G.R. No. L-25721. May 26, 1969
MISAEL VERA, AS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE; EDUARDO ROMUALDEZ, AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; AND RAFAEL SALAS, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO ARC…
FERNANDO, J.:
With the judiciary called upon to apply the law on the facts as
found by it and with the supremacy of the Constitution as a cardinal postulate,
the exercise of the power of judicial review by a court of justice, an inferior
tribunal not excepted, is unavoidable.[1]
There are times, and not infrequently either, when both a constitutional provision and a statute may govern the matter before it. In the event, therefore, that there is a
contrariety or repugnancy between them, such delicate and awesome power comes
into play. Even prior to adjudication,
at the inception of a lawsuit, a party who seeks to
annul such legislative act may pray for a
writ of preliminary injunction so that its operation could be arrested.
So it was in this case, respondent Judge Francisco Arca, now retired, indulging the other respondents[2]
in their plea for a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the Tax Census Act.[3]
Petitioners[4]
through this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition would have the
validity of such preliminary injunction tested.
That is the initial issue before us.
In the event that there was such an improvident exercise of the power to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction, does a petition for certiorari and prohibition lie?
That question, we must likewise resolve.
The other respondents, on February
4, 1966, started a special
civil action for prohibition and injunction in the sale of respondent Judge,
seeking to declare the Tax Census Act[5] as unconstitutional, illegal and invalid. The respondents in that suit were the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of Finance and the Executive
Secretary, now the petitioners before us.[6]
Reference was made to its first section, which would require of
every resident of the Philippines over 18 years of age within the month of
February, 1962 and thereafter within the same month every four years to file
with the City of Municipal Treasurer in a form prescribed by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, a statement
under oath containing such data as the name; age; sex; nationality (if alien,
the number of the Alien Registration Certificate, and aliases used, or
authorized to be used, if any):
address; occupation; place of business; wife’s or husband’s name, age, sex,
occupation and place of business; and the members of his family, age and sex[7]
as well as real property owned, stating the nature thereof, location and assessed value thereof, and the
annual gross income therefrom during the preceding
year; property held under lease stating also the nature, location and assessed
value thereof and the annual income during the preceding year; business subject
to tax giving the nature and location thereof and the annual gross receipts or
earnings during the preceding year; stocks in corporations or shares in
partnerships or associations; inventories of assets particularly machineries
and buildings, merchandise on hand, unfinished
goods and raw materials on hand, short and long term receivables, and
investments in stocks and bonds; professions or occupations, stating the kind
and location thereof and the annual salaries or gross receipts or earnings
during the preceding year; and personal properties except those worth less than
five hundred pesos.[8]
Two other sections were likewise cited in the petition.[9]
It was then alleged that the Tax Census Act has been enforced and implemented
since 1962 and that the parties who filed the suit, now respondents before us,
“are required to make and file Sworn Statements of Assets, Income and Liabilities” in accordance
with the Act.[10]
It was likewise asserted that the then Senator Camilo
Osias filed a bill to repeal such legislation and
that the Secretary of Finance had admitted that it had not been able to produce
the result expected from it, the information yielded not justifying the trouble
caused not only to the public but also to the government.[11]
The main portion of the petition before respondent Judge dealt
with the alleged infirmity of the Tax Census Act as being violative
of the constitutional right to liberty, to the guarantee against
self-incrimination and the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures with a citation from both Philippine and American cases in support of
such a plea.[12]
A writ of preliminary injunction was therein likewise sought, the argument
being advanced that the other respondents before us in the petition before
respondent Judge “would suffer great and irreparable damage arising from
the non-filing of their Sworn Statement of Assets, Income and Liabilities, as
they are subject to criminal prosecution under Section 5 of the Tax Census Law
which is in clear violation of herein petitioners’ aforesaid constitutional and
legal rights and which would render the judgment in favor of herein petitioners
ineffectual.”[13]
The present petitioners, as respondents in such special civil
action, in their answer filed on February 18, 1966, after denying specifically
