G.R. No. L-25605. June 20, 1977
FERNANDO MAPA III, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CRISPINA GUANZON, RAYMUNDO BAYETA, VALENTIN BAYETA, LUCIANA BAYETA, AGUSTIN BAYETA, DOLOROSA BAYETA, AND THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF …
ANTONIO, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court by defendants?appellants, Crispina Guanzon, Raymundo, Valentin, Luciana,
Agustin and Dolorosa, all surnamed Bayeta, from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Civil Case No. 279 (6616).[1]
This appeal was instituted before Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296 was
amended by Republic Act. No. 5440, which took effect on September 9, 1968.
The basic question of law, however, is whether or not the
question of ownership over Lot. No. 2636 could still he relitigated in said Civil Case No. 279 (6616), in view of
the final dismissal on the merits of Civil Cases Nos. 4666 and 5557, which were
actions instituted by herein defendants-appellants to recover the ownership and
possession of the same property from plaintiff-appellee.
The records show that Isidoro Bayeta was the grantee of a homestead of fourteen (14)
hectares, eighty-two (82) ares and seventy-nine (79) centaresl (subject
matter of this case and hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2636), located in
Barrio Langub, Municipality of Escalante, Province of
Negros Occidental, under Homestead Patent No. 8105,
dated August 2, 1925,[2]
and by virtue of which he was issued, on September 21, 1925, Original
Certificate of Title No. 268[3]
over said property. On September 7,
1928, or three (3) years after the issuance of the aforesaid title, Isidoro Bayeta and his wife, Crispina Guanzon, one of the
defendants-appellants herein, sold the said land to Spouses John Roemer and
Julia Roemer for the consideration of P1,482.00. It is not clear, however, whether the
original certificate of title over the property in the name of Isidoro Bayeta was delivered to
the Roemers, but in the private instrument evidencing
the sale the vendors stated that “(w)e make as integral part of this
instrument the documents that show our ownership over the immovable subject of
this sale.”[4]
On March 11, 1935, the Roemers sold, by means of a public instrument, the land to
Lucas Guirnela for P862.50[5] Guirnela, in turn,
sold said land on November 10, 1936 to Fernando Mapa,
Jr., who immediately took possession thereof,[6] and paid taxes therefor
in the name of Isidoro Bayeta
as the title and assessment of the land remained in his (Isidoro’s)
name.[7]
On January
31, 1950, Fernando Mapa, Jr. leased said land to Vicente Omarementaria
and Fermin Ballesteros for
a period of eight (8) years, that is, from the agricultural year 1950-1951 to
1957-1958.[8] The contract of lease was registered with
the Danao Sugar Central for sugar cane milling
purposes.[9]
On January 26, 1953,
said land was sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes and was bought by
the Province of Negros Occidental there being
no bidders.[10]
It was repurchased by Fernando Mapa, Jr. on January 26, 1954 in the total amount
of P684.60.[11]
On December 28, 1956, said
land was again sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes and the Province
of Negros Occidental
again bought the same, there being also no bidders.[12]
The final bill of sale in favor of the Province
of Negros Occidental
was issued on March 4, 1959,
and registered in the Register of Deeds on March 25, 1959.[13]
Meanwhile, or on January
13, 1958, the
original certificate of title in the name of Isidoro Bayeta was reconstituted administratively and the reconstituted
title in the name of Isidoro Bayeta
was given the number, to wit:
Certificate of Title No. RP-1019 (268).[14] On the same date, January 13, 1958, the
heirs of Isidoro Bayeta,
namely, Crispina Guanzon,
his widow; and Raymundo, Valentin,
Luciana, Agustin and Dolorosa, all surnamed Bayeta,
defendants-appellants herein, filed an action against Fernando Mapa for recovery of ownership of Lot No. 2636 (docketed as
Civil Case No. 4666 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental)[15] alleging, among other things, that Isidoro Bayeta during his
lifetime acquired aforesaid property from the government as homestead; that
sometime in 1950, Isidoro Bayeta
entered into a verbal agreement with the defendant Fernando Mapa
whereby the former leased to the latter said land at an agreed yearly rental of
P2,000.00; that the lease agreement expired on December 31, 1955 without the
defendant’s paying any rental, notwithstanding repeated demands made by Isidoro Bayeta; that shortly
after the death of Isidoro Bayeta
on April 17, 1956, the plaintiffs demanded of the defendant that said property
be returned to them, but the defendant refused to return the said property in
spite of repeated demands; that the defendant claimed and asserted interest
therein adverse to the plaintiffs. They
prayed therein that they be declared owners of the said property and the defendant
be ordered to restore them to
its possession. The complaint, however,
was dismissed on October 5, 1959
for lack of interest.
