G.R. No. L-23315. May 26, 1969
DESIDERIO S. RALLON, PLAINTIFF, VS. PACIFICO RUIZ, JR., EUFEMIO RUIZ, ANTONIO GERAGA, TIMOTEO BULILIS, DEFENDANTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Four (4) possessory actions were simultaneously brought before the
Court of First Instance of Bohol covering divers
portions of a piece of public land, Lot 46, Cadastral Case No. 15, G.L.R.O.
Record 1469, located at San Antonio, Borja (now Sagbayan), Bohol.[1] Following a protracted joint trial, judgment
was there rendered by the Bohol court dismissing the
complaints upon the ground that “it has no jurisdiction to decide the four
cases involved herein” for the reason that the jurisdiction of courts
“only refers to forcible entry cases)” and that: “Plaintiff’s
Exhibit B dated April 13, 1954 and defendant’s Exhibits 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36
reveal that the Director of Lands has taken action on the controversy
concerning the parcel of land involved in the four (4) cases, now subject of
our consideration. With this action
taken by the Director of Lands, we find more reasons to refrain from
interfering with the proceedings conducted by said officer.”[2]
The background facts are:
On September 30, 1935, in the cadastral case just mentioned, the
cadastral court rendered judgment declaring Lot 46 with an area of about 165
hectares a public forest.
Previous to said cadastral proceeding, however, the same Lot 46
was sold by one Jesus Vaño[3]
to one Vicente Rallon. It would appear that Josefa
Rallon and Petrona Rallon, aunts of Vicente, were issued a timber license on
said Lot 46,[4]
and a campsite permit for ten (10) hectares thereof, respectively, both by the
Bureau of Forestry. Upon a private
document,[5]
on April 15, 1943, for and in consideration of one peso, Josefa
and Petrona Rallon, as such
holders of ordinary timber license and campsite permit, transferred their
rights of possession to the land known as Catagbacan
Forest to their nephews and niece, the four plaintiffs, Desiderio
S. Rallon, Felicisima S. Rallon, Vicente Rallon, Jr., and Cresencio S. Rallon, with
specific areas for each. This notwithstanding,
the records of the Bureau of Forestry do not show the names of plaintiffs as
licensees or permittees. The record discloses that the license of Josefa Rallon expired on June 30,
1941.[6]
There is no evidence of renewal. Josefa Rallon died in March,1951;
Petrona Rallon died in
April, 1954.[7]
The trouble for defendants, who appear to be settlers on portions
of Lot 46,[8]
began when, at the instance of Vicente Rallon, the
Government of the Philippines sued them and/or their predecessors for illegal
occupancy of that forest land.[9]
They were required to restore to the Philippine Government the respective
portions occupied by each pursuant to the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol of December 31, 1935.[10]
Their homes were demolished. Because they reentered the land, they were
punished for contempt of court and sentenced to ten (10) days imprisonment
which they served.[11]
At various dates in August of 1952,[12]
defendants filed their respective applications[13]
for free patent in the Bureau of Lands, except defendant Timoteo
Bulilis whose free patent application was dated
February 25, 1953. It was only on May 3,
1954 that each of the plaintiffs lodged their simultaneous sales applications
in the same bureau for portions of Lot 46.
On the same day, they protested the free patent applications of
defendants.
The initial hearing of the controversy between defendants on the
one hand and plaintiffs on the other was conducted by the Provincial Land
Officer of Bohol on December 20, 1954. It was to be continued on August 16, 1955,
was later reset for September 6 and 7, 1955.
Then came the present court cases. On August 26, 1955, before the Provincial
Land Officer of Bohol could continue with the investigation,
the Rallons simultaneously filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol the present actions to recover possession. The Rallons
complained of having been illegally dispossessed in March 1952 of their lands
(forming portions of Lot 46) by defendants in the portions set out in their
respective complaints. The object of
these cases, according to the Rallons, was to facilitate
the adjudication of the administrative dispute as soon as the
question of priority of possession was settled.[14]
Plaintiffs made it clear that they acquired their rights from their aunts Josefa and Petrona Rallon. They also
averred possession at the time when the territory became alienable.
