J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER, THE GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., AND HON. NICASIO YATCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (QUEZON CITY, BR…

Application for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division), in its Case No. 26805-R, setting aside the orders of execution and
demolition issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Civil
Case No. Q-3519, and ordering said Court to hold in abeyance such execution
until final judgment is rendered in Civil Case No. 4809, pending before the
same. We granted certiorari on July 26, 1960.

The following facts appear of record: Respondent Bienvenido Sanvictores
occupies, a portion of the so-called Tatalon Estate, of which petitioner J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. is the registered owner holding a Torrens certificate
covering it Said portion is designated as Lot 49 of the Veteran’s Subdivision
plan, and appears to have been purchased in 1949 by Sanvictores from one Pedro
Deudor, who claimed title to the estate as against the registered owners.
Sanvictores had been in possession since then, and erected a house and made
other improvements estimated at P20,000, more or less.

Litigation between the Tuasons, as registered owners, and Deudor culminated
in a deed of compromise executed on March 16, 1953, wherein Deudor recognized the
title of Tuason over the estate, and the latter agreed to pay certain
compensation. The agreement expressly mentioned the rights of the previous
vendees of Deudor, the latter agreeing to make them recognize the Tuason
ownership and sign new contracts of purchase of their respective lots at the
current prices and terms specified by the Tuasons in selling lots of their Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision.

On November 20, 1958, Tuason & Co. filed in the Court of First Instance
an ejectment action (accion publiciana) against Sanvictores to reeover
Lot 49 (Case No. Q-3519). After due trial, judgment was rendered on March 30,
1959, declaring Sanvictores without right to the possession of the lot and
ordering him to vacate.it. No appeal was taken, hence the judgment became final
and executory. On July 29, 1959, a writ of execution was issued.

Upon motion of defendant (now respondent) Sanvictores, the Court of First
Instance, by order dated September 26, 1959, suspended execution of its
judgment, granting Sanvictores 60 days within which—

“to voluntarily remove his house and other constructions therefrom as well as
to make proper negotiations with the plaintiff in connection therewith, after
which period the correspondent writ of demolition will be accordingly
issued.”

It seems that since May of 1959, Sanvictores had been bargaining for the
purchase of Lot 49, but no contract was ever concluded because the parties could
not agree as to the price. Wherefore, on November 20, 1950, six days before the
suspension period expired, Sanvictores filed another case (Q-4809) in the same
Courts asking that a fair and equitable price be fixed for Lot 49, and that
Tuason & Co. be compelled to convey the lot to him, as preferential
purchaser under the Deudor-Tuason compromise of 1953. Five days later, the same
party moved in the ejectment ease (No. Q3519) for indefinite suspension of the
execution. This motion was denied on December 2, 1959. Thereupon, Sanvictores
sought out a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, and the latter, after
due hearing, granted it as noted at the beginning of this opinion.

Not satisfied with the decision, Tuason & Co. resorted to this Court.

We find the appeal meritorious.

Assuming, without deciding, that the Tuasons had really bound themselves to
recognize the alleged preferential rights of the vendees of Deudor, it is more
than remarkable that appellee Sanvictores, one of the vendees, did not take
steps to enforce his supposed preference until after the adverse decision of the
Court of First Instance in the possessory action had become final and executory
in 1959, six years after the Deudor-Tuason compromise was made. This inaction of
Sanvictores is all the more strange when we consider that he could have set up
such preferential rights as a defense against the suit filed by appellant Tuason
& Company against him. If he really was entitled to purchase the contested
lot, the claim was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim under section 6 of
Rule 10, since it was necessarily connected with the right of possession
asserted by the Tuasons, and did not require the presence of third parties for
its adjudication. Both under section 6 of Rule 10, as well as section 10 of
Rule, 9, the failure to set up such rights resulted in a waiver thereof, and
they became barred after the judgment in the possessory action became final. It
was, therefore, error on the part of the Court of Appeals to consider that the
determination of appellee’s alleged preferential right constituted a prejudicial
question to the execution of the final judgment of ouster against appellee.

And if it be considered that the action of Sanvictores to compel Tuason &
Company to sell him the lot is completely independent of the possessory action
filed by the Tuasons, because it concerned title and not possession, then with
greater reason will the pendency of the first action be irrelevant to the
execution of the final judgment of ouster.

It is also worthy of note that the compromise between Deudor and Tuason, upon
which Sanvictores predicates his right to buy the lot he occupies, has been
validly rescinded and set aside, as recognized by this Court in its decision in
Deudor vs. Tuason. 112 Phil., 63,. 59 Off. Gaz, 217,

Finally, no questions of fact were raised in connection with the execution of
the final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in G. R. No.
Q-3519 of that Court. The only question was one of law, whether or not execution
should be further suspended because of the pendency of Sanvictores’ suit for
specific performance (Case No. Q-4809). No appeal, therefore, could have been
taken thereon to the Court of Appeals; and as the writs of certlorari,
prohibition, etc. can only be issued by that Court in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, it becomes plain that the Court of Appeals had ho
jurisdiction to entertain Sanvictores’ petition for certiorari wherefore, the
decision of the Court of Appeals, now under review, was null and void (Tuason
& Co,. Inc,. etc, vs. CA. and Republic vs. Tuason. et al,. both decided
jointly and reported in 113 Phil,. 673. and cases therein cited),

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside. Costs against appellee, Bienvenido Sanvictores.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.