On November
29, 1959, the same
heirs of Isidoro Bayeta
filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental another complaint against Fernando Mapa,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5557,[16] also for recovery of ownership and
possession of the same parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 4666. They alleged therein that the deed of sale in
favor of Lucas Guirnela is “null and void for
lack of consideration and consent, and for being contrary to the express
provisions of the public land law,” Upon motion of the defendant Mapa to dismiss the complaint, the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental dismissed the same on February
16, 1960 on the ground of res
judicata as the dismissal of Civil Case No. 4666 is with prejudice and had the
effect of adjudicating the case on the merits.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied by the court, the
plaintiffs therein appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals
certified the case to this Court stating that the issue involved therein was
“solely on the interpretation of the order of the court a quo,
dated October 5, 1959, particularly the dispositive
portion thereof which is a legal question.” This Court, in its decision
promulgated on February 28, 1963, in G. R. No. L-19249, [17] sustained the ruling of the lower court, to wit:
“The only issue we are called upon to determine in this
proceedings, is the import of the Order of October 5, 1959.
It will be noted that the lower court made a clear interpretation of the
Order, when it said: ‘x x. The first
sentence of the dispositive part of the order in
question refers to the dismissal of the complaint, which is ‘without any
condition at all, and under Section 3,
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, it is understood to be with prejudice,
and shall have the effect of an
adjudication on the merits.’ We share the view of the court a quo. No
other reasonable interpretation could have been meant. And considering the fact that the judge who
issued the controversial order, was also the one who interpreted or clarified
the same, it becomes apparent that what the court really ordered when it
dismissed the complaint was a dismissal with
prejudice. If he had meant what the appellants
want Us to understand, his Honor could have likewise suffixed the dismissal of
the complaint with the phrase ‘without prejudice, in the same way he did with
the dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim.
The argument of appellants that the word ‘likewise’ refers or modified
both the complaint and counterclaim, is, to Our mind, untenable. Even under ordinary rules of grammar, the
phrase ‘without prejudice’ appearing on the second sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision, should modify or refer
only to the counterclaim. Had the two
sentences been separated by a comma, there would have been no doubt that the
phrase without prejudice had modified and/or referred to the dismissal
of both the complaint and the counterclaim.
But there were two different and distinct sentences, containing
different subjects, predicates and modifiers.”
As a consequence of the dismissal by the Court of Civil Case No.
4666 and provided now with the deed of sale between Isidoro
Bayeta and the Roemers and
the confirmation of Lucas Guinela of the sale of Lot No. 2636 to him, Fernando Mapa, Jr. wrote to the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental on October 15, 1959, praying that he be
allowed to repurchase Lot No. 2636 from the province. The Provincial Board, acting upon the request
of Mr. Napa, passed and approved Resolution No. 1742-A on December 16, 1960,[18]
to wit:
“In view of the petition of Mr. Fernando Napa, III, Actual
Occupant and owner of Lot No. 2636 of Cadastral Survey of Escalante requesting
to be allowed to purchase the said lot (Lot No. 2636) which had been
adjudicated to the Province of Negros Occidental for
non-payment of land taxes due on the land and due to the decision of the Court
of First Instance of this Province dated October 5, 1959 and February 16, 1960,
deciding the ownership of said land in his favor in Civil Cases Nos. 4666 and
5557.
“On motion by Hon. Mario N. Peña,
Member, THE BOARD RESOLVED, To authorize the Provincial Treasurer to sell said
land, Lot No. 2636 to said Fernando Mapa III for the
value of the taxes due on the land.”
