REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MEL-QUIADES G. ILAO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE. PASCUAL M. PEREZ AND NICASIA SARMIENTO, RESPONDENTS.

On 3 November 1959 the petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte a verified petition dated 2 November 1959 averring that on 1
August 1958 the respondents Pascual M. Perez and Nicasia Sarmiento, husband and
wife, filed in the same Court a petition for registration in their names under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended, of four parcels of land
situated in barrio Tuaca, municipality of Basud, province of Camarines Norte
(land registration case No. 202; Exhibit D); that to this application the
petitioner filed an objection on the ground that three of the parcels of land
sought to be registered are of the public domain and, except Lots Nos. 6 to 19,
inclusive, Psu-167487, are within the Bicol National Park established by
Proclamation No. 657 of the Governor General, dated 13 February 1934 (Exhibit
A), as amended by Proclamation No. 655 of the President of the Philippines,
dated 23 December 1940 (Exhibit B), pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3915
(Exhibit E); that during the pendency of the land registration case the
respondent applicants filed with the Bureau of Forestry an application for
registration in their names of the same parcels of land as private forest land
under the provisions of section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code
(P.W.R.A. No. 2616); that the Director of Parks & Wildlife objected to the
respondent applicants’ request for registration as private forest land insofar
as the area within the Bicol National Park is affected (Exhibit F); that before
the hearing of the land registration case the respondent applicants filed a
motion in the land registration court praying for the withdrawal of their
petition for registration; that on 2 June 1959 the land registration court
granted the respondent applicant’s motion for withdrawal of their petition for
registration, without prejudice to reviving it should they so desire; that on
15 June 1959 the Assistant Director of Forestry granted the respondent
applicants’ request for registration of the parcels of land as private forest
land “on a year to year basis after compliance with all requirements * * * and
subject to the condition that within one year the land owner or owners hereof
shall take positive steps to perfect the title thru land registration
proceedings,” but without conceding that the possessory information title
purportedly issued in the name of the respondent applicants’ predecessor is a
registerable title to the land under Act No. 496, as amended (Exhibit F); that
on 30 June 1959 the Assistant Director of Forestry issued to the respondent
applicants Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. 1533 (Exhibit G);
that the order dated 15 June 1959 and Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration No. 1533 dated 30 June 1959 (Exhibits F & G) were issued by the
Assistant Director of Forestry without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion and are null and void; that the respondent
applicants had never occupied or possessed and they have no right, claim,
ownership or interest over the Bicol National Park or any part thereof; that the
respondent applicants have started logging operations in the forest area
within the Bicol National Park; that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction and unless the respondent applicants are restrained, the
continued logging operations being conducted by them in the Bicol National
Park during the pendency of this case would work injustice and inflict
irreparable damage and injury to the petitioner; and that the petitioner has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
petitioner prayed that upon the filing of the petition, the Court issue
ex-parte a writ of preliminary injunction without bond enjoining the
respondent applicants and/or their agents or employees from entering, cutting,
deforesting and/or undertaking any logging operation of the forest, trees,
timber and other forest products in the Bicol National Park or any part
thereof; and after trial, render judgment declaring the order dated 15 June 1959
issued by the Assistant Director of Forestry and the Certificate of Private
Woodland Registration No. 1533 issued pursuant thereto (Exhibits F & G)
illegal and null and void; that the respondent applicants had never occupied or
possessed and they have no right, claim, ownership and/or interest of any nature
or kind whatsoever over the Bicol National Park or any part thereof; that the
writ of preliminary injunction to be issued be declared final; and that the
respondents therein be ordered to pay the costs. The petitioner further prayed
for other just and equitable relief (civil case No. 1140, Annex A).

