THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OSMUNDO CASTAÑEDA Y ENCONTERO, BENEDICTO DE AUSEN @ DICK @ BENNY, AND JUANITO RAGURO, DEFENDANTS. OSMUNDO CASTAÑEDA Y ENCO…

About 3:00 o’clock in
the morning of March 1, 1970,
a man by the name of Edmundo Enriquez became the
victim of a robbery-killing at Pilapil
St., Pasay
City.  He was beaten and stabbed on the
different parts of his body which caused his subsequent death.^[1]
His wallet containing P60.00, his wrist watch, ring, shirt, and shoes, were all
taken from him.^[2]

A certain Teresita Nobello,
a deaf-mute, who at the time was walking along Taft Avenue and E. de los Santos Avenue, Pasay City,
allegedly saw the incident,^[3]
and around 8:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, reported the matter to
the police authorities of Pasay City, who thereafter,
investigated and took down her statement in writing.^[4]
Nobody, however, was arrested for the offense.

Sometime, on June 2, 1970,
one Osmundo Castañeda was
arrested by NBI agents at the ice factory where he
was working, located at the boundary of Pasay City
and Baclaran.^[5]
After the investigation, he signed a sworn statement,^[6]
in the form of question and answer, admitting his participation in the
commission of the crime, and pointed to Juanito Raguro and Benedicto de Ausen as his companions.

In the said sworn statement, Osmundo Castañeda, declared in substance as follows:

About 10:00 o’clock in
the evening of March 1, 1970,
he went to a prostitution house at Pilapil
St., Pasay
City.  Arriving thereat, he saw Benny,
whose real name is Benedicto de Ausen,
and one Juanito conversing or “nagkukwentuhan“. 
Thereafter, the two called for him. 
Benny asked him if he had money and when he answered that he had, the
former invited him and Juanito to drink.  So, they proceeded to the store of “DULING” (Josephine’s Store) on Taft
Avenue, Pasay
City.

While drinking beer at the said store, they noticed the deceased Edmundo Enriquez, who was also drinking beer at a nearby
table.  Juanito
approached the deceased and engaged the latter in a conversation.  After a while, Juanito
returned to their table and informed them that the deceased had plenty of money
because the latter often dropped coins in the jukebox, and that he (the
deceased) could be of help in their need for money.

Upon being so informed, Benny instructed Juanito
to go back to the table of the deceased and to ask the latter if he would like to
have a girl.  Accordingly, Juanito approached and asked the deceased if he would like
to have a girl, to which proposal the deceased consented.  The three of them accompanied the deceased to
the prostitution house at Pilapil
St., Pasay
City.

After they left the prostitution house, and while walking along Taft
Avenue, Pasay
City, Benny demanded money from the deceased. 
The latter, however, told Benny that he had no more money and instead
offered his cigarettes to him,
which Benny refused and insisted that the deceased should give him money.  As they passed along a dark alley, Benny told
him, “Mando, Itulak
mo”.  Accordingly, he pushed the
deceased into the dark alley, and immediately thereafter, Juanito
hit the deceased on the head and different parts of his body with a lead pipe,
while Benny whipped out a “balisong” and
repeatedly stabbed the deceased on the hand, nape, and slashed his throat and
neck.

After the deceased staggered to the ground, Benny took the wallet
of the deceased containing P60.00 and divided it among themselves.  Benny also took the wrist watch, ring, and
shirt of the deceased.  Thereafter, they
fled from the scene of the crime.

