THE RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, DEMANDANTE Y APELANTE, CONTRA CLEMENTE G. REYES, DEMANDADO Y APELADO.

Tratase de una accion de expropiacion, presentada en 4 de noviembre
de 1949, de acuerdo con la Ley del Commonwealth No. 539, por la Rural
Progress Administration, de los tres lotes Nos. 2, 3 y 4, descritos en
el Certificado Original de Titulo No. 529 de la Oficina del Registrador
de Titulos de la provincia de Rizal a nombre del Hospital de San Juan de
Dios, y que en 24 de octubre de 1942 dicho hospital habia vendido por
P10,000 a Clemente G. Reyes, demandado en esta causa.

En 17 de noviembre del mismo año, el demandado presento su
contestacion manifestando que estaba conforme con la expropiacion,
excepto con la de las pesquerias que, segun el, no son susceptibles de
expropiacion.

Despues de haberse señalado varias veces la vista de la causa,
el demandado presento una mocion de sobreseimiento alegando que los
terrenos objeto de la demanda solo miden seis hectareas, contra cuya
mocion la demandante presento oposicion. En 30 de marzo el Juzgado
sobreseyo la demanda, y en 14 de abril la demandante presento mocion de
reconsideracion. En 21 de mayo el Juzgado revoco su orden de
sobreseimiento y repuso la causa. En 19 de junio el demandado presento
mocion de reconsideracion, contra la cual la demandante presento
oposicion en 29 de julio, y en 18 de agosto el Juzgado dicto una orden
concediendo en parte la mocion de reconsideracion; esto es, descreto la
expropiacion de los dos lotes Nos. 2 y 4 y sobreseyo la demanda en
cuanto al lote No. 3. Denegada la mocion de reconsideracion, la
demandante presento directamente apelacion ante este Tribunal contra la
orden de sobreseimiento.

Las parcelas en litigio habian sido ocupadas por varias
personas desde tiempo inmemorial; por su industria consiguieron
introducir muchas mejoras en las mismas: terraplen de solares para
residencia, excavacion de las partes destinadas a pesqueria, casas para
vivienda, arboles frutales y diques de las partes destinadas al cultivo
del palay; todas las mejoras son de la propiedad de los inquilinos, y
eso lo admite y lo reconoce el Hospital de San Juan de Dios porque el
terreno era originariamente anegadizo.

A pesar de los esfuerzos del demandado de desposeer a los
ocupantes, hasta la fecha estos continuan en posesion de los terrenos y,
por el hecho de que no se les habia dado por el Hospital preferencia en
la venta, se consideran atropellados en sus derechos y creen que se ha
cometido con ellos una injusticia. Despues de la liberacion, el
demandado reamillaro en un cuatrocientos por ciento el valor de los
terrenos, aumentado las rentas en la misma proporcion, y los ocupantes
no tuvieron otro remedio que satisfacerlas. El demandado es propietario
de seis parcelas en la ciudad de Manila, amillaradas en P23,341.00 y
una parcela en el municipio de Tanay, Rizal.

El informe del Jefe de la Division Legal de la demandante dice
en parte: “To allow the petitioners (tenants) to buy only the
residential portion and exclude the fishpond and riceland, will solve
the problem of the petitioners only half way. To leave the fishpond and
riceland to Mr. Reyes and allow the tenants to acquire only the
residential portion will create more problems between the landowner, Mr.
Reyes, and the herein petitioners. For some reason or another,
conflicts will crop out between Mr. Reyes and the petitioners.”

Hay cuatro pesquerias pequeñas en el lote No. 3: la primera a
nombre de Vicente Fulgencio, solo mide 6,000 metros cuadrados y de ella
dependen 40 personas como sucesoras de Vicente Fulgencio; la segunda, a
nombre de Antonino Cruz, es de 900 metros cuadrados, y mantiene a 24
individuos sucesores del finado Antonino Cruz; la tercera, a nombre de
Julian Victoria, es de 180 metros cuadrados, de cuyos productos dependen
9 personas sucesoras del finado Julian Victoria; y la cuarta pesqueria,
a nombre de Alejandro Cruz, es de 500 metros cuadrados, viviendo de sus
productos 40 personas como sucesoras del finado Alejandro Cruz. Pero,
incluyendo las porciones altas, la parcela No. 3 mide 20,737 metros
cuadrados. El area del lote No. 2 es de 42,974 m. c., el del lote No. 3
es de 20,737 m. c., y el del lote No. 4 es de 44,159 m. c.; area total,
107,870 metros cuadrados, o sea 10 hectareas, 78 areas y 70 centiareas.

