ISABEL Q. JUECO, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD FLORES, RESPONDENT.

BARRERA, J.:


This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated October 17, 1961, as well as
its resolution en banc of December 19, 1961 in WCC Case No. 226.

On April 21, 1958, respondent Felicidad Flores (claimant-mother of
the deceased Emiliano Flores) filed with the Department of Labor
(Regional Office No. 3) a complaint against Isabel Q. Jueco alleging, inter alia,
that the latter was the owner and operator of passenger pick-ups and
cargo trucks; that her son, the deceased Emiliano Flores, had been in
the employ of said Jueco as a truck helper from April 23, 1957; that on
April 25, 1957, while said deceased was “engaged in the performance of
his duty with other co-employees, he was pinned down between two trucks
owned and operated by petitioner, thereby “causing his death”; and that
she is entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
(Act No. 3428, as amended) in the sum of P4,000.00, but petitioner
refused and failed to pay her. Claimant prayed that judgment be
rendered against Jueco ordering the latter to pay her P4,000.00 as
compensation, and such other relief as may be just and proper.

To this complaint, petitioner filed an answer (on January 22. 1959)
alleging as special defenses that the deceased Emiliano Flores “has
never been employed” by her and, therefore’ “there existed no relation
of employer-employee between her and the deceased”; that petitioner as
owner of the truck involved in the accident wherein the deceased was
killed “has settled the claim” of respondent, the latter having
executed a document of release and waiver of entire satisfaction,
thereby releasing petitioner from any and all claims whatsoever, suits,
actions, and liabilities which have or may arise by reason of said
accident; and that whatever consideration was given by petitioner to
respondent in connection with the death of the deceased, was on account
of her subsidiary liability as employer of the driver of the truck that
caused the accidental death of the deceased, and not as alleged
employer of the deceased, because in truth and in fact, the deceased
“has never been employed” by petitioner. Petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.

Issues having been joined, the case was tried and after trial, the
Hearing Officer (Paulino S. Perez) rendered a decision (on October 29,
1959) finding that the deceased “worked for and in furtherance of the
business” of petitioner, and that he died “from accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment”, and consequently, his dependent
mother (herein respondent) was entitled to death benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. Petitioner was ordered to pay to respondent
the sums of P2,496.00 as compensation and P200.00 as burial expenses.

Dissatisfied with this decision of the Hearing Officer, petitioner
elevated the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. On October
17, 1961, the Commission rendered a decision modifying that of the
Hearing Officer, by ordering petitioner to pay to respondent P1,996.80
as compensation, P200.00 as burial expenses, and P149.76 as attorney’s
fees.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, on
the ground that the following findings of fact were not supported by
substantial evidence: (1) the employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and the deceased; and (2) the actual and full dependency of
respondent on the deceased at the time of the injury which caused his
death. Said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission in its resolution en banc of December 19, 1961.

On January 6, 1962, petitioner filed with us the present petition
for review. Petitioner claims that the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission erred:

(1) In finding; the existence of employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and the deceased son of the respondent
at the time of the accident, without any substantial evidence in
support thereof, substantial evidence being to the contrary.

(2)
In failing, contrary to law and precedents, to order the deduction from
the awarded amount of compensation of the sum of P400.00 admittedly
received by respondent from petitioner as re- presented by the waiver
and release. Annex C-1.

(3) In finding that respondent was
fully dependent upon Emiliano Flores at the time of the accident
without any substantial evidence in support thereof, substantial
evidence being to the contrary.

(4) In awarding the attorney’s fees as part of the decision in this case, without any basis in law.

