CHINESE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ESPERANZA P. MARTINEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. GLICERIO JOCO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal^[1] taken by
defendants Esperanza Martinez and Glicerio Joco from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur (in Civil Case No. 3307), finding them guilty of
indirect contempt of court under Section 3 (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court
and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for 1 month, for their
failure to vacate the property belonging to plaintiff Chinese Commercial
Property Co. Inc. at Naga City.

The records disclose that on October 17, 1955, plaintiff filed with the
Municipal Court of Naga City a complaint against defendants, for illegal
detainer of certain real property, namely, Door No. 6 of a building located at
General Luna St., Naga City belonging to plaintiff. To this complaint,
defendants filed their answer on November 23, 1955, alleging among others, that
said Door No. 6 is their exclusive property. After trial on the merits, the
municipal court rendered a decision dated January 9, 1956, the dispositve part
of which reads:

“* * * the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
defendants Esperanza P. Martinez and Glicerio A. Joco to vacate the commercial
store or Door No. 6 in the building known as the Chinese Commercial Property
Company Building at General Luna St., City of Naga, and to restore the
possession thereof to the plaintiff Chinese Commercial Property Company, Inc.,
and to pay the amount of P1,400.00 as accrued rental plus P200.00 monthly, from
the month of November, 1955 until the possession of the premises is delivered to
the herein plaintiff, and to pay the costs.”

From this decision, defendants within the reglementary period for appeal,
duly filed their notice of appeal (to the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur), an appeal docket fee, and a supersedeas bond, to stay the Immediate
execution of said decision of the municipal court. The records of the case,
having been forwarded to the court of first instance, defendants duly filed
their answer to the reproduced complaint, reiterating that the premises in
question are their exclusive property.

On July 18, 1956, the court of first instance issued the following order for
immediate execution of the decision of the municipal court:

“Considering that the defendants in this case failed to pay either to the
plaintiff or to the Court the amount of P200.00 as monthly rental of the
premises in question, from the time that the decision was rendered, and after
the defendants perfected their appeal from the judgment 6f the Municipal Court
of the City of Naga, it ia ordered that writ of execution be issued against the
defendants, considering that the supersedes bond posted by the said defendants
is only to cover the accrued rentals of P1,400.00 and the expenses mentioned in
the decision, and not to cover the payment of the future rentals of the premises
in question.”

The writ of execution issued by the clerk of court having been returned
unserved by the ex-oficio City Sheriff of Naga, an alias writ of
execution was issued on April 23, 1957. Said alias writ was served on defendants
by the Sheriff on April 28, as per his return to wit:

“I hereby certify that on April 26, 1957, I went to the Commercial Store or
Door No. 6 in the Building, known as the Chinese Commercial Property Company
Building at Gen. Luna St., Naga City, and I commanded to the defendants
Esperanza P. Martinez and Glicerio Joco to vacate and deliver the said building
stated above to the plaintiff representative of the Chinese Commercial Property
Company, Inc., and to pay the amount of accrued rentals as stated in the
execution, but said defendants refused to vacate and deliver the same and
refused to pay said amount. Nevertheless, said defendants received a copy of the
writ of execution, but they refused to sign receipt.”

On the strength of the foregoing return, plaintiff, on June 26, 1957, filed a
motion to declare defendants in contempt of court. On July 6, the court of first
instance issued an order requiring defendants to appear before it and explain
why they should not be punished for contempt.

After hearing, the court of first instance issued order adverted to at the
beginning of this opinion, which in part reads:

“Considering that the respondents, Glicerio Joco and Esperanza Martinez, were
duly served with the alias writ of execution (Exh. A-incident), which was
evidenced by the return of the Sheriff dated April 26, 1957, marked Exh.
B-incident, and that, despite the said writ of execution, they refused to vacate
the same, as manifested by them in open Court on July 13, 1957 (Exh.
C-incident), the Court found (sic) them guilty of contempt for disobedience of,
or resistance to a lawful writ, provided for under paragraph (b) of Section 3 of
Rule 64, which reads as follows:

‘Disobedience of or resistance to lawful writ, process, order, judgment and
command of a trial court or injunction granted by the judge’.