On January 3, 1961, plaintiff-appellee Fernando Mapa III, who
by that time had already bought the land from his father, Fernando Mapa, Jr., on the basis of the afore-mentioned resolution
of the Provincial Board, went to the
Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Negros
Occidental and offered to repurchase the land, but Acting Provincial Treasurer
A. S. Narboneta refused to receive the payment.
In view of his
refusal, plaintiff-appellee Fernando Mapa III filed, on March
11, 1961, a special civil
action for mandamus against.
Acting Provincial
Treasurer A. S. Narboneta
with the Court of First instance of Negros
Occidental and docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 6068. [19]
On March 13, 1961, counsel
for the plaintiff filed a notice
of lis
pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. [20]
In the meantime, or on January
27, 1961, the heirs of Isidoro Bayeta, the defendants-appellants herein, executed an
Extrajudicial Partition[21]
whereby they divided and adjudicated among
themselves the afore-mentioned Lot No. 2636 in the proportion described
therein. In that agreement of partition,
Agustin Bayeta
purchased all the rights, interest and participations of his co-heirs on said
property for a consideration of
P1,000.00.
By virtue of said
extrajudicial partition which was inscribed on the reconstituted Certificate of
Title No. RP-1019 (268), on March 22, 1961, said reconstituted title was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29483 in the name of Agustin Bayeta was issued in lieu thereof.[22] On the basis of the extrajudicial
partition and sale, Acting Provincial Treasurer A. S. Narboneta
allowed Agustin Bayeta to repurchase said Lot No.
2636 and was issued the Certificate of Repurchase on March
23, 1961, that is,
two (2) days before the two-year period expired, upon paying the total amount
of P816.41.[23] In allowing Agustin Bayeta
to repurchase the property, the Acting Provincial Treasurer believed that on
the basis of the tax records of his office, the heirs of Isidoro
Bayeta, not Fernando Mapa,
were the persons entitled to repurchase the property within the two-year period
from the date of registration of the final deed of sale.[24]
Because the Acting
Provincial Treasurer allowed the repurchase of the land by Agustin Bayeta notwithstanding the pendency
of the mandamus case, plaintiff Fernando Mapa
III, successor-in-interest of Fernando Mapa, Jr.,
filed on May 18, 1962, the present case against the heirs of Isidoro Bayeta and the Provincial
Treasurer of Negros Occidental for cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2948 in the name of Agustin Bayeta and the Certificate of Repurchase issued by the
Provincial Treasurer in favor of Agustin Bayeta, and
the issuance of an order requiring the Provincial Treasurer to execute the
deed of sale in favor of said plaintiff, after payment of all taxes due on
said property. Thereafter, or on June 23, 1962, the mandamus case, on petition of
plaintiff, was dismissed in view of the filing of the case at bar.[25]
In their answer to the
complaint, defendants-appellants asserted that there is no sufficient cause of
action against them as they are the legitimate heirs of Isidoro
Bayeta and that Agustin Bayeta
is a successor-in-interest of Isidoro Bayeta and a purchaser in good faith and for value of a
property sold under auction sale from a registered owner, which is the Province
of Negros Occidental, and that title to the lot in question was transferred to him by the
Province of Negros Occidental upon payment of taxes
and penalties amounting to P816,41.
Appellants further alleged that Lot No. 2636 in question had been acquired
by their father, Isidoro Bayeta,
by homestead which was approved and patented on August 28, 1925 and was
inscribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Negros Occidental on September 21, 1925. Moreover, appellants maintained that since
under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, from the date of the approval of
the application (homestead) and for a term of five (5) years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead cannot be subject to encumbrances or alienations nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period,
plaintiff’s contention under paragraph 7 of his complaint to the effect that
his ownership proceeded from a sale purportedly dating back to the year 1928,
is without legal basis and is unenforceable being contrary to law.[26]
In reply thereto, plaintiff-appellee
contended that Lot No. 2636 of the Escalante Cadastre has been sold by Isidoro Bayeta, father of the
defendants- appellants, on September 7, 1928 and for more than 30 years
thereafter, no person, much less the defendant Agustin Bayeta
who had been living within the vicinity of said lot, made any claim of ownership
or of possession of the same. Any
demand, therefore, on the part of Agustin Bayeta for
the title or possession of said lot is stale and unenforceable.”[27]
On November 4, 1965,
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and against
the defendants-appellants. According to
the trial court, the question of ownership over the said property (Lot No.
