FLORENTINO AMANSEC, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, DAGUPAN CITY BRANCH, AND JAVIER PABALAN, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF …

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to set aside the
order of respondent Judge dated June 24, 1952 which dismisses
provisionally Criminal Cases Nos. 19286 and 19287 of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan and to compel respondent Provincial Fiscal to
file the corresponding informations in said cases without awaiting the
result of a similar case pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

On September 28, 1951, petitioner filed with the
Justice of the Peace Court of San Fabian, Pangasinan, two complaints
for libel, one against Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin
Roces (Criminal Case No. 587) in connection with an article published
in the Daily Mirror in its issue of May 26, 1951, and another
against Pio Pedrosa (Criminal Case No. 588) in connection with another
article published in the Free Press in its issue of June 2, 1951.

After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation the Justice of
the Peace Court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused, who
posted a bond for their temporary release. In a motion dated December
5, 1951, the accused waived their right to preliminary investigation
and prayed that the cases be forwarded to the Court of First Instance
for further proceedings. This was done on December 6, 1951, and the
cases were docketed as Criminal cases Nos. 19286 and 19287.

On March 20, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal filed with the court a
petition in which he prayed for the temporary dismissal of the two
cases with costs de oficio and the cancellation of the bond
filed by the accused for their provisional release, alleging, among
other things, that the administration of justice would be better served
if the two cases be held in abeyance until after the final termination
of Criminal Case No. 15952 then pending in the Court of First Instance
of Manila which has reference to the charge for falsification with
libel filed by Pio Pedrosa against petitioner. To the motion petitioner
vigorously objected contending that the ground on which it is
predicated has no basis in law and should not be entertained.

On June 24, 1952, respondent judge granted the motion as prayed for on
the sole premise that a public prosecutor has the sole power and
authority to file the information in a criminal case to the extent that
if, upon proper investigation, he finds that the evidence on hand does
not warrant prosecution, he may desist from taking action thereon if he
chooses to do so. This order was reiterated on August 22, 1952 when the
court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. This denial gave
rise to the present petition for certiorari.

The petition
for provisional dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal was motivated,
according to him, by the following developments: On April 14, 1951,
Florentino Amansec, petitioner herein, then a Tax Examiner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, submitted to his office a report on the tax
liability of Pio Pedrosa, then Secretary of Finance, stating therein
that the latter had committed certain irregularities in the disclosure
of his income and assets. A news item containing this imputation
appeared in an issue of the Evening News, a local daily. When
Pedrosa learned of this imputation he lost no time in taking action
against Amansec by filing a complaint for falsification with libel
against him with the City Fiscal of Manila. The complaint was duly
investigated and the corresponding information filed against Amansec.
Coetaneous with the taking of this action in court there appeared in
two local dailies, namely, the Daily Mirror and the Free Press,
two news items wherein it was made to appear that Secretary Pedrosa
sent letters to the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Secretary of
Education, and the Executive Secretary in which he asked that Amansec
be dismissed from the service, banned from teaching accounting in
private colleges, and expelled from the Association of Certified Public
Accountants stressing the fact that the Government has no use for men
of his kind because he is either thoroughly dishonest or a mental case.
Pedrosa went to the extent of saying, according to the news items, that
Amansec is not fit to become even a janitor of a bureau. Amansec
resented the publication of these news items, and considering them to
be defamatory, he lodged a complaint against Pedrosa with the office of
the city fiscal. Following the routine of the office, this charge was
also investigated by an assistant fiscal, but instead of filing the
necessary information, he recommended that action thereon be deferred
until after the termination of the case for falsification with libel
that had been previously filed by Pedrosa against Amansec considering
that the alleged defamatory imputations were but mere defensive
declarations made by Pedrosa in self-defense and which may be
considered as a valid defense in a crime of libel. And in deference to
this opinion respondent provincial fiscal deemed it wise to file the
petition under consideration considering that the publications which
had given rise to the complaint lodged by Amansec against Pedrosa in
Manila are the same ones which prompted Amansec to file the two
complaints in the province of Pangasinan.

While the motive
which impelled the provincial fiscal to move for the temporary
dismissal of the charges for libel under consideration is plausible, we
believe that the procedure he has adopted is not in accordance with law
and precedents as it might result in a miscarriage of justice to the
detriment of the rights of the offended party. The objective which the
fiscal had in mind could be accomplished without the need of taking the
drastic action he had taken which resulted in throwing the two cases
out of court. It should be noted that these cases originated in the
Justice of the Peace Court of San Fabian, Pangasinan, by virtue of two
complaints for libel filed by petitioner. These cases were set for
preliminary investigation, but the accused in due time waived their
right to said preliminary investigation, and so the justice of the
peace court forwarded the two cases to the Court of First Instance. It
was then the duty of the provincial fiscal under the law to give course
to these two cases if the evidence on hand so warrants, or to dismiss
them altogether, if he finds them to be unmeritorious. He has to take
either course of action if he is to comply, as he must, with the law.
But far from doing so he took a different course of action which is the
filing of a petition for provisional dismissal. He did more than that.
He not only moved for the temporary dismissal of the two cases but
asked for the cancellation of the bond posted by the accused for their
provisional release, and this he did, not because there was no evidence
to warrant prosecution but merely in deference to the opinion of an
assistant fiscal of Manila on a similar case pending between the same
parties.

While we believe that the administration of justice
may be better served if these two cases are held in abeyance until the
final termination of the criminal case in Manila pending between the
same parties, the action that should have been taken was not to ask for
the dismissal of the two cases but rather to give due course to them
and then ask the court for their temporary suspension if it is desired
to avoid duplication of work and a resultant conflict of opinion
between courts of justice on the same subject matter. By this we mean
that the fiscals could file the corresponding informations and then ask
for the suspension of trial until the other case in Manila has been
finally terminated. Unless this is done the resultant consequence might
work injustice to the offended party considering that the crime of
libel prescribes in two years. And it cannot be said that the law of
prescription is subserved by lodging merely a complaint with a public
prosecutor even if no action is taken thereon by said official because,
under article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered and can
only be interrupted “by the filing of the complaint or information” in
court. (People vs. Aquino, 39 Off. Gaz. 1855; Surbano vs. Gloria, et al., 51 Phil., 415.)

Wherefore, the orders subject of the present petition for certiorari
are hereby set aside, and respondent provincial fiscal is directed to
act in the above criminal cases as required by law, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.