G.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, SALVADOR GATBONTON AND ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause,[1]
whenever appropriately invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court
ever since the adoption of the Constitution.[2]
Bermudez v. Castillo,[3]
decided in 1937, was quite categorical.
As we there stated: “This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision
under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person
invoking it.” As phrased by Justice
Laurel in his concurring opinion: “The provision, as doubtless it was designed,
would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the
individual intended to be served.”[4]
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is
the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,[5]
where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the
Anti-Graft Law[6]
cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner
was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to
be the first witness of the complainants,
he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. That was a correct
decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual,
Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965
with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged
therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case[7]
for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would
present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee,
who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee,
through counsel, made of record
his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that
at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that
in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners
was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to
respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative
proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a
privilege, being quasi-criminal in character.
With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent
Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his
willingness to put a bond, he
prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for
a writ of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965,
the lower court ordered that a writ
of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to
await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a
bond in the amount of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts
stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination
being available only when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the
affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee’s
remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent “a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law,” precluding the issuance of the
relief sought. Respondent Board,
therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the administrative case for
malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that
they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in
intervention was duly filed by them on March
23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them
is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in
their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against
self-incrimination cannot he availed of in an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of
petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
prohibiting respondent Board “from compelling the petitioner to act and
testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his
consent and against himself.” Hence this appeal both by respondent Board
and intervenors, the Gatbonton. As noted at the outset, we find for the
petitioner-appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court
decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us
in Cabal v. Kapunan.[8] In that proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it
appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed
against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act,[9]
the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be
ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner’s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for
contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its
denial, he initiated this proceeding. We
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
“the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.”
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice
that while the matter referred to an administrative charge of unexplained
wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property
a public officer or employee
may acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful
income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while
administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly
disadvantaged. He could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical
practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan
could thus be distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court
opinion highly persuasive in character.[10]
In the language of Justice Douglas: “We conclude * * * that the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other
individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of
disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting
it.” We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a
proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice
the medical profession.
2. The appeal apparently
proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants
that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited
to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead
to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of
another American decision,[11]
is the protection against “any disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a
criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be
so used.” If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence.
As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: “The accused has a
perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption
of his guilt.”[12]
Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[13]
speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the
right of a defendant “to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand – with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his
own free genuine will.”
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should
not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive
to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most
heinous crimes is given due weight. To
quote from Chief Justice Warren, “the constitutional foundation underlying
the privilege is the respect a government * * * must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens.”[14]
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated,
precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or
mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification
with the right to privacy. Thus according
to Justice Douglas: “The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment.”[15]
So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of “a right to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life. That
right is the hallmark of our democracy.”[16]
In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no
possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the
decision now on appeal. We hold that in
an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with
the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2,
1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on
official leave.
[1]
Section 1, Clause 18, Art. III, Constitution.
[2] It was so even under previous organic acts.
Cf. United States v. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143 (1904);
Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929).
[3] 64 Phil. 483.
[4] Ibid, p. 492. This constitutional command, according to Justice Fortas, “has [been] broadly applied and
generously implemented in accordance with the teaching of the history of the
privilege and its great office in mankind’s battle for freedom.” Re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967).
[5] 6
SCRA 1059 (1962).
[6]
Republic Act No. 1379 (1955).
[7]
No. 639 of Respondent Board entitled Salvador Gatbonton
v. Arsenio Pascual.
[8] 6
SCRA 1059 (1962).
[9]
Republic Act No. 1379.
[10] Spevack v. Klein, 385 US
511 (1967).
[11]
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York,
378 US 52 (1964).
[12] United
States v. Luzon,
4 Phil. 343 (1905). Cf. United States v. Junio,
1 Phil. 50, decided three years earlier: “It appears from the record that
a copy of the complaint was served upon the accused and he was required to
plead ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ in accordance with section 18 of General Orders,
No. 58. He pleaded ‘not guilty.’ In response to this request the defendant made
a statement. We are of the opinion that this procedure is illegal. The judge
had no right to compel the accused to make any statement whatever.”
[13]
24 SCRA 663.
[14]
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US
436 (1966).
[15]
Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 US 479
(1965).
[16] United
States v. Grunewald,
233 F2d 556 quoted in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 US 436
(1966).