2636) “was ventilated in Civil Cases Nos. 4666 and 5557 in the Court of
First instance of Negros Occidental which dismissed both and affirmed by the
Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-19249. The
decisions in the two cases were already final and an adjudication on the
merits.”
Thus, the lower court stated:
“The question of ownership of this property, as indicated
above, at the time of the sale at public auction is the crux of the case. This question was ventilated in Civil Cases
Nos. 4666 and 5557 in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental which dismissed both and affirmed by the Supreme Court in G. R. No.
L-19249. The decisions in the two cases
were already final and an adjudication on the merits * * *. In the complaint in Civil Case No. 5557 * *
*, the plaintiffs alleged ownership and prayed the Court to be declared as
such. This case, having been disposed of
by a final decision, the issues involved therein cannot be passed upon in the
present case as the same have already been barred by prior judgment. In effect the defendants in said cases Nos.
4666 and 5557 were declared the owners of the property. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable
and clear that as of February 28, 1963
(date of decision in G. R. No. L-19249), Fernando Mapa,
Jr. was declared the owner of the property and this decision retroacts as of
the date the same was sold by Isidoro Bayeta to Mr Roemer. As such, Mr. Fernando Mapa,
Jr. had the better right than the heirs of Isidoro Bayeta to repurchase the property. The certificate of repurchase issued by the
Assistant Provincial Treasurer cannot affect or divest him of his right to
repurchase the property as it was done during the pendency
of the mandamus case and after the notice of lis
pendens was sent to the Register of Deeds. Therefore, Agustin Bayeta
cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith and for value.
“However, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the
then Assistant Provincial Treasurer, Mr. A. S. Narboneta,
cannot be held guilty of bad faith as he acted upon the opinion of the
provincial fiscal and upon his honest belief that the heirs of Isidoro Bayeta were entitled to
repurchase the property, considering that the question of ownership was
finally resolved only in 1963.”[28]
Consequently, the lower court declared
the Certificate of Repurchase, dated March
23, 1961, in favor of Agustin
Bayeta and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29483 in his name as null and
void and ordered their cancellation.
Plaintiff, however, was ordered to pay, by way of reimbursement, Agustin Bayeta
the sum of P816.41, as well as
the payments he made for taxes, both with interest at the legal rate until the amounts were paid.
Believing that the decision of, the lower court was contrary to law, the defendants appealed to
this Court, assigning the following errors, to wit:
“I. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THIS HONORABLE COURT DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1963, ENTITLED
‘CRISPINA GUANZON, ET AL. VS. FERNANDO MAPA’ IN G.R. NO. L-19249, INVOLVING THE
SAME LOT 2636 of ESCALATE CADASTRE VESTED TITLE ON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OVER
SAID LOT, AND SAID JUDGMENT RETROACTS AS OF THE DATE WHEN SAID PROPERTY LOT
2636 WAS SOLD
BY ISIDORO BAYETA TO JOHN ROEMER.
“II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
LOT 2636 IS A HOMESTEAD LOT AND ANY CONVEYANCE THEREOF BEFORE THE LAPSE OP
FIVE-YEARS PERIOD FROM THE DATE OF THE ISSUANCE OF PATENT TO ANY PRIVATE PERSON
MORE ESPECIALLY WHERE THE DOCUMENT OF CONVEYANCE IS JUST A MERE PRIVATE
DOCUMENT AND NOT RATIFIED BY A NOTARY PUBLIC IS VOID AB INITIO.
“III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
REGISTRATION IS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO CONVEY AND AFFECT THE LAND, AND SINCE TEE
APPELLANT AGUSTIN BAYETA HAD PURCHASED THE LAND LOT 2636 AT PUBLIC AUCTION SALE
FROM THE DEFENDANT PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, HE IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED A
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, AND HENCE ENTITLED TO
THE PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND DAMAGES FOR THE LAND UNTIL HE IS PUT IN POSSESSION.
