G.R. No. L-22682. July 23, 1968
GORGONIO PABILING, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ISIDORO PARINACIO, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
A conflict between a sales application filed by Petitioner Gorgonio Pabiling and a homestead
application of Crisanto Parinacio
predecessor in interest of herein respondent Isidoro Parinacio having been decided by the Director of Lands –
hereinafter referred to as the Director – in favor of Pabiling,
an appeal was taken by Crisanto Parinacio
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources – hereinafter referred
to as the Secretary – who reversed the decision of the Director and rendered
another decision in favor of the heirs of Crisanto Parinacio, who had died meanwhile. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration
of the latter decision, Pabiling filed, with the
Court of First Instance of Isabela – hereinafter
referred to as the CFI – this civil action for certiorari, against Isidoro Parinacio, the Director
and the Secretary, to annul the latter’s decision and his order denying said
motion for reconsideration, to revive the decision of the Director and to
recover from Isidoro Parinacio
the possession of the disputed land, as well as damages. The CFI having, in due course, rendered
judgment dismissing the case, with double costs against Pabiling,
the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, upon submission of the case
for decision on the merits, certified the records to the Supreme Court, upon
the ground that the issues raised in the appeal are purely questions of law.
Petitioner alleges that the lower court erred:
1.
“x x
x in denying petitioner’s motion for postponement of
the first day of the trial of the case set on January 29, 1962.
2.
“x x
x in holding that the appeal of the decision of the
respondent Director of Lands to the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources by the respondent Isidoro Parinacio was perfected on time.
3.
“x x
x with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in affirming the decision of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources which decision is not supported by the
evidence on records and the law and jurisprudence governing the present case.
4.
“x x
x in not holding that the appellant is the real and
absolute owner of the land in question by virtue of prior occupation and valid
title to the said land.
5.
“x x
x in holding that the amicable settlement Exhibit 1
has the force and effect of res judicata
between the appellant and the respondent Parinacio.
“
With reference to the first assignment of error, it appears that,
when this case was called for trial in the CFI, on January 29, 1962, Pabiling’s counsel moved for postponement, upon the ground
that Pabiling was not present, owing, perhaps, to
“inability to get a transportation from his place or x x
due to circumstances beyond his control.
The Court denied the motion; but, instead of proceeding immediately
with the hearing, it called a recess, “to give counsel a chance to wait
for his client.” When the session was resumed later, that same day, said
counsel stated that, “in order to facilitate the termination of this
case”, he would “just present our documentary evidence, ” which
he did. Thereupon, respondents proceeded
to introduce similar evidence, which formed part of the records of the Bureau
of Lands. After the presentation of
certified copies of said documents and the filing of memoranda by both parties,
the CFI rendered its aforementioned decision, from which, after the denial of a
motion for reconsideration thereof, Pabiling
interposed the present appeal.
It is clear from the foregoing that the first assignment of error
is devoid of merit, for: 1) Pabiling’s failure to
appear before the trial Court has not been explained, much less justified; 2)
no effort has ever been made to show that his testimony, if introduced in
evidence, would probably change the result of the case; 3) no petition for new
trial, to introduce said testimony, has been filed; and 4) Pabiling’s
testimony had been introduced in the Bureau of Lands – hereinafter referred to
as the Bureau – and formed part of the documentary evidence presented in the
CFI and considered by the same.
Moreover, this being an action for certiorari, based upon the
theory that the decision of the Secretary is “null and void, for being
contrary to evidence, law and jurisprudence”, no other evidence than that
which the Secretary had before him should be considered in the determination
of the case. Indeed, “the findings
of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid before him, for
that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to substitute for
the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the discretion and judgment of the
court, to whom the statute had not entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present action
should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari, in
either event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the
Secretary, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a
trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive
findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the law, and are free
from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence.
x x x“[1]
As regards the second assignment of error, the records show that
the decision of the Director is dated June 15, 1959; that copy of said decision
was sent by registered mail, in Manila, on July 6, 1959, addressed to “Crisanto Parinacio, c/o Santiago Parinacio, Cordon, Isabela;
” and that the envelope containing said copy was received at the post
office of Cordon, Isabela, on July 9, 1959. Inasmuch as Parinacio’s
notice of appeal from said decision is dated December 7, 1959, Pabiling
concludes that the appeal had not been perfected within the period of 60 days
prescribed in the rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources – hereinafter referred to as the Department.
Pabiling insists in this pretense –
despite the fact that the envelope containing copy of the decision of the
Director was returned “unclaimed” to its sender – upon the ground
that the postmaster of Cordon, Isabela – who is
presumed to have complied with his duty – must have sent the corresponding notice
to the addressee and that the latter is deemed to have received said decision
upon expiration of five (5) days from receipt of said notice, which, Pabiling further assumes, must have been more than 60 days
before December 7, 1959.
