G.R. No. L-23761. September 04, 1979
JESUS LAVA, PETITIONER, VS. JESUS DE VEYRA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XIV OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA; FLORENTINO N. VILLANUEVA, AS SECOND ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL…
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In this certiorari and prohibition proceeding, petitioner
Jesus Lava sought to set aside and nullify an order of respondent Judge Jesus
de Veyra, now retired, denying his motion to dismiss for lack of merit. It is his contention that the act under which
he was prosecuted for anti-subversion, Republic Act No. 1700, is
unconstitutional, primarily on the ground of its being an ex post
facto law and a bill of attainder, but including likewise the allegation
that it constituted as to the petitioner a denial of due process, equal
protection, and his freedom of association.
This Court required respondents[1] to answer.
Accordingly, such responsive pleading was filed[2] wherein the alleged infirmities imputed to
the Anti-Subversion Law were refuted and the assertion that petitioner was
likewise denied due process, equal protection and his freedom of association
were characterized as devoid of merit. The
case was orally argued. Thereafter,
respondents were given a period of ten days to submit an additional memorandum,
and petitioner, the same period to reply.
It is apparent that the
principal question raised is the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law. Accordingly, in a resolution of June 20, 1979,
this Court issued a resolution requiring the parties, more
specifically the petitioners, to state by appropriate pleadings whether the
petition has become moot and academic in the light of the decision in People v.
Ferrer[3] sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act and the fact that petitioner Jesus Lava is no
longer under detention. Petitioner, as
of this date, has not filed such manifestation.
It is understandable why. He has
been released, and is now free. The
threat of loss of liberty no longer exists.
His prosecution has ceased. As to
him, the issue of the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act and the alleged
denial of due process, equal protection, and freedom of association no longer
possess any significance. The legal
points raised are merely of academic interest now, insofar as he is concerned.
It only remains to be added that the validity of the
Anti-Subversion Law was sustained by this Court, as noted in People v. Ferrer,
the extensive and scholarly opinion being penned by the late Chief Justice
Castro, with only one dissent coming from the writer of this resolution.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed for being moot and
academic.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., adds brief
remarks in a separate concurrence.
Fernandez and De Castro,
JJ., did not take part.
Makasiar and Santos,
JJ., on official leave.
[1]
Outside of the then Judge de Veyra, the other respondents named are the
following: Florentino N. Villanueva,
Second Assistant City Fiscal of Manila; Buenaventura Fernandez, Special
Prosecutor, Philippine Constabulary; Santiago Tan, Special Prosecutor,
Philippine Constabulary; Pedro S. David, Assistant Fiscal of Manila; and
Ernesto Oxciano, Assistant Fiscal of Manila, occupying the respective offices
mentioned as of the date of the filing of the petition.
[2]
One of the counsel for respondents is the then Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico de Castro, who is now a member of this Court.
[3]
L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382.
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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I concur. I only wish to
add that when the Court in its Resolution of April 30, 1974 denied
respondents-accused’s motions for reconsideration of the decision of December
27, 1972 in People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382), I filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion, in which I stressed that the very rationale of the decision
in saving the Anti-Subversion Act from the fatal stigma of the bill of
attainder is that the Act be not construed “as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of
the [Communist] Party, ” as follows:
“I dissent from the resolution insofar as it denies the motion
for reconsideration of respondent Nilo Tayag praying in essence not for
reconsideration but for a clarification of the guidelines on page 32 of the
Court’s decision (which really forms an integral part of the judgment) so as
to incorporate therein the Court’s own rationale expressed on pages 15-16 of
its decision that the Anti-Subversion Act is not to be construed ‘as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful
goals of the [Communist] Party’ since section 4 thereof ‘requires that membership, to be unlawful,
must be shown to have been acquired ‘knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts.’ The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by ‘overt acts.’ This constitutes an element
of ‘membership’ distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization’s unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the organization’s illegal
objectives.'” (Resolution on motion for reconsideration in People vs.
Ferrer, April 30, 1974, reported in 56 SCRA 793, 803-816; emphasis copied).