the allegations contained in the petition intended to establish the
unconstitutionality of the Tax Census Act, emphasized in the special and
affirmative defenses interposed that such an enactment was intended to
implement the governmental function “for a just, equal and efficient
system of collecting taxes.” The purpose of Republic Act No. 2070, in the
language of its authors, Senators Puyat and Roy, is to provide “for a national
tax census and the keeping of national registers in every city and municipality
of the Philippines, * * * to provide the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
with vital tax statistics upon which they can formulate sound policies and
recommend reforms in the tax system and in revenue to achieve efficiency and
honesty in the collection of taxes. * * * It is believed that the
establishment of a national tax census will enhance revenue collection,
minimize evasion of taxes, promote honesty and efficiency in revenue administration
and, above all, give fair assurance that every citizen pays his just proportion
of the public burden, and thus develop in this country tax consciousness which
is vital to tax collection,’; * * *.”[14]
Stress was likewise laid on the undeniable power of Congress to enact such a measure. Then came an
extended discussion to demonstrate that the right against self-incrimination as
well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures did not suffer any
infringement as a result of the challenged legislation.[15]
There was a vehement opposition
to the plea for preliminary injunction.[16]
The prayer was for a denial of the preliminary injunction and the dismissal of
the petition.
Then came the order of respondent Judge of February 21, 1966,
which is the basis of the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition, noting that a hearing on the
plea for the issuance of the writ for preliminary injunction took place on
February 19, 1966 and ordering the issuance thereof upon the posting of a bond of P1,000.00, thus restraining
petitioners before us from requiring the other respondents and other similarly
situated to file their sworn statements of assets, income and liabilities under
Republic Act No. 2070. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition, dated February 23, 1966.
Petitioners in this special civil action seek the setting aside
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge and would
restrain him perpetually from further hearing the suit for prohibition and
injunction pending before him.
Petitioners predicate their plea on the allegation that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction as
the Tax Census Act is valid and constitutional, there being neither any
self-incrimination feature nor unreasonable search and seizure taint, there
being moreover a presumption of its conformity with the fundamental law and no
grave and irreparable injury being suffered by the other respondents,
petitioners before respondent Judge.[17]
Petitioners likewise justify their contention that there was a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge in the issuance of such writ of
preliminary injunction due to his failure to consider the serious injury it
would cause the paramount public interest, to realize that the enforcement of
penal laws cannot thus be restrained and to take note that the other
respondents as petitioners before him are guilty of laches.[18]
This Court, in a resolution dated February 25, 1966, gave due course to the foregoing
petition for certiorari and prohibition and required respondents to file an
answer within 10 days from notice.
Such an answer was filed on March 8, 1966, wherein after
admitting the jurisdictional facts alleged as well as the statement of the case as set forth in the petition,
respondents specifically denied the allegations in the petition to the effect
that Republic Act No. 2070 is valid and constitutional, reference being made to
the alleged violation right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[19]
Then came the specific denial of that portion of the
petition which pointed to the alleged grave abuse of discretion of respondent
Judge in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.[20]
In their special and affirmative defenses respondents would reiterate their
argument against the validity of the Act for the asserted transgression on the
constitutional protection against self-incrimination and against unreasonable
searches and seizures. They did likewise
question its validity as being in excess of
the State’s taxing power, ignoring the fact that the Act is more properly a police
power legislation.
At the hearing of the case
scheduled for May 16, 1966, nobody appeared for any of the parties, petitioners
however filing a motion, seeking a period of 30 days within which to submit a
memorandum. With its filing on September 5, 1966, the arguments set
forth in the petition to uphold the validity of the Tax Census Act being
reiterated therein and the respondents’ reply memorandum on December 27, 1966, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
1. The primary question
before us then is whether respondent Judge ought to have issued the writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act. The answer must be in the negative.