This process of reasoning presupposes, however, that the
addressee had received said notice, on which there is absolutely no
evidence. And there could have been no
possible receipt of such notice by its addressee, namely, “Mr. Crisanto Parinacio c/o Santiago Parinacio, Cordon, Isabela,
” because:1) Crisanto Parinacio
had died on December 4, 1957, and the Director’s attention was called thereto,
on June 18, 1959, and the deceased was, accordingly substituted, in the
administrative proceedings in the Bureau, by his heirs, represented by herein
respondent, Isidoro Parinacio;1 2) no person by the name of
Santiago Parinacio existed in Cordon, Isabela.; and 3) according to the records of the Bureau,
the address of Crisanto Parinacio
is Inanama, Angadanan,
Isabela, so that, even if alive, he could not have
possibly received the notice from the postmaster of Cordon.
Besides, since the Parinacios were
represented, in the Bureau, by counsel, the notice should have been sent to the
latter, not to his client. At any rate,
the CFI found that Isidoro Parinacir
did not know of said decision until the last week of October 1959, when
Patrolman Isidro Zuniga of Isabela inquired from him
about the identity of the Santiago Parinacio, who
turned out to be a non existent person.
In short, there is nothing to show that either the Director or the
Secretary had erred in giving due course to Paris
appeal from the former’s decision.
Being interrelated, the last three assignments of error will be
discussed jointly, for they refer to the merits of the case. The pertinent facts are:
Pabiling had, in 1932, filed, with the
Bureau, a sales application for a tract of land of about 32 hectares, located
in the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela. This
application and that of one. Lorenzo Sumen, were in conflict with a sales application of Marcel
Villanueva, Said conflict was, on October 3, 1936, decided, adversely to the
latter, by the Director, who rejected Villanueva’s application and gave due
course to the applications of Pabiling and Sume On November 23, 1938, Sumen
sold his improvements on the land covered by his application to Valentin Nacino, in view of which
the Director cancelled Sumen’s a application and
accepted the sales application of Nacino, with
reference only to a portion of the land covered by the same and known as Lot
No. 7333 of the Santiago Cadaster, the rest of said
land being still unsurveyed.
Subsequently, Nacino died and, claiming
to have succeeded to his rights under said application, his father-in-law, Crisanto Parinacio, addressed a
communication to the Director complaining about Pabiling’s
alleged refusal to recognize his (Parinacio’s) rights
over said unsurveyed tract of land. This led to an investigation by the Bureau,
which culminated in a compromise agreement embodied in a joint affidavit,
Exhibit 1, dated October 20, 1947, and acknowledged, by both parties, before
Junior Public Lands Inspector Marcelino Hernaez, whereby Pabiling
relinquished, in favor of Crisanto Parinacio, whatever rights and interests the former had
over the area actually held by the latter, as set forth in a sketch appearing
on the back of said instrument.
Accordingly, the District Land Officer issued an order, dated November 29, 1947, dropping Parinacio’s aforementioned protest and amending Pabiling’s application, by excluding therefrom
the area covered by said agreement. In
conformity with the same, soon later, or on May 3, 1948, a homestead application1 filed by Parinacio,
on October 21, 1947, for
said area, was approved. In due course
thereafter, an order for the issuance of a patent therefor,
in favor of Parinacio, was issued on April 30, 1953.
Meanwhile, the public auction for the sale of the land covered by
Pabiling’s application had been held in 1949 and said
land was formally awarded to him on September
20, 1951. Sometime later, or
6n June 21, 1953, Pabiling protested against Parinacio’s aforementioned homestead application, upon the
ground that it had been filed through stealth and machinations, the land
therein applied for having allegedly been held by Parinacio
with his (Pabiling’s) permission. The Director decided the issue in favor of Pabiling, but, on appeal taken by the Parinacios,
the Secretary reversed the Director’s decision and found for the Parinacios, stating
“x x x During
the investigation of his protest, appellee Pabiling repudiated the terms of the joint affidavit and
maintained that what he agreed to relinquish was an area eighty (80) meters
distant from the boundary line of Santiago and Angadanan
(Alicia), along the Nagbacalan Creek to a balala tree; that the distance was actually measured by the
parties without the presence of the Junior Land Inspector concerned who
remained in the house of Parinacio while they were
measuring the area; that at the time they signed the affidavit there was no
sketch appearing at the back thereof.
“On the other hand, the Junior Public Land Inspector concerned
testified that he actually measured the area together with the parties and the
two others and after which he prepared the affidavit and have the same
translated to the parties by one Pedro Leano, a tax
collector who happened to be present at the time and who likewise affixed his
signature to the affidavit; and that he was quite positive, that at the time
the parties affixed their signatures the sketch was already drawn at the back
of said document.
