THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GUILLERMO BELLO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in
its Criminal Case No. 592-G, for murder. The information filed against
the accused alleged four (4) aggravating circumstances, namely:
treachery, evident premeditation, night-time, and superior strength,
the trial court made a finding of “treachery, evident premeditation and
in cold blood and without any provocation”; however, the dispositive
portion of the appealed decision states as follows:

” * * * , the Court finds the accused Guillermo
Bello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and
punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
circumstances of (1) night time, (2) abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness (3) superior strength off-set only by his surrender to
the authorities and hereby sentences him to DIE by electrocution in the
manner provided by law ordering his heirs, after his death, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alicia Cervantes in the sum of
P3,000.00, with costs.”

The record bears out, the Office of the Solicitor-General does not challenge, and the counsel de officio agrees with, and adopts, the following findings of fact of the trial court:

“From the evidence adduced at the hearing of the
case, it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court (1) that
on September 17, 1954 the accused Guillermo Bello, a widower, who at
that time was about 54 years of age took a young1 peasant lady named
Alicia Cervantes, about 24 years old, as his common-law wife; (2) that
from that day they lived together apparently in blissful harmony as man
and wife without the benefit of marriage. bearing-, however no child. *
* *; (3) that on May 15, 1958, the accused who had no means of
substantial livelihood except that of making “kaingin” and who
apparently was then, in financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to
accept an employment as entertainer in a bar and restaurant
establishment known as Maring’s Place situated at the corner of
Aguinaldo and Bonifacio Streets, Gumaca, Quezon; (4) that Alicia
Cervantes entered the service of Marine’s Place on that day as a public
hostess; (5) that the accused being infatuated with his young bride
used to watch her movements in Maring’s Place everyday; (6) that on May
15 he saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater in Gumaca with a man whom the
accused found later was caressing his common-law wife inside the movie
house; (7) that being in love with her he took her out from the movie
house and warned her to be more discreet in her personal conduct in
Gumaca; (8) that Alicia Cervantes continued to serve at Maring’s Place
as a public hostess; (9) that on May 20, 1958, at 3:00 p.m. the accused
went to Maring’s Place to ask for some money from Alicia; (10) that
Maring, the owner of the Place, and Alicia refused to give money,
Maring telling him to forget Alicia completely because he was already
an old man, an invalid besides and should stop bothering Alicia; (11)
that having failed to obtain financial assistance from his paramour,
the accused left the place somewhat despondent and went home passing
Bonifacio Street; (12) that on his way home he met the brothers Justo
Marasigan ,and Luis Marasigan who greeted the accused, Luis saying to
his brother Justo the following: ‘So this is the man whose wife is
being used by Maring for white slave trade’; (13) that these remarks of
Luis Marasigan naturally brought grief to the accused, to drown which
he sought Paty’s place in Gumaca where he drank 5 glasses of tuba; (14)
that from Paty’s place he went to Realistic Studio which is in front of
Maring’s Place and from there watched the movements of Alicia; (15)
that at about 9:00 o’clock that night he entered Maring’s Place and
without much ado held Alicia from behind with his left hand in the
manner of a boa strangulating its prey and with his right hand stabbed
Alicia several times with a balisong; (16) that seeing Alicia fallen on
the ground and believing her to he mortally wounded, he fled and went
to the municipal building and there surrendered himself to the police
of Gumaca.”

Both the prosecution and the defense also agree that the crime
committed is not murder but only homicide, but they disagree in the
qualifying or aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The prosecution
holds that the crime is homicide, aggravated by abuse of superior
strength, but off-set by voluntary surrender. On the other hand, the
defense maintains that the accused is entitled to the additional
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The trial court
held a different conclusion, as earlier stated.

While it cannot be denied that Alicia was stabbed at the back, the
wound was but a part and continuation of the aggression. The four (4)
stab wounds (the 3 others were in the breast, hypogastric region, and
in the left wrist-as shown in the certificate of the Municipal Health
Officer) were inflicted indiscriminately, without regard as to which
portion of her body was the subject of attack. The trial court itself
found that the stab in the back was inflicted as Alicia was running
away. For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed (Peo. vs. Cañete, 44
Phil. 478).