Osmundo Castañeda
also re-enacted and demonstrated to the NBI agents
his participation in the commission of the crime.^[7]

On the strength of the said sworn statement, and other evidence, Osmundo Castañeda, Juanito Raguro, and Benedicto de Ausen were
prosecuted for the robbery and homicide com­mitted against the deceased Edmundo Enriquez in the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Pasig,
Rizal, docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
CCC-VII-407-P.C. under an information^[8]
reading as follows:

“The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses OSMUNDO CASTAÑEDA y ENCONTERO, BENEDICTO DE AUSEN @ DICK @ BENNY and JUANITO RAGURO, the true names and real identities and present
whereabouts of the last two accused, are still unknown and uncertain of the
crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 1st day of March, 1970, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Osmundo
Castañeda y Encontero, Benedicto de Ausen @ Dick @ Benny
and Juanito Raguro,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and against the will and consent of Edmundo
Enriquez and with the use of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and rob
from said Edmundo Enriquez the cash amount of P60.00,
his wrist watch, ring, shirt and shoes valued at P300.00, to the damage and
prejudice of said Edmundo Enriquez in the aforesaid
total amount of P300.00; the said accused, in accordance with and pursuant to
their conspiracy and in order to carry out their avowed purpose, with treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit with a lead pipe on the head
and stab with a balisong on the neck said Edmundo Enriquez causing his instantaneous death.

“Contrary to law.”

Meanwhile, on July 3, 1970,
the accused Juanito Raguro
was arrested by NBI agents in Bo. Lantag,
Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur.^[9]
After the investigation, he also signed a sworn statement,^[10]
in the form of question and answer, admitting his participation in the
commission of the crime, and likewise named his co-accused Osmundo
Castañeda and Benedicto de Ausen as his companions. 
His declaration in the said sworn statement corroborates in material
points the declarations of Osmundo Castañeda in his sworn statement.

As the accused Benedicto de Ausen is still at large, trial proceeded as against the
accused Osmundo Castañeda
and Juanito Raguro only,
who upon arraignment pleaded not guilty to the charge.^[11]

At the trial, the prosecution presented in evidence, among
others, the extra-judicial confession of the two accused as well as its only
eyewitness to the crime, Teresita Nobello,
who testified thru qualified interpreters. 
She declared that while she was passing along Taft
Avenue and E. de los Santos
Street at around 3:00
in the morning of March 1, 1970,
she saw the accused Osmundo Castañeda
in front of a nearby alley, standing and smoking.  When she noticed that the said accused was
looking around as if guarding something, she hid herself.  Thereupon, she heard a shout or scream.  When she looked at the direction where the
shout came from, she saw three men ganging up on the deceased.  One of them (Benedicto
de Ausen) stabbed and slashed the neck of the
deceased, while the other man (Juanito Raguro) hit the victim on the head and different parts of
the body with a lead pipe.  The third man
(Osmundo Castañeda) acted
as a lookout.^[12]
Thereafter, she saw the accused Osmundo Castañeda take the wallet and the wrist watch of the
deceased.  She saw also the man with
sideburns (Benedicto de Ausen)
remove the T-shirt of the deceased while the short and stout man (Juanito Raguro) removed the shoes
of the victim.^[13]
After the three men had left, she wanted to help the victim, but when she saw
that the man was dying, she ran away.^[14]

The two accused denied any participation in the commission of the
crime, and repudiated their respective confessions, claiming that the same were
procured through threat and maltreatment.^[15]
In addition, they interposed an alibi. 
Thus, the accused Osmundo Castañeda
claims that about 1:00 o’clock in the
morning of March 1, 1970, he
was at his place of work – at the bodega of an ice factory located at the
boundary of Pasay
City and Baclaran
– waiting for orders for delivery of ice. 
Around 2:00 a.m., a certain
Eddie ordered some ice to be delivered at the market place of Baclaran.  After
delivering the ice, he returned to his place of work, arriving thereat at 2:30 a.m. and rested there until he was
relieved at 5:00 a.m. by the next
shift.  There­after, he went to the house
of the manager, one Mr. Marcelino Gardula,
at P. Burgos, Pasay
City, and stayed there until 7:00 a.m. of that day.^[16]
On the other hand, the accused Juanito Raguro declared that on March 1, 1970, he was at Bo. Lantag,
Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur,
helping the barrio captain, Alejandro Rabong, in
curing tobacco, and that he had been residing at the said place since February 12, 1970 up to July 3, 1970.^[17]

After the trial, on September
18, 1970, the trial court rendered its decision convicting the two
accused of the crime of robbery with homicide, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding the accused Osmundo
Castañeda and Juanito Raguro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Section 1 of Article 294 thereto, as charged in the information, the Court
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased, Edmundo Enriquez, the amount
of Twelve Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Pesos (P12,360.00); to pay the heirs of
the deceased the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages, and another Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay their proportionate
share of the costs.”^[18]

The case is now before Us for mandatory review.