In all of the four complaints, the Director of Lands was made
defendant. On September 13, 1955, the
Director of Lands moved to dismiss the four complaints for lack of
jurisdiction. Although plaintiffs at
first opposed the motion, nonetheless, on October 1, 1955, they moved to
exclude the Director of Lands as defendant upon their claim that counsel for
the Director of Lands made the court to understand that the Director would
suspend hearing on plaintiffs’ protests, would “respect the decision of
this Honorable Court and would take into account the same in the final award
and adjudication that he may make with reference to the public land in question.”[15]
The lower court, however, on October 17, 1955, dismissed the cases with respect
to the Director of Lands “on the ground that the plaintiff has absolutely no cause of action
against the latter.”[16]
Failing in their attempt to secure a similar dismissal as against
them, defendants filed their respective answers substantially along similar
lines. Their common ground was that they or their predecessors started
possession at various dates, since the early 1920s; that in 1932, they declared
the lands for taxation purposes; that they had not failed to pay the taxes
thereon; that after the contempt proceedings against them they went back to the
lands; that they brought their plight to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and to the President; that in 1940, they applied for
homestead covering their respective portions; that their applications were
denied because the lands at the time were within the forest zone; that it was
at their own initiative and efforts that the lands were released from the
forest zone on February 27, 1952; that plaintiffs did not have actual
possession; that a license or permit does not carry the right of possession but
only the right to cut, collect and remove forest products; that said right was
revoked, or cancelled by the release of the lands into the disposable public
domain; that licenses or permits are non-negotiable and non-transferable and
cease upon the death of the licensees or grantees; that plaintiffs have not
acquired any rights from Josefa and Petrona Rallon; and that such
transfer, if any, from Josefa and Petrona
Rallon to plaintiffs did not have the consent or
approval of the Bureau of Forestry. They
reiterated their averment of want of jurisdiction which was the ground of their
motion to dismiss.
Back to the Bureau of Lands.
On May 29, 1956, the Director of Lands ordered the Bohol
Provincial Land Officer to proceed with the investigation of the administrative
case between plaintiffs and defendants, The Director took the view that because
of the court’s ruling that plaintiffs “have absolutely no cause of
action” against him, he entertained the belief that his office “may
now proceed independently of the judicial proceedings.”
On August 2, 1956, plaintiffs requested postponement of the
investigation by the Lands Office for the reason that the court cases had not
as yet been finally decided or determined.
Because of the Director’s directive, the Provincial Land Officer set the
continuation of the hearing for August 3, 4 and 6, 1956. Plaintiffs chose not to appear thereat.
Defendants presented evidence ex-parte.
On August 7, 1956, after formal hearing terminated, plaintiffs
appeared at the Provincial Land Office.
There, they were apprised of the hearing which ended the day previous,
that is, the 6th. They were asked if
they were ready to present their evidence.
They answered in the negative.
They were then informed that an ocular inspection would be conducted on
the following day, August 8, at
which they were requested to be present.
But at the ocular inspection, the plaintiffs likewise did not appear.
On the face of the
foregoing, the Provincial Land Officer rendered his report on August 10, 1956
to the Director of Lands. His findings
were that defendants were actual occupants of the lands they applied for,
entered the lands as early as 1920, introduced considerable improvements
thereon; that the lands were converted into ricelands
and corn fields, planted to root crops, fruit trees, coconut trees, jackfruit
trees and bamboo; that houses were built thereon. There was also the explicit
finding that plaintiffs had not occupied any portions of the lands in
controversy nor did they have any improvements on the same. The Provincial Land Officer’s recommendation,
accordingly, was that the protests of plaintiffs be dismissed and the free
patent applications of defendants be given due course.
It was on May 11, 1957
when the Director of Lands entered an order dismissing plaintiffs claims and
giving due course to defendants free patent applications. Plaintiffs (protestants) moved to
reconsider. The Director of Lands issued
the denial order on September 13, 1957. He there dwelt on the power of the Director
of Lands to investigate and proceed to dispose of public land to whomsoever has
a better right to acquire the same under the provisions of the Public Land
Act. And this, independently of the
powers of the courts in deciding possessory questions
arising out of forcible entry, usurpation or similar acts of
dispossession. The Director found that
plaintiffs herein “had persistently refused to submit to the investigation
[of his Office] without justifiable cause” and ordered that, upon the
facts established in the investigation, plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed.