Si los lotes 2 y 4 son expropiables – como asi decreto el
Juzgado – no vemos la razon por que no puede ser tambien expropiado el
lote No. 3.

La contencion de que las pesquerias no son susceptibles de
expropiacion es insostenible. La piscicultura, la avicultura, no son
mas que variedades de la agricultura; de ahi que el “bañgus” que produce
la pesqueria, el ave de corral que produce la granja avicola, son
productos agricolas como el palay y el maiz que produce la tierra.
Todavia mas: las cuatro pesquerias que estan dentro del lote No. 3, no
son mas que mejoras introducidas en dicho lote. Cuando la ley habla de
“private lands” no excluye las pesquerias porque estas no son mas que
parte de un terreno.

El Juzgado denego la mocion de reconsideracion, fundandose en
la decision de Guido contra Rural Progress Administration, 47 O. G.,
1848; Commonwealth of the Philippines contra Borja, L-1496, Nov. 29,
1949; y Ciudad de Manila contra Arellano Law Colleges, Inc. 47 O. G.,
4197: creyo que la extension superficial del terreno determina su
expropiabilidad, sin tener en cuenta los conflictos desagradables que
pueden degenerar en desorden social.

Las causas citadas no tienen paridad con el caso presente. En
el asunto de Guido se trataba de un terreno de 22,655 metros cuadrados;
en el de Borja, de otro de 10,565 m. c. y la mejor parte era comercial,
ocupada por tiendas, y varios de los ocupantes para cuyo beneficio se
pedia la expropiacion tenian terrenos de su propiedad en otras partes; y
en el de Arellano Law Colleges, de 7,270 m. c. se trataba de un solar
que se compro para construir un edificio para clases, y los ocupantes
eran simples detentadores, rinde mas beneficio al publico el solar
destinandolo a centro de enseñanza que para residencia de unos intrusos;
no habia peligro de que surgieran conflictos graves entre los ocupantes
y los propietarios para justificar la intervencion del gobierno, y poe
eso este Tribunal dijo en el asunto de Guido: “The expropriation
proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few
families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace and
order, or other public advantage.”

En cambio, el lote No. 3 es parte de una extensa propiedad
inmueble, ocupada y mejorada desde tiempo inmemorial por los actuales
ocupantes y sus antecesores; es propiedad que puede considerarse como
perteneciente al tipo en que estaban y estan clasificadas las haciendas
de los frailes. El Hospital de San Juan de Dios lo ofrecio en venta al
Sr. Ponce Enrile y este no quiso comprarlo porque creia que los actuales
ocupantes debian tener preferencia. El Sr. Reyes consiguio comprarlo,
sin ofrecerlo en venta el Hospital de San Juan de Dios a los actuales
ocupantes que, con o sin razon, creen tener preferencia. No debemos
olvidar la venta al gobierno de la Hacienda de Arayat, en vez de hacerlo
directamente a los ocupantes, que dio por resultado, segun version
publica, el tragico asesinato de Doña Aurora, su hija y de su yerno y
otros. El Sr. Reyes no consiguio ocupar lo que compro a pesar de haber
solicitado la ayuda de un oficial japones, el cual no fue inhumano y
tuvo mas en cuenta la situacion de los ocupantes que las suplicas de un
amigo. Hubiera sido facil lanzarlos del terreno porque los japoneses
hacian y deshacian todo cuanto querian; pero el oficial japones hizo
justicia a los ocupantes y no les molesto.

En el caso remoto de que fracasase este expediente de
expropiacion y el nuevo dueño intentase lanzar del terreno a los
ocupantes, surgira un conflicto de acuerdo con el jefe de la Division
Legal de la Rural Progress Administration y el abogado Sr. Ponce Enrile;
quedaran afectados, no solamente los antiguos inquilinos del hospital,
sino tambien los 117 subinquilinos que viven en el lugar.

