G.R. No. L-22333. February 27, 1969
LUCIANO AZUR AND NICOLAS BULALACAO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, AND PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, AND THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN, CAMARINES SU…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, in its Civil Case No. 4871, dismissing the
complaint and the subsequent order denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal.
On March 17, 1960,
a complaint for reinstatement and collection of salaries and damages was filed
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur by plaintiffs-appellants Luciano
Azur and Nicolas Bulalacao
and one Pedro Pasilaban,[1]
against the Provincial Board and
the above-named officials of the Province
of Camarines
Sur. The complaint alleged that:
Plaintiffs are provincial guards who have been holding their
positions continuously for more than five years; they took the Patrolman Qualifying Examination at Naga
City on February 27, 1960; on or about January 15, 1960, they were
notified by the Secretary of the defendant-appellee
Provincial Board that their positions had been abolished by its Resolution No. 16, Series of 1960, and that thirty (30) days thereafter their work “is already
terminated”; on January 30, 1960, Resolution No. 16 was amended by
Resolution No. 45 which, “in order to economize”, reduced the
forty-five (45) existing positions of
provincial guards to thirty-five (35), ten (10) positions eliminated and their
items abolished “subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Finance”;
said Resolution No. 45 had not been approved by the Secretary of Finance and, was, therefore, still ineffectual; the
real purpose in separating the
ten (10) persons occupying the
positions abolished was not to economize but to have them replaced by persons belonging to the political party of the new provincial administration; prior to the separation of plaintiffs from the service, the provincial administration hired five (5) new provincial guards who were later on separated
for sometime to conceal defendants’ intention to replace plaintiffs, as in fact, they were again allowed to work on March
16, 1960; the appointment of
said five (5) new provincial guards is illegal; plaintiffs have been
rendering service continuously from February 15, 1960 up to the filing of the complaint but had
not received their salaries because defendants were compelling them to submit their resignations and clearances before they would
be paid; on February 23, 1960,
plaintiffs informed defendants of the illegality of their separation from the service
and demanded their pay for services rendered until they are legally separated by competent
authority, but they had not yet been paid on the date the complaint was
filed; due to their illegal separation from the service and the refusal of
defendants to pay their salaries, they have
suffered damages and have, therefore, engaged the services of counsel,
for a fee, for the protection of their
rights. The complaint ends with the
prayer that defendants be ordered to reinstate them and, on the the other hand, to separate from the service the five (5) new provincial guards whose
appointments are illegal; to pay them the salaries to which they are entitled
until they resign or are legally separated; and to pay them P600.00 as
attorney’s fees and P6,000.00 in moral damages.
In due time, defendants-appellees filed
their answer to the complaint. In said
answer, defendants-appellees admitted the employment
and subsequent dismissal of plaintiffs-appellants and the approval of Resolutions
16 and 45. The rest of the allegations
of the complaint were denied. As
affirmative defenses, they alleged that (1) plaintiffs had no cause of action
since the complaint admitted that they were still rendering service; (2) they
have not exhausted all administrative remedies; (3) the abolition of their
positions was legal; and (4) not being civil service eligibles,
they were merely temporary employees” whose tenure of office could not be
more than three (3) months unless reappointed at every end of the three months
period”, and they were not reappointed “at the beginning of the
present administration”.
Accordingly, the case was thereafter set for trial on June 15, 1960 but this was postponed
until the next assignment. On August 11, 1960, the date next set
for the trial of the case, the court postponed the hearing to give the
Provincial Fiscal time to file a motion to dismiss on behalf of defendants-appellees. The
motion referred to was subsequently filed and defendants-appellees
prayed therein for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action;
(b) the plaintiffs have no legal right to demand for reinstatement; (c) the
abolition of their positions by Resolution No. 16, as amended by Resolution
No. 45, is legal and authorized by Republic Act No. 2260; and (d) petitioners
did not exhaust administrative remedies as required by law, which grounds, as
can be readily noted, were mere reiterations of the affirmative defenses in
their answer and in effect, all of them amount to only one, i.
e., that the complaint stated
no cause of action.
Plaintiffs-appellants opposed the motion for dismissal,
alleging, that defendants-appellees have already
filed their answer and, therefore, the motion was filed out of time; that
except for ground (a), the others relied upon are not grounds provided for in
the Rules; that there was no merit in defendants-appellants contention that
the petition states no cause of action; that they have a right to reinstatement under the Civil Service Law, as the
abolition of their positions is illegal because the purpose was to replace them
with others chosen by the Provincial Board; and that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable to the case which is “for
reinstatement or quo warranto proceedings.”
Resolving the motion to
dismiss, the trial court issued the questioned order of dismissal sustaining
the ground relied upon by respondents that the complaint states no cause of
action. His Honor reasoned thus:
“In paragraph 12 of the petition it is alleged that the
petitioners have been rendering service continuously from September 16, 1950 (sic) to the present time,
indicating thereby that they did not vacate their positions. They do not have, therefore, a right to
demand for reinstatement since by their own allegation they are still holding their
positions.