Evident premeditation was, likewise, not established. The accused had been carrying a balisong
with him for a long time as a precaution against drunkards, and without
any present plan or intent to use it against his common-law wife. That
he watched her movements daily manifested his jealous character, but
there is no evidence that from this jealousy sprouted a plan to snuff
out her life.

The evidence does not show, either, any superior strength on the
part of the accused, and, not possessing it, he could not take
advantage of it. True that he was armed with a balisong, but he was old and baldado
(invalid), while Alicia was in the prime of her youth, and not infirm.
The facts are not sufficient to draw a comparison of their relative
strength. Possession of a balisong gives an aggressor a
formidable advantage over the unarmed victim, but the physique of the
aggressor ought also to be considered. At any rate, taking into account
the emotional excitement of the accused, it is not clearly shown that
there was “intencion deliberada de prevalerse de la superioridad 6
aproyecharae intencionadamente de la misma” (Sent. TS. 5 Oct. 1906),
i.e., deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.

The crime was committed at night-time, but the accused did not seek
or take advantage of it the better to accomplish. his purpose. In fact,
Maring’s Place was bright and well lighted; hence, the circumstance did
not aggravate the crime. (U.S. vs. Ramos, et al., 2 Phil. 434; U. S.
vs. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958).

We can not understand how the trial court came to couple the crime
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness. There is nothing to show that the assailant and his
common-law wife reposed in one another any special confidence that
would fee abused, or any gratitude owed by one to the other that ought
to be respected, and which would bear any retaliation, or connection,
with the crime committed. None is itiferable from the fact that the
accused was much older than his victim, or that he was penniless while
she was able to earn a living and occasionally gave him money, since
both lived together as husband and wife. Neither is it shown that the
accused took advantage of any such special confidence in order to carry
out the crime.

Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evi- dent
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, which could have
qualified the crime as murder, were not present, and since the generic
aggravating circumstances of night- time and abuse of confidence and
obvious ungratefulness have not been established, the accused can only
be liable for homicide.

Both defense and prosecution agree that accused-appellant is
entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender to the authorities. The remaining area of conflict is reduced
to whether the accused may lay claim to a second mitigating
circumstance, that of having acted on a provocation sufficiently strong
to cause passion and obfuscation. The defense submits that accused is
so entitled, because the deceased’s flat rejection of petitioner’s
entreaties for her to quit her calling as a hostess and return to their
former relation, aggravated by her sneering statement that the accused
was penniless and invalid (baldado), provoked the appellant, as
he testified, into losing his head and stabbing the deceased. The state
disputes the claim primarily on the strength of the rule that Mission
and obfuscation can not be considered when “arising from vicious,
unworthy and immoral passions” (U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217).

We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the
circumstances disclosed by the record. It will be recalled that the
lower court found that the accused had previously reproved the deceased
for allowing herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct
was forcibly driven home to the accused by Marasigan’s remark on the
very day of the crime that the accused was the husband “whose wife was
being used by Maring for purposes of prostitution”, a remark that so
deeply wounded the appellant’s feelings that he was driven to consume a
large amount of wine (tuba) before visiting Alicia (the
deceased) to plead with her to leave her work. Alicia’s insulting
refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was not
motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed
her determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her
to distribute her favors indiscriminately. We can not see how the
accused’s insistence that she live with him again, and his rage at her
rejection of the proposal, can be properly qualified as arising from
immoral and unworthy passions. Even without benefit of wedlock, a
monogamous liaison appears morally of a higher level than gainful
promiscuity.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified.
This Court finds the accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by two (2)
mitigating circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and (b)
voluntary surrender; and, therefore, imposes upon him an indeterminate
sentence ranging from a minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years of prision mayor; orders
him also to personally indemnify the heirs of Alicia Cervantes in the
amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.