ATTY. ERNESTO B. ESTOYA, ET AL., COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE MARVIE R. ABRAHAM SINGSON, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 10, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIQUE, RESPONDENT.

A sworn letter-complaint against the respondent Judge, signed by
forty-seven officers^[1] and
employees^[2]
of Branches 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Sixth
Judicial Region in San Jose, Antique; the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor;
the Office of the Provincial Probation and Parole Office; and the Office of the
Citizens District Attorney of the Public Assistance Office, all of the Province
of Antique, was filed with this Court on 4 October 1991. The signatories alleged that the respondent
(a) treats her staff members in a “dictatorial and terroristic manner
without regards [sic] to the basic dignity and self-respect of the
individual,” making the “working atmosphere … entirely dependent on
her moods on the particular day which most often fluctuates with the
moon”; (b) has become “more terroristic, dictatorial and oppressive …
not only against her staff but also against the lawyers, litigants, and to the
general public, who happen to be around” when she is present; and (c) “does
not comply with the rule on continuous trial as mandated by the Hon. Supreme
Court.” They prayed that they be “relieve[d] from [their] predicament
by getting Judge Singson out of Antique.” Attached to the letter-complaint
are affidavits of some of the complainants.

In their letter of 29 January 1992, the complainants prayed for a
“full-dress” investigation of their complaint because the respondent
has become more oppressive and dictatorial after she learned about the filing
of the complaint. They stated that they
could not understand her bizarre actuations and that sometimes “she is
excessively generous”; however, in most occasions she is “oppressive,
dictatorial, despotic, and unbearable, if not hysterical.”^[3]

On 19 February 1992, this Court received the First Indorsement,
dated 6 February 1992, of Executive Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the RTC of
Antique^[4]
forwarding to this Court the verified letter-complaint, dated 28 January 1992,
of some of the original complainants, namely, Atty. Ernesto Estoya, Tomas Huelar,
Jr., Leonardo Samulde, Fe Autajay, and Susan Macabuag. They further accused the respondent of gross
and culpable incompetence for having, inter alia, (a) delegated her judicial
authority to the Clerk of Court by requiring the latter to make orders or resolve
or decide cases for her; (b) considered “unlawful aggression” as a
mitigating circumstance; (c) imposed two minimum prison terms and two maximum
prison terms in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law; (d)
promulgated decisions before their typing had been completed; (e) pronounced
the acquittal of an accused even if the decision itself was not available since
it was left in her steel cabinet; (f) denied giving due course to an appeal in
a civil case on the ground that appeal, as she learned during the Judicial
Career Development Seminar on 7 to 11 October 1991, is not a matter of right;
(g) considered a motion filed personally by a party as a mere scrap of paper
because the party was not represented by a lawyer; (h) denied the prosecution the
right to present evidence in opposition to an application for bail; and (i)
violated P.D. No. 385 by restraining the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the
Provincial Sheriff from consolidating ownership over certain parcels of land
foreclosed by the PNB.

In the Resolution of 4 June 1992, this Court required the
respondent to answer the charges.

In her verified Answer dated 12 November 1992,^[5]
the respondent alleged that the charges consist of denunciations and opinions
unsupported by any statement of facts; she has not implemented the continuous
trial of cases in Antique because from the beginning, she has been assigned to
actively handle the case load of two salas — Branches 10 and 11; many of the
complainants are persons unknown to her and were merely solicited by a few of
her court staff who have openly resented her work policies; and her work
policies, though fairly strict, were in part
dictated by the work load of the two branches assigned to her. She considered the imputation concerning her
moodiness as a charge that she is
suffering from some mental malady to which she made the following response:

“The complaint’s language pictures respondent to be suffering
from some mental malady, which cause her ‘moods … (to) fluctuate with the
moon! She respectfully submits that this in itself indicates the lack of
seriousness with which complainants treat this matter.”

Complainants Ernesto Estoya, Caridad Jubilan, and Susan Macabuag
filed separate Replies to the Answer.^[6]

In their 18 June 1993 letter, the complainants adverted to their letter-complaint of 28 January
1992 which asked this Court to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with
respect to the respondent’s
decisions, orders, and pronouncements in the cases mentioned therein.

Issues having been joined, the Court required the parties to
inform the Court if they desired to submit the case for decision on the basis
of their pleadings.^[7]

In her Manifestation and Motion filed on 15 March 1993, the respondent prayed that this case “be assigned for
investigation and hearing for the reception of the parties’ respective
evidence.”^[8]

In the Resolution of 3 August 1993, the Court referred this case to Associate Justice Pedro
Ramirez of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation.^[9]

Justice Pedro Ramirez conducted the investigation of the case and
submitted a 21-page Report on 1 August 1994.