As far back as March
23, 1909, more than 60 years ago, this Court, in the leading case of Devesa v. Arbes,[21]
made the categorical pronouncement that the issuance of an injunction is addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court, the exercise of which is controlled not
so much by the then applicable sections of
the Code of Civil Procedure, now the Rules of Court, but by the accepted
doctrines, one of which is that it should not be granted while the rights
between the parties are undetermined except in extraordinary cases where
material and irreparable injury will be done.
For it is an action in
equity appropriate only when there can be no compensation in damages for the
injury thus sustained and where no adequate remedy in law exists. Such a
holding reflected the prevailing American doctrine that there is no
power “the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
caution, deliberation and sound discretion or more dangerous in a doubtful
case,” being “the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be
extended,” except where the injury is great and irreparable.[22]
We have remained committed to such an approach since then. Only last year, in Palanan
Lumber & Plywood Co. v. Arranz,[23]
we emphasized: “It is not amiss to recall here that time and again this
Court has had occasion to deplore the readiness of some judges to grant and
issue injunctions ex parte against acts
of public functionaries, ignoring the presumption of regularity and validity of
official actuations, in disregard of the deference and courtesy due to a coordinate
branch of the government, and with no other guide than the far from impartial
assertions in pleadings of interested parties, which a summary hearing would
have shown to be either dubious or unfounded.
The result has been that all too often, the
public interest has been prejudiced through unnecessary delays. It bears repeating here that preliminary
injunctions remain extraordinary remedies that should be dispensed with
circumspection, and that both sides should be first heard whenever
possible.”
It is true that the evil of ex parte
injunction was stressed in the above excerpt.
It is equally true that a reminder was made of the extraordinary
character of this remedy “to be dispensed with circumspection” to
avoid its invocation by interested parties whose claims could be shown “to
be either dubious or unfounded.” What cannot be sufficiently pointed out
is that a party seeking injunction must show that his right to it must be clear
and unmistakable.[24]
The propriety of its issuance, therefore, requires unmistakable proof
“that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only
when his complaint shows fact entitling him to such relief.”[25]
Whatever may be said of the original petition for prohibition and
injunction filed by the other respondents before the respondent Judge, it
cannot be plausibly asserted that facts have been alleged which would make
manifest the violation of any of their constitutional rights. Instead of relying on facts, they contented
themselves with the general allegation that for them the Tax Census Act was
null. It was assailed for presumably
violating the right to liberty, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures and the prohibition against self-incrimination. What was thus being sought in effect was a
declaration of invalidity based on the belief that its constitutional
infirmity is apparent on its
face.
Independently then of whether or not there has been an unwarranted
departure from the governing principle that the power to issue a preliminary
injunction is not to be availed of indiscriminately, the more specific and
pivotal question is whether it could be exercised to restrain the enforcement
of the Tax Census Act under the circumstances disclosed. The answer, to repeat, must be in the
negative.
In the order granting the petition for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction,[26]
it was stated that a hearing on the matter took place on
February 19, 1966. Then came a summary of the legal arguments advanced
both by the other respondents as petitioners and the then Solicitor General, now Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, on behalf of the petitioners before us, who were
the parties proceeded against before the lower court.
It is apparent on the face of such order that respondent Judge
took into consideration purely legal arguments, no evidence being introduced,
both for and against the validity of the challenged statute. Moreover, his attention was invited to the
presumption of validity that every legislative act has in its favor as well as
the doctrine that the task of suspending
the operation of the law “is a matter of extreme delicacy because that is
an interference with the official acts not only with the duly elected
representatives of the people in Congress but also of the highest magistrate of
the land.”[27]
Respondent Judge was deaf to the force of such cogent and persuasive
constitutional law doctrines. He issued the preliminary injunction nonetheless.
