GODOFREDO I. MOSUELA—(34), GREGORIO C. MON—(35) AND HONORIO L. PADILLA—(36), PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The above-entitled cases have been elevated for review to this Court by the
respondent, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, seeking relief from the
Resolution of the Social Security Commission, dated October 26, 1959, ordering
the said respondent to pay sickness benefits to petitioners for the periods
claimed by them, in amounts to be determined by the Social Security System’s
Claims Department.

The findings of fact by the Social Security Commission are admitted by the
respondent and are as follows:

“Godofredo Mosuela was an employee of the respondent from August 25, 1955 to
January 19, 1969, with a salary of P1.02 per hour and worked eight (8) hours a
day. In August, 1957, he became a covered member of the Social Security System
and was assigned SSS No. 03-011790. In the collective bargaining agreement
concluded between the employee’s union, of which petitioner is a member, and the
respondent, it is provided among other things that an employee who falls ill
shall receive sick leave with full pay for the first two weeks of illness and
thereafter, sick leave with half pay for the duration of the illness up to a
maximum of six (6) months.

On September 30, 1958, Godofredo Mosuela was afflicted with sciatica and was
confined in the Waterous Clinic on October 6, 1958. He was operated on October
6, 1958, and discharged from the clinic on December 20, 1958, from which date he
was confined in his house for purposes of recuperation until January 4, 1959. In
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the respondent allowed the
petitioner sick leave with full pay from September 30, to October 15, 1958, and
sick leave with half pay from October 15, 1958 to January 4, 1959. On January 5,
1959, petitioner returned to work for respondent until January 13, 1959. On
January 14, 1959, he was asked by respondent to stop working and was finally
discharged on January 31, 1959. Soon after his discharge, petitioner applied to
the respondent for sickness benefits under Section 14 (a) of the Social Security
Act, as amended, for the period of his ailment from October 16, 1958 to January
3, 1959, when he was receiving only half pay, but respondent refused to grant
the same.

Gregorio C. Mon was an employee of respondent from 1950 up to January 30,
1959, with a salary of P.82 per hour and worked eight (8) hours a day. In
August, 1957, he became a covered member of the Social Security System and was
assigned SSS No. 03012561. On December 16, 1958, he was confined at the Waterous
Clinic where he underwent a kidney operation and was discharged therefrom on
January 8, 1959. From January 9, to January 19, 1959, he was confined in. his
house to recuperate. In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement
heretofore mentioned, respondent granted the petitioner sick leave with full pay
from December 16-30, 1958, and, thereafter, sick leave with half pay from
January 1-29, 1959. On January, petitioner was discharged by respondent. Soon
after, he applied to respondent for sickness benefits under the Social Security
Act, as amended, for the period of his ailment from January 1-29, 1959, when he
was receiving only half pay, but the respondent likewise refused to grant the
demand.

“Honorio L. Padilla was employed with the respondent from 1950 to December
31, 1958, with a salary of P1.20 per hour and worked for eight (8) hours a day.
In August, 1957, he became a covered member of the System and was assigned SSS
No. 03011179. Between January and March, 1958, he was periodically ill and was
granted by respondent sick leave with full pay for two weeks so that by March,
1958, he had exhausted all sick leaves with full pay to which he was entitled
from the respondent by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement mentioned
in the two preceding cases.

“On August 1, 1958, he was afflicted with fibrotic tuberculosis and was
hospitalized at the Waterous Clinic. He was discharged from the hospital on
August 20, 1958 but remained in confinement in his home up to September 3, 1958.
Having exhausted all sick leaves with full pay from the respondent, he was
granted sick leave with half pay from August 1 to September 3, 1953, Soon after
his release from the Waterous Clinic on August 20, 1958, he applied to
respondent for sickness benefits under the Social Security Act, as amended, for
the period of his ailment from August 1, 1958 to September 12, 1958, when he was
receiving only half pay but respondent refused to grant it. On September 4,
1958, respondent’s physician declared petitioner fit for duty but respondent’s
operation supervisor, Mr. Homer Pratte, refused to let him work alleging that
he was not then yet fit for duty. On December 31, 1958, petitioner was
discharged by respondent.”

Since the cases involved similar facts and the same question of law, the same
were tried jointly by the Commission.

The issue resolves upon the proper interpretation of the word “pay” appearing
in the second proviso of Section 14 (a) of Republic Act No. 1161, which is
worded as follows:

“SEC. 14. Sickness benefit.—(a) Under such rales and conditions as the
Commission may prescribe, any covered employee under this Act who, after one
year at least from the date of his coverage, on account of sickness or bodily
injury is confined in a hospital, or elsewhere with the Commission’s approval,
shall, for each day of such confinement, be paid his employer, or by the System
if such person is a voluntary member, an allowance equivalent to twenty per
centum of his daily rate of Compensation, plus five per centum
thereof for every dependent if he has any, but in na case shall the total amount
of such daily allowance exceed six pesos, or sixty per centum of his
daily rate of compensation, whichever is the smaller amount, nor paid for a
period longer than ninety days in one calendar year: Provided, That he
has paid the required premiums for at least six months immediately prior to his
confinement: Provided, further, That the payment of such allowance shall
begin only after the first seven days of confinement, except when such
confinement is due to injury or to any acute disease; but in no case shall
such payment begin before all leaves of absence with pay, if any, to the
credit of the employee shall have been exhausted: * * *” (Italics
supplied.)

It may be gleaned from the records that the respondent, pursuant to a
bargaining agreement with petitioners’ union, granted them two weeks’ sick leave
with full pay and thereafter, sick leave with half pay up to a maximum of six
months.

Petitioners contend that upon exhaustion of their two-week full pay sick
benefits, they became entitled to the sickness allowances provided for under the
Social Security Act (Republic Act 1161, as amended), although they were still
enjoying the half-pay benefits during their illness for a maximum period of six
months.

On the other hand, the respondent maintains that as the petitioners are still
receiving some amount of sick leave pay from it, although less than full pay,
said petitioners are not entitled to the sickness allowances under the said
Social Security Law.

We agree with the appellees that appellant Company’s contention is untenable.
The Social Security law was enacted for the avowed purpose of protecting
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death, and
these purposes would be frustrated if lawful claims were to be denied simply
because the claimant is receiving some pay, however infinitesimal, from the
employer. Such would be the logical consequence of appellant’s theory that the
term “leaves of absence with pay” used in the statute includes leaves with any
amount of pay, whatever such amounts should be. It stands to reason that in
requiring the employee to exhaust all his leaves of absence with pay before his
sickness allowances can begin, the statute takes into consideration that if the
employee does receive the same compensation as when he was healthy, he has no
ground for complaint. But this can not be true if the compensation received
during his leave of absence is substantially reduced.

It is argued that unless appellant’s interpretation is adopted, the laid-off
employee may receive a total sickness allowance (under the statute and under the
collective bargain combined) greater than the compensation he was actually
earning before sickness. Suffice it to say that the law, in fixing the sickness
allowance, did not take into account allowances fixed by agreement, since the
legislator could not determine in advance whether such allowances would be
agreed upon, nor their amount. Hence the contractual sickness benefits can not
operate to reduce the statutory indemnities. The remedy evidently lies in taking
into account the provisions of the Social Security law in the collective
bargaining contract, and in providing for the deduction of the statutory
allowances from the benefits that the employer is required to pay under the
agreement. But such deduction can not be made without express assent to the
effect by all the contracting parties, since courts can not write the contract
for them.

In view of the foregoing, the Social Seeurity Commission’s resolution now
under appeal is affirmed. Costs against respondent-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.