“IV. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT A COURT OF EQUITY MUST BE VIGILANT TO THOSE WHO
EXPLOIT IGNORANT PEOPLE ESPECIALLY WHERE THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT IS TO GIVE
LAND TO THE LANDLESS.”
1. We agree with
the lower court that the basic question is the ownership over Lot No. 2636
which cannot be litigated anew in this case, in view of the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4666 which, in Guanzon,
et al. v. Mapa,[29]
this Court declared to be a dismissal with prejudice and had the effect of an
adjudication of the case on the merits. Thus,
this Court sustained the order of the trial court in Civil Case No 5557,
dismissing the complaint therein for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of Lot No. 2636, on the ground that such action is already barred by the prior judgment of the Court in
Civil Case No. 4666.
We have examined the
answer of defendants-appellants in the case at bar (Civil Case No. 279 [6616])
and found that its special and affirmative defenses are substantially the same
as the allegations of the complaint filed by the same parties in the
prior case (Civil Case No. 5557). The
subject matter, the cause of action in the first and the special and
affirmative defenses in the case at bar, as well as the parties are the same. Thus, in both the complaint in Civil Case No.
5557 and in their answer in this case, the defendants-appellants predicated
their right to recover the ownership and possession of Lot No. 2636 on the
alleged nullity of the conveyance made by Isidoro Bayeta, their predecessor-in-interest, in favor of Spouses
John C. Roemer and Julia Roemer
and, therefore plaintiff-appellee being the
successor-in-interest of the Roemers could not have
acquired any title over said property.
In both pleadings, defendants-appellants claim that the sale is not
valid because it was made within the prohibited period of five (5) years provided
by the Public Land Law.[30]
Since in Guanzon, et al. v. Mapa,
supra, this Court ruled that the action of the herein
defendants-appellants, who were then the plaintiffs-appellants in said Civil
Case No. 5557, to recover the ownership and possession of Lot No. 2636, is
barred by the prior and final judgment in Civil Case No. 4666, there is no
question now that their attempt to recover the ownership and possession of the
same property from plaintiff-appellee is equally
barred under the principle of res judicata. Under
the doctrine of res judicata,
an “adjudication is final and conclusive not only as to the matter
actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have
litigated and have had decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the
original action, both in respect to matters of claim and of defense,”[31]
It cannot be denied that the title and possession over the property was a
matter in issue in the previous case.
By virtue of the previous judgment, the defendants-appellants
are now precluded not only from questioning in this action the validity of the
sale of Lot No. 2636 from Isidoro Bayeta
to the Roemer spouses but also the right of ownership and possession of
plaintiff-appellee over the said property.
2. But Agustin Bayeta, one of the
defendants-appellants, insists that when the Province of Negros
Occidental acquired the property on December 28, 1956 at the tax auction sale,
a certificate of title was issued to the aforestated
province “free from all liens and encumbrances”, subject only to two
(2) years period of redemption in accordance with the assessment law, and,
therefore, when he purchased the lot in question from the Province of Negros Occidental and said sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds of said province and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-29483 issued to him, he was a purchaser in good faith and for value and
entitled to the ownership and possession of the property. He argues that it is the act of registration
that operates to convey or affect this registered property.
