THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (QUEZON CITY BRANCH); MARIO HEN…

People versus San Diego

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by the People of the Philippines against Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and against five accused in a murder case. The People ask the Supreme Court to annul the trial court's orders granting bail to the accused in a capital offense. The case matters because it fixes the procedural standard a judge must follow before granting bail in a capital case: the prosecution must first be heard, and the order itself must summarize the evidence and then conclude whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

Procedural History

In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, an information charged Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco as principals in the murder of Jesus Lapid. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail would be considered in the course of the regular trial rather than in a summary proceeding. After the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court granted the motions for bail over the prosecution's objection that it still had material witnesses to present. The orders fixed bail at 50,000 pesos for each defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong. The fiscal moved for reconsideration in contumacious language and was cited for contempt, though the judge later declined to punish him on condition that the offending words be deleted. The People then came to the Supreme Court by special civil action for certiorari.

Facts

Five men stood charged with murder, qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed men, and craft or fraud. Because the offense was capital, each accused filed a motion for bail. The parties agreed that these motions would be resolved not in a summary hearing but in the course of the regular trial itself.

The trial proceeded. The prosecution presented eight witnesses, and it represented to the court that it still had material witnesses to present. Despite that objection, the trial court resolved the motions and granted bail to all five accused, at 50,000 pesos each, on the sole stated ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong.

The fiscal's motion for reconsideration used contumacious language, and he was cited for contempt. In a forgiving mood, the judge did not punish him, provided the contumacious words were deleted. The orders granting bail, dated the seventh, ninth and twelfth of October 1968, stood, and the People challenged them before the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when the trial court granted bail before the prosecution had finished presenting all the evidence it desired to introduce.
• Whether or not the orders granting bail were valid, given that they contained only the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt was not strong, without a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific article or section of the Constitution or the Rules of Court. It rests on the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process, which it applies to bail proceedings in capital offenses. The governing rule, as the Court states it, is this:

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.

This rule bears directly on the case because the trial court cut off the prosecution's presentation before it had finished, and then granted bail.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court answered in the affirmative: the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The Court held that, whether the motion for bail is resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be allowed, within a reasonable time, to present all the evidence it desires before the court resolves the motion. If the prosecution is denied that opportunity, there is a violation of procedural due process, and the order granting bail is void on that ground. The orders of the seventh, ninth and twelfth of October 1968 were therefore null and void.

On the second issue, the Court held that the court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders in question were defective in form and substance because they contained only the conclusion that the evidence of guilt was not strong, without any summary of the prosecution's evidence. On this ground as well, they could not stand.

Doctrine

In a capital offense, the judge's discretion to grant bail is not free-floating. It must be exercised only after the prosecution has been given a reasonable opportunity to present all the evidence it desires, whether the matter is heard summarily or in the course of the regular trial. Denial of that opportunity is a violation of procedural due process, and the order granting bail is void.

The order itself must show its work: it must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by the court's conclusion on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. An order that states only the conclusion, without the summary, is defective in form and substance.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the orders of the seventh, ninth and twelfth of October 1968 granting bail to the five accused, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: in capital offenses, the prosecution must first be heard, and the bail order must summarize its evidence before concluding that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Examiners use this case on the procedure for bail in capital offenses, on procedural due process, and on the required contents of a bail order.