In regard lo the first assigned error, we find the finding of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission as to the existence of
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the deceased at
the time of the accident, amply supported by substantial evidence. As
stated by the Commission:

“In denying any contractual relationship with the
deceased workman, the respondent (herein petitioner) swore that
although said Emiliano Flores was recommended by Pepito Banaga she did
not, in reality, hire him because it appeared that he was inexperienced
in the line of work he was applying for. To fortify her stand, the
respondent (herein petitioner) presented the payroll covering the
period from April 1 to April 30, 1957 (Exh. 2) which did not contain
the name Emiliano Flores. Respondent’s husband tried to corroborate
this testimony by saying that he was the only one who had the power to
hire new employees, and that Emiliano Flores was not known to him,
having heard his name only after the occurrence of the accident,

“We
cannot give any credit to the respondent’s defenses. The records of the
case clearly show that in the police investigation of the criminal
aspect of the accident, Pepito Banaga and Salvador Pulido issued
separate statements before the peace officer in charge of the case
wherein they repeatedly referred to Emiliano as their co-worker. It is
significant that these statements were given on the very day of the
accident, when the filing of a compensation claim was not yet even
thought of by the parties involved, a fact which discounts the
possibility that the affiants might have contrived to prejudice the
interests of the respondent. Although Pepito Banaga later tried to
impeach his own statements which were given before the peace officer,
nevertheless, he admitted that all the facts therein stated were
furnished by him. It appears that after the accident, Banaga
disappeared for a long time, and presented himself to his employer only
during the Christmas season of that year, for reasons which need not be
looked into. It was on this occasion that Banaga agreed to testify for
the respondent and on the strength of this assurance, the respondent
moved for a new trial of the case. As already adverted to above, Banaga
tried to retract his previous statements, by means of another affidavit
which was used by respondent in connection with a motion for new trial.
Considering the circumstances, we do not believe that what was said in
the affidavit last mentioned should, one way or another, influence our
conclusion on the matter before us. The same is true with the payroll
presented as evidence by the respondent. It was admitted that said
payroll was prepared on the first day of the month, and that the hours
of work and the corresponding wages earned are noted only at the end of
the month. There is no question that Emiliano Flores met his death on
April 25, 1957, that is, after the payroll had been prepared, and
before any entry in the hours work and wages could be made. The
claimant and the respondent are in agreement on the fact that Emiliano
presented himself for employment in the latter part of April, although
the evidence for the claimant, in effect, tried to show that it was on
April 23, 1957, contrary to respondent’s assertion that it was on
April. 25, 1957. These facts make it clear why Emiliano’s name did not
appear in the payroll presented by the respondent.

“The
reason advanced by respondent Isabel Jueco for her alleged refusal to
employ EmiHano appears to us to be flimsy and without basis. Having;
been orphaned at a Very tender age, Emiliano, then only 13 years old,
was forced by necessity to work in different lines of employment which
all demand manual exertion. As a matter of fact, he worked as truck
helper for a certain Mr. Flores in Bagac, Bataan, Because every
opportunity given Emiliano to work was a boon to claimant Felicidad
Flores, she had to come to Makati to make sure that what she heard
regarding her son’s new job was true. She was not disappointed, because
on the evening of April 23, 1957, her son assured her that he was
already working under the respondent. Mrs. Floras went home the next
day feeling, relieved and without the slightest premonition of the then
impending injury which was to take the life of her only Breadwinner,
When she learned about the death of her son, she immediately returned
to Makati, and with the aid of others, was able to get P400.00 from the
respondent which she spent in bringing the remains of her son to
their home province.

“Portions of the testimony of Felicidad
Flores appear to he hearsay, but we cannot let this fact have any
material effect on the outcome of the case, because what have been
disclosed by them, were substantially corroborated by other evidence.
It should be remembered that this Commission and the Hearing Officers
taking cognizance of Workmen’s Compensation cases are not hound by
technical rules of procedure. * * *

“Because of the death of
Emiliano Flores, the respondent had all the opportunity to deny any
relations with him during his life-time. The only persons who could
shed light on the issue as to why Emiliano was actually working on the
day he met the fatal accident, have turned their backs on his
dependents. Under these circumstances, we arc inclined to tilt the
scale of justice in favor of the claimant, who by constitutional
mandate, should be afforded the protection of the state. * * *.”