“But even conceding that they have vacated their positions,
they still have no cause of action. Since they
are temporary employees whose employment automatically expires after 3 months
if no new appointment is extended to them, they cannot demand reinstatement (Civil
Service Law). Appointments which are
temporary in character can be terminated at pleasure by the appointing power
(Mariano Quitiquit vs:
Salvador Villacorta, G. R. No. L-15048,
April 29,
1960; Alfredo Cuadra
vs. Teofisto Cordova, G. R. No. L-11602, April 21, 1958). Temporary employees may be replaced by others
even if the latter are not themselves civil service eligibles
(Jose Montero vs. Cuido de Castillanos,
G. R. No. L12694, June 30, 1960).
“It is thus obvious that the petitioners have no cause of
action. x x x x x.“
In a subsequent order, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration of the above-mentioned order of dismissal, hence the instant
appeal[2]
interposed by petitioners who maintain that the dismissal of the petition is
not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Appellants now contend that the court below erred in holding that
they have no cause of action. They maintain
that the dismissed complaint contained sufficient allegations of fact which,
if proven, constitute a sufficient cause of action against appellees
who have unjustly and illegally terminated their services. We hold there is merit in this contention
and, therefore, the order of dismissal appealed from should be set aside.
In order to sustain a dismissal
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency
of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint,[3]
and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, to
constitute a cause of action, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint.[4]
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint.[5]
Examining the allegations of the complaint in question in the
light of the foregoing rules, there can be no doubt that appellants are
correct. The averments in their
complaint show, in synthesis, that they are invoking a right to stay in office
on the basis of their allegation that they have been duly appointed thereto and
have been holding their positions continuously for more than five (5) years,
that they claim a violation of that right by appellees‘
act of abolishing their positions and terminating their services in bad faith,
as shown by their averment that the excuse of economy put forth by appellees was belied by the fact that soon after their
separation from the service, five(5) new provincial guards were appointed, that
they have consequently suffered injury since they were not being paid and were
being disemployed and that on this basis, they would
be entitled to the reliefs of retention or reinstatement
and payment of back salaries prayed for.
It is obvious that if the above allegations are assumed to be
true, appellants have a cause of action stated in their complaint. They have alleged facts showing that appellees
have committed acts constituting “a delict or
wrong by which one party violates the rights of another
causing him loss or injury,” hence a cause of action has been alleged by
them. (I Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 91, 1963 ed.) When the ultimate facts
alleged in the complaint show that plaintiff has a right and that right has
been violated by the defendant, then there is a cause of action. (Community Investment et al. v. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 217-218)
Appellees maintain, on the other hand,
that the lower court was right in dismissing the action by reason of appellants
own allegation in the complaint “that they have been rendering service continously from February 15, 1960 to the present
time” which shows, it is asserted, that they have not vacated their
positions and, consequently, cannot demand reinstatement. This contention
is untenable. The allegation referred to
may indeed appear inconsistent with the demand for reinstatement, but the same
should be overlooked in the light of the more prominent and positive averments
in the complaint that the services of appellants have been terminated by appellees. (Cf.
Worldwide Ins. & Surety Co., Inc. v. Manuel, 98 Phil. 46, 48-49) To warrant
the dismissal of a complaint for insufficiency, it should appear that a claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated. A complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty, from the face of the complaint,
that plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which
could be proved within the facts alleged therein.[6] Stated otherwise, though the allegations of
the complaint are ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain, but, nevertheless, a
cause of action can, in any manner, be made out therefrom,
and plaintiff would be entitled to recover in any aspect of the facts or any
combination of the facts alleged, if they were to be proved, then the motion to
dismiss should be denied.[7]
As to appellants’ allegation in their complaint that they have
been continuously rendering service up to its filing, the same should not be
given any legal significance, in view of their other averment that they were
duly notified by the Secretary of the Provincial Board that their services were
terminated. Appellants may have
continued discharging the functions of their office, but the same does not detract from the
fact that they had been dismissed and that said dismissal had been implemented,
also alleged in the complaint under consideration, by non-recognition of their
official capacity or non-payment of their salaries.[8] Consequently, admitting
the truth of both averments, appellants would still be entitled to
reinstatement under the circumstances.
Appellants next assail the reasoning of the lower court that conceding
they have been disemployed, still they could not
demand for reinstatement because, being temporary employees, their employment
automatically expired after every three (3) months and had to be given new
appointments at the end of each such period, and that, in any event, their
tenures were terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power. Appellants maintain, on the other hand, that
even if they may be considered as temporary employees, they are still protected
under the Civil Service Law by reason of the fact that they have been
continuously holding their positions for more than five (5) years.
