FAUSTINA CALLANTA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FELIPE VILLANUEVA, CITY JUDGE, CITY COURT OF DAGUPAN CITY, CORNELIA JIMENEZ AND PASTORA DAVID JIMENEZ, RESPONDENTS.

The denial by respondent City Judge Felipe Villanueva of Dagupan City to grant the motions to quash the two
complaints for grave oral defamation against petitioner gave rise to these
suits for certiorari, the validity of the issuance of the warrants of
arrest by respondent City Judge Felipe Villanueva of Dagupan
City^[1]
being contested on the ground that it should have been the City Fiscal who
should have conducted the preliminary examination.  There was then, in the opinion of
petitioner’s counsel, a jurisdictional infirmity.  From the very petition itself, however, it
was shown that after such issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail
fixed in the amount of P600.00,
petitioner posted such required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional
liberty.^[2]
Moreover, in the answer of respondents, it was expressly set forth: “The
City Fiscal has shown intent to prosecute the petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos.
9298 and 9375.  As early as February 25, 1965, after conducting
his preliminary examination and after acquiring jurisdiction over the
petitioner the respondent Court referred the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos.
9298 and 9375 to the City Fiscal.  * * *
So that on March 4, 1965,
the arraignment and hearing of the cases were postponed because the City Fiscal
was investigating them.  * * * It may
also be noted that at the proceedings in said criminal cases on April 20, 1965,
the Fiscal entered his appearance for the government and manifested that he was
ready for trial.  If the Fiscal did not
agree with the Judge in the latter’s investigation of the case, he would have
asked for a further reinvestigation of the cases.  But the City Fiscal did not.  On the other hand the Fiscal appeared at the proceedings
to prosecute the petitioner, indicating that he was in agreement with the
complaint already filed.”^[3]
There was no denial thereof by petitioner.

On the above facts, certiorari does not lie.

1. With the express admission by petitioner that she had posted the
required bail to obtain her provisional liberty, it becomes futile to assail
the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest.  This excerpt from the opinion f Justice
Sanchez in Zacarias v. Cruz^[4]
finds pertinence:  “Posting of a
bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a
person, estops him from discussing the validity of
his arrest.  In the recent case of Luna
v. Plaza * * *, our ruling is that where petitioner has filed an
application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, ‘he had
waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted  * * * prior to
the issuance of the warrant of arrest.'”^[5]
As a matter of fact, such a doctrine goes back to People v. Olandag,^[6]
the opinion being rendered by former Chief Justice Paras.  After Zacarias,
mention may be made of three other decisions, Bermejo v. Barrios;^[7] People v. La Caste,^[8] and Manzano v.
Villa.^[9] The latest case in point is People v. Obngayan^[10] where
this Court, through Justice
Antonio, after referring to Luna v. Plaza, again reiterated the ruling
“that where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary
investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.”^[11] At any rate, it cannot be denied that the
City Fiscal of Dagupan City had been quite active in
the investigation and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner.  The matter was referred to his office.  It was he who appeared at the hearing and
manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial.  It would be then to pay an undue premium to
technicalities to assert that under such circumstances the procedural
requisite, assuming that the contention of petitioner is correct, of such
official conducting the preliminary examination was not in fact complied with.

2. Nor can it be concluded that there is justification for the
tone f certainty of counsel for petitioner that only the City Fiscal of Dagupan may conduct a preliminary examination.  Apparently, he had in mind Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila.^[12]
That was a decision involving the Charter of the City f Manila.  The opinion of Justice Feria
did state the following: “Under the law, a complaint charging a person of
commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with
the municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above
stated the latter do not make or conduct preliminary investigation * * *.”^[13]
Such a doctrine is inapplicable.  The
reliance is, therefore, misplaced.  The
Charter of the City of Dagupan
cannot be any clearer.  The City
Court of Dagupan City
“may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without
regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over
any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper
court.”^[14]

WHEREFORE, these petitions for certiorari are
dismissed.  The restraining order issued
by this Court is lifted and set aside. 
Costs against petitioner.

Barredo and
Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., concurs with the
main opinion and in its concurring opinion of J. Aquino.

Aquino, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

^[1]
The private respondents are Cornelia Jimenez and Pastora
David Jimenez.

^[2]
Petition, par. 7.

^[3]
Answer, 7.

^[4]
L-25899, November 29, 1969,
30 SCRA 728.

^[5]
Ibid, 730.  Luna v. Plaza,
L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968 is
reported in 26 SCRA 310.

^[6]
92 Phil. 286 (1952).

^[7]
L-23614, February 27, 1970,
31 SCRA 764.

^[8]
L-29083, February 27, 1971,
37 SCRA 767.

^[9]
L-27018, August 30, 1972,
46 SCRA 711.

^[10]
L-29201, January 31, 1974,
55 SCRA 465.

^[11]
Ibid, 471.

^[12]
80 Phil. 859 (1948).

^[13]
Ibid, 869.  Cf. Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97
Phil. 228 (1955).

^[14]
Section 77, Article XIII, Republic Act No. 170 (1947).

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