RIZAL CEMENT WORKERS UNION (FFW), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

The antecedent facts, as found by the CIR are as follows: On September 2,
1954, Petitioner Union sent to respondent company, a letter containing a set of
proposals for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining contract with
it. A reply was made by respondent on September 11, 1954, stating that it could
not entertain the proposals until after Case No. 676-V, which was then pending
with respondent CIR, has been finally settled, since the demands in the
proposals and those involved in the pending case were the same. Petitioning
Union, responding to the reply, claimed in a letter of September 24, 1954, that
the proposals being submitted were distinct and separate from those litigated in
Case No. 676-V. On September 29, 1954, respondent Company answered petitioner’s
letter and reiterated its previous stand regarding the proposals. On October 5,
1954, the Union filed with the Department of Labor, a Notice of Strike.
At a conference held on October 30, 1954, with the intervention of the
Conciliation Service of the Labor Department, the Union proposals were not
discussed. On November 4, 1954, another Union, the Binañgonan Labor Union (NWB),
presented a set of proposals with the respondent Rizal Cement Company, and after
a series of conferences held by the Conciliation Service, a collective
bargaining contract was entered into between respondent company and the
Binañgonan Labor Union. On May 27, 1956, petitioner union declared a
strike against respondent company at its plant in Binañgonan, Rizal. The dispute
was certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial
Relations (C.I.R.).

In its decision, the CIR, made the following findings:—

“Undisputed facts of this case are as follows: that on May 27, 1956,
petitioner declared a strike against respondent at its cement plant in
Binañgonan, Rizal, where the strikers conducted their picketing; that during
said strike, a Philippine Constabulary detachment was assigned in the strike
area to maintain peace and order; that on February 28, 1957, petitioner, in
behalf of its striking members, made an offer to respondent to return to work;
that at the height of the strike, a PC officer named Lt. Emilio Simbulan was hit
and struck with a piece of bamboo in the strike area on May 27, 1956; that some
workers of respondent company were not able to work on May 27, 1956 because of
the strike of petitioner union; that stones were hurled at the motor launch
‘Carbon’ of respondent, as a result of which its front windshield was broken;
that Jose Alejan, timekeeper of respondent Company, was found dead along the
provincial highway near the strike area; that on November 10, 1954, a collective
bargaining agreement was entered into by and between respondent and intervenor;
that on March 18, 1952, this Court issued an injunction order in Case No. 676-V
enjoining respondent not to lockout its employees, and the employees not to
strike.”

* * * * * * *

And finally, concluded:

“Respondent argues that the notice of strike prescribed in Section 14, par.
(d) of Republic Act No. 875, applies to the strike in issue. This is not so,
because the present case involves a strike against unfair labor practice acts,
and not an economic strike. The required 30-day notice which affords the parties
cooling off period within which to settle their difference through processes of
collective bargaining applies to economic strike.

“With respect to the means employed in carrying out the strike stage by
petitioner union, the evidence shows that the case was generally peaceful and
orderly, with the exception of some alleged isolated acts of violence committed
during the height of the strike, particularly on May 27, 1956. The strike in
issue was declared after a general meeting of the union members who voted
viva voce in favor of it. Some of the strikers appear to have been
charged in courts with criminal acts, but there was no conviction by final
judgment against any of them. This being the case, and aware of the fact that
passions and emotions are running high at the heat of the strike, it is believed
that a certain degree of reason and fairness be afforded the strikers who are
seeking to vindicate the wrongs committed against them. Consequently, this Court
finds the strike in question justified.

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS this court hereby orders
the respondent company to reinstate all the striking members of petitioner union
to their former positions or substantially equivalent positions, without back
wages.”

Petitioner Union sought a reconsideration of the above decision in so far as
it did not award back wages, contending that same is contrary to law and the
evidence on record. Likewise, the respondent Rizal Cement Company moved for a
reconsideration of the judgment, insofar as it considered the strike justified.
On January 16, 1961, the CIR, en banc, denied both motions, with two
Judges taking no part. Only the petitioner Union appealed to this Court.

In the petition for Review, the Rizal Cement Workers Union contend, in the
main, that since the respondent CIR found the strike justified, it was error on
its part not to award back wages and urged a modification of the decision sought
to be reviewed so as to include strike-duration-pay (back wages). It is claimed
that—

(1) Depriving employees of wages they should have earned but did not as a
consequence of a lockout is a violation of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 875,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

(2) Denial of back wages to locked-out employees is a desecration of the
express policies of the Magna Charter of Labor; and

(3) Divesting locked-out employees of back pay is a total disregard of all
Philippine jurisprudence as well as American on the subject
matter.