It is manifest that respondent judge did overstep the bounds of
discretion that set limits to the authority he is entitled to exercise in the
issuance of the preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of a statute. There can be no dissent from the proposition
that where the action required of a lower court would be tantamount, even if
only for a temporary period, to disregarding the clearly expressed will of the
two branches of the government, the need for caution is greatest. Here, respondent Judge was apparently oblivious
to such a need.
It might be said, of course, that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction does not have the impress of finality. After a hearing on the merits, the
legislative act could regain its full vigor and could then be enforced. There is much to be said though in favor of
Cooley’s approach in the exercise of what he referred to as the “high
prerogative of declaring a legislative enactment void,” a lower court, “conscious of the
fallibility of human judgment” being admonished to manifest the utmost
reluctance.[28]
That attitude should be displayed even at the stage of considering whether a
preliminary injunction should issue.
Had respondent Judge been of such a frame of mind, he would have arrived
at a more acceptable conclusion. He
would have refrained from indulging the other respondents in their plea for a
preliminary injunction.
To borrow from the language of Justice Laurel, he was hardly
conscious of the truism “that a becoming modesty of inferior courts demands
conscious realization of the position they occupy in the interrelation and
operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.”[29]
For if note be taken of the rigorous requirement of a two-thirds vote for this
Court to annul a statute,[30]
the confidence displayed by respondent judge in thus restraining the
enforcement of the act does indeed appear to be quite excessive, under all the
circumstances disclosed by the record.
Correspondingly, it could be interpreted as the failure to observe what
Cooley referred to as “due caution end circumspection” and as well as
“the respect due to the action and judgment of the lawmakers.”[31]
It might have been different if at the hearing the attention of
respondent Judge was invited to facts which would overcome the presumption of
validity. Even with reference to
municipal ordinances, Justice Malcolm so clearly emphasized that “the
presumption is all in favor of validity.”[32] In the recent decision of Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Asso.
v. City Mayor of Manila,[33]
we announced the view that as underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation, “the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute.” It would appear clear, therefore, that the
force of such a presumption would preclude the issuance of a preliminary injunction, unless
there be facts disclosed which would serve to weaken if not to defeat the
presumption of validity. No such facts
have even been alleged.
It could be argued, of course, that what was sought before the
lower court was to declare the Tax Census Act void on its face which would do away with the requirement of a
factual foundation to establish nullity.
Considering that its operation would serve to curtail individual liberty
as every resident of the Philippines
above 18 years of age would be required to furnish certain information even
against his will, such a plea
could indeed have been raised.[34]
It could then be plausibly maintained that the need for a factual foundation for invalidity vanishes. Support for such a view may be furnished by
the cardinal principle that on the whole the Bill of Rights does raise barriers
to unwarranted intrusion and that in such a realm the primacy of liberty demands that the individual be
left alone.[35]
That is so but it is equally undeniable that the liberty in its
general sense enshrined by the Constitution does not rule out in appropriate
cases legislative deprivation as long as due process is observed.[36]
While courts should not relax its vigilance in assuring that no undue
curtailment of liberty exists, still it is to be admitted that except in cases
where the specific freedoms of belief whether religious or secular, of expression,
of assembly and of association are concerned,[37] a domain where Congress is forbidden
to trespass except under the clear and present, danger doctrine,[38]
the need for introducing evidence to counteract the assumption that a statute
is valid may be unavoidable. So it was
in this case. The absence thereof
sufficed to cast on the
issuance of the preliminary injunction, now challenged, the mark of a grave
abuse of discretion.
Such a temporary
injunction, in the language of Justice Black, “is in reality a suspension of an act, delaying the
date selected by Congress to put its chosen policies into effect. [Judicial] power to stay an act of Congress,
like judicial power to hold an act unconstitutional, is an awesome responsibility
calling for the utmost circumspection in its exercise.”[39]
Respondent Judge was of a different persuasion.
