PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOAQUIN M. SALVADOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

In a joint decision, promulgated on September 28, 1968, we dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, L-29471, and another petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, L-29487, both filed by the Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions.  As noted in the
aforesaid decision:  “In these two
petitions for certiorari, both filed by the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions, the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge in both cases, the
Honorable Joaquin M. Salvador, in the second petition speaking for respondent
Court of Industrial Relations en banc, to issue the orders
complained of is assailed.  It is the
view of petitioner that there being no presidential certification, an urgent
petition of August 29, 1968, filed by the other respondent, the Social Security
System, to seek an authoritative interpretation of a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement adopted as a formal award of the Court of Industrial
Relations of August 5, 1966, is beyond the competence of respondent judge to
pass upon.”^[1]

The stand of the Social Security System was set forth in such
decision thus:  “The respondent
Social Security System met the issue squarely with the allegation that the
absence of a new presidential certification is not necessarily fatal, there being
a previous one as a result of which the formal award of the re­spondent court
embodying a collective bargaining agreement reached by the parties was issued
on August 5, 1966.  It would follow that
the appropriate provisions of the Court of Industrial Relations Act if utilized
render manifest the undeniable power of such court during the effectiveness of
such award, ordinarily covering a period of three years, after due hearing to
‘alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or
decision, or reopen any question’ that may be invoked.  It likewise possesses authority under the
succeeding section to determine the meaning or interpretation of an award,
order, or decision.”^[2]

The question was answered by us in this wise:  “We find the above contention persuasive
and sustain the jurisdiction of respondent Judge Salvador.  Accordingly, the petitions are
dismissed.”^[3] We noted in the body of the
opinion that “there is no question that under the collective bargaining
agreement which was embodied in the award of August 5, 1966, the period of effectivity
dated from July 1, 1966 and
continues up to June 30, 1969,
or for a period of three years.”^[4]

We characterized the power of the Court of Industrial Relations
insofar as interpreting an award, order or decision issued by it as well as
modifying the same in whole or in part during its effectiveness on the
application of an interested party and after due hearing, a power which may
extend to setting it aside, as “comprehensive in character” being
given by us an interpretation “consistent with the well-nigh sweeping
reach of its language.” We went on to say: 
“It has never been construed in a niggardly sense; the recognition
of such authority has been full and sympathetic, never grudging.”^[5]

It has been thus from the earliest case decided in 1939, Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations,^[6] where the then Justice Laurel,
for this Tribunal, rejected a “narrow construction” of the authority
vested in the Court of Industrial Relations which, according to him, could be
justified only on “a fragmentary view of the law.” It was our
conclusion then:  “We do not go as
far as to hold that once there is a presidential certification under Section 10
of the Industrial Peace Act, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
necessarily apply.  Nor is it
necessary.  For the purpose of passing
upon these two petitions, it suffices to declare that there being a previous
presidential certification resulting in an award, the effectivity
of which continues up to the present, respondent Judge could appropriately rely
on the two above sections for the purpose of considering the merit or lack of
it of the urgent petition filed by respondent Social Security System.”^[7]

Subsequently, on October 3, 1968, a Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by petitioner in the two above cases inviting attention to what it
considered the adverse impact of our decision “not only upon [its] rights
but, more importantly, also upon the basic policies of the Industrial Peace Act
relative to the workingman’s fundamental right to a collective bargaining, * *
*.”^[8]
It is its contention, as more fully set forth in its Urgent Amended Motion for
Reconsider­ation, filed on October 14, 1968, that we should have given due
course to its two petitions on a finding of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in view of the express policies
and provisions of the Industrial Peace Act establishing collective bargaining
as the primary method of resolving industrial disputes and curtailing and
limiting compulsory arbitration, stress­ing that the jurisdiction originally
acquired by respondent Court in 1963 should not be made to extend to a 1968
labor dispute and that such jurisdiction could not be justified under its power
to interpret, set aside or modify any award, order or decision.  It concluded by asserting that to view a
collective bargaining agreement as an award and thus to confer complete
control upon the Court of Indus­trial Relations over any question or
differences that may arise there under would negate particular policies
and provisions of the Industrial Peace Act.

It is to be admitted that the points raised by petitioner in the
Motion for Reconsideration as well as the later pleading entitled an Urgent
Amended Motion for Reconsideration are serious in character and were discussed
with thoroughness and exhaustive­ness. 
Considered from the purely theoretical aspect divorced from the
controlling facts of this case, its plea may be said to be impressed with an
element of persuasiveness.

If such a motion for consideration should be denied, as we are
denying it, it is due to the legal proposition therein contained being bereft
of support in the circumstances from which these two petitions originated.  As explained in the answer of respondent Social
Security System, former Solicitor General Antonio Barredo,
now a member of this Court:  “In the
case at bar, petitioner de­cries this Honorable Court’s virtual sanction of
judicial arbitration, but in truth it has no reason to complain.  To start with, strictly speaking, the
collective bargaining agreement which petitioner so much invokes is not, in
fact, the product or result of real and free bargaining between petitioner and
respondent SSS.  The records clearly show
that before any such collective bargaining agreement was formulated, the
respondent court had already rendered a decision or made an award laying down
the terms and conditions that would govern the relations between the
parties.  When this award was in the
process of being appealed to this Honorable Court, the parties came to an
understanding that to restore harmonious relations between them as early as
possible the appeal be abandoned and, instead, they submitted to the court a
so-called collective bargaining agreement which, in effect, and except for some
inconsequential differences, was the award already made by the court.  In other words, the terms and conditions of
the collective bargaining agreement were practically the very same terms and
conditions enjoined by the court.  So, if
what petitioner wishes is for this Honorable Court to give effect in this case
to what petitioner alleges is the spontaneous or voluntary will of the parties
or an agreement the terms and conditions of which were ‘determined,’ to use
petitioner’s expression, by the parties, which a genuine collective bargaining
agreement implies, the effort would be in vain.”^[9]