The appellants now maintain that the trial court erred in holding
that their extra-judicial confessions were given voluntarily; in giving weight
and credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s only eyewitness; in
discrediting their defense of alibi; and in imposing the death penalty despite
the absence of conspiracy.

We are not impressed by the appellants’ insistence that their
extra-judicial confessions were involuntary. 
Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are
universally recognized as admissible evidence against him, and this rule is
based on the presumption that no one would declare anything against himself
unless such declarations were true. 
Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an evidence
of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and his conscience.^[19]
Hence, the presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of the statement given by an accused, and it
is incumbent upon him to destroy that presumption.^[20]        The appellants, in the case at bar,
failed in the exercise of that task. 
They have not adduced any evidence to overcome this presumption except
their retraction of their extrajudicial confessions.  On the other hand, We find that there is
nothing on the face of their respective confessions to cast doubt upon their
integrity.  Their answers to the
questions are res­ponsive and informative, which reflects spontaneity and
coherence.  It contains details which
could not have been fabricated by the NBI
investigators and which could have been supplied only by the appellants
themselves.  Thus, for example, in his
sworn statement the appellant Osmundo Castañeda declared that he is 25 years old, married, a
driver of an ice delivery truck, and a resident of 34 Electrical Road, Domestic
Airport, Pasay City; that he reached only first year
high school; that Juanito Raguro
has a tattoo of a woman on his shoulder which was subsequently confirmed.^[21]
On the other hand, the appellant Juanito Raguro stated in his sworn statement that he is 25 years
old, single, and residing at 240-E H. Domingo, Pasay City;
that he reached only grade six; that he knows how to read and write Tagalog.  Besides,
their confessions substantially interlock, confirming each other as to the
details, and are corroborated by Teresita Nobello, the prosecution’s eyewitness to the crime.  These circumstances negate the appellants’
claim of involuntariness.  Besides, the
fact that they did not immediately denounce the alleged threats and
maltreatment, or file any complaint against the NBI
agents who allegedly threatened and maltreated them further belie their claim
of involuntariness.  In the main, We are
fully convinced that the appellants herein freely and voluntarily executed
their respective confessions.

The appellants assail the trial court in giving weight and
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Teresita
Nobello, claiming that her testimony is incredible
and improbable, and that, it is inconsistent with her sworn statement.  Thus, they argue that her testimony that she
went to Baclaran to hear mass at 3:00 o’clock in the
morning of March 1, 1970, and that when she reached the place where the crime
was committed, she heard a shout or scream, is untrue as it is incredible and
improbable because Holy Masses or any other kind of religious services are not celebrated at 3:00 o’clock in the
morning.  Further, that being deaf and
dumb she could not have heard the alleged shout or scream which drew her
attention to the incident in question.

The appellants’ contention is untenable.  Assuming for the sake of argument, that some portions
of the testimony of Teresita Nobello
are incredible and improbable, nevertheless, the same are insufficient to
discredit the whole of her testimony. 
The trial court is not bound to believe all that the said witness has
said, but it may give weight and credence to such portions of her testimony as
it may deem worthy of belief and disbelieve the other portions of her
testimony.  Thus, as one authority puts
it:

“Triers of facts are not bound to believe
all that a witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and
reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and
circumstances, to be the truth.  x x x.  Even when witnesses are found to have
deliberately falsified in some particulars, the jury are not required to reject
the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as
they may deem worthy of belief.”^[22]

As was stated by this Court:

“It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a
witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other
facts.  As it has been aptly said even
when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be
credited.”^[23]

In this regard, it would suffice to state that the trial court by
reason of its proximate contact with witnesses, is in a more competent position
to discriminate between the true and the false, and in the case at bar, We find
no reason to disturb its conclusion that the said witness of the prosecution
saw the incident in question.