¿Por que compro el Gobierno de Filipinas las haciendas de los
frailes? Por los serios conflictos que en ellas habian te nido lugar
entre ocupantes y propietarios. La paz impuesta por la fuerza y el
gobierno establecido por la Comision Civil no extinguieron el germen del
descontento. El ansia por condiciones de vida mejores, el deseo de
quedar libre de la asclavitud del terreno cultivado estaban latentes en
las masas. Ser dueño y no esclavo de la tierra que cultivaban con el
sudor de su frente era la obsesion de los desheredados. Taft negocio
con exito la compra. Obtenidas las haciendas y revendidas, a plazos, a
los ocupantes en pequeñas porciones, se calmaron los animos y la paz se
restablecio como por encanto. El fin por el cual se aprobaron las Leyes
del Commonwealth Nos. 20, 260, 378, 420 y 539 era precisamente evitar
que surgiesen conflictos innecesarios entre los ocupantes y los
propietarios; en las primeras leyes se usaron las palabras “landed
estates”, pero en la ultima se usan las siguientes: “private lands or
any interest therein.” En asuntos de expropiacion, la Legislatura ya no
se refiere a grandes haciendas sino a cualquier propiedad inmueble
particular o interes en ella en que existiesen serios conflictos y
hubiese necesidad de resolverlos.

El demandado Sr. Reyes no es el antiguo propietario de los
terrenos cuya expropiacion se pide, ni los ha obtenido en herencia como
la viuda de Guido: solamente los compro por P10,000 en 24 de octubre de
1942 durante el regimen japones. Es un simple advenedizo; nunca los
cultivo o mejoro, ni los ocupo materialmente por algun tiempo.

En cambio, las cuatro familias que ocupan el lote No. 3 han
cobrado cariño a su hogar, al pedacito de terreno y pesqueria que han
mejorado, y no es facil convencerles de que deben dejar las mejoras que
han realizado y que deben levantar sus casas porque sobre ellas el Sr.
Reyes tiene mejor derecho que ellos. El Sr. Reyes que, por razones de
fortuna y suerte, consiguio comprar el terreno, puede enajenarlo sin
sentir el dolor que los actuales ocupantes sufririan si evacuasen sus
solares, destrozasen sus hogares y abandonasen sus pesquerias y
sembrados. El gobierno puede pagar al Sr. Reyes el valor razonable del
terreno concediendole todas las ganancias justas por el capital que en
el ha invertido; pero no puede, con todo el oro del mundo, mitigar el
dolor que los actuales ocupantes sentirian si tuvieran que abandonar su
hogar. El amor al hogar – ya sea este un castillo, mansion o casa de
caña y nipa – es un sentimiento que no se borra facilmente.

La relativa tranquilidad actual no promete paz duradera, no
presagia tiempos de bonanza; si acuartelais a los soldados unos dos
meses estad seguros de que acaeceran sucesos desagradables. Debemos
vernos en el espejo de Rusia: la concentracion de la propiedad raiz en
pocas manos dio por resultado la caida de los zares, la propiedad
privada se convirtio en propiedad del Estado, y es hoy el foco del
comunismo. China, en donde la propiedad es acaparada por unos pocos,
gime hoy bajo el yugo rojo. Mientras haya millones de desempleados,
millones sin trabajo, no es posible la paz. La corriente migratoria
desde los campos hacia los centros urbanos es sintoma de falta de
trabajo; acuden a las ciudades en busca de trabajo y solo una pegueña
proporcion halla acomodo y, como no encuentran trabajo, en poco tiempo
gastan lo poco que tienen y quedan obligados a pedir pan; no siempre
encuentran personas caritativas; entonces dirigen la mirada al cielo y
no reciben el mana; desesperados, deambulan por las calles en busca de
trabajo y flamantes coches les salpican de lodo; acuden a los mitines de
la oposicion y no oyen mas que ataques contra los que estan en el
poder; asisten a los mitines de los que estan en el gobierno y no oyen
mas que diatribas contra los que desean turnar en el poder. Como no
tienen tiempo de considerar detenidamente los dicterios que oyen en
tales discurso, terminan por perder la confianza en los unos como en los
otros. Si se encuentran con un comunista, este les convence de que la
propiedad es un robo; si se topan con un Huk, este lespersuade de que se
debe derrocar al gobierno para que “los que no tienen” pueden organizar
el suyo. Como podeis esperar que estos individuos que tienen
indigestion de teorias en la cabeza y hambre en el estomago no caigan
presa de las doctrinas mas subversivas? Existe necesidad, existe
urgencia de que se les de oportunidad de poseer una pequeña huerta y un
hogar propio. Cuando todas las familias tengan un pedazo de tierra que
labrar y un hogar que defender, nadie pensara en abrazar la doctrina
perniciosa del comunismo o en hacerse Huk. En los campos como en las
ciudades reina el hambre entre las masa mientras frecuentan los festines
de la clase acomodada. Esa desigualdad es la que atiza el fuego del
odio de clase aqui como en todas partes y en todas las edades. Ese es
el problema social que la ley de expropriacion se propone resolver. La
extension del terreno no es el unico factor uqe determina su
expropiabilidad. Para interpretar dicha ley hay que buscar inspiracion
en esta disposicion de la ley fundamental; “El Estado cuidara de
promover la justicia social a fin de asegurar el bienestar y la
estabilidad economica de todo el pueblo.” (Art. 5, Titulo II).

