THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (QUEZON CITY BRANCH); MARIO HEN…

In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of
First In­stance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, the information charged the defendants, Mario Henson, Rafael
Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as
principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident preme­ditation, and abuse of
superior strength and with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity,
aid of armed men and craft or fraud.  The
prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants
would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary
proceeding.  In the course of the regular
trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court
resolved the motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the
prosecution on the ground that it still had ma­terial witnesses to present.  The orders granting bail in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not
strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very
angry because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he
used contumacious language for which he was forthwith cited for contempt.  Fortunately,
after the Fiscal had submitted his answer and explanation, the trial judge, in a forgiving mood, did not punish him for contempt on condition that the
contumacious words be deleted from his motion for
reconsideration.

The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process.  The answer is in the
affirmative.  We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail
of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an op­portunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.  If, as in the criminal case involved in the
instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of proce­dural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.  The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued in
violation of procedural due pro­cess, must be considered null and void.

The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be
exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; other­wise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.  Hence, the court’s order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong.  The orders of
October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five
defendants are defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution. 
They only contain the court’s conclusion that the evidence of guilt is
not strong.  Being thus defective in form
and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed
to stand.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, are set aside.  No
costs.

Certiorari granted.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.