It should be remembered, however, that when Agustin Bayeta repurchased the property from the provincial
government of Negros Occidental on March 23, 1961, the action of Agustin Bayeta and his co?heirs to recover the ownership and possession of the same property from
Fernando Mapa, Jr. in Civil Case No. 5557
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental on February 16, 1960 on the ground of res judicata. It
must be noted also that plaintiff-appellee and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of this parcel of
land since 1928 until 1958 under claim of ownership adverse to all others,
without defendants, appellants or their predecessors questioning the former’s adverse possession. As a result of their inaction, the property
was sold by the Roemers to
Lucas Guirnela on March 11, 1935. Guirnela, in turn, sold it to Fernando Mapa,
Jr. on November 10, 1936, and later, it was conveyed to plaintiff- appellee
who is now in possession of said property and the one paying the realty taxes
thereon. While it cannot be denied that
no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, this legal guarantee may in
appropriate cases yield to the right of a third person in the equitable
principle of laches.[32] Moreover, at the time of the sale at public auction of the lot in question on December 28, 1956
for non-payment of taxes or tax delinquency, it was Fernando Mapa, Jr. who was in possession of the property “en concepto
de dueño“.[33]
Being the taxpayer of the land, communications from the
Municipal Treasurer of Escalante, Negros Occidental and the Provincial Treasurer of said province regarding the taxes thereon
were addressed to him.[34]
Tax receipts for taxes paid on
said lot, although issued in the
name of Isidoro Bayeta,
contained the notation that the
payments mere made by Fernando Mapa.[35]
As a matter of fact, when the same
property was first sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes On January 26, 1953 and the same was awarded to the Province
of Negros Occidental there being no bidders, it was Fernando Mapa, Jr. who was allowed to repurchase the property on January
26, 1954. Since it cannot he disputed that Fernando Mapa, Jr. was the taxpayer of the property and the one who defaulted in the
payment of those taxes, he is, therefore, the party called, upon by the law to
exercise the right of redemption or repurchase with in two (2) years from the date of the registration
of the sale, that is, up to March 25, 1961.[36] Thus, the law specifically authorizes only
the “delinquent taxpayer” who, in this case, at the time of the sale
at public auction on December 28, 1956, was no other than Fernando Mapa, Jr or any other person in
his behalf, to repurchase the
property.
“SEC. 38. Repurchase of real property after
sale. – Within the term of two years from
the date of the sale, the delinquent
taxpayer or any other
person in his behalf shall have the right to repurchase the property sold by
paying to the provincial treasurer or his deputy the total amount of taxes and
penalties due up to the date of repurchase, * * *.” (Italics supplied.)[37]
Indeed, not one of the
defendants-appellants as heirs of Isidoro Bayeta, could have validly exercised the right of
redemption or repurchase of the property.
They were already barred by the prior judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 4666
from asserting any right of ownership or title over said property. They could not also exercise the right to
repurchase as the “delinquent taxpayer” since they were never the taxpayer
of said property. Considering,
therefore, that the repurchase made by Agustin Bayeta
was in contravention of the final judgment of the Court of First instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5557, which was affirmed
by this Court, and of the specific provision of Section 38 of Commonwealth Act
No. 470, as amended, which confers the right to repurchase only to the
“delinquent taxpayer” or any person in his behalf, such repurchase
although registered with the Register of Deeds, is ineffectual as a basis of
title over the property. Agustin Bayeta could not also invoke the alleged indefeasibility
of the transfer certificate of title issued to him, since he is precluded from
doing so being a holder in bad faith of said certificate.[38] It did create, however, a lien in his favor
for the price of the repurchase.[39] This should be so, for in redeeming or repurchasing the land in question, Bayeta had prevented
its loss which should have been to the prejudice of the plaintiff-appellee.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
Fernando, (Chairman) and
Martin, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Aquino,
JJ., in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
[1]
Entitled “Fernando Napa III, Plaintiff, vs. Crispina
Guanzon, Raymundo Bayeta, Valentin Bayeta, Luciana Bayeta, Agustin Bayeta, Dolorosa Bayeta, and the
Provincial Treasurer of Negros
Occidental, Defendants, for Cancellation of Certificate of Repurchase and Title”.
[2]
In the preliminary paragraph of
reconstituted Certificate of Title No. RP-1019 (268), Exhibit “4“, it is stated that the patent was issued by
the President of the Philippines, dated at Manila on August 28, 1925. The
quoted contents of the homestead patent, however, appears to have been signed
by Leonard Wood, Governor General of the Philippines, on August 2, 1925. In
the Deed of Sale, Exhibits “F” and “F-1”, between Isidoro Bayeta and the Roemers, it is stated that the patent was issued on August 2,
1925.