Se decreta la expropiacion del lote No. 3 y devuelvase el
expediente al juzgado de origen para su ulterior tramitacion.

Paras, C. J., Reyes, Jugo y Labrador, MM., conformes.

---

 

CONCURRING OPINION

ANGELO, J.:

Lest my vote be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent the
ruling in the cases of Guido, Borja and Arellano Law Colleges, I will
give a brief explanation.

Lot No. 3 which is now being expropriated is indeed too small to be
the subject of expropriation under the law. To expropriate a small
piece of land for the benefit of a few can hardly be said to be in
keeping with the purpose of our Constitution. It will be a
transgression of the principle underlying private ownership. But the
lot in question should be looked upon in a different light for it was
acquired under circumstances which warrant a departure from the rule.
This lot, the record shows, was originally part of a big tract formerly
owned by the San Juan De Dios Hospital and was acquired by defendant to
promote merely his personal advantage. Its present occupants were never
given a chance to acquire it and was sold to defendant in complete
disregard of their rights of possession and the improvements they had
made thereon. It appears that these occupants, as well as their
predecessors, had been in possession of this lot from time immemorial,
and had considered it their home and permanent abode. To be
dispossessed thereof without having been given a chance to make it their
own merely to accommodate an individual is indeed painful if not
revolting. It is for these reasons that they are now vigorously
objecting to their dispossession invoking the letter and spirit of our
Constitution. This case has given rise to a serious social problem to
which our Government cannot remain indifferent. In my opinion, the
action now taken by the Government is justified if only to do justice to
these unfortunate tenants whose rights have been disregarded.

---

 

DISSENTING OPINION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

I regret my inability to agree to some consideration in the
majority opinion which to me, strictly speaking, are not exactly
relevant and material to the issues involved in this case; and as to the
result, I am afraid that the ruling, decreeing the expropriation of lot
No. 3 with an area of about two hectares, runs right in the teeth of
the doctrine laid down by us in the recent case of Guido v. Rural
Progress Administration, G. R. No. L-2089, 47 Off. Gaz. No. 4, p. 1848.

There are three parcels sought to be expropriated, lot 2 with
an area of 49,974 sq. m., lot 3 containing 20,737 sq. m., and lot 4 with
44,159 sq. m. Defendant owner Clemente G. Reyes agreed to sell lots 2
and 4 which as of now have already been expropriated, but he vigorously
objects to the inclusion of lot 3 which contains the fisheries, on the
ground that they are the only fisheries he owns, and that he needs them
for his family, including eight children.

The majority wonders why if lots 2 and 4 are subject to
expropriation, lot 3 is not. The reason is simple. Lots 2 and 4 have
been expropriated, not because they are subject to eminent domain, but
for the reason that the owner thereof is agreeable to the petition. But
he not only disagrees to the expropriation of lot 3, a smaller lot, but
vigorously assails the pretended right of petitioner to compel him to
sell it against his will. So, let us confine our consideration to this
area of about 2 hectares.

The Guido case involved a parcel with a larger area, namely,
22,655 sq. m. and yet this Court denied the right of the Government to
expropriate it on the ground that Section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution on which Commonwealth Act 539 was based contemplated and
authorized the expropriation of only large tracts of lands, haciendas
and landed estates, but not of small parcels, and that the Government
had no right to compel the owner of a small tract of land to sell it to
tenants or occupants who want to own a portion of it. In that case this
Court thru Mr. Justice Tuason held that the condemnation of a small
property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families
does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to
give the use public character, and that what was proposed to be
done there by the Rural Progress Administration (the very entity now
seeking expropriation of the fisheries in the present case), was to take
plaintiff’s property and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refused
to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises. The very same
situation obtains in the present proceedings. Justice Tuason added that
the claim and proposition of the Rural Progress Administration in
seeking to expropriate the small property of Guido in that case is “far
wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public
use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated
in our system of government and embraced by the majority of the
citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates
to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be
constitutional, we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm
land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who
want to own a portion of it.” (Underlining mine) In other words, this
Tribunal in that case opined that even a 25-hectare tract of land was
not big enough to come under the provisions of the Constitution and of
Commonwealth Act 539 to justify expropriation.