The evidence clearly shows that in the return of the writ of execution dated
April 23, 1957 (Exh. B-incident), they were ordered to vacate and deliver the
Commercial Store or Door No. 6 in the building known as the Chinese Commercial
Property Company Building at General Luna Street, City of Naga, and to restore
the possession thereof to the plaintiff, but they refused to do so, manifested
by them in open Court, when they appeard before it on July 13, 1957.

“They are, therefore, sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) month
each.

“IT IS SO ORDERED.”

From this order, defendants instituted this appeal.

Defendants-appellants, in this instance, claim that the trial court erred in
finding them guilty of indirect contempt of court under Section 3(b), Rule 64,
of the Rules of Court, citing in support of their submission the case of Goyena
de Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. (85 Phil., 459).

We agree with appellants. In the Goyena de Quizon case, (the facts of
which are practically on all fours with those of the case at bar except that in
the Goyena case it was a final judgment that was being executed, while here it
was a judgment of the Municipal Court under appeal but was immediately
executable under the special provisions of Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court, a difference which is immaterial for the purposes of this incident),
appellant Angela Goyena de Quizon was declared by the court below guilty of
indirect contempt of court under Section 3(b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court
and sentenced to imprisonment, for her disobedience to its judgment requiring
her to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the property belonging to
appellees Alex F. Magtibay and Paulina B. de la Cruz, as well as the order of
execution levied by the Sheriff, by refusing to vacate the premises in question
and deliver possession thereof to said appellees. On appeal to this Court, we
reversed the order of the court below and acquitted appellant of contempt,
stating as follows:

“The judgment involved here requires the plaintiff to vacate the premises and
deliver the possession thereof to the said defendants Alex P. Magtibay and
Paulina B. de la Cruz.’ Under Section 8(d) of Rule 39, if the judgment be for
the delivery of the possession of real property, the writ of execution must
require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the
possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto.
This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from
the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. If
subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters or
attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be
charged with and punished for contempt under paragraph (h) of Section 3, Rule
64.

“In United States vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183, a similar writ of execution was
invoked to punish the defendant for contempt of court. The defendant, who had
been adjudged in a civil case to deliver the possession of a certain parcel of
land to the plaintiff, manifested to the sheriff in writing that he was not
willing to deliver to Sabino Vayson [the plaintiff] or to the deputy sheriff of
this municipality, Cosme Nonoy, the land in my possession, as I have been
directed to do by the said sheriff, in order that, in the latter case, he might
deliver the same to the aforementioned Vayson, in conformity with the order
issued by the justice of the peace of this municipality.’ In affirming the order
of the Court of First Instance acquitting the defendant of contempt, this court,
interpreting the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure from which paragraph
(d) of section 8, Rule 39, was taken, held:

‘According to these sections, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to
execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and, in fact, it
was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the justice of the peace who
rendered that judgment, to place the plaintiff, Vayson, in possession of the
land. The defendant in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of
possession, and, consequently, his statements expressing his refusal or
unwillingness to effect the same, are entirely officious and impertinent and
therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had
the sheriff known how to comply with his duty. It was solely due to the latter’s
fault, and not to the alleged disobedience of the defendant, that the judgment
was not duly executed. For that purpose the sheriff could even have availed
himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort
thereto’.

* * * * * * *

“Appellant cannot be punished for contempt under paragraph (b)
of Section 3, Rule 64, for disobedience of or resistance to the judgment of
the trial court because said judgment is not a special judgment enforceable
under Section 9 of Rule 39, which reads as follows:

‘SEC. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment.—When a judgment
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale
or delivery of real or personal property, a certified copy of the judgment shall
be attached to the writ of execution and may be served by the officer upon the
party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required
thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished
for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.’

“In other words, when as in this case, the judgment requires the delivery
of real property, it must be executed not in accordance with paragraph
(d) of Section 8, Rule 39, and any contempt proceeding arising
therefrom must be based on paragraph (h) of Section 3, Rule 64,
and not on paragraph (b) of the same section in relation to
Section 9 of Rule 39.

“Acquitting appellant of contempt of court, we reverse the order appealed
from, with costs against the appellees Alex F. Magtibay and Paulina B. de la
Cruz.” (Italics supplied.)

Conformably with this decision, the order appealed from of the court a
quo is hereby reversed and appellants are declared acquitted of contempt of
court, with costs against the appellee.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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[1] Originally appealed to the Court of Appeals but
certified to us on March 24, 1961 because it involves only questions of law.