“This case hinges on the appreciation of the probative value
of the joint affidavit in the light of the surrounding facts relevant thereto.
“Uncontroverted is the fact that at
the time of the ocular investigation on October 20, 1947 leading to the
amicable settlement, Parinacio was found to be in
actual occupation of the area in controversy (portion “B” shown in
the sketch drawn at the back hereof) and to have fully improved the same. Uncontroverted also
is the fact that at the time of the ocular investigation conducted sometime in
1954 by reason of the protest of appellee Pabiling, Parinacio was still in
actual occupation of the same area.
These facts certainly are strong and convincing reasons for us to give
faith and credit to the aforesaid joint affidavit. If it were true that the sketch appearing in
said joint affidavit did not express the true area relinquished by appellee Pabiling, he could have
immediately protested against the continued occupation and possession of Parinacio of the controverted
area as he is just staying in portion “A” (See sketch), adjacent to
the said area occupied by Parinacio, and as thus
situated, he can be considered to have been fully aware of what was taking place. But this he failed to do and instead he
tolerated Parinacio’s continued occupancy and only
protested in 1953 after a lapse of five (5) years and nine (9) months from the
execution of the amicable settlement on October 2, 1947.
This circumstance would compel us to conclude that he respected the
said joint affidavit and recognized the rights of Parinacio
over the said area for the said period, and after which he decided to change
his mind and repudiated the affidavit.
“Moreover, appellee Pabiling’s claim that he relinquished only an area of
eighty (80) meters wide from the Santiago-Angadanan
boundary, along the Nagbacalan Creek, to a Balala tree, cannot be relied upon as that is only the
measure of the distance of only one side of the area, leaving us entirely in
the dark to conjecture the distances of the other sides of the area, if we are
to sustain his claim and segregate the true area he relinquished in favor of Parinacio.
“In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from should be, as hereby its, set aside. Sales Application No. 16263 (E?V-793)
of Gorgonio Pabiling should
be, as hereby it is, amended, by excluding therefrom
portion “B” shown in the sketch drawn at the back hereof, and as
thus amended, the said application and H. A. No. V-8447 (E-V-7884) of Crisanto Parinacio, now his
heirs, covering said portion “B” shall be given further due course.
It is urged that the findings of fact made by the Director are more
weighty than those of the Secretary, because the former had observed the behaviour of the witnesses whom the latter has not
seen. Their testimony was taken,
however, in the presence of neither the Director nor the Secretary, but before
subordinate officers of the Bureau.
Besides, a decision of the Director is conclusive upon question’s of
facts and not subject to review by the courts if affirmed by the
Secretary and supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, said decision was not
affirmed by the Secretary. Worse still,
it was set aside and reversed by the latter, who, by law, has control
over the Director, whose decisions must, accordingly, yield to those of the
Secretary
Then, again, Pabiling’s case is
anchored upon his testimony, to the effect that he had not understood the
contents of the aforementioned compromise agreement – subscribed and sworn to
by him and Crisanto Parinacio
before Bureau of Lands Inspector Marcelino Hernaez on
October 20, 1947 – in which be (Pabiling) relinquished, in favor of Parinacio, whatever rights and interests he (Pabiling) had over the land described in the sketch
appearing on the back of said instrument.
Pabiling would now have us believe, further,
that said sketch did not exist when he affixed his signature on Exhibit 1.
This testimony was contradicted, however, by that of Inspector Hernaez, who positively affirmed that the sketch was
already on said document when the parties thereto signed thereon and that,
before the did so, he saw to it that its contents were properly translated to
and understood by them. Considering the
other factors set forth in the decision of the Secretary, it cannot be said
that he erred in attaching more weight to the testimony of said inspector, than
to that of Pabiling.
In fact, even if the Secretary had, hypothetically, erred in the
appreciation of the relative veracity and weight of the testimony of said
witnesses, this would not render him guilty of a “grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction”, warranting the issuance of the
writ of certiorari prayed for herein.1
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against petitioner-appellant, Gorgonio Pabiling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1] Lovina v. Moreno,
L-17821, November 29, 1963.
1
See Exh. 18, p. 108, Record of Exhibits.
1
No, V-8447 (E-V-7884).
1
Aureus v. Sec. of Agri.
& Nat. Resources, L-2367, Nov. 11, 1949; 85 Phil. 1,5; Julian v.
Apostol, 52 Phil. 422; De Guzman vs. De Guzman,
L-11627, June 25, 1958; Heirs of B.A. Crumb v. Rodriguez, L-7954, March
31, 1959; Denopol v. Dir. of Lands, L-13829,
Nov. 28, 1959, citing Alejo v. Garchitorena, L-2326, May 31, 1949; Ganitano
v. Sec. of Agri. & Natural Resources,
L-21107, March 31, 1966.