As already stated, lot No. 3 involved herein is only about two
hectares. Surely, such an extension is not too big for a man to own for
himself and his family so as to justify its being broken up into
smaller portions thru expropriation. The old Public Land Act (Act 926)
fixed at 16 hectares a homestead which an applicant may apply for and
eventually own from the public domain. Even this relatively large area
was considered too small for a man and his family, because in Act 2874
which replaced Act 926 and later in Commonwealth Act 141 which
superseded Act 2874, the area of the homestead was increased to 24
hectares. In other words, the Government itself believes that even a
poor man who has to resort to soliciting part of the public domain for
his home and his farm for support, needs about 24 hectares for himself
and his family so as to leave room for future expansion. That is for
homestead.

As to sales of public lands to individuals, section 23 of Act
2874 allowed in individual to purchase a portion of the public domain
100 hectares in area. Commonwealth Act 141, section 22 thereof,
increased this area to 144; that is to say, that for an individual, 144
hectares of land was not too big for him to buy, to hold and own. In
the present case, the Government through the Rural Progress
Administration insists in expropriating lot No. 3 with an area of only
about 2 hectares. Lot No. 3 consists of four small fisheries: the first
with an area of 6,000 sq. m. listed in the name of VICENTE FULGENCIO on
which it is claimed about 40 persons are depending for support; the
second with an area of 900 sq. m. in the name of ANTONIO CRUZ supporting
24 persons; the third with an area of 180 sq. m. in the name of JULIAN
VICTORIA on whom 9 persons depend for support; and the fourth with an
area of 500 sq. m. in the name of ALEJANDRO CRUZ upon which 40 persons
look for support. The four fisheries comprise an area of less than one
hectare. But in spite of the insignificant area involved, and just
because quite a number of persons, – heirs and relatives, of the four
persons who have held said fisheries as tenants or lessees, depend upon
it for support, we are asked and the majority has decided to compel
defendant Reyes to sell said four fisheries against his will and at
cost.

If the lessees and tenants of these four small fisheries and
their heirs and relatives chose to crowd in that small area and eke out
an existence from the portion of the products corresponding to the
lessees, that is their right and privilege; although it is hard to
conceive how any fair and even decent standard of living can be made out
and maintained by over 100 persons on a portion of the product of such a
very small area, less than one hectare. The alternative in my opinion
is for such persons to disperse and seek other fields and means of
livelihood with some hope of expansion and improvement of their economic
situation, instead of obstinately remaining in an area which years ago
may have been adequate to support their forefathers but which now proves
to be clearly inadequate to support the children, grandchildren and
perhaps great grandchildren and other relatives. We may take a lesson
and profit in the example set by our brothers, the Ilocanos from
northern Luzon. Land in their provinces bounded on the west by the
China sea and on the east by the mountains, was naturally very limited
in area and many of them worked as tenants or lessees on small farms.
These Ilocanos had large families and very soon they encountered the
same problem posed by the present case, that the land occupied and
cultivated by them as tenants was inadequate and insufficient to support
their growing families. Did they seek to compel their landlords to
sell said farms to them at cost, knowing and realizing that even if
granted, the land would still be insufficient to feed and clothe them
and their families? They did not. Instead, possessed of legitimate
ambition and spirit of adventure, a good number of them, if not the
majority migrated to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, Pangasinan,
Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Zambales and Mindoro and the unoccupied lands of
Mindanao, so that at present, in those provinces, or in many of them,
they form the majority of the population. Extending their horizon
farther, they went to Hawaii and to the United States Pacific coast as
laborers; some joined the U. S. Navy and the Philippine Scouts. Now,
they and their successors have become prosperous families; and many of
them have retired from the U. S. Army and Navy with substantial
pensions. Others, for sentimental reasons have returned to their places
of birth and with their substantial savings have bought the old farms
which they formerly worked as tenants, from their old landlords. They
did not and now do not present any social or land problem.