As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the said
witness and her sworn statement,^[24]
it suffices to state that the same refer to minor and collateral matters which
do not affect her credibility.  On the
contrary, it heightens her credibility as it shows that her testimony was
neither coached nor rehearsed.  Far from
being evidence of falsehood it could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration
of her good faith.^[25]
Besides, it may also be pointed out that Teresita Nobello did not know personally any of the accused before
the crime was committed.  Neither did she
know the victim.  She had no motive to
fabricate evidence against the appellants implicating them in so grave a crime
as robbery with homicide.  The absence of
any improper motive on her part to make a false imputation against the herein
appellants further strengthens her credibility.^[26]

The appellants further contend that the said witness lacks the
requisite qualifications of a witness, being a deaf-mute.  This is equally without merit.  The mere fact that she is a deaf-mute is
insufficient to justify a finding that she is an incompetent witness,^[27]
so long as she can perceive, and perceiving she can make known her perception
to others.^[28]
In the case at bar, the trial court ascertained whether the said witness has
the requisite intelligence and ability to convey and make known her perception
to others.  After such a determination,
the trial court found her to be a competent witness, and allowed her to testify
thru qualified interpreters.  In fact she
was able to make a detailed narration of the events, unfolding them one after
the other as she saw them happen.  We
find, therefore, no reason to disagree with the trial court’s con­clusion as to
her competence as a witness.

At any rate, even if the testimony of the said witness is left
wholly out of consideration, still there is sufficient basis for conviction,
for a confession corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti
will suffice.  It is not indispensable
that an eye?witness should have seen the commission of the crime before
an accused may be held liable under his own confession.  Otherwise, the usefulness of the confession
as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the
confession to adduce evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession.^[29]

Again, the appellants’ contention that the trial court committed
an error in rejecting their defense of alibi is likewise devoid of merit.  The rule is well-settled, to the point of
being trite, that the defense of alibi, which is easy to concoct, must be
received with utmost caution, for it is one of the weakest defenses that can be
resorted to by an accused,^[30]
hence, to be successful, it must be proven by positive, clear and satisfying
evidence, reasonably satisfying to the mind of the court of the truth of such
defense.^[31]
Where nothing supports it except the testimony of relatives and friends – as in
the present case – the said defense weighs and is worth nothing.^[32]
Besides, the rule is to the effect that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
but the defendant must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at such time.  Appellant Osmundo Castañeda’s alibi does not meet this requirement.  In any event, their defense of alibi pales
into in­significance considering that they had already admitted in their
respective confessions their participation in the crime.  Obviously, such defense cannot prevail over
their confessions which they freely and
voluntarily executed.^[33]

Finally, the appellants
dispute the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.  Their contention is that, assuming that there
was conspiracy to commit robbery, the killing of the victim was not a part of
the conspiracy.  Hence, they should be
held liable only for robbery, while their co-accused who actually killed the
victim is the one responsible for the crime of robbery with homicide.  This contention is untenable.  Once conspiracy to commit robbery is admitted
or conceded, the appellants herein are liable for the crime of robbery with
homicide, whether or not they actually participated in the killing of the
victim, for the rule is settled that
when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery,
all those who took part in the robbery shall be guilty as principals of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated
in the killing, unless there is proof that they had endeavored to prevent the
killing.^[34] The appellants, therefore, are liable as
principals in the crime of robbery with homicide.

The appellants invoke the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender for the reason that they never
resisted the authorities when they were arrested.  This is without merit.  The fact that they did not resist the
authorities when they were arrested does not amount to voluntary
surrender.  A surrender to be voluntary
must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities.  In
the case at bar, there is no voluntary surrender to speak of because the
appellants were in point of fact arrested.^[35]

Upon the other hand,
treachery attended the killing.  The
attack against the deceased who was unarmed, was sudden and unexpected, without
any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend
himself.  The aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is likewise present, however, the same is absorbed
in treachery.  It cannot be estimated as
an independent aggravating circumstance
when treachery is present.^[36]

Robbery with homicide is
punished by reclusion perpetua
to death.^[37]
There being one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the
trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.^[38]

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision,
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and Fernandez, J., took no part.