The Report discloses that at the start of the hearing of the case
on 25 January 1994, the parties stipulated that the charges against the
respondent were:

“(1) misconduct;

(2) gross ignorance of the
law;

(3) incompetence and
inefficiency; and

(4) erratic mind … all of
which affect her capacity and ability to administer justice.”^[10]

The complainants presented their evidence to prove the
charges. The respondent “waived
presentation of evidence in her
behalf but prayed that she be granted time within which to file a memorandum in
argument,”^[11]
which she did.

The Report summarizes the evidence for the complainants as
follows:

“The Evidence

The evidence adduced by complainants in support of the charge of
(1) misconduct; (2) gross ignorance of the law; (3) incompetence and
inefficiency; and (4) erratic behavior which affect her capacity and ability to
administer justice consist of the testimony of the following witnesses and
their respective affidavits:

1. Susan D. Macabuag (t.s.n., January 25, 1994; Exhibit C, p. 35, rollo);

2. Fe M. Autajay
(t.s.n., supra; Exhibit D, p. 23, rollo);

3. Caridad M.
Jubilan (t.s.n., supra; Exhibit J, p. 17, rollo); and

4. Tomas C. Huelar,
Jr. (t.s.n., supra; Exhibit K, p. 16, rollo);

and the sworn
statements of the following:

1. Atty. Ernesto B.
Estoya (Exhibit L, p. 510, rollo) and its appendices (Exhibits L-1 to
L-11, pp. 520­572, rollo);

2. Atty. Napoleon A.
Abierra (Exhibit M, p. 584, rollo);

3. Mr. Roberto N.
Minguez (Exhibit N, p. 586, rollo);

4. Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor John I.C. Turalba (Exhibit O, p. 587, rollo);
and

5. Atty. Roy P.
Murallon (Exhibit P, p. 28, rollo)

whose cross examination Atty. San Juan for
respondent Judge waived (order of February 24, 1994, pp. 381-382, rollo).

1.     
Susan D. Macabuag, Court
Interpreter, testified: On September
19, 1990, after calling for her and the staff assistants for criminal and civil
cases, respondent Judge upon going over the day’s calendar, said: ‘this is what I want. I want the arraignment, the motions as
follows: x x x if you cannot do as I asked you,
as I ordered you to do, I’m going to tear this calendar before you I will throw
it away or I will let you eat this, ipakaon ko na sa inyo’ (pp. 46-47, t.s.n.,
Jan. 25, 1994). Once she called for the
janitor or another staff assistant to find out if the assistant provincial
prosecutor was still in court. Informed
that he had gone home already because of an upset stomach, respondent Judge
said, ‘punyeta, shit’ and other invectives (pp. 47, 48, t.s.n., Jan. 25,
1994). There were times respondent
Judge would come to office in a very bad mood. Sometimes she looked like she did not comb her hair and did not have any
make-up at all. But there were times
when she was visibly made up and fully dressed and even had lipstick on her
teeth. When she was in good mood and
was well dressed she was very nice to her staff. Her bad moods usually come before full moon or new moon or two
days after (p. 57, t.s.n., Jan. 25, 1994).

