G.R. No. L-18768. February 28, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. ARSENIA TAMBA Y LUQUIRO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
the Court of First Instance of Davao under an information stating that,
with grave abuse of confidence, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
she burned the house owned and inhabited by one Carlos S. Gavila to the
damage and prejudice of its owner in the total amount of P30,000.00,
and as a result minor Regino Gavila III was burned to death.
Upon arraignment, the accused, with the assistance of her counsel de oficio,
pleaded guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the court rendered decision
finding her guilty as charged “under Art. 321, paragraph 1, in relation
to Article 249, of the Revised Penal Code, and conformity with Article
48 of the same Code, hereby sentences her to RECLUSION PERPETUA with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify Carlos S. Gavila
in the amount of P30,000.00, and the heirs of Regino Gavila III in the
amount of P3,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency because of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs.”
The accused now appeals from this decision raising the same question
already raised by her counsel at the hearing held before the court a quo
to the effect that it was error for said court to have found the
accused guilty of homicide under Article 321, paragraph 1, in relation
to Article 249, considering that the information does not expressly
allege that the accused knew that the house was occupied at the time
she set fire to the same.
We find merit in this contention, for this Court has already held
that “Knowledge on the part of the accused that the building set fire
to is occupied, is an essential element of the form of arson defined in
Article 549 (new Article 321) of the Penal Code, and the information
must contain allegations to the effect that the accused had such
knowledge at the time of the commission of the crime in order to
.sustain a conviction under that article.[1]
Here the information does not allege that the accused had knowledge
that the building was occupied at the time she set fire to it, and
considering that a plea of guilty admits only what is alleged in the
information, the accused can only be found guilty of what is actually
alleged therein which at most constitutes the crime of arson described
in Article 321, paragraph 2, subsection (b), of the Revised Penal Code,
dealing with the burning of an inhabited building, the offender not
knowing whether or not such building was occupied at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Arson under this provision is punishable with reclusion temporal, in the same manner as homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying Article 48 of the same Code, reclusion temporal
should be applied in its maximum period, or from 17 years 4 months and
1 day to 20 years. There being present the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty, said penalty should be imposed in its medium period, or from 18
years 2 months and 21 days to 19 years 1 month and 10 days reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, we hereby sentence
the accused to suffer a penalty the minimum of which should be not less
than 12 years of prision mayor and the maximum not more than 19 years 1 month and 10 days of reclusion temporal.
Modified as above indicated, we hereby affirm the decision appealed from in all other respects, with costs de oficio.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] People v. Macalma, 44 Phil., 170 Valentin Ilo, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 108 Phil., 938.