[3]
In the reconstituted title, Exhibit
“4”, it is indicated that the original number is “268”. The
Deed of Sale, Exhibits “F” and “F-1”, states the number as
“208”, while in the pleadings of the Bayetas
in Civil Cases Nos. 4666 and
5557, as well as in the Extrajudicial Partition, Exhibit “Q”, it
appears that the number is “298”.
[4]
Exhibits “F” and “F-1” The Spanish text of the quoted statement reads” “Hacese parte integrante
de esta escritura los documentos que acreditan nuestra
propiedad sobre el inmueble objeto de esta venta.”
[5]
Exhibit “E”.
[6]
Exhibit “D”; Testimony of Fernando Mapa,
Jr., t.s.n., February 7, 1963, p. 24.
[7]
Exhibits “M” and ‘N”.
[8]
Exhibits “K”, “K-1” and “K-2”.
[9]
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee p. 4.
[10]
Exhibits “V” and “W”.
[11]
Exhibits “V-1” and “W”.
[12]
Exhibit “T”.
[13]
Exhibit “U”.
[14]
Exhibit “4”.
[15]
Exhibit “CC”.
[16]
Exhibit “EE”.
[17]
7 SCRA 457,459-460.
[18]
Exhibit “Y”.
[19]
Exhibit “A”.
[20]
Exhibit “B”.
[21]
Exhibit “Q” of plaintiff, which is Exhibit “1” of the defendants.
[22]
Exhibit “4”, page B.
[23]
Exhibit “R” of plaintiff, which is Exhibit “2” of the defendants.
[24]
Record on Appeal, p. 28.
[25]
Exhibit “5”.
[26]
Brief for the Appellants, pp. 6-8.
[27]
Record on Appeal, p. 46.
[28]
Record Appeal, pp. 81-82.
[29] 7 SCRA 457.
[30]
Sections 116 and 122, Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the Public Land Law.
[31]
Freeman on Judgments, pp.
1421-1422. Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, L-26523, December
24, 1971, 42 SCRA
589; De Goma v. De Goma, L-18739, December
28, 1964, 12 SCRA
674.
[32]
Mejia
de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277. In this case, this Court, citing Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co., et al., vs.
City of Austin, et al., U. S. 962, said:
“‘The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the
right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there
has been neglect. In other words, where
a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that
equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously
impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the
consequences of his own neglect.’
(Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., et
al., vs. City of Austin, et al., U. S. 962.)
“In effect, the principle is one of estoppel because
it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights
of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of
the original patentee and his successors in interest.” (pp. 282-283.)
In Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laaruan, 65 SCRA 605, We found the occasion to discuss the equity of laches
and had compared it with prescription, to wit’:
“‘Laches‘
has been define as ‘such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as
a bar inequity.’ It is a delay in the assertion of a right ‘which works
disadvantage to another’ because of the ‘inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties.’ It is based
on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be
denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. It is different from and applies
independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches
is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity being founded on some change in the
condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory, laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at
law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is
not.” (at pp. 609-610.)
[33]
See Exhibits “K” and
“K-2”, Lease Contract, par. II.
[34]
Exhibit “O”, Statement of
Real Estate Tax Delinquency; Exhibit “P”, Notice of Sale at Public
Auction of Delinquent Real Property; Exhibit “AA”, Letter of the Provincial Treasurer, re Tax Delinquency for the
Year 1954-1955; Exhibit “AA-1”, Statement of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the Treasurer; Exhibits “BB”, “BB-1”,
“CC” and “CC-1”, Statements of Real Estate Tax Delinquency
from the Municipal Treasurer of Escalante.
[35]
Exhibits “M”, “N”, “AA-1”, “AA-2” and
“AA-III”.
[36]
The period of redemption of registered
lands sold for tax delinquency commences to run not from the date of the
auction or tax sale but from the day the sale was registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds. (Techico v. Serrano, 105 Phil. 956. See also Santos v.
RFC, et al., 101 Phil. 980.)
[37]
Section 38. Commonwealth Act No. 470,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1275,
approved on June 14, 1955.
[38]
Ignacio v. Chua Hong, 52 Phil. 940.
[39]
Borja v. Addison, 44 Phil. 895; Manansala v. Baron, et
al.,
105 Phil. 1051.