IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS. JESUS L. CARMELO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PROBE COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, …

On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a
committee “to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and
other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City
Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the
Mayor).” He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.

It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private
citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear
before it on June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection
with an administrative case against Crisanto Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom
the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.

Claiming that Ramos’ refusal tended “to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administrative proceedings,” petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during
which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court
dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering
committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that
witnesses testify under oath. It also held that to compel Ramos to testify would
be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the office of the
Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated, on several occasions, sums of
money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter’s
taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been discovered earlier because
Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer’s office at Casa de Alba
where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to
compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case against
certain employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to
give testimony that could be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of
which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision,
petitioner appealed to this Court.

The main issue in this case is the power, if any, of a committee, like the
committee of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear
before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal.

The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)^[1]
of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like
the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly
defined as contempt of court, as in done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code. (People vs. Mendoza and Dizon, 92 Phil., 570;
49 Off. Gaz. No. 2, 541)

Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides as follows:

“Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take
testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any
nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood
to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summon witnesses and shall
include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions
and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.

“Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one
who, without lawful excuse, falls to appear upon summons issued under the
authority of the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or
body exercising the power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony,
or produce documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be
subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and upon application of
the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by
the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner
provided by law.”

One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has
“authority to take the testimony or evidence” before he can apply to the courts
for the punishment of hostile witnesses. (Francia vs. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil.,
100)

Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner’s committee have from
which the power to cite witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section 580?

To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor
creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to
this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city
employees.

Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end that the
power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials or employees
(Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly and fairly exercised. We agree
with this proposition and We held so in the case of Pagkanluñgan vs. de la
Fuente, 92 Phil., 94; 48 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p. 4332. But We do not agree with
the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigate implies also a
delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in
denying this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of
Manila, We said in Francia vs. Pecson, et al., supra: “We do not think
the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the powers to administer oaths, to
take testimony, and to issue subpoenas.”

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the
Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to
national bureaus or offices of the government.

Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that “the power of the
investigation committee to issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to the power of the mayor
to investigate, suspend and remove city officers and employees, supra, is
the recognized rule that where the statute grants a right, it also confers by
implication every particularly power necessary for the exercise thereof.” There
is no merit in the argument. In the first place, the authority cited speaks of
statutory grant of power to a body. Here, We have seen that whatever power may
be claimed by petitioner’s committee may only be traced to the power of the
Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend or remove certain city
employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioner’s
committee.

In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to
require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is
that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the
petitioner. (Francia vs. Pecson, et al., supra)

Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule
invoked by the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that “where the liberty and
property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation of a power
claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because necessary to its due
execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be
reached.” Here, no less than the liberty of Armando Ramos is involved in the
claim of the committee to the right to cite witnesses.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner’s committee has no power to cite
witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of
refusal. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for Us to pass upon the other
error assigned by petitioner as having been allegedly committed by the trial
court.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

---

[1] Section 4 of this rule provides in part:
“Charge; Where filed.—* * *And where a contempt punishable by law has
been committed against an administrative officer or any non-judicial person,
committee, or other body, the charge may be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city in which the contempt has been committed.” This provision of Rule 64 embodies the historical notion that the contempt
power is necessarily judicial. This notion dates as far back as 1893, when the
Supreme Court of the United States, in ICC vs. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, remarked
that such body as the Interstate Commerce Commission “could not, under our
system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested with
authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or
imprisonment.” But the Court went on to hold that a judicial proceeding to
enforce a subpoena issued by the Commission satisfies the “case” or
“controversy” requirement of the Constitution and that judicial enforcement does
not violate the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, since 1893, the
Congress of the United States has consistently refused to empower any agency to
commit for contempt, customarily providing instead that agencies may apply to
appropriate district court for an order enforceable by contempt proceedings.
(Davis, “The Administrative Power of investigation,” 56 Yale, L. J. No. 7, 1111
at 1139-40)