This position of appellants also deserves approval. There is nothing in the complaint to sustain
the view that appellants’ appointment had lapsed. From the allegation in their complaint that
appellants had been continuously holding their positions for more than five
years, it is not legally deducible that from their first appointment as
provincial guards, no new appointments had been extended to them during their
more than five years of continuous service.
To conclude otherwise would be to go beyond the allegations of the
complaint and the presumption of regularity which arises therefrom,
and to dismiss the complaint under such circumstances is not legally
sustainable.
On
the contrary, precisely because of the allegation in their complaint that they
had been serving for more than five (5) years already, and there being no
allegation therein that those who have been appointed to replace them were eligibles, appellants are entitled to the preferential
rights under the following provisions of the Civil Service Law:
“Sec. 23 x x x
x x x
“Qualification in an appropriate examination shall be required
for appointment to positions in the competitive or classified service in
accordance with the civil service
rules, except as otherwise provided for in this Act: Provided, That whenever there is a civil
service eligible available for appointment, no person who is not such an
eligible shall be appointed even in a temporary capacity to any vacant position
in the competitive or classified service in the government or in any government-owned
or controlled corporation: Provided,
further, That non-eligible employees who, upon the approval of this Act, have
tendered five years or more of continuous and satisfactory service in classified positions and who meet the
other qualifications for appointment to their positions, shall, within one year
from the approval of this Act, be given qualifying examinations in which their length of satisfactory service shall be accorded preferred
consideration: Provided, further, That those who fail in
those examinations as well as those who fail or refuse to take the examinations when offered
shall be replaced by eligibles. x x x.” [Underscoring Ours]
Thus, under the facts alleged by them,
which, as already stated have to be hypothetically assumed to be true by the motion to dismiss, appellants
have the right to await the results of the qualifying examinations they
alleged in their complaint they had taken on February 27, 1960, which was well
within the one year grace period fixed by the above provision, from the
approval of the Civil Service Law, Republic Act 2260 on June 19, 1959, and only
if they had failed therein, which does not appear in said complaint, that they can be
replaced, and more importantly, only by eligibles. Parenthetically, We
note that in the motion for reconsideration appellants filed with the lower
court on July 26, 1961, they alleged that
they had passed the examination, and the interesting sequel thereto is related
by them thus:
“The provision of Republic Act 2260 is very clear and
petitioners fall squarely under the provision of Section 23 for the reason that
they have rendered more than five years satisfactory service. They took the
civil service examination within the required period and luckily they passed
said examination. As a matter of fact,
on March 19, 1960,
the Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur thru the Provincial Warden wrote Pvt. Nicolas Bulalacao to report for duty, but he refused to return to work because one of the
conditions was to first get a clearance from the President of the Liberal Party
of his municipality. It is then very
plain that the motive in the abolition of petitioners, positions is political,
but even if it is not political, still said abolition are
illegal in accordance with the executive power, law and decision of the Supreme
Court previously cited.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 23-24.)
Of course, We
are not taking these acts into account because they are not alleged in the
complaint. They are quoted only to make
it more evident that, in any event, We are on the
right track in going along with
appellants.
For the same reasons We have just
discussed, the holding of His Honor that appellants’ temporary appointments are
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power, cannot stand. Insofar as appellants were concerned, the rule invoked by His Honor was
subject to the above-quoted Section 23 of the Civil Service Law regarding an
appointee who has already served more than five years under a temporary
appointment at the time of the approval of the Act. Under the said provision, it is indeed clear
that, as already stated, after an employee who had been given a temporary
appointment had, for any reason, already served under said appointment, upon
the approval of the Civil Service Law, he
acquired a right to continue holding his position until three conditions have
been complied with, namely, (1) he must have been given a qualifying
examination within one year from said approval, (2) he either failed in said examination or failed or refused to take
it, and (3) he could be replaced only
by one who has the requisite or, appropriate civil service
eligibility. Without these conditions,
he had the right to continue in his position even permanently.
Appellees contend, nevertheless, that
the abolition of appellants’ positions by respondent Provincial Board is
legal, because the same is authorized by the provisions of the Civil Service
Law itself which authorizes that the staff of any office, bureau or agency may
be reduced whenever it is advisable in the interest of economy. (Section 24 [G], Republic Act 2260) Again, appellees must be overruled. The complaint alleges that the abolition of their positions was made by appellees in bad faith, i. e.,
not for the bona fide purpose of economy, but for the purpose of replacing
appellants, as, in fact, they were replaced by at least five other guards, in violation of their preferential rights
to continue holding their positions We have just discussed. Upon such factual basis, the veracity of
which We are to assume, the following rulings laid
down this Court are squarely applicable:
“There is no statute expressly empowering the Board to abolish
the office or positions it has created; however, it is a well-established principle in the
law of public administration that the power to establish an office includes
the authority to abolish it – unless there are constitutional or statutory
rules expressly or impliedly providing otherwise. And the abolition of the office terminates
the right of the incumbent to exercise the rights and duties thereof.” (Castillo vs. Pajo, etc., et al. G.R. No. L-11262, April 28, 1958)
x x x while
abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true
only where the abolition is made in good faith; that the right to abolish can
not be used to discharge employees in violation of the civil service law nor can
it be exercised for personal or political reasons. x x
x.” (Briones, et al. vs. Osmeña, Jr.