What lends force and
emphasis to the above refutation of the contention of petitioner is the
succeeding paragraph in the answer of respondent:  “On the other hand, if it be contended
that even if such were the case, at least, the parties reviewed the award and
discussed it among themselves, hence, in a sense, it is the mutual agreement of
the parties that has given it legal life and standing and not the imposition of
the court, we would respectfully invite the attention of this Honorable Court
to the important point, which to your respondents is decisive, that when the
parties submitted said collective bargaining agreement to the CIR, they did
not, as we have previously pointed out in our answer, just inform the
court that they had arrived at an amicable settlement or compromise between themselves and asked for the
dismissal of the case.  What they did was
to ask the court that the agreement reached between them be approved by the
court and made its award.  For emphasis,
we beg leave to reiterate our discussion of this particular point in our
answer, which, indeed, we were hoping this Honorable Court would pass upon in
its decision to bolster its finding that what is really in issue in this case is
not a collective bargaining agreement but an award hence the jurisdiction of
the CIR had not been terminated.”^[10]

It likewise cannot escape attention that as made clear by
respondent Social Security System, the previous actuations of petitioner stand in opposition to the plea now
submitted.  Thus:  “In petitioner’s Urgent Motion For
Execution, Manifestation – Motion and Motion To Deny, filed with the Court of
Industrial Relations under the same docket number 46-IPA, it had been
categorically stated that the CBA had been approved and adopted by the
Court of Industrial Relations ‘as its
formal and final award in the case.’ In other words, the petitioner was
even the first to go to the CIR and invoke its residuary power under Section 17
of C.A. No. 103, as early as February 2, 1967, and, naturally, ahead of what
has been done now by the respondent SSS, to make the Court act on the award,
with the difference that the respondent SSS is only asking for the
interpretation of a single provision, under Sec. 18 of C.A. No. 103, as will be explained later, whereas the
petitioner wanted the implementation or execution of the whole award and Atty.
Cid wanted to be as­certained of his 12% attorney’s fees.”^[11]

Mention was then made of the motion for execution of February 2, 1967,
where petitioner alleged that on August 5, 1966, the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations issued an order approving and adopting “as its formal
and final award in the case” the collective bargaining agreement between
it and respondent Social Security System. 
Then in another motion of February 7, 1967, the counsel for petitioner
reiterated that on the date above-mentioned the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations “issued its order and adopting as its formal and final award in
the case the Collective Bargaining Agreement * * *.” With but the
slightest modification, petitioner, again in a motion of March 16, 1967, referred to the “formal and
final award in the case.”

To emphasize such point, respondent Social Security System
stressed:  “‘In a way, the
petitioner Union was forced again to run to this Court for aid since the
Collective Bargaining Agree­ment implementation was being delayed and
industrial peace and harmony being made insecure.'”^[12]

No valid objection then could possibly be taken from the
conclusion reached by respondent Social Security System in its answer to
petitioner’s Urgent Amended Motion for Reconsider­ation.  “As we have said at the outset, we join
petitioner in its desire that the great strides achieved by labor for its
protection should not be rendered naught, but we must emphasize that in this
case, what is being enforced is not, in truth the order of the court with its
taint of compulsory arbitration but the clear definite and unmistakable will of
the parties that their collective bargaining agreement be made in the form of
and given the status of an award. 
Indeed, as already related above, it was petitioner who first went to
the CIR to invoke said award as such and it was petitioner’s counsel, none
other than the signer of the subject motion Atty. Cipriano
Cid himself, who asked for an order regarding his attorney’s fees under such
award.  To reiterate, our point is that
if the so-called collective bargaining agreement is being treated as an award,
it is only because the parties wanted it that way and so asked the court to
make it such.  And now, to argue that
this Honorable Court should not speak of an award but of collective bargaining
agreement is surely violative of the will of the
parties as expressed in their past actuations and definitely contrary to the
very spirit of giving effect to the mutual understanding and agreement of the
parties, the principle which petitioner is fighting for.  As we see it, petitioner is now arguing in the
light of principles, which are always right, but has over­looked the specific
application of those principles to the proven facts of this case.  Petitioner’s present position is based on
erroneous premises and necessarily, the conclusion cannot be correct.”^[13]

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner,
dated October 3, 1968, and
its Urgent Amended Motion for Re­consideration, dated October 14, 1968, are
denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
did not
take part.

^[1]
Decision of September 28, 1968,
pp. 1-2.

^[2] Ibid,
pp. 2-3.

^[3] Ibid, p. 3.

^[4] Ibid, p. 5.

^[5] Ibid, p. 6.

^[6] 68 Phil. 444.  The
following cases were likewise cited: 
Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon Labor Union, 83 Phil. 801 (1949);
Church v. La Union Labor Union, 91 Phil. 163 (1952); Hotel &
Restaurant Free Workers v. Kim San Cafe, 102 Phil. 470 (1957); National
Development Co. v. CIR, 106 Phil. 307 (1959); Hda.
Luisita v. National Labor Union, L-13072,
March 30, 1960; San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, L-18270, November 28,
1962; NAWASA v. NAWASA Cons. Unions, L-18938, August 31, 1964.

^[7]
Decision of September 28, 1968,
p. 7.

^[8] Motion for Reconsideration.

^[9] Answer
of respondent Social Security System, p. 3.

^[10]
Ibid, p. 4.

^[11] Ibid, p.10.

^[12] Ibid, p. 12.

^[13] Ibid,
pp. 12-13.