ALEJANDRO ABAO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. J.M. TUASON & CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal from an order granting several motions to dismiss and, accordingly,
dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, with costs against the latter.

In said complaint, plaintiffs—numbering 67—allege that they are occupants
and/or owners of residential lots, situated in Tatalon, Matalahib and Masambong,
Quezon City, purchased by them from several persons named in said pleading and
collectively designated therein as Deudors; that said residential lots are
covered by a Torrens title in the name of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.; that by
virtue of a compromise agreement dated March 16, 1953, the Deudors sold,
transferred and conveyed to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta,
Inc. a parcel of land of 50 “quiñones”, including said residential lots occupied
and/or owned by plaintiffs, for a valuable consideration stated in said
agreement; that despite the recognition therein of the rights of the Deudors—and
hence, of those of plaintiffs herein, as successors and assigns of the
Deudors—in and to said residential lots, the aforementioned J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. instituted, in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, numerous suits against the plaintiffs to eject
them from said residential lots; and that, as a consequence of these suits, said
corporations contemplate and threaten, unless restrained by a writ of
preliminary injunction, to proceed with the ejectment proceedings and/or oust
and force the plaintiffs to vacate the lots they had respectively purchased from
the Deudors.

Plaintiffs prayed, therefore: a) that judgment be rendered: (1) declaring
that they are entitled to enforce their respective contracts with the Deudors
against said corporatfons, and, accordingly, to step into the shoes of the
Deudors, in respect of the rights of the latter, under the aforementioned
Compromise Agreement, with regard to the residential lots above referred to, and
that said corporations cannot demand from plaintiffs payment of a price higher
than that fixed in the contract between the latter and the Deudors or, else,
that the increase in the price, if any, should be deducted from the amount due
to the Deudors under said compromise agreement; and (2) ordering said
corporations to execute the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of the
plaintiffs; and b) that, meanwhile, said corporations and the Sheriff of Quezon
City be enjoined fitom further proceedings in the aforementioned ejectment
suits.

Soon after the filing of said complaint, plaintiffs filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, to which the main defendants
objected, and which was eventually denied by the lower court.

In due time, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. filed
separate motions to dismiss on various grounds, one of which was that venue had
been improperly laid. These motions were granted upon the last ground, the
residential lots in question not being located wholly or partly in the City of
Manila. The order of the lower court to this effect is now assailed by
plaintiffs-appellants upon two (2) grounds, namely: (1) that this is a personal
action, for specific performance, which was properly instituted in Manila, where
defendant corporations have their main offices; and (2) that venue had been
waived by said defendants.

There is no merit in this pretense. Plaintiffs’ action is predicated upon the
theory that they “are occupants, landholders”, and “most” of them “owners by
purchase” of the residential lots in question; that, in consequence of the
compromise agreement adverted to above, between the Deudors and defendant
corporations, the latter had acknowledged the right and title of the Deudors in
and to said lots, and hence, the right and title of the plaintiffs, as
successors in interest of the Deudors; that, by entering into said agreement,
defendant corporations had, also, waived their right to invoke the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title in favor of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.;
and that defendants have no right, therefore, to oust plaintiffs from the lots
respectively occupied by them and which they claim to be entitled to hold.
Obviously, this action affects, therefore, not only the possession of
real property, but, also, the title thereto. Accordingly, it should have
been instituted in the Court of First Instance Of the Province of Rizal in which
said property is situated (Rule 5, section 3, Rules of Court).

Plaintiffs’ second argument is premised upon the allegation that in Civil
Case No. 36303 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Co., Ltd. vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and/or
Gregorio Araneta, Inc.”, which is allegedly, “similar and identical” to the
case at bar, defendant corporations had not objected to the venue. Not being
parties in said case No. 36303, it is obvious that plaintiffs herein cannot
avail themselves of the waiver therein allegedly made by said corporations,
which, at the first opportunity, have expressly objected to the venue in the
present case.

Plaintiffs insist that the lower court should have issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by them, but, the venue having been improperly
laid, it is clear that plaintiffs’ contention has no leg to stand on.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
plaintiffs-appellants. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.