2.     
Fe M. Autajay, Court Stenographer, testified: On January 8, 1991, in the afternoon, Branch
Clerk of Court Estoya called the staff members to a conference in the judge’s
chambers. While Atty. Estoya was
reporting to her about the transcript of stenographic notes that the
stenographers were to submit, respondent judge shouted at her (witness) ‘Nga-­Fe
nga wala ka magatrabaho, kaguwapa sa imo, wala ka nakatrabaho, hindi ina pwede,
bisan asawa kang huwes kinahanglan magtrabaho’ (Why is it Fe that you are not
working, that should not be done. Even
if you are the wife of a Judge, you should work) (p. 116, t.s.n., Jan. 25,
1994). When she began to explain,
respondent Judge shouted at her, ‘Unta ti na inang inyong kutsu-kutsu,
trabaho-trabaho’ (‘Stop that gossiping, work, work’). Then she turned to Mrs. Luz Pedreña who was then transcribing her
notes and, pointing at her, respondent Judge said: ‘Ikaw Luz, wala wala kapa ka makasubmit sang imong transcript’
(‘You Luz, you have not yet submitted your transcript’). In a loud voice she drove her out, ‘Guwa,
guwa’ (‘Go out, go out’). Mrs. Pedreña
left and returned to her table to control herself. After shouting at Mrs. Pedreña, respondent Judge shouted at her
(witness), ‘Nga-a Fe nga naga-piti-piti ka?’ as she was sorting out her papers
because she ran out of supplies. On
June 24, 1991, respondent Judge shouted at her in the presence of Dr. Enrique
Pe, an accused in a criminal case. It
was a little past 8:00 o’clock in the morning as his case was to be
called. He wanted to secure a copy of
the transcript of stenographic notes. As she was verifying from the minutes of the session respondent Judge
came out and shouted at her, ‘Ano ina Fe may bisita ka naman? (‘What is that Fe, do you have a visitor
again?’). Indi na pwede pa gwa-a siya,
pagua-a’ (That should not happened (sic), send him out, send him out’). So she (witness) whispered to Dr. Pe, ‘Gua
lang ron to’ (‘just go out’), which he did immediately (p. 27, t.s.n., January
25, 1994). That same day, June 24,
1991, at about 11:30 in the morning, Erlinda Buyco Fria and two others whom she
did not know, came to verify something from the record. Before Erlinda could finish talking to her
respondent judge came out of her chambers and shouted at her (witness), ‘nga-a
Fe kada bes magwa ako may bisita ka’ (‘why is it Fe that every time I came out
of my office, you have a visitor?’). She answered, ‘Ma’am, they came from a far flung barrio and they wanted
to find out what happened to their cases.’ As she tried to explain further
respondent Judge said: ‘pagwa-a na sila pagwa-a na sila’ (‘you sent (sic) them
out, send them out’). So she (witness)
told them to leave and proceed to her house (pp. 127-131, t.s.n., Jan. 25,
1994). On September 4, 1991, while
Adelia Espartero was asking her for a copy of the transcript of stenographic
notes needed to prepare her defense, respondent Judge asked her again in a loud
voice, ‘ano naman ina Fe’ (‘what is that again Fe?’). When she answered that she was Adelia Espartero, an accused in a
case who wanted to secure a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes to
prepare her defense,’ respondent Judge said: ‘pakadtua ina dire sa akon’ (‘let her come to me’). So she told Adelia to go to the Judge and
explain to her. The judge told Adelia
to just sit down while she (witness) was sorting out her transcript. Eventually Adelia was able to get a copy of
the transcript that she needed (pp. 131-135, t.s.n., Jan. 25, 1994). On July 12, 1990, when she was on duty as
stenographer, one of the cases scheduled to be tried was that of Roberto
Marzonia for illegal possession of ammunition. After the session, respondent Judge called her to her chambers and asked
her for a copy of a decision involving an accused who had pleaded guilty. According to respondent Judge, Atty. Estoya
told her that she knew how to draft a decision of that nature and told her to
submit one to her by Monday morning. It
was a case where the fiscal recommended the imposition of one year
penalty. After preparing the draft of
the decision that same afternoon she (witness) placed it on top of respondent
Judge’s table. In the morning of July
16, 1990, after she (witness) was informed of her brother’s interment at 1:00
o’clock that day, she went to the office and typed in white bond paper the
draft of the decision that she was asked to prepare so that if she had no
correction to it, respondent Judge could sign it. She wrote a short note on top of the record of the case to inform
her (respondent Judge) that she would be absent that day to attend her
brother’s funeral. When she returned to
the office after buying something she was told by Leonardo Samolde that
respondent Judge was looking for her. As she (witness entered her chambers, respondent Judge shouted at her,
‘Sino ang nag-siling sa imo nga i-finalon mo ini?’ She answered, ‘Ay, Ma’am,
that is still considered as a draft, you can either delete something or add
something. I only prepared that in a
white sheet bond paper because it was typewritten first in mimeograph form.’
Respondent Judge did not even listen to her explanation that her brother was to
be buried that day. In the afternoon of
the same day when she returned to the office before 5:00 o’clock, she found
that the draft of the decision she had prepared did not have any correction at
all. And it was promulgated as drafted
by her (pp. 137-146, t.s., Jan. 25, 1994). On August 7, 1990, she was the stenographer on duty. Before the session started, respondent Judge
called her to her chambers. In the
presence of other stenographers she shouted at her, ‘Kapila ko na kamo
singganon nga i­transcribe ninyo and iyong stenographic notes? (‘How many times have I told you to
transcribe your stenographic notes?’. When she asked her which case she was referring to, respondent
Judge said, ‘Pamankota ninyo si Atty. Estoya’ (Ask Atty. Estoya’). That is why on January 14, 1991, she (witness)
wrote the Supreme Court, through the Executive Judge, requesting that she be detailed
to Branch 12 because she could not bear with respondent Judge anymore (pp.
149-150, t.s.n., Jan. 25, 1994). On
January 23, 1991, all three stenographers, namely, Luz Pedreña, Lelani Nolasco
and herself (witness) saw in Court a man whom she did not know. Respondent Judge told all three of them to
receive orders from that man and submit to him their transcript of stenographic
notes of cases submitted for decision but pending resolution. When she left the respondent Judge’s
chambers she told the man she met earlier that her husband was also an RTC
judge. In the course of her
conversation with him she learned from the calling card he showed her (Exhibit
F) that he was a retired judge. He
dictated orders to Ema Grasparil who was not a stenographer to resolve the
incidents and cases submitted to respondent Judge (pp. 157-163, t.s.n., Jan.
25, 1994). Respondent Judge never
dictated any order in open court. And
when objections were interposed during the trial she ruled, ‘sustained,
overruled’ (p. 164, t.s.n., Jan. 25, 1994). Respondent Judge’s mind is unstable especially when it is full moon or
it is new or it is at its last quarter, but it is usually when it is full moon
or two or three days before it that she is irritable. She shouts at anybody for no reason at all (pp. 168, 169, t.s.n.,
Jan. 25, 1994).