Respondents Court and Company filed separate Answers and, after the customary
admissions and denials, maintained that it was within the broad powers of the
CIR to award or not to award back wages, as the facts and circumstances of the
case warrant; that there was no lockout; and although the respondent Court found
that the strike was characterized with violence, it nevertheless justified said
strike by tolerance, by giving the strikers certain degree of reason and
fairness, for passion and emotional outbursts. Respondent company further
maintained that the review has become academic and moot, since the decision
sought to be reviewed has already been implemented and/or executed, in that the
strikers affiliated with the petitioner union, had returned to work and
respondent company has reinstated them to their former positions or
substantially equivalent positions, as ordered by respondent court; that under
the circumstances, petitioner is now estopped from or has waived the right to
question the legality or validity of the decision.

It becomes, therefore, manifest that the issues raised by the petitioner
center on whether or not its members are entitled to back wages.

Petitioner principally based its claim for back wages on the theory that
there was a lock-out or “virtual lockout”, which prevented them to work. The law
(Act No. 875), provides—

“Sec. 15. Violation of Duty to Bargain Collectively.—It shall be
unlawful for any employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representative of his employees, or to declare a lockout without having first
bargained collectively with the representatives of his employees, in accordance
with the provisions of this Act. Any employee whose work has stopped as a
consequence of such lockout shall be entitled to backpay. * *
*”

It will thus be seen that under the above provision, the lock-out referred to
is that which is committed by the employer, if it refused to give work to its
workers. No finding was made by the CIR on the question of lockout. That there
was no lockout is clear from the observations of the respondent court, when it
said: “the striking union decided on this question of strike which was
carried out and maintained by picketing the respondent’s cement plant at
Binañgonan, Rizal”. The offer to return to work made by the members of the
petitioner, did not make the refusal to accept the same, a lockout. This is so
because the case on the legality or not of the strike was then pending decision
by the CIR and said Court did not issue any order in connection with said offer.
The strike which was openly and publicly declared by the petitioner union on May
27, 1956, can not be converted into a pure and simple lockout, by the mere
expedient of filing before the trial court a notice of offer to return to work,
during the pendency of the labor dispute. Petitioner alleges that said refusal
to accept them, constituted a “virtual lockout”. The law does not provide for a
virtual lockout. But assuming, that the non-acceptance of the unconditional
offer to return to work was virtual lockout, still the circumstances of the case
would not justify the demand that the strikers are entitled ipso jure to
back wages. This is so because the respondent court found that the strike was
attended by isolated acts of violence committed by the strikers, and stated, in
the same breath, that certain degree of reason and fairness be accorded the
strikers. Thus respondent Court stated in its Answer—

“* * * When this statement is preceded with an earlier statement made of the
awareness of the Trial Court of the fact that passions and emotions run high at
the heat of the strike, it is then clear that such judicial pronouncement is
based on the broad powers of respondent to adjust the parties in order to arrive
into a happy solution of their dispute. If respondent Court has the power to
adjudge a strike legal, even as it is attended with violence, personal injuries
or damage to property, and this is not disputed in this case, then with equal
reason respondent Court could also declare that such strikers may be reinstated
without backwages. It could not be denied that the strikers failed to earn
the wages they ought to have received when they offered to return to work but
not accepted; but it likewise could not he denied that because of the strike and
how it was carried out, the employer also suffered. The Decision and the En Banc
Resolution disputed, therefore, simply placed the parties in a situation where
one gamed none for the fault of the other and vice-versa. This is in
accordance with section 13, in relation to Section 20, of Commonwealth Act No.
103, as amended, the effectivity of which is revived upon the certification of
the labor dispute by the President to respondent Court (Compania Maritima, et
al., vs. Phil. Marine Radio Off. Assn., G.R. No. L-10115, decided Oct. 31,
1957).

Inasmuch as the present case has been certified by the President of the
Philippines to the CIR, said Court is authorized to exercise its powers of
arbitration under the provisions of Act No. 103 as amended, including the fixing
of the terms and conditions of employment which embrace reinstatement of the
strikers, with or without back wages.

“* * * upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 875, the case comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, which
enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries
indispensable to the national interest when the President certifies the case to
the Court of Industrial Relations. The evident intention of the law is to
empower the Court of Industrial Relations to art in such cases, not only in the
manner prescribed under said Act No. 103, but with the same broad powers and
jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is
granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution
consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be
contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or
jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what use is its power of
conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to
carry into effect the solution it had adopted. Lastly, if said court has the
power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the
return of the workers with or without backpay as a term or condition of
employment.” (Phil. Marine Radio Officers’ Association vs. CIR, et al., 102
Phil., 373). (Italics supplied).

The doctrine enunciated above, finds a fitting application to the case at
bar.

Finding no reasons, cogent or otherwise, to alter the decision appealed from,
or to declare that said respondent had committed abuse of discretion, in not
awarding the backpay claimed by the Union, the petition is dismissed and the
said decision is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.