Plaintiffs herein appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. On January 13, 1958, Acting Secretary
Jose M. Trinidad rendered a decision reciting the facts and affirming the order
of the Director of Lands of May 11,
1957. Although plaintiffs
received copy of this decision on January
28, 1958, they only moved to reconsider on March 26, 1958.
On April 22, 1958, Secretary Juan de G. Rodriguez ruled that upon the
provisions of Section 12 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6, the decision of
his Office becomes final after the lapse a thirty (30) days from the date of
its receipt by the interested party, declared that plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration was beyond the reglementary period
and, accordingly, denied the same. No
appeal from the Secretary’s decision to the Office of the President was taken
by plaintiffs.
Upon due process and jurisdictional grounds, plaintiffs went to the Court of
First Instance of Bohol on June 10, 1958 on
certiorari to annul the decisions and orders of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources just adverted to, On October 6,
1959, the Court of First Instance of Bohol rendered
judgment annulling the administrative decisions and orders aforesaid and
directing the Director of Lands to reinvestigate.
It was defendants’ turn
to go to the Court of Appeals on appeal challenging the correctness of the Bohol court’s decision.[17] On November 3, 1965, the Court of Appeals reversed the Bohol court by declaring that plaintiffs had not
been deprived of their day in court, that the absence of the Rallons from the administrative investigation was due to
their own fault and that they were thus not denied opportunity to be
heard. More importantly, the Court of
Appeals pronounced that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources had already become “final and definite”. The Court of Appeals’ judgment of November
3, 1965 had also
become final.
It was only on April 18, 1963 – or over five (5) years after the
Secretary’s decision in defendants’ favor – that the trial court rendered
judgment in the present cases, mentioned earlier in this opinion. Plaintiffs
appealed direct to this Court on purely questions of law, and assigned the
following as errors: (1) “The lower court erred in dismissing the four
cases involved herein and in holding that it has no jurisdiction to decide the
same”; and (2) “The lower court erred in not granting the reliefs prayed for in the four complaints involved
herein.”
1. The power of executive control, administration, disposition and
alienation of public lands is lodged with the Director of Lands subject, of
course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. This is a rule set out in the
law,[18]
and fairly stabilized by jurisprudence.[19] Nonetheless, there should be no
question by now that courts have jurisdiction over possessory
actions involving public lands, even if the same are involved in administrative
cases before the Bureau of Lands.
In Pitargue vs. Sorilla,
92 Phil. 5, the question as set out by this Court is this: “Do courts have
jurisdiction to entertain an action of forcible entry instituted by a bona
fide applicant of public land, who is in occupation and peaceful
possession thereof and who has introduced improvements, against one who
deprives him of the possession thereof before award and pending
investigation of the application?”[20] We then ruled that the remedy of forcible
entry may be pursued independently of the administrative case in the Bureau of
Lands. We there expressed the rationale
of the rule, thus:
“x x x The
vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and
alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of
the Government of the exercise of their
respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop
disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, and the
authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom
not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.
Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in
American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the
rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition of the land
has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will riot
interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C.J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual
physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and
preventing disorder and breaches of the peace.
A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel
of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another
through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never
be prejudice interference’ with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were deprived of
jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of
judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would
be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between
applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or
justice, would rule.”[21]
In Bohayang vs. Maceren, 96 Phil. 390, 392, the lower court
suspended the hearing of a case for accion publiciana pending
the decision of the Director of Lands in the administrative case being heard
by him. This Court overruled the lower
court and pronounced that: “x x x an action for recovery of possession is an urgent matter which must be decided promptly to forestall
breaches of peace, bodily injury to person, mayhem, or perhaps loss of
life. It is the duty of the Court to act
swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature.”
Recently, we made a categorical statement in Molina vs.
De Bacud (1967), 19 SCRA 956, 959,[22]
that “[t]he authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition
of public lands’ does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land
notwithstanding.”[23]
Thus it is, that the jurisdictional question raised below must be decided
in the affirmative: courts have
jurisdiction over possessory actions involving
public lands to determine the issue of physical possession (in forcible entry
cases before inferior courts) or the better right of possession (in accion publiciana cases
before courts of first instance).[24]
And this, because the issue of physical possession raised before the courts is
independent of the question of disposition and alienation of public lands which
should be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands.