3.     
Caridad M. Jubilan, Court Stenographer,
testified: The affidavit, Exhibit J (p.
17, rollo) is hers (pp. 227, 228, t.s.n., Jan. 25, 1994). There she stated that on August 26, 1991,
respondent Judge, while in session, pointing a finger at her, ordered her to
leave the courtroom ‘because my presence was unnecessary;’ that she went inside
the courtroom to look for somebody but had to leave because he was not there;
and that she was humiliated by what respondent Judge did to her.

4.     
Tomas C. Huelar, Jr.,
Interpreter. After counsel for both
parties had agreed that the affidavit (Exhibit K, p. 16, rollo) was
executed by the witness, said affidavit to constitute as his testimony, Atty.
San Juan for respondent Judge waived cross-examination of the witness (pp.
239-241, t.s.n., Jan. 25, 1994). The
affidavit of the witness (Exhibit K, p. 16 rollo) corroborates that of
witness Caridad M. Jubilan (Exhibit J, p. 17, rollo).

5.     
Atty. Ernesto
B. Estoya, Clerk of Court, swore in his affidavit (Exhibit L, p. 510, rollo) that
respondent Judge’s gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, inefficiency and
erratic mind are shown in her decisions and orders in the following cases:

(a)  
Criminal Case No. 3221, People vs. Jose Dungganon, where after
finding the accused guilty of murder she sentenced him to ‘Prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or Ten (10) years
and one (1) day to Twelve (12) years in its minimum, to Fourteen (14) years,
Eight (8) months and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months in
its maximum’ (Exhibit L-1, p. 520, record);

(b)  
Criminal Case No. 4078, People vs. Basillo Resuma, where
without a written decision duly promulgated, she ordered the release of the
accused who was acquitted of the charge of homicide (Exhibit L-2, p. 538,
record); thereafter judgment of acquittal was promulgated (Exhibit L-3, p. 539,
records);

(c)  
Civil Case No. 2449, Rolly C. Mijares vs. Hon. Efren
Esclavilla et al., where after finding petitioner entitled to the relief
demanded imposed upon him a fine of P1,000 for the closure order he has issued
without regard to due process (Exhibit L-4, p. 545, record);

(d)  
Civil Case No. 2501, Ireneo Febrero vs. Leonardo
Tarroja, Jr., where defendant’s motion for extension of time to file answer was
denied on the ground that it was but a mere scrap of paper because it was not
signed by a lawyer (Exhibit L-5, p. 548, record);

(e)  
Criminal Case No. 2408, People vs. Benhur Barayoga, where
without promulgating the decision in the case which was with the Branch Clerk
of Court who was on leave of absence, respondent Judge after telling the
accused in open court of his acquittal considered the decision already
promulgated (Exhibits L-6 and L-7, pp. 549, 550, record);

(f)    
Civil Case No. 2448, Lino Bandoja et al. vs. Spouses
Victoriano Balonon et al. and Civil Case No. 2472, Mayor Ramon Bangcaya vs.
Felipe Pagunsan, where separate appeals of the losing parties were denied on
the ground that they were not a matter of right but subject to the Judge’s
sound discretion (Exhibits 8 and 9, pp. 556, 557, record);

(g)  
Civil Case No. 2008, Juanito Dionisio vs. Soledad Necer, where
a colleague was declared to have acted in ‘an underhanded manner’ in a
deceitful way in transferring to her a case, knowing that she was assigned to
two branches of the court (Exhibit 10, p. 558, record);

(h)  
Criminal Case No. 2444, People vs. Dimas Draper et al. where
after finding accused guilty of homicide sentenced them to suffer six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum (Exhibit L-12, p. 560, record); and Criminal Case No.
4266, People vs. Tirso Noble, where after finding the accused guilty of
homicide, sentenced him to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years as
maximum (Exhibit L-13, p. 572, record).

