JESUS LAVA, PETITIONER, VS. JESUS DE VEYRA, AS PRESI­DING JUDGE OF BRANCH XIV OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA; FLORENTINO N. VILLANUEVA, AS SECOND ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL…

Lava versus De Veyra

The Case

This is Lava versus De Veyra, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition brought by Jesus Lava against the presiding judge of a branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and against the city and constabulary fiscals who were prosecuting him. Lava asked the Supreme Court to set aside and nullify the trial judge's order denying his motion to dismiss, and he anchored that motion on a constitutional attack against the Anti-Subversion Law, Republic Act Number 1700. He claimed the statute was an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder, and that it denied him due process, equal protection, and freedom of association. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it shows how the Court treats a constitutional challenge that events have overtaken, and it records the Court's firm stance that the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law had already been settled.

Procedural History

Lava was prosecuted for anti-subversion under Republic Act Number 1700 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, before the respondent judge. He filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute itself was unconstitutional, and the trial judge denied that motion. Lava then went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to set aside and nullify the denial. The Court required the respondents to answer, and an answer was filed refuting the alleged infirmities of the Anti-Subversion Law and insisting that the claims of denial of due process, equal protection, and freedom of association were devoid of merit. The case was orally argued, after which the respondents were given ten days to submit an additional memorandum and the petitioner the same period to reply. Because the principal question raised was the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law, the Court issued a resolution in June 1979 requiring the parties, more particularly the petitioner, to state by appropriate pleadings whether the petition had become moot and academic in light of the decision in People versus Ferrer, which sustained the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act, and in light of the fact that Lava was no longer under detention. As of the date of the decision, the petitioner had not filed such a manifestation.

Facts

Jesus Lava was charged with anti-subversion under Republic Act Number 1700, and he was held under detention in the course of that prosecution. Rather than await trial, he attacked the statute itself, filing a motion to dismiss before the Manila court on the ground that the law was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder, and that it denied him due process, equal protection, and freedom of association.

The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss, and Lava elevated the matter to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The respondents answered, defending the statute and denying that any constitutional right of the petitioner had been violated.

While the case was pending, two things happened. The Court, in People versus Ferrer, sustained the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act, with the extensive and scholarly opinion penned by the late Chief Justice Castro and only one dissent, coming from the writer of the resolution in this case. And Lava was released from detention. He was, as the Court put it, now free; the threat of loss of liberty no longer existed, and his prosecution had ceased.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic in light of the decision in People versus Ferrer sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act and the fact that the petitioner is no longer under detention.
• Whether or not the constitutional objections raised against the Anti-Subversion Law, namely that it is an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder and that it denies due process, equal protection, and freedom of association, still possess significance as to the petitioner.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any constitutional or statutory provision in full. It refers to Republic Act Number 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, as the act under which the petitioner was prosecuted, and it treats the constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder and the guarantees of due process, equal protection, and freedom of association as the grounds of the attack. Because the Court resolved the case on mootness rather than on the text of any provision, no verbatim quotation of a provision is reproduced here.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition had become moot and academic. It noted that the petitioner had been released and was now free, that the threat of loss of liberty no longer existed, and that his prosecution had ceased. As to him, the issue of the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act and the alleged denial of due process, equal protection, and freedom of association no longer possessed any significance. The legal points raised, the Court said, were merely of academic interest now, insofar as he was concerned.

On the second issue, the Court held that the constitutional attack no longer required resolution in this proceeding. It observed that the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law had been sustained by the Court in People versus Ferrer, and it treated that ruling as settling the matter. The Court also noted that the petitioner had been required to state whether the petition had become moot, and that he had not filed the required manifestation, which the Court found understandable given that he had been released.

Doctrine

First, a petition becomes moot and academic when the relief it seeks can no longer be granted or when the threatened harm has ceased, as where the petitioner has been released from detention and the prosecution against him has ended. In such a case the Court will dismiss the petition, and the constitutional questions raised become merely of academic interest.

Second, the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law, Republic Act Number 1700, was sustained by the Supreme Court in People versus Ferrer, and that ruling stands as the Court's settled position on the statute. A subsequent petitioner who raises the same constitutional objections cannot expect the Court to re-litigate them, especially where his own situation has rendered the challenge academic.

Third, a party who is directed by the Court to state whether a petition has become moot and who fails to file the required manifestation cannot complain when the Court proceeds on the basis of the facts apparent on the record, here the petitioner's release and the cessation of his prosecution.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for being moot and academic.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the petition was dismissed for being moot and academic because the petitioner had been released and the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law had already been sustained in People versus Ferrer. Examiners use this case to test the mootness doctrine and the rule that a constitutional challenge is dismissed once the threatened harm has ceased and the statute's validity has been settled.