The purpose of Art. XIII, Sec. 4, of the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act 539 was to break up landed estates and large haciendas
owned and controlled by a few individuals or entities so as to give an
opportunity to the tenants or lessees to own portions thereof. Once
broken up into small parcels, the purpose and mission of the law are
ended. But it is now claimed that because the fishery or fisheries
involved in this present case formerly formed part of the hacienda owned
by the San Juan De Dios Hospital, the provisions of the Constitution
and Commonwealth Act 539 are still applicable. That theory is, in my
opinion, manifestly untenable, and if followed would lead to results
irrational and unjust. Under said proposition, after a big tract of
land or landed estate is broken up by expropriation into small parcels
and sold, the small tracts of land would still be subject to eminent
domain, and their purchasers would forever have like the sword of
Damocles hanging over their heads a virtual perennial expropriation. A
purchaser through expropriation of say an eight-hectare parcel from a
landed estate if he employs and places tenants thereon, and if in the
course of time said tenants and their children become numerous and
dependent upon the products of the parcel, then they may also invoke
expropriation on the theory that the land originally belonged to or
formed part of a landed estate. And said tenants purchasers in turn may
under like circumstances be also subject to compulsory sale of their
holdings until I suppose, the irreducible minimum area is reached, say a
few square meters. It would be a story or an expropriation without
end. As already said, the four fisheries under consideration, have a
total area of less than one hectare, to be exact 7,580 square meters.
To whom are they to be sold? We must bear in mind that there are 111
persons living on these fisheries and depending on them for support, and
there must be from 15 to 20 different families that comprise this
group. If the four fisheries are sold to the heads of these families
equally, each family would have less than 400 square meters of the
property. That does not look like an adequate basis for decent standards
of living, and guarantee of a well fed and well clothed family.

As to the justice and propriety of the expropriation sought,
Judge Abaya of the trial court dismissed the complaint outright, saying
that “nothing for public welfare and convenience can be obtained in the
expropriation of the land in question,” and that “to deprive the
defendant of his property which he purchased from the Hospital de Dan
Juan De Dios would be unjust and unwarranted exercise
of the right of eminent domain on the part of the Government and
it would be taking the property of the defendant without due process
of law. x x x.” Later, Judge Encarnacion set aside the order of
dismissal. Still later, Judge Gatmaitan upon a motion for
reconsideration, dismissed the complaint with respect to lot No. 3,
which contains the small fisheries in question, saying that after
reading the official paper of the Rural Progress Administration itself,
he was convinced “that to permit the expropriation of the fishpond
would be to sanction plain coercion and tyranny.” Ruling adversely
upon a motion for reconsideration, said Judge Gatmaitan said:

“There is no question that the government should give as
much protection as possible to the working class in industry and
agriculture; but if that protection intended to be conferred should go
to the extent of guaranteeing economic independence to particular
persons; and to do so, this Court will have to forcibly coerce an
unwilling owner to part with his patrimony, we do not understand that
this is still the mission of the judiciary.” (Underlining mine)

I fully agree with Judges Abaya and Gatmaitan in their views above
cited regarding the limitations of the right of eminent domain. And
their views find sanction in the case of Guido where this Court thru
Justice Tuason further said:

“The promotion of social
justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount
basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural
Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social
justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are
equality of opportunity, equality of political rights equality before
the law, equality between values given and received, an equitable
sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts exerted
in their production.” (Underlining mine)

The Rural Progress Administration in insisting on the expropriation
of the fisheries, and the majority in granting expropriation, lean
heavily on the fact that quite a number of persons live on the property,
and what is more, they depend upon its products for their support. I
do not think that is a satisfactory reason for or a safe test of the
propriety of expropriation. Hundreds of tenants may live in an
apartment house; and hundreds or even thousands of laborers including
their families may, not only live on but find support in a gold or
copper mine; but, surely, their number and their means of support may
not be used or invoked for expropriating either apartment house or mine
so as to be sold to the tenants and mine workers and their dependents.

The Constitution authorizes the breaking up of landed estates
thru expropriation. Once broken up into small tracts, the Constitution
equally protects the purchaser of the small tract and guarantees that
the small parcel he had purchased from the Hacienda will not be taken
away from him without his consent except for a clearly and purely public
purpose.

For the reasons above adduced, I dissent.

Montemayor, J., Padilla, Tuason and Bengzon, JJ.,
concur.