On 6 November 1959 the Solicitor General wrote a letter to the Director of
Forestry through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources urging
suspension of the force and effect of or holding in abeyance Certificate of
Private Woodland Registration No. 1533, dated 30 June 1959, issued by the
Assistant Director of Forestry to the respondent applicants and that they be
ordered immediately to desist from cutting trees and logging timber in the
area covered by the said certificate, in view of the pendency of civil case No.
1140 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, questioning the legality
and validity of the said order and certificate issued by the Assistant Director
of Forestry (Annex B). On 9 November 1959 the Undersecretary for Natural
Resources referred to the Director of Forestry the Solicitor General’s letter
of 6 November 1959 and directed “that the force and effect of PWB No. 1533 of
Pascual Perez be suspended and that Pascual Perez and Nicasia Sarmiento be
immediately directed to stop cutting timber thereunder, until the case is
finally decided by competent authorities” (Annex B-1). On the same date, 9
November 1959, the Assistant Director of Forestry suspended the force and effect
of Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. 1533 and directed the
respondent applicants to stop “all cutting operations thereunder.” On 12
November 1959 the Assistant Director of Forestry wired the Forester in Camarines
Norte to immediately stop the cutting operations of the respondent applicants
under Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. 1533 (Annex B-2).

On 9 November 1959 the respondent applicants filed in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s petition for a
writ of prohibition and objection to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that the Court “has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, the order appealed from having become final and unappealable,” and
that “the petition states no cause of action against the respondents” (Annex
C).

On 19 November 1959 the respondent applicants filed in Court a motion dated
17 November 1959 praying that the Director of Parks and Wildlife and the
respondent Assistant Director of Forestry be directed to preserve the status
quo of the parties as of the filing of the petition dated 2 November 1959,
pending final determination of the issues raised in the said petition; to
refrain from any act or conduct amounting to contempt of court by interfering
with the processes or proceedings of the Court or directly or indirectly
impeding, obstructing or degrading the administration of justice; and to annul
the order of the Assistant Director of Forestry dated 9 November 1959 (Annex I).
On 3 December 1959 the petitioner filed an objection thereto (Annex J).

On 20 November 1959 the petitioner by registered mail filed a verified
amended petition dated 19 November 1959, supplementing the original petition
filed on 3 November 1959, impteading as respondents Paulino Castillo and
Francisca Sabando and, in addition, praying for recovery of damages in the
amount of not less than P500,000 (Annex D). On the same date, 20 November 1959,
the petitioner filed an “Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to
the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction,” stating that its prayer for a
writ ef preliminary injunction already had become moot because the respondent
applicants must have stopped cutting timber inside the Bicol National Park, and
praying that in view of the filing of an amended petition by it, the respondent applicants’ motion to dismiss be denied, without prejudice to allowing them
to raise the same issue against the amended petition should they so desire
(Annex E).

On 24 November 1959 the Court entered an order dismissing the original
petition filed by the petitioner, without costs, on the ground “that the
Director of Parks and Wildlife did not take any appeal from the order (of the
Director of Forestry); that he failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
provided for by law on the matter and that when the petitioner filed the present
petition for prohibition and injunction, the order in question of the Assistant
Director of Forestry has already become final” (Annex F).

On 4 December 1959 the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Court dated 24 November 1959 dismissing its petition, “it being
contrary to law and the facts of the case, which will be demonstrated in the
oral arguments and/or memorandum in Support of this motion for reconsideration”
(Annex G). On 16 December 1959 the petitioner filed a “memorandum in support of
the motion for reconsideration dated December 4, 1959” (Annex G-1). On 19
December 1959 the respondents filed an objection to the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration (Annex H). On 29 December 1959 the respondents filed a motion
praying that they be granted a period of ten days “from receipt of the resolution on petitioner’s ‘Urgent Motion for Reconsideration’ within which to submit
their responsive pleading to the ‘Amended Petition’ dated November 19, 1959”
(Annex H-1).

On 5 January 1960 the respondent Court entered an order denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, declaring the order of the Assistant
Director of Forestry, dated 9 November 1959, suspending the force and effect of
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. 1533, null and void, ordering
the Director of Parks and Wildlife and the Assistant Director of Forestry to
preserve the status quo of the parties pending resolution of the issues in the
petition and to refrain from committing any act amounting to unlawful
interference with the processes or proceedings of the Court or tending to
directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice
(Annex M).

