HIDPION P. DEL ROSARIO AND AMADO SAÑEZ, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, MIGUEL YUVIENCO, DOMINADOR CAMERINO AND JOSE MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Direct appeal, taken by petitioners, Hidpion
P. del Rosario and Amado   from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, dismissing their petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, to annul certain acts and orders of respondent, Dominad Camerino, as Municipal
Mayor of Imus, Cavite, and
to enjoin him and respondent, Abelardo Subido, as Acting Commissioner of Civil Service –
hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner – from re­moving or separating said
petitioners from their respective position as Chief of Police and Police
Lieutenant, respectively, of Imus, as well as to
compel respondents Miguel Yuvienco and Jose Mendoza, as Provincial Treasurer of Cavite and Municipal Treasurer of Imus
– hereinafter referred to as Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasure
respectively, to pay the salaries of the aforementioned petitioners, and to
recover attorney’s fees and costs.

There is no dispute on the facts, the parties having stipu­lated
thereon, in addition to submitting documentary evidence.

The record shows that on October I, 1963, Dominador
C. Ilano, as Mayor of Imus,
Cavite,
issued a “permanent” appointmen in favor of petitioner Amado J. Sañez promoting him from
“T? Sergeant to Police Lieutenant” of Imus,
effective on the same date. 
“Attested pursuant to section 23 ( )^[1]
of Republic Act 2260″, by the Provincial Treasurer, said appointment was forwarded
to the Commissioner, who, however, returned it, without his approval, to
the Provincial Treasurer, for lack of certain papers required therefor.

On October 31, 1963,
Mayor Ilano extended, in favor of petitioner Hidpion P. del Rosario, a “permanent” appointment as Chief of Police of
Imus, Cavite,
effective on November 21, 1963.  “Attested pursuant to section 24(b) of
Republic Act No. 2260,” by the Provin­cial Treasurer, it was subsequently
“approved under section 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260″, by
the Commissioner.  Both Del Rosario and Sañez, who had
merely the civil service eligibility for “patrol­man”, assumed office
on the dates of their respective appointments.

On
January 9, 1964, Dominador Camerino,
as new Mayor of Imus, notified Del Rosario, in
writing, that his “services and provisional appointment as Chief of
Police” were thereby “terminat­ed”, effective “at
the close of office hours” of said date, upon the ground of “lack of
appropriate civil service eligibility as Chief of Police”, and “lack of
confidence”, at the same time “offering” him the position of “patrolman”,
for which
he was eligible, with the warning that he would be deemed to have turned
down the offer,, un­less he otherwise advised the writer before the close of
office hours on
January 10, 1964.  Soon later, Del
Rosario received a letter of Mayor Camerino,
dated January
14, 1960, inviting
attention to a first indorsement of the Commissioner,
of January 13, 1960, stating that Del Rosario’s appointment as Chief of Police had
been “approved under provisional status pursuant to section 24(c) of Republic Act 2260, his eligibility not
being appropriate for the position involved”; that “the records x x x fail to show”
that he had taken “the Chief of Police (Municipalities) examination”; and that
“in view thereof, the termination” of his services “as
Chief of Police is deemed in order.” A similar notice of termination of
services and offer of appointment as “patrolman” were served upon and made to Sañez, on January 14, 1964, except that the only
ground stated for said termination of hi, “services and provisional appointment” was his “lack of appror iate civil service eligibility
as Police Lieutenant”, and that his deadline for acceptance of the
offer was January 15, 1964.

Despite
these notices, Del Rosario and Sañez refused
to relinquish
their respective positions as Chief of Police and Police Lieut­enant of Imus; but payment of their-salaries as such was withheld
since January 7 and 16, 1964, respectively.  Hence, on January 20, they commenced the
present action, in the Court of First instance of Cavite, against the Commissioner,
the Provincial Treasurer, Mayor Camerino, and the
Municipal Treasurer.  Upon the filing of
a Pl, 00U bond, said court
issued, on the same date, a writ of pre­liminary injunction restraining the
Commissioner and Mayor Camerino “from enforcing their orders for the
termination” of petitioners’ services.

Soon thereafter, or on January 24, 1964, the Civil Service
Commission certified that “there are Chief of Police eligibles
who are residents of Cavite available from the
register established from the Chief of Police (Municipalities) examination held
in Manila on November 23, 1963,” Then, or on February 16, 1964, Mayor Came­rino extended a “permanent” appointment, in
favor of one Artemio Candalla
– a member of the police force of Manila, who had passed “the Chief of
Police (Municipalities) entrance examination held on November 23, 1963, with a
rating of 79.9” – as Chief of Police of Imus,
“to take effect upon approval by the Commissioner of Civil Service.”

After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered judgment
holding that, being, at best “provisional” in nature, peti­tioners’
appointments were subject to termination at any time and, consequently,
dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioners, as well as
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued on Jan­uary 20, 1964, and
ordered the payment of petitioners’ respective salaries, up to and including
the date of notice of said decision.  A
motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, petitioners appealed
directly to the Supreme Court “on pure questions of law.”

They now alleged that the
lower court erred:  1) in not hold­ing
that their appointments are permanent; 2) in holding that provisional
appointees may, like temporary appointees, be summarily removed from office,
even without cause; and 3) in “not ordering the payment of the salaries of
petitioners-appellants.”

It is true that Mayor Ilano had
extended “permanent” appoint­ments to petitioners herein; that Del
Rosario’s appointment was at­tested,
also, as permanent by the provincial treasurer; and that the latter, likewise,
attested the appointment of Sañez, without specify­ing
the nature of the attestation they; given – whether “permanent”,
“provisional”, or “temporary”.  It is no less true, however, that, in this
connection, the Provincial Treasurer had acted as “deputy” of the Commissioner
of Civil Service, “for the purpose of attesting, in accordance with Civil Service Law
and rules, appointments made by provincial
governors and municipal mayors; ” that, consequently, said appointments,
as thus attested, which shall be “forwarded within ten days to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, for review pursuant to Civil Service Law
and rules, ” are subject to “correction or re­vision, ” by the
Commissioner of Civil Service within “one hundred eighty days after
receipt” thereof;1 that in
the exercise of this au­thority, the Commissioner had corrected or revised the
action of the provincial treasurer and attested Del Rosario’s
“permanent” appointment as a “provisional” one, for he had
not qualified in an examination “appropriate” for Chiefs of Police,
but otherwise met “the requirements for appointment to a regular position
in the com­petitive service, ” for he possessed the civil service
eligibility for “patrolman”; and that the appointment of Sañez was, not only not attested by the Commissioner,
but returned, for non-compliance with certain requirements.  It is, also worthy of notice that peti­tioners
have not appealed from the action thus taken by the Commis­sioner,2 so that the correctness thereof cannot now be
assailed by them; that Del Rosario cannot deny the provisional” nature of
his appointment, which is in line with the letter and spirit of section 24(c)
of Republic Act 22603;3 and that,
for the same reason, Sañez cannot claim a better status than that of a
provisional appointee.

It is argued that pursuant to section 2Z66 of the Revised
Administrative Code,4 only one
examination for admission to the police service shall be held and that Del
Rosario’s civil service eligibility as “patrolman” is, therefore,
sufficient to qualify him for a permanent appointment as chief of police.  Said
provision does not prohibit, however, the holding of different examinations for
dif­ferent ranks in the police force.  It
merely requires that there be, at least, one qualifying examination for said force.

Moreover, the provisions of the Administrative Code con­cerning
police forces, including said section 2266, should now be interpreted in
harmony with, if not considered amended or repealed by the Civil Service Act of
1959,1 the provisions of which “embrace all branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government”,2
including, accordingly, local governments. 
Said Act classifies of­ficers and employees of the Government into three
(3) categories, namely:  1) those “exempt” from the
provisions of said
Act; 2) those in the “competitive or classified service”; and
3) those in the “non?competitive or unclassified service”.

The competitive or classified service is said to “include positions for
appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination
is required.”3 Under his authority, inter
alia, “to enforce, execute, and carry out
the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system”,
underlying the Civil Service Law; to “supervise the preparation and
rating” and “control all civil service examinations in the
Philippines”, as well as,
“with the approval of the President, to prescribe, amend and enforce
suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions” of
said Act; and to exercise “exclusive jurisdiction over the approval
under the Civil Service Law and rules of all appointments including
promotions to positions in the competitive service,”4 the
Commissioner has prescribed special examinations for chiefs of police of cities
and municipalities, distinct from that prescribed for, patrolmen thereof or
from that required for police lieutenants, and one who has passed the civil
service examination for “patrolman” is not eligible for permanent
appointment as “police lieutenant”, much less for “chief
of police”, for, “x x x qualification in
an  appropriate examination shall
be required for appointment to positions in the competitive or classified service in accordance
with the civil service rules.”1

Hence, “x.x x except as otherwise provided by law, eligi­bility
in a certain examination shall serve as qualification for appointment only
to the position or positions for which the examination was held and no
horizontal or vertical conversion of the eligibility or examination rating
shall be allowed x x x,
“2 and “x x x a perma­nent appointment shall be issued to a person who
has met all the re­quirements of the position to which he seeks
appointment in accor­dance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and
standards promulgated in pursuance thereto x x
x.”3

In short, the “permanent” appointments, made by Mayor Ilano, of Del Rosario, as Chief of Police, and, of Sañez; as “Police Lieutenant”, could not be
attested to except, at best, as “provision­al” appointments.

Petitioners insist that, unlike “temporary” appointees,
“provisional” appointees may not be removed except for cause; but, it
is not necessary for us to pass upon this question, inasmuch as “a pro­visional
appointment shall, in no case extend beyond thirty (30) days from receipt by
the appointing officer of the certification of eligi­bles,”4 and such certification not merely of the
availability of eligibles for appointment as Chief of
Police, in general, but, also, of eligibles residing
in Cavite, in particular – was received by Mayor Camerino on June 24, 1964, thus confirming the first indorsement of the Civil Service-Commission dated January
13, 1964, de­claring that the termination of Del Rosario’s services as Chief of
Police is “in order”.  In fact,
it is not disputed that Artemio S. Candalla, whom Mayor Camerino
appointed as Chief of Police, on February
16, 1964, had “qualified in the Chief of Police (Municipal­ities)
entrance examination held on November
23, 1963 with a rating of 79.9%”.

Thus, even if a provisional appointee were not removable except for
cause, petitioner Del Rosario would not be entitled to the writ prayed for,
because his right to hold office as chief of police expired on January 14,
1964, when he received the Commissioner’s indorsement
of January 13, 1964, or, at the latest, on February 24, 1964, the thirtieth day
after receipt by Mayor Carnerino of the above
mentioned certification of availability of eligibles
for appointment as Chief of Police.

As regards petitioner Sañez, his
appointment as Police Lieutenant had not been even attested by the
Commissioner, who returned it for non-compliance with applicable
requirements.  What is more, it is not
claimed that such act of the Commissioner is con­trary to law or that said
requirements had been complied with.  It
is thus clear that Sañez has no cause of action
against respondents herein.

Being a mere consequence of the first two (2) assignments of
error, which have been disposed of, petitioners’ third assignment of error
needs no further discussion.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against petitioners, Hidpion P. del
Rosario and Amado Sañez.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The parenthesis was left blank.

1 Section 20, Republic Act 2260.

2 
See Section 18(b), Republic Act 2260.

3 Reading:  “A provisional appointment may be issued
upon the prior authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and the rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto
to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who
otherwise meets the requirements for appoint­ment to a regular position in the
competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is
necessary in the interest of the service and there is no appropriate
register of eligibles at the time of appointment.”

4 Which provides:  “An examination for admission to the
police service shall be held in each province during the month of January of
every year; and it shall be the duty of each secretary, by authority of his
board and at such time as it shall determine, to give public notice of the
place, day, and hour therefor.”

1 Republic Act 2260.

2 Section 3, Republic Act 2260.

3 Section 4, Republic Act 2260.

4 Section 16 (b), (c), (e) and
(h).

1 Section 23, Republic Act
2260.

2 Section 8, Rule IV of the
Civil Service Rules.

3 Section 24(b), Republic
Act 2260.

4 Rule VI of the Civil
Service Rules.