Santos, J., on leave.

^[1]
Exhibit “A”, p. 35, Record.

^[2]
Exhibit “G”, p. 48, Record.

^[3]
Exhibit “D”, p. 45, Record.

^[4]
pp. 13-14, t.s.n., June 19, 1970.

^[5]
pp. 8, 17, t.s.n., June 18, 1970; p. 3, t.s.n., September 18, 1970.

^[6]
Exhibit “C”, p. 41, Record.

^[7]
p. 13, t.s.n., June 18, 1970; Exhibits
“F” to “F-14”, pp. 123-137, Record.

^[8]
p. 1, Record.

^[9]
p. 63, Record.

^[10]
Exhibit “I”, p. 105, Record.

^[11]
pp. 7, 87, Record.

^[12]
pp. 8-11, t.s.n., June 18, 1970.

^[13]
pp. 13, 16, t.s.n., June 18, 1970.

^[14] p.
17, t.s.n., June
18, 1970.

^[15]
pp. 52-53, t.s.n., Sept. 8, 1970; pp. 43-46, t.s.n.,
Sept. 9, 1970.

^[16]
pp. 2-3, 6-8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., Sept. 8, 1970.

^[17]
pp. 36-38, t.s.n., September 9, 1970.

^[18]
pp. 53-54, Record.

^[19] Magtoto, et al. vs. Manguera,
et al., L-37201-02, March 3, 1975,
63 SCRA 4; See also Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII,
1973 Ed., pp. 364-365.

^[20]
People vs. Pareto, L-20894, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA
1469, citing People vs. Garcia, 101 Phil. 616; People vs. Dorado,
L-23464, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People vs.
Manobo, L-19798, Sept. 20, 1966, 19 SCRA 30.

^[21]
Exhibit “H-1”, p. 102, Record; pp. 4-5, t.s.n.,
August 10, 1970.

^[22]
1 Moore on Facts, p. 23, quoted
with approval in People vs. Keller, 46 O.C.
No. 6, pp. 3222-3223.  See also People vs.
Li Bun Juan, L-11077, August 23, 1966,
17 SCRA 934.

^[23]
People vs. Malillos, L-26568, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA
133.  See also People vs. Mabuyo, L-29129, May
8, 1975, 63 SCRA 532; People vs. Roxas, L-32912, Oct.
29, 1976, 73 SCRA 583.

^[24]
On Page 7 of their brief, the appellants point to the following
inconsistencies:

“a) She claimed
in her testimony that appellant Castañeda took the
wallet and the watch (TSN, June 18, 1970, p. 13)
whereas in Exh. D, she declared that the person who
stabbed the victim was the same person who took the wallet and the watch and
that Castañeda was merely acting as the lookout
man.  That appellant Raguro
took part in the taking off of the shoes was her statement in Court while in
her signed statement the one who took the shoes off was the same man who
stabbed the victim.  (TSN,
June 18, 1970, pp. 14, 15 and 16.)

“b) That she
went to Baclaran from a motel (Exh.
“D”, 64) whereas in her direct testimony she claimed to have come
from her father’s residence in Quezon
City (TSN, June 19, 1970,
pp. 7 and 8).”

^[25]
People vs. Reyes, L-33154, Feb.
27, 1976, 69 SCRA 474; People vs. Estocada, L-31024, Feb.
28, 1977, 75 SCRA 295.

^[26]
People vs. Ancheta, L-29581-82, Oct. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 333.

^[27]
People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281; People vs.
De Leon, 50 Phil. 539.

^[28]
Sec. 18, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.

^[29]
People vs. Narciso, L-24484, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
844; People vs. Dorado, L-23464, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53.

^[30]
People vs. Cortez, et al., L-31106, July 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 308.