2. Withal, plaintiffs’ cause still fails. The possessory actions before us have been
rendered moot and academic by the prior decisions of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources heretofore referred to.
The validity of the proceedings leading to these administrative
decisions have been put to a test in certiorari proceedings initiated by
plaintiffs against defendants, the Bureau of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in the Bohol court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals on appeal declared that said proceedings
were not tainted with abuse of discretion which would call for the supervisory
power of the courts. Because, as the
Court of Appeals held, plaintiffs could only be blamed for their failure to
appear in the administrative proceedings and for allowing the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to become “final and
definite”. We cannot turn our back
on the judgment of the Court of Appeals, now final.
No longer is it within the power of the courts of justice to
interfere with the Lands Department decision.
More so because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies by not filing their motion for reconsideration with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on time and by not appealing from said
decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Long familiar is the precept that failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to any court review.[25]
The reason then for possessory actions
in court, namely, to “facilitate adjudication’s by the Lands Department of
a dispute over public land[26]
no longer exists. For, defendants’
applications are no longer pending investigation. Defendants’ possession of the lands disputed,
for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the administrative
case. The administrative branch of the
government has thus already spoken. Its
action has lapsed into finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim of possession is lost. Since plaintiffs’ protests,
in reference to possession, has already been resolved adversely against them by
the Lands Department, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue.
The case of Hernandez vs. Clapis,
98 Phil. 684, cited in Nazal vs. Belmonte (May 23, 1968), 23 SCRA 700, 703, is in
point. In Hernandez a forcible
entry and detainer case was decided in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendants. This
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Execution of the judgment was objected to upon the ground that during
the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had rejected the sales
application of plaintiffs and allowed the defendants to purchase the land in
dispute. In reversing the order of
execution issued by the lower court, “in so far as the matter of
possession of the land in question is concerned,” we said: “While the
decision in the forcible entry and detainer case is final, it can no longer be
executed at least in so far as the
possession of the land in question is concerned, because, under section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Director of Lands has direct executive control of
the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the
lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact are conclusive
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture; and because the latter had already
cancelled the right of plaintiff Maria L. Hernandez to administer the land in
question and rejected both her sales application and that of her husband,
plaintiff Antonio Hernandez, at the same time giving the defendants the
preferential right to apply for said land in virtue of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 65. The correctness of
the final decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is not herein involved, but
it is valid and binding until reversed in a proper proceeding by the
court. The situation is not that the
judgment in the forcible entry and detainer case has lost its virtuality,
but that the plaintiffs had subsequently ceased to be entitled
to the relief awarded by said judgment.”[27]
In Realiza vs. Duarte
(August 31, 1967), 20 SCRA 1264, after the entry of judgment
in a forcible entry case, the homestead application of Duarte
was approved by the Director of Lands.
In an action for revival of the forcible entry judgment, we ruled
“that the approval of his (Duarte’s)
homestead application legalized his position, and such
approval constitutes a justiciable defense
against the action for revival of judgment as it necessarily affects
the appellee’s (Realiza’s) right
of possession of the land from which Duarte
was ordered ejected.’[28]
We, accordingly, reversed the decision against Duarte
“with respect to his possession of the land.”
Also on this point, we quote from our opinion in De los Santos vs. Rodriguez
(January 31, 1968), 22 SCRA 451, 457, thus: “At the time of the rendition
of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 18912-R, the question of whether or not said
portion was to be part of her homestead had not as yet been definitely settled.
Accordingly, it became necessary to determine in that case who shall meanwhile
be in possession. The aforementioned
question was finally decided in favor of Rodriguez, in the order of the
Director of Fisheries, dated February
27, 1959. Thereafter
he is, therefore, the party entitled to said possession. In other words, the decision in CA-G.R.
18912-R may no longer be
executed, not because the decision in CA-G.R. 32970-R
has annulled it, but because of events subsequent to the first decision, which
events have changed materially the situation between the parties.”
The only difference between the foregoing cases and the present
is that here, the administrative decisions came before the trial court
rendered judgment. Which closes the possessory actions at bar in their entirety.
For the reasons given, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, JJ., on
official leave.