2. Petitioners thus are
clearly entitled to the writ of certiorari prayed for. Respondent Judge did possess discretion to
issue or not to issue a preliminary
injunction. That discretion, however,
according to the circumstances disclosed, was abused, and abused gravely. Even on a matter of less significance, this Court has not hesitated to
exercise its supervisory authority by correcting such failure to abide by controlling
legal principles with a petition for certiorari as the appropriate
remedy. We have made that clear in past
pronouncements. Thus, in a 1919
decision:[40]
“We are also of the opinion that the action of a Court of First Instance in exercising this power may, under
certain conditions, amount to an abuse of discretion and constitute an
irregularity so far in excess of the proper power of the court as to give rise
to a right in the injured party to have relief by the writ of certiorari.”
So also in Silen v. Vera:[41]
“Therefore, the respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and abused his discretion in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction the nullity of which is sought, and the writ
of certiorari applied for should be issued.”
There is much greater reason for a writ of preliminary
injunction being set aside in this case by the grant of the certiorari prayed
for. It may serve to deter other
inferior tribunals similarly minded. It
may serve to induce the conviction on the part of a lower court judge that it
is a matter of the utmost
seriousness to stop the enforcement of an act after it has been enacted by a
bicameral legislative body composed of the House and the Senate and approved
by the President, two of the coordinate branches of the government. The greatest care should thus be taken before
its operation is enjoined. Thereby, it
would be manifesting not judicial timidity but judicial wisdom.
This is not to say that in no case should a writ of preliminary
injunction issue. There are times the
exercise of such an authority is appropriate. Thus when there is an invasion of the
preferred freedoms of belief, of expression as well as the cognate rights to freedom of assembly and
association, an affirmative response to a plea for preliminary injunction would
indeed be called for. The primacy of the
freedom of the mind is entitled to the highest respect. This is not such a case, however, and the writ of certiorari must be granted.
3. Petitioners likewise
seek from us a writ of prohibition
to restrain respondent Judge “from further hearing the petition before him
filed by the other respondents to annul and declare invalid the Tax Census
Act.” Considering that as of now what had transpired was merely the
hearing on the preliminary injunction, this particular prayer obviously poses a
more difficult question than the plea for a writ of certiorari.
There may be cases where at this particular stage reached, prohibition
may be granted.[42]
After due reflection, we feel that it is not one of them. To call a halt to any further proceeding before respondent Judge in connection
with this particular suit before him to validate such legislative act might be
to run the risk of acting prematurely.
Since the lower court is possessed of the power to act in the premises,
respect must be accorded such authority in the absence of any compelling reason
justifying direct action on our part. It
is our conclusion that under the circumstances disclosed, prohibition does not
lie.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for declaring
null and void and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
respondent Judge on February 21, 1966
is granted. The writ of prohibition sought is
denied. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., in the result.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on official leave.
[1] J. M. Tuason
and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961).
[2]
The other respondents are Mayor Antonio Villegas of the City of Manila,
Gregorio Ejercito, Angel C. Cruz and Romeo L. Kahayon.
[3]
Rep. Act No. 2070 as amended (1958).
[4]
The petitioners are Misael Vera, as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Eduardo Romualdez as Secretary of
Finance, and Rafael Salas as Executive
Secretary.
[5]
Rep. Act No. 2070.
[6] Petition before Respondent Judge, Annex A to Petition, par. 2.
[7] Ibid, par. 3.
[8] Ibid.
[9]
Section 5 would penalize any person who fails to file the statement required in
this Act, or who intentionally gives false or fraudulent information. Section
6 vas worded thus: “No information secured from the statement required in
section one hereof shall be published, except in the form of tabulations or
summaries having no reference to individuals: Provided, That any court of
record by order or subpoena duces tecum
may require the presentation of documents or information herein provided for
the adjudication of the case at issue. Any such officer or employee who shall
divulge to any unauthorized person information regarding the business, income,
or inheritance of any taxpayer, the secrets, operation, style of work, or
apparatus of any manufacturer or producer, or confidential information,
knowledge of which was acquired by him in the discharge of his official duties
under the provisions of this Act,” is made punishable “except in such
instances where the information regarding the business, income, or inheritance
of any taxpayer, the secrets, operation, style of work, or apparatus of any
manufacturer or producer or confidential information, constitutes prima facie
evidence of the commission of a crime, or constitutes in itself a crime, in
which case the obligation to reveal the same to any duly constituted
investigating body shall exempt the officer or employee from any liability.
