court anent the issue of abandonment rests on substantial
evidence.

III.  Toward the end of the
proceedings in the respondent court, Macaraeg
interposed a pleading which he denominated “sup­plemental petition,”
wherein he asked for damages as a result of his dispossession.  The said “supplemental petition”
was given due course by the hearing commissioner and Macaraeg
was allowed to present evidence in support thereof.  On the basis of the evidence thus adduced,
the respondent court awarded damages to Macaraeg as
decreed in its abovementioned resolution of November 27, 1962.

Teodoro maintains that the respondent
court erred in admit­ting the said “supplemental pleading” on the
basis of section 2, Rule 17 (now section 3 of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of
Court) which exclusively pertains to amendment of pleadings, and has nothing to
do with the interposition of supplemental pleadings which is sepa­rately
governed by section 5 of Rule 17 (now section 5 of Rule 10).  Teodoro avers,
moreover, that since Macaraeg filed his claim for damages
only when the hearing below was about to end, his inac­tion must be considered
as a waiver of such claim or that he should be considered guilty of fatal
negligence.

In resolving this last assignment of error, attention must be
centered on the liberal policy which frees the Court of Agrarian Relations from
the fetters of formalistic procedure.  As
aptly ob­served in one case,^[9]

“Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation
like the present, an element of ri­gidity would be affixed to procedural
precepts and made to cover the matter. 
Flexibility should not be ruled out. 
Precisely, what is sought to be accom­plished by such a fundamental
principle expressly so declared by the Constitution (Art. II, sec. 5) is the
effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist the economically
underprivileged.  For under exist­ing
conditions, without such succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able
to secure justice for themselves.  …

“Moreover, there is equally the obligation on the part of the
State to afford protection to labor.  The
responsibility is incumbent then, not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary, to
translate this pledge into a living reality. 
The present case is an appropriate occa­sion for the discharge of such a
trust.  To preclude relief under the
circumstances herein disclosed would be to fail to submit to the dictates of a
plain constitutional duty.  That we should
not allow to hap­pen.”

Since the abovementioned “supplemental pleading” was
filed without intent to delay the proceedings, the agrarian court exercised
sound discretion in giving it due course in order that “the real matter in
dispute and all matters in the action in dis­pute between the parties may, as
far as possible, be completely determined in a single proceeding.”
Moreover, Teodoro has no reason to complain, for he
was accorded every opportunity to controvert Macaraeg’s
claim for damages, but apparently he did not, as in fact he does not here
traverse the substantiality of the award.

Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not “res­tricted
to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the par­ties to the dispute, but may include in the order or
decision any matter or determination which may be teemed necessary and ex­pedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing fur­ther disputes,
provided said matter for determination has been established by competent evidence
during the hearing.”^[10]
In other
words, the respondent court could have determined Macaraeg’s
claim for damages even without his “supplemental petition,” pro­vided
there was proof to substantiate such claim (and such requi­site evidence was
not wanting).  Hence, if the agrarian
court could have awarded damages in favor of Macaraeg
even in the absence of a specific prayer, then there is no conceivable reason
to bar the respondent court from granting the same with the interposition of
the aforesaid “supplemental petition” which explicitly and
unmistakably prays for damages resulting from Macaraeg’s
dispos­session.

We hasten to modify, however, the award of damages in so far as
it deducts from the total amount recoverable by Maca­raeg
the sum of P30 or its equivalent of 3 cavans of palay, representing
his earnings during the period of his unlawful ejectment.  This part of the award contravenes section
27(1) of the Agricul­tural Tenancy Act which makes the erring landlord
“liable to the tenant for damages to the extent of the landholder’s
participation in the harvest in addition to the tenant’s right under
Section twenty-two of this Act.” And section 22(1) provides that the
“tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the nature of his farm
obliga­tions warrants his temporary absence from his holdings.”
Consequently, Macaraeg’s measly earning of P30 during
the period of his dispossession should not be deducted from the total
amount of damages due to him. 
Interpreting the abovecited section 27(1) in
relation to section 22(1), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that

“The earnings of the tenants during the pe­riod of unlawful ejectment are
not now deductible from the award of damages.  In the case of Poten­ciano
vs. Estefani, L-7690, promulgated on 27 Ju­ly 1955,
this Court, on grounds of equity,
ruled to deduct such income, but said case was decided un­der the prior law,
Act 4054.  The above-quoted Sec­tion
27(1) of Republic Act No. 1169, as amended, which is the one applicable to the
present case, not only provides for a quantum of damages to the te­nant; based
on the landlord’s share in the harvest, but adds thereto his right under
Section 22, which states:

‘(1)  the tenant shall be free to work elsewhere
whenever the nature of his farm obligations warrants his temporary absence from
his holdings.’

This right, although already granted under
Section 20 of Act 4054, was not then a right additional to the recovery of
damages consequent to unlawful dis­missal, but under Republic Act 1199, as
amended, it is to be added to the damages recoverable.”^[11]
(emphasis supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the decision and resolution under review are
hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the earnings of the herein
respondent during the period of his dispossession shall not be deducted from
the award of damages.  Costs against the
petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Quiroga vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 38 Phil.
501.

^[2]
Agustin vs. De Guzman, etc. and Guerrero, 104 Phil. 250; Buencamino vs. Reyes, etc., and Pallasiqui,
104 Phil. 906; Somera, et al. vs. Galman and the Court of Agrarian Relations, 105 Phil. 431.

^[3]
Section 9, Rep. Act 1199, as amended by Rep. Act 2263.

^[4]
Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation,
vol. 3 (1967 edition), p. 43.

^[5]
Datu vs. Cabangon, G.R.
No. L-14590, May 25, 1960.

^[6]
See De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968.

^[7]
Del Rosario vs. De los Santos,
G.R. No. L-20589-90, March 21, 1968,
citing Lapina vs. Court of Agrarian Relations,
G.R. No. L-20706, September 25, 1967.

^[8]
Picardal vs. Lladas,
G.R. No. L-21309, December 29, 1967,
and the cases cited therein.

^[9]
Carillo vs. Allied Workers’ Association of the
Philippines, G.R.
No. L­-23689, July 31, 1968.

^[10]
Section 11, Rep. Act 1267, as amended.

^[11]
Ilustre, et al. vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., G.R. No. L­-19654,
March 31, 1964; see also Villaviza, et al. vs. Panganiban,
G.R. No. L-19760, April 30, 1964.