^[31]
People vs. Llamera, L-21804-5-6, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA
48.

^[32]
People vs. Baniaga, L-14905, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA
283; People vs. Ricaplaza, L-25856, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 374.

^[33]
People vs. Luna, L-28812, July
31, 1974, 58 SCRA 198; People vs. Fontanosa, L-19421, May
29, 1967, 20 SCRA 249.

^[34]
People vs. Puno, L-31594, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA
659; People vs. Espejo, L-27708, Dec. 10, 1970, 36 SCRA 400; People vs. Pujinio,
L-21690, April 29, 1969, 27
SCRA 1185; People vs. Atencio,
L-22518, Jan. 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 88.

In the case of People vs. Espejo, supra, this Court held:

“Tabios
now contends that even granting that he was aware of the plan of his co-accused
to commit the crime of robbery, he should not be held liable for the crime of
robbery with homicide because the killing of the Chinaman was not a part of the
conspiracy, invoking the case of People vs. Basistan,
et al., 47 Phil. 493, wherein this Court held:

‘Where it appears
that only one of the defendants committed homicide at the time of perpetrating
the robbery said homicide not having been the subject of the conspiracy, nor
the others having had any intervention in said homicide, the author of the
homicide is the only one responsible for the complex crime of robbery in band
with homicide, the other defendants being responsible only for the robbery in
band.’

“In People vs. Rogel, G.R. No. L-15318, March 31, 1962 (4 SCRA
807) where the accused also invoked the ruling in People vs. Basistan, this
Court rejected his view, thus:

‘We do not share
appellant’s view in this respect for as early as 1926, one year after We
enunciated the ruling in the Basistan case, supra,
We decided to revert to the former doctrine laid down in U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9
Phil. 1, in the following language:  –

‘x x x The Supreme Court of Spain, interpreting the provisions
of the Penal Code touching the crime of ROBO CON HOMICIDO,
has frequently decided that, where the complex crime has been committed, all
those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are guilty as principals in the
commission of the crime of ROBO CON HOMICIDO, unless it appears that they en­deavored to
prevent the unlawful killing.  (Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872,
and June 9, 1890.  See also Viada,
Vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356).  (Italics
supplied).’

“Thus, in People vs. Bautista, et al., 49 Phil. 389
(1926), We held that:  –

‘x x x Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence
or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the complex
crime of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it is clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide (U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1).’ (Italics supplied).

“The same ruling was applied in many subsequent cases, among them
People vs. Atencio, G.R.
No. L-22518, (Jan. 18, 1968) where this Court held that while the appellants
therein might not have participated in the slaying of the victims,
nevertheless, they were liable for the crime actually committed, for the rule
is settled that when homicide takes places as a consequence or on the occasion
of a robbery, all of those who took part in the robbery shall be guilty as
principals of the complex crime of robbery with homicide unless there is proof
that they had endeavored to prevent the killing, citing the cases of People vs.
de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365; People vs. Libre, 93
Phil. 5; U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1; U.S. vs.
Santos, 4 Phil. 189.  The same ruling was reiterated in People vs.
Pujinio, G.R. No. L-21690, April
29, 1969 (27 SCRA 1185) citing People vs. Morados,
70 Phil. 558; and People vs. Carunungan, et
al., G.R. No. L-13283, September 30, 1960.”

^[35] People vs. Reyes, supra.

^[36] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., Vol. I, p. 348,
citing Jamino, 3 Phil. 102; Bastas,
5 Phil. 251; Vitug, 17 Phil. 1; Domingo and Dolor, 18
Phil. 250; Estopia, 28 Phil. 97; Redoña,
87 Phil. 743; Davelos, 16 SCRA 47; Agustin, 16 SCRA 467; Reyes, 20 SCRA 304; Nabunal, 28 SCRA 747; Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764; Layson, 30 SCRA 92; Abletes, 58 SCRA 241.

^[37]
Art. 294, par. 1, Revised Penal Code.

^[38]
Art. 63, par. 1, Revised Penal Code.