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent courts of
justice or the Congress or any legislative committee to require the production of any statement referred to herein
when relevant to the issues or matters subject to judicial or legislative
investigation.
[10]
Petition before Respondent Judge, Annex A to Petition before Us, pars. 4 and 5.
[11] Ibid,
pars. 6 and 7.
[12] Ibid,
pars. 8 to 14.
[13] Ibid, par. 15.
[14] Answer to the Petition before Respondent Judge, Annex B of Petition
before Us, par. 2.
[15] Ibid,
pars. 4 to 10.
[16] Ibid,
pars. 11 to 17.
[17] Petition, pars. 7 to 18.
[18] Ibid,
pars. 19 to 22. There was likewise the allegation that
respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction on the assumption that it is the
Court of Tax Appeals and not be that is vested with the competence to hear and
determine such an issue. This particular argument need not be considered
further.
[19] Answer,
pars. 1 to 5. There is likewise the rather
all-embracing allegation that the validity of the Tax Census Act could be
assailed on the ground of its being “oppressive, unjust, susceptible to
abuse and misuse in a vindictive and oppressive manner and an insult to the
personal and official integrity” of respondents.
[20] Ibid,
pars. 7 to 10. There was likewise a denial as to the propriety of the laches being invoked against them.
[21] 13 Phil. 273. Cf. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., 17 SCRA 731 (1966).
[22]
Truly v. Wanzer, 5 How. 140
(1847).
[23] 22 SCRA 1186 (1968). Cf. Chief of the
Philippine Constabulary v. Sabungan Bagong Silang, Inc., 16 SCRA 336
(1966).
[24] Sangki v.
Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 1392 (1967).
[25] Angela Estate, Inc. v. Court of First Instance, 24 SCRA 500
(1968).
[26]
Annex C of the Petition.
[27] On this point, I Willoughby on the Constitution, 2d, p. 43 (1929)
and Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871) were cited.
[28]
Cf. 1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 322 (1927).
[29] People v, Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
[30] Sect 10, Art. VIII, Constitution.
[31] Cooley, op. cit, p. 335.
[32] United States v. Salaveria, 39
Phil. 102 (1918).
[33] 20 SCRA 849 (1967) citing O’Gorman & Young V. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co., 282 US 251 (1931).
[34] Near
v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931);
Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938);
Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940);
Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 US 105
(1943);
Saia v. New York, .334 US
558
(1948);
Kunz v. New York, 340 US 290
(1951); Staub v. Boxley, 355 US
313
(1958); Smith v.
California, 361 US 147
(1959); Talley v.
California, 362 US 60
(1960); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 US
278 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US 360 (1964); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500 (1964).
[35]
Cf. Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. Law Rev. 91, 93
(1966).
[36] Sec. I, Art. III, par. 1 Constitution.
[37] Sec. I, Art. III, pars. 6, 7 & 8, Constitution
[38] Primicias v. Fugoso, 80
Phil. 71 (1948); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102
Phil. 152 (1957) and Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April
18, 1969.
[39]
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 US 241 (1964). Cf. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 US 440 (1928); Public Serv. Commission v. Great
Northern Utilities Co., 289 US 130 (1933); Boyden’s
Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 US 194 (1934).
[40] Gordillo v. Del Rosario, 39 Phil. 829. Cf. Sabado V. Gonzales, 53 Phil.
770 (1928).
[41] 64 Phil. 868 (1937). Chua Ke v.
Abeto, 63 Phil. 539 (1936) was likewise cited.
[42] Cf. Climaco v. Macadaeg,
4 SCRA 930 (1962).