The third assigned error is also untenable. On this point, the Workmen’s Compensation observed that;

“In the first place, it should be stated that we are
fully convinced that the claimant herein was wholly dependent upon her
deceased son during the lifetime of the latter. The fact that there
were times when deceased Emiliano Flores was out of work can not alter
the status of dependency upon him of his mother, because in truth, he
was his mother’s sole bread-winner. We agree to the contention that
from time to time the claimant was the recipient of financial aid from
her brother when her son was not working, but this circumstance would
not be sufficient to make her a legal dependent of said brother. From
the point of view of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, as long as one is
wholly dependent upon the earnings of a deceased workmen at the time of
the latter’s death, he or she should be entitled to the full benefit
provided by law. In other words, the controlling factor in the
determination of whether one should be considered fully dependent or
merely partially is the extent of his or her dependency at the time of
death of the workmen depended upon. In this case there can be no
question that the claimant’s subsistence was wholly anchored on the
income of her deceased son at the time he met an untimely death.”

We also find the fourth assigned error devoid of merit. We fully
agree in the following reasoning of the “Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and adopt it as our own:

“Another assigned error in the instant, petition for
review is that ‘the award, of attorney’s fees has no basis in law’.
This contention is devoid of merit. In addition to the Civil Code
provisions regarding attorney’s fees in workmen’s compensation cases
(Art. 2208[8]), certain provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Laws,
as amended, clearly show that the respondent is the one who should
legally shoulder the payment of attorney’s fees ordered by the
Commission in the instant case. Pursuant to an established rule in
statutory construction, provisions of law should be construed or read,
in relation to other provisions of the same law. Section 31 of Act No.
3428, as amended, is silent as to who should shoulder the payment of
attorney’s fees provided therein. However, if we construe the
provisions of this section, in relation to those of Sections 7, 29, and
47 of the same law, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that
the respondent or .employer in a workmen’s compensation case should be
adjudged liable to pay attorney’s fees, if they are found liable to pay
compensation under the Act. Sections 7 and 29 of the Act prohibit the
diminution of compensation which is legally clue the claimant. Should
the claimant be ordered to pay attorney’s fees, the order would, in
effect, be out of harmony with the intention of the law to keep intact
the compensation provided for in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. One of
the enumerated powers and duties of the Commission under Section 47 of
the Act is the power to fix attorney’s fees, which carries with it the
necessary connotation that the Commission may designate the party who
should pay said attorney’s fees. Section 47 provides in part:

‘Sec. 47. General powers and duties.—The Commissioner shall have full power and authority;

* * * * * * *

‘(b)
To hear and determine all claims for compensation under this Act in the
manner herein provided; to require and order medical service for
injured employees provided herein; to approve and fix attorney’s fees
and claims for medical services; * * *.’

“The commissioner’s power to fix attorney’s fees goes hand in hand with
its power to fix claims for medical expenses. In as much as the
reimbursement of medical expenses is a liability imposed upon an
employer or respondent, it stands to reason that the respondent should
also be held liable for the payment of attorney’s fees.”

However, we find some merit in petitioner’s second assigned error.
True it is, that during the hearing of the case, petitioner had
declared that she gave the amount of P400.00 in question, not as
advanced payment of compensation, but in compliance with the provision
of another law prescribing subsidiary liabilities of the employer of a
driver causing injury in a motor vehicle accident. But the fact remains
that petitioner, as employer of the deceased Emiliano Flores has been
adjudged by the Work- men’s Compensation Commission liable to pay to
respondent compensation for the death of her son under the provisions
of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and not under the provision of
another law. Therefore, in the interest of justice and in fairness to
petitioner, said amount of P400.00 should, for all legal intents and
purposes, be considered as an advance payment of the compensation
(P1,996.80) adjudged by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in this
case. Consequently, said amount of P400.00 should be deducted from the
amount of P1,996.80 which the Commission had ordered petitioner to pay
as compensation to respondent.

Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the decision and resolution
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission appealed from, are hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción,
Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur