G.R. No. L-23796. July 23, 1968
LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY BRANCH IX AND BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original action, for
“certiorari, prohibition and injunction”, to annul an order of the
Court of Appeals and restrain the same from further proceedings in case CA-G.
R. No. 34826-R. thereof.
The record shows that,
after investigating an alleged mauling of one Manuel Abella,
in Quezon City, on October 3, 1964, Benjamin M. Grecia, as Assistant Fiscal of said City, filed, in
connection therewith, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch – hereinafter referred to as CFI –
presided over by Hon. Lourdes P.
San Diego, Judge, an information – which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-6029 of said CFI – for frustrated murder, against Juancho
G. Gutierrez, Celedonio P. Cayado
alias Tony Cayado, Alfonso D. Tagle alias Panchito Alba,
Benjamin A. Johnson, Eliseo C. Estanislao
and three (3) other persons designated in said pleading as John Doe, Richard
Doe and Peter Doe.
Among those implicated in
the alleged mauling were Modesto Obispo and Cipriano Valeriano, Assistant City Fiscal and member of the Police
Force respectively, of Quezon City; but they were not
named specifically in the information for the reason – stated in a letter of
the City Fiscal to the Secretary of Justice, hereinafter referred to as the
Secretary – “that only the victim Manuel Abella
identified them, while his two other witnesses were negative in their
identification of the two, aside from the fact that they were able to present
witnesses to show that they did not participate in the mauling. ” The City
Fiscal further stated, in his letter, that the investigation had been set, for
continuation thereof, on October 5, 1964, and that, owing to the danger that
any action taken thereon by his office may be “misinterpreted”,
because a member of his staff – Assistant Fiscal Obispo – was involved, he (the
City Fiscal) requested that a special prosecutor of the Department of Justice –
hereinafter referred to as the Department – be designated “to continue x x said investigation.
Accordingly, on October
5, 1964, the Secretary designated State Prosecutor, Francisco
Villa, “to assist the city fiscal of Quezon City in the investigation
and prosecution of all the persons responsible for the alleged mauling of
Manuel Abella x
x x.” On the
same date, Villa proceeded to conduct the investigation, which he resumed on October 7, 1964. Thereupon, he recommended to the Secretary
the dismissal of the case, in so far as Obispo and Valeriano
were concerned, upon the ground that Manuel Abella
had refused to testify. This
recommendation was, however, disapproved by the Secretary, who instructed the
prosecution to do everything possible to secure Abella’s
testimony. Hence, on October 13, 1964, the city fiscal
issued a memorandum directing Grecia and Villa to sit
together and resume the investigation,
as well as report thereon.
On October
19, 1964, the defendants designated in the information by
their true names were arraigned before the CFI.
On this occasion, Judge San
Diego asked Assistant Fiscal Grecia, about the
identity of the persons referred to in said pleading as John Doe, Richard Doe
and Peter Doe Grecia replied that the first two (2)
were Assistant City Fiscal Modesto Obispo and Patrolman Cipriano
Valeriano, respectively – hereinafter referred to
collectively as the respondents.
Thereupon, Judge San Diego authorized Grecia
to cross out the conventional names John Doe and Richard Doe, in the
information, and write, instead, “Fiscal Modesto Obispo” and
Patrolman Cipriano Valeriano“,
which Grecia did.
Then, the warrants for their arrest were issued, on motion of Grecia.
Respondents forthwith moved to set aside said warrants of arrest,
but, the motion was denied on October
20, 1964; whereupon, respondents posted their respective bail
bonds, and moved to quash the information, upon the ground of absence of a
preliminary investigation and the consequent lack of authority to file said
pleading. After listening to the
argument of respondents counsel, when said motion was heard on October 31, 1964, Judge San Diego
stated that, “not being founded on the grounds provided by the Rules of
Court, ” the motion would “have to be denied. ” As said counsel
requested some time to file a motion for reconsideration, Judge San Diego remarked that she saw no need therefor, if the arguments adduced that morning would
merely be reiterated. She, however,
allowed Atty. Marvin Hill to appear as amicus curiae and
submit, not later than November 2,
1964, a memorandum in support of said motion to quash. Judge San Diego
further announced that the written order thereon would be issued on November 4, 1964 – as, in fact, it
was then issued – on which date respondents would be arraigned and should be
ready for trial.
Respondents, however, filed, with the Court of Appeals, on November 2, 1964, a petition,
docketed as CA-G. R. No. 34826-R, for “certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, ” to annul the information against them and restrain Judge San
Diego and Assistant Fiscal Grecia from proceeding
with their (respondents’ arraignment and trial in said Criminal Case No.
Q-6029. On November 3, 1964, a division
of the Court of Appeals passed a resolution requiring said Judge and Assistant
Fiscal to answer the petition therein and, upon the filing of a P500 bond,
issued a “summons with” the “writ of preliminary
injunction” prayed for by respondents herein.
On November 12, 1964, Judge San Diego and Assistant Fiscal Grecia, in turn, filed, with the Supreme Court, the present
action for “certiorari, prohibition and injunction, ” against the
respondents and the Members of the Division of the Court of Appeals that passed
said resolution and authorized the issuance of the writ aforementioned, to
annul both, upon the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. As prayed for in the
petition herein, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Court of
Appeals from further proceedings in said CA-G. R. No. 34826-R.
Respondents alleged in their petition therein that the amended
information against them is null and void:
(1) because they were given no preliminary investigation, before being
included in said pleading, and (2) because Grecia
allegedly “lost all authority to amend the information” by including
therein respondents herein.
The infirmity of the last ground was manifest on the very face of
said petition. Indeed, respondents quoted therein section 2 of Republic Act No. 1198, pursuant to which “State Attorneys
shall only assist or collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal or city
attorney unless otherwise expressly directed and authorized by the Secretary of
Justice, ” and it is not alleged in said pleading that the latter had thus
“otherwise expressly directed and authorized state attorney” Villa,
as regards the alleged mauling of Manuel Abella. In fact, Villa was merely “designated to
assist the City Fiscal of Quezon City, ”
so that the latter, and, on his behalf, Assistant Fiscal Grecia
retained control over the prosecution in Criminal Case No. Q-6029.
With respect to the first ground, it is worthy of notice that the
Constitution does not require the holding of preliminary investigations. The right thereto exists only, if and when
created by statute. When so
created, the absence of a preliminary investigation – if it is not waived – may
amount to a denial of due process.
In this connection,
Section 38 of the Revised Charter of Quezon City
reads:
“Every person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be
brought before the City Attorney, the municipal court, or the Court of First
Instance for preliminary hearing, release on bail, or trial. x x x In case triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant
shall not be entitled as of right to preliminary examination in any
case where the Fiscal of the city, after a due investigation of, the facts,
shall have presented an information
against him in proper form. But
the Court of First Instance may make such summary investigation into the case
as it may deem necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether
the offense is bailable. “
Thus, the defendant in a case “triable
only in the Court of First Instance” of Quezon
City, “shall not be entitled as of right to preliminary
investigation x x
x where the Fiscal of the City, after due
investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in,
proper form.” In the case at bar,
such investigation had been conducted and said “information in proper
form” was filed by the “Fiscal of the City. “ Hence, the action of Assistant Fiscal Grecia in inserting, in the information in Criminal Case
No. Q-6029, the true names of those accused therein as John Doe and Richard
Doe, and the authority given therefor by Judge San
Diego, are violative of neither the Fundamental Law
nor the statutes, and do not constitute a denial of due process.
In other words the petition in CA-G. R. No. 34826-R failed to set
up a cause of action, because the law relevant to the subject-matter of every
pleading – and, hence, the Revised Charter of Quezon
City, as regards said petition – must be considered as part and parcel of the
allegations thereof,[1]
and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals had
abused, therefore, its discretion so gravely as to have exceeded its
jurisdiction.[2]
Needless to say, the cases cited in respondents’ petition in CA-G.R.
No. 34826-R are not in point. Conde v. Judge of First Instance[3]
was concerned mainly with the harassment visited upon the accused and a denial
of speedy trial, through substantial amendments of the information, by changing
the nature of the crime charged therein, and the filing of new
charges, without a preliminary investigation, after the dismissal of those
originally filed, as well as undue delays in proceeding with the hearing
of the case. In the one at bar,
respondents seek to prevent their trial under an information the
allegations of which, as regards the nature of the crime charged, have never
been changed or amended.
In U.S. v. Marfori,[4] an information was filed in the court of
first instance after the dismissal of the complaint by the justice of the
peace who conducted the preliminary investigation. Upon the other hand, the justice of the peace
who conducted the preliminary investigation in U. S. v. Banzuela[5] found that “there were no grounds for
believing that” the “accused was guilty of the crime charged against
him, ” and, accordingly, ordering his release, thus, in effect, dismissing
the complaint. In People v. Red,[6] no preliminary investigation was ever
made.
In the case of
respondents herein, Assistant Fiscal Grecia had
conducted an investigation, and had not dismissed, either expressly or impliedly, the charges against
them. What is more, he included
them in the information, although under the conventional names of John Doe and
Richard Doe, and their true names were not revealed [u]ntil
the arraignment of their co-defendants, on October 31, 1964.
Lastly, none of the aforementioned cases involved the application of a
provision analogous to that of the Revised
Charter of Quezon City, explicitly denying the
right to a preliminary investigation in cases triable only in the Court of First
Instance thereof, where the prosecutor, after due investigation of the
facts, shall have filed an information against him in proper form.
WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34826-R is hereby annulled, with
costs against respondents, Modesto A. Obispo and Cipriano
Valeriano.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
Alemany v. Sweeney, 2 Phil. 654; La. Insular v.
Jao Oge, 42 Phil. 367; De los Santos v. Provincial Sheriff, 64 Phil. 193; Alzua vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 349-350, 365.
[2]
North Negros Sugar Co. v. Hidalgo, 63 Phil.
664, 671; Ayo v. Ilao
L-23293, January 16, 1968; Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel, L-20266, January 31, 1967; Vivo v. Arca, L-21728, December 27, 1963. Vivo v. Cloribel, L-23239, Nov.
23, 1966; Board of Commissioners v. Domingo, L-21274, July 31,1963; Climaco
v. Barcelo L-19597, July 31, 1962.
[3]
45 Phil. 173.
[4]
35 Phil. 666.
[5]
31 Phil. 564.
[6]
55 Phil. 706.