Claiming that in entering the orders of 24 November 1959 and 5 January 1960,
dismissing its original petition for prohibition, and denying its motion for
reconsideration, the respondent Court gravely abused its discretion and/or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, the petitioner prays this Court for
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent Court from enforcing
the orders dated 24 November 1959 and 5 January 1960 (Annexes F and M) and the
other respondents from entering into and cutting timber and forest products in
the Bicol National Park; after hearing, for a writ declaring illegal, null and
void the said orders (Annexes F and M); directing the respondent Court to give
due course to the petitioner’s amended petition dated 19 November 1959 (Annex D)
and to summon the respondents named therein to file their responsive pleading;
declaring the writ of preliminary injunction to be issued permanent and
irrevocable; and ordering the respondents except the Court to pay the costs. The
petitioner further prays for other just and equitable relief. On 4 March 1960
this Court granted the writ prayed for and on 7 March 1960, issued it.

In their answer to the petition the respondents contend that the respondent
Court did not exceed jurisdiction or abuse its discretion in entering the orders
complained of and deny that the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought, for
its remedy was an appeal from the orders complaint of.

This being a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, the only
issue to determine is whether or not the respondent Court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for prohibition filed by the petitioner.

Section 1, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, provides:

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within ten (10) days after it is
served. (Italics supplied.)

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading its served. In its order dated 5 January 1960, the
respondent Court states:

* * * The above-entitled petition was filed on November 3, 1959. The
respondents Pascual Perez and Nicasia Sarmiento filed their motion to dismiss on
November 12, 1959. The motion to dismiss was set for hearing on November 14.
On November 14, the petitioner did not appear and after the attorney for the
respondents finished his oral argument, the motion to dismiss was submitted
for resolution. Upon request, however, of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of the
Solicitor General’s Office, the petitioner was given 5 days within which to file
an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The request was granted and on November
23, an opposition dated November 19, 1959, was received in the Office of the
Clerk of Court. The opposition did not contain any notice of hearing and there
was no separate petition for the hearing of 4310 motion to dismiss. When the
Court, therefore, issued on November 24, 1959, the order dismissing the
petition, the motion to dismiss was already submitted for resolution and could
be acted upon by the Court.

It is true that on November 23, 1959, an amended petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with damages was filed by the petitioner. But the
amended petition is, for all legal intents and purposes, a mere scrap of paper.
It was filed after the motion to dismiss was served upon the petitioner and
submitted for resolution, and without leave of court. The motion to dismiss is
a pleading under Sec. 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court and a responsive
pleading under Sec. 2 of Rule 17. (Annex M)

A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading within the meaning of
section 1, Rule 17, said this Court in Paeste vs. Jaurigue, 94 Phil., 179; 50
Off. Gaz. 112, 114. The petitioner filed an amended petition before the respondents filed an answer to the original petition. The motion to dismiss filed
by the respondent applicants not being a responsive pleading, the petitioner
could amend its petition as a matter of right. The respondent Court, therefore,
in treating the petitioner’s amended petition for prohibition as “a mere scrap
of paper” because it was not filed with previous leave of court had unlawfully
excluded the petitioner from the enjoyment of a right to which it is entitled.
Mandamus, therefore, will lie to compel the respondent Court to consider the
petitioner’s amended petition.

The most serious objection to the granting of the petitioner’s prayer is
that the orders complained of should have been appealed. The only dates
appearing in the record are 1 December 1959, of receipt of a copy of the order
of 24 November 1959 and 4 December 1959, of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. The record does not furnish the Court with the date of receipt by the Solicitor General ef a copy of the order of 5 January 1960. So the
only period that may be counted against the petitioner’s right to appeal is
three days from 2 December 1959, the day following the receipt of a copy of the
order of 24 November 1959, to 4 December 1959, the date of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration. And in view of the clear and serious error which
the respondent Court had committed in dismissing the original petition when
there was an amended petition already filed, this Court chooses to grant the
remedy prayed for to prevent or forestall that an injustice be done to the
petitioner.

The other point that goes into the legality and validity of the suspension
by the Assistant Director of Forestry of the force and effect of Certificate of
Private Woodland Registration No. 1533 need not be passed upon and determined,
because the respondent Court, that has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court
to issue writs of prohibition, having acquired jurisdiction of the case where
the same issue had been raised, has to pass upon and determine it.

The writs prayed for are granted, with costs against the respondents except
the Court.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.