etc., et al. G.R. No. L-12536, Sept. 24, 1958)
“This Court has held that it is a well established principle
in the law of public administration that the power to establish an office
includes the authority to abolish it unless there are constitutional or
statutory rules expressly or impliedly providing otherwise. Likewise, this Court has held that the power
of a local
government to abolish an office that
it had created is subject to limitations, that is, that that power must be
exercised in good faith, not for personal or political reasons, and not in
violation of the civil service law.” (Ocampo, et al. vs. Duque, et al.,
G. R. No. L23812, April 30, 1966)
”x x
x what were abolished were the petitioning employees,
not their positions. Their removal was
in bad faith. Courts are duty bound to honor the constitutionally protected security of tenure in observance,
not in breach. x x x.” (Abanilla, et al. vs. Ticao, et
al., G. R. No. L-22271, July 26, 1966)
It is of no moment that the above-quoted precedents involved
employees who were dismissed despite the fact that they were eligibles holding permanent positions, for as We have
already explained, since the appellants had already more than five years of
service to their credit, their right to continue in office is as fully
protected under the Civil Service Law as those of eligibles
with permanent appointments unless the conditions imposed by Section 23 above-quoted
are complied with.
It may not be amiss to
add here that in the lower court, appellants questioned the propriety of the motion to dismiss on the ground
that appellees had already filed an answer. They have not, however, reiterated the same argument here, realizing perhaps and
correctly that the rules expressly provide that the ground of dismissal
herein involved, that the complaint states no cause of action, may be alleged
in a latter pleading or even at the trial, so much so that in the latter case, the motion is to be resolved in the light of the evidence which may have been
received. (Sec. 2,
Rule 9 [Sec. 10, Rule 9 in the Rules of
1940]; Community Investment & Finance Corporation v. Garcia, supra.)
Finally, the contention
of appellees that appellants have not
exhausted available administrative remedies, is as groundless as all their other
previously discussed claims. It is settled
that the invoked rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule; it admits of exceptions. Admitting the truth of appellants’ allegations in their complaint to the
effect that they were separated from the service
in patent violation of the Civil Service Law, which contentions We are upholding on
the hypothetical assumption that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, immediate recourse to
the courts of justice by appellants is not objectionable. One of the well-known exceptions to
the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is when the controverted act is patently illegal.[9]
In view of all the
foregoing, We declare that the court below fell
into error in dismissing the complaint of appellants. We find that if the facts alleged in said complaint are true, and they must be
assumed to be so, for the purposes of the appellees‘
motion to dismiss, they constitute a sufficient cause of action entitling
appellants to the reliefs prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the trial court of June 30, 1961
dismissing the complaint of appellants and of August 30, 1961 denying
appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the first order, both appealed from
herein, are hereby set aside, and this case is remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
[1]
Pedro Pasilaban was allowed by the court to withdraw
as petitioner on April 8, 1960.
[2]
The clerk of the lower court erroneously transmitted the record of the case to the
Court of Appeals which, upon discovery of the mistake, certified the appeal to
this Court on December 16, 1963.
[3]
Garcon vs. Redemptorist
Fathers, G.R. No. L-23510, May 30, 1966; Convets, Inc. vs. NDC, G.R. No.
L-10232, February 28, 1957.
[4]
See Ramos, et al. vs. Condez, et al., G.R. No.
L-22072, August 30, 1967; Garcon vs.
Redemptorist Fathers, supra; Wise &
Co. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-9156, April
29, 1957.
[5]
Garcon vs. Redemptorist
Fathers, supra; PNB vs. Hipolito,
G.R. No. L-16463, January 30, 1965; Alquique vs. de Leon, G.R. No.
L-15059, March 30, 1963; Republic vs.
Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, January
31, 1963.
[6]
I Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 685, citing French vs.
French Paper Co., 4 Fed. Rules Service, p. 148; See also, I Moran, Rules of Court
1963 ed. 423.
[7]
Pangan, et al. vs. The
Evening News Publishing Co., Inc. et al., G.R. No. L-13308,
December 29, 1960.
[8]
Morales, Jr. vs. Patriarca, G.R.
No. L-21280, October 21, 1965.
[9]
See Mitra vs. Subido,
et al., G.R. No. L-21691, Sept. 15, 1967, and cases therein cited.