THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

By
a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct
People’s Court after trial of appellant Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge
of treason on several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder
and sentenced him thus—

“In view of the foregoing considerations,
the court, finding the accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty of the
complex crime of treason and murders as defined in Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 48 of the same code,
sentences him to suffer death penalty, with the accessories of
the law, to indemnify the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount of
P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in the amount of
P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Sofia Tambirao in the amount of
P2,000, and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) and the
costs of the proceedings.”

Villanueva duly appealed
to this court. The records were sent up to us not only by virtue of the
appeal but also under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the
Rules of Court which provides for review and judgment by this Tribunal
of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by a
court of first instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or
not.

It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, could not
be located, and following the recommendation of the solicitor general,
a resolution was promulgated on August 1, 1952, remanding the case to
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimony
of said witnesses.

Thereafter before said court
defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953,
stating that about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive granted executive
clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose
cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first
withdrawn, supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower
court, and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting
upon said petition the Court of First Instance of Iloilo issued an
order dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of the case to
this Court for whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of
the petition for withdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant and
because the case had to be reviewed by the Supreme Court anyway
regardless of the appeal by the defendant.

The case was
considered by us on September 21, 1953. The agenda of this Court on
that date as regards this was prepared by the Clerk of Court’s Office
only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the
defendant. Our attention was not called to the fact that defendant had
previously appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which
decision called for an automatic review and judgment by us. So,
following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on
petitions for withdrawal of appeals where the briefs have not yet been
filed, as in the present case, said petition for withdrawal of appeal
was granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. On the same date,
however, and presumably after the passing of the resolution, appellant
Villanueva filed directly with this court a petition reiterating the
request for withdrawal of his appeal previously made with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his petition Exhibits A and B,
said to be copies of the conditional pardon and of the letter of the
legal assistant in the Office of the President addressed to the
director of prisons. It was only on considering said petition that we
realized the nature of the case and the decision appealed to this
Court, the withdrawal of which appeal had been granted by the
resolution of September 21, 1953.

An accused appealing from
a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his
appeal like any other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the
briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the
case from the jurisdiction of this court which under the law is
authorized and called upon to review the decision though unappealed.
Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve
to render the decision of the People’s Court final. In fact, as was
said by this court through Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs.
Laguna, 17 Phil., 532, speaking on the matter of review by this court
of a decision imposing the death penalty, the judgment of conviction
entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot be executed and is
wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by
the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of
conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the
attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that until it has been
reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is
not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review by the Supreme
Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something which
neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.

Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower court for the
purpose of retaking the testimony of those witnesses who testified on
October 8, 1947, the case was virtually remanded for new trial. Of
course, the evidence and the testimony received during the trial before
the People’s Court which is still intact and available shall stand and
the new trial will be confined to the testimony of the same witnesses
who testified on October 8, 1947, the stenographic notes or transcript
of which cannot now be found. Under these circumstances, it is
necessary for the trial court to render a new decision because the new
trial is being held before a new Judge and there is no assurance that
the witnesses testifying, altho the very same ones who were on the
witness stand on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and
in the same manner that they did at the former trial, altho they are
supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de Almario vs. Fidel
Ibañez, et al., 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 390, 81 Phil., 592).
Going over the record of the case, we find that it would not be too
difficult for the trial judge to see to it that the said witnesses as
far as possible confine themselves to the same points on which they
testified on October 8, 1947, because testimonies of said witnesses
including the defendant are referred to and described in the decision
of the People’s Court on pages 87, 123, and 124 to 129, and that there
are only four witnesses including the accused himself.

Examining Exhibits A and B submitted by appellant in relation to this
petition for the withdrawal of his appeal, we find that although his
name appears in the list of prisoners convicted by the People’s Court
and supposed to be pardoned conditionally, the pardon itself refers to
the remission of the “unexpired portions of the prison sentence terms
and the fines of the prisoners listed below who were convicted by the
defunct People’s Court of treason and committed to the new Bilibid
Prison to serve their sentence.”^[1]
It is highly doubtful that the pardon could have contemplated and
included appellant herein because his sentence of death does not merely
involve a prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death sentence
is not exactly served but rather executed.^[2]
Moreover, Exhibit B says that “those prisoners whose cases are still
pending on appeal shall be released only after their appeal has been
withdrawn.” The implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal
rendered the decision of the People’s Court final, resulting in
conviction, this to bring it into harmony with article VII, section
10(6) of the Constitution which requires conviction as a condition
precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we have already
stated, despite defendant’s withdrawal of his appeal from the decision
imposing the death sentence, there is no definite conviction or
sentence until and after this tribunal has reviewed the case and
rendered its own decision affirming, modifying or reversing that of the
lower court, unless of course in the new decision of the trial court
based on the new trial a sentence other that death is imposed, in which
case there would be no automatic review by us.

Let the
record of this case be again remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo for new trial and thereafter, for a new decision.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Italics ours.

^[2] Italics ours.