[1]
Civil Case 964, entitled “Desiderio S. Rallon, Plaintiff, versus Pacifico
Ruiz, Jr., Eufemio Ruiz, Antonio Geraga,
Timoteo Bulilis, and the
Director of Lands, Defendants”; Civil. Case 965, entitled “Vicente Rallon, Jr., Plaintiff, versus Pacifico
Ruiz, Jr., Esperidion Rosalejos,
Anastacio Caño, Lino Rita, and the Director of Lands, Defendants”;
Civil Case 966, entitled “Felicisima S. Rallon, Plaintiff, versus Pacifico
Ruiz, Jr., Olegario Cordilla,
Vidal Geraga, Timoteo Bulilis, and the Director of Lands, Defendants”; and
Civil Case 967, entitled “Cresencio S. Rallon, Plaintiff, versus Eufemio
Ruiz, Simeon Ubas, Gabriel Alipoyo,
and the Director of Lands, Defendants.”
[2]
R.A., p. 544.
[3]The
application for registration of Jesus Vaño over Lot
46 was denied by the Supreme Court for being forest land in the case of Vaño vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161, 162
(promulgated on November 15, 1920).
[4]
Exhibit 19 shows that as of 1940, the area covered by the timber license was only 45
hectares, although the four complaints uniformly allege that such timber
license covered the entire area of 165 hectares.
[5]
Exhibit Z-1, Record.
[6]
See Exhibit 20.
[7]
Tr., October 11, 1960, p.
168.
[8]
See Exhibit H-1.
[9]Civil
Case 1419, entitled “Gobierno de
las Islas Filipinas, Demandante, contra Esperidion Rosalejos, Anacleto Rosalejos, Maximo Enad, Antonio Geraga, Anastacio Caño, Emiliano Caño, Simeon Ubas, Alfonso Regidor, Gabriel Cordilla, Alfonso Tampi, Gregorio
Perocho, Felipe Perocho, Demandados“, Exhibit B.
[10]
Exhibits C and D.
[11]
Criminal base 4357, for contempt, entitled “El Pueblo de Filipinas, Querellante, contra Esperidion S.
Rosalejos y otros, Acusados“, Exhibits F and G.
[12]
The exhibits show that these applications were received by the District Land
Office in Cebu
City on March 18, 1953.
[13]
Notarized on August 13, 1952.
[14]
R.A., pp. 14, 89, 164, 238.
[15]
R.A., p. 459.
[16]
R.A., p. 463-464.
[17]
CA-G.R. 26946-R, entitled “Desiderio S. Rallon, Felicisima S. Rallon, Vicente Rallon, Jr, and Cresencio S. Rallon, Petitioners-appellees, versus
Director of Lands, Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Gabriel Alipoyo, Timoteo Bulilis, Anastacio Caño, Antonio Geraga, Vidal Geraga, Lino Rita, Esperidion Rosalejos, Eugenio Ruiz and Pacifico Ruiz,
Jr., Respondents-appellants.”
[18]
Sections 3 and 4, Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended.
[19]
See cases cited in City of Baguio
vs. Marcos, L-26100, February 28, 1969, at footnote 7.
[20]
At p. 9; emphasis supplied.
[21]
At pp. 12-13; emphasis supplied.
[22]
Citing Bohayang vs. Maceren, supra, and Pitargue vs. Sorilla, supra.
[23]
See also: Villaflor
vs. Reyes (1968), 22 SCRA 385, 392-393, citing Pitargue vs. Sorilla, supra; Madamba
vs. Araneta, L-12017, August 28, 1959; Bueno vs. Patanao,
L-13882, December 27, 1963; Angcao vs. Punzalan, L-20521, December 28, 1964.
[24]
Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291.
[25]
Calo vs.
Fuertes, 5 SCRA 397, 399-400; Ham vs. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., L-13677, October 31, 1960, citing
cases; Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño, 21 SCRA 895, 899.
See also: Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil. 542, 544; Lubugan vs. Castrillo, 101 Phil.
1229, 1230; Lachica vs. Ducusin, 102 Phil. 551, 554; Rellin vs. Cabigas,
L-15926, October 31, 1960;
Balmonte vs. Marcelo, 1 SCRA 1028, 1032.
[26]
Pitargue vs. Sorilla,
supra, at p. 13.
[27]
At p. 687; emphasis supplied.
[28]
At p. 1269; emphasis supplied.