6.     
Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera of the
Public Attorney’s Office swore in his affidavit that on two occasions
respondent Judge drove him out from court without him being able to say
anything; that in three cases decided by her she imposed the wrong penalty;
that in one case she denied an accused’s appeal because the penalty imposed was not life
imprisonment; and that in other cases she did not allow the prosecution to
conduct the direct examination of the witnesses but instead ordered that
affidavits of witnesses found in the record be deemed as their testimony on
direct examination (Exhibit M, p. 584, record).

7.     
Robert N. Minguez, Chief of the Probation
and Parole Office, swore in his affidavit that she treats the court personnel,
lawyers and litigants in a tyrannical manner without respect for their rights;
and that she is a slave driver; and that she has an erratic mind (Exhibit N, p.
586, record).

8.     
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor
John I.C. Turalba swore in his affidavit that respondent
Judge lacks the necessary experience required of one to become a judge as shown
by her actuation in the cases assigned to her; and that it was one Atty. Reyes
who acted in her behalf in the cases pending before her court (Exhibit O, p.
587, record).

9.     
Atty. Roy P. Murallon, Clerk of
Court, swore in his affidavit that respondent Judge ‘has been terrorizing the
personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Antique and the avalanche of complaint
had been lodged against her not only by the court personnel but as well as the
practicing lawyers and the general public’ (sic; Exhibit P, p. 28, rollo).”

Justice Ramirez made the following
findings:

“Findings:

Respondent Judge did not testify at all to deny the truth of the
testimony and sworn statements of the witnesses against her, much less prove
the falsity thereof. Neither did she
adduce evidence in support of her defenses invoked in her answer.

Upon the evidence on record, it may be concluded that respondent
Judge lacks the temperament required of a Judge, as demonstrated by complainants
Susan D. Macabuag, Fe M. Autajay and Caridad M. Jubilan in their
testimony. Her actuations toward them
reflect tyranny in her dealings with her subordinate employees to cover up her
inadequacy. And her acts are not mere
admonitions to correct the employees’ wrong doings.

The decisions rendered and orders issued by respondent Judge speak
of her ignorance of basic laws.

The penalties imposed by her in Criminal Case No. 3221, People vs.
Dungganon (Exhibit L-1, p. 520, record); Criminal Case No. 2444, People vs.
Dimas Draper et al. (Exhibit L-12, p. 560, record); and Criminal Case No. 4266,
People vs. Tirso Noble (Exhibit L-13, p. 572, record) are without fixed periods
and, therefore incorrect, reflective of her poor knowledge of elementary law.

So is her act of releasing an accused from confinement without
first promulgating the decisions that she has earlier prepared in Criminal Case
No. 4078, People vs. Basilio Resuma (Exhibit L-2, p. 538, record) and Criminal
Case No. 2408, People vs. Benhur Barayoga (Exhibits L-6 and L-7, pp. 549, 550,
record) proof of her disregard of the procedure provided for in the Rules of
Court in such situations.

The imposition of a fine upon the petitioner in Civil Case No.
2449, Rolly C. Mijares vs. Hon. Efren Esclavilla et al. despite the judgment
that he was entitled to relief prayed for; denial of defendant’s motion for
extension of time to file an answer in Civil Case No. 2501, Ireneo Febrero vs.
Leonardo Barroja, Jr., treating it as a mere scrap of paper because it was not
signed by a lawyer (Exhibit L-5, p. 548, record); and dismissing the losing
parties’ appeal in Civil Case No. 2448, Lino Bandoja et al. vs. Spouses
Victoriano Balonon et al. and Civil Case No. 2472, Mayor Ramon Bangcaya vs.
Felipe Pagunsan, on the ground that such appeals were dependent upon the
Court’s sound discretion (Exhibits 8 and 9, pp. 556, 557, record) evince
disregard of the law that as a judge is expected to know.

As admitted by her when interviewed by Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad on May 21, 1992, pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated
March 21, 1992 (p. 80, rollo), after being admitted to the bar in 1973,
she practiced law in Iloilo City until November 1975. She then became employed in a bank as a documentation attorney
and house counsel until March 1986 (pp. 2, 3, t.s.n., May 21, 1992, pp.
120-122, rollo). She never had
any experience working in a court before her appointment as a judge in 1990
(pp. 16, 19, supra). Her
previous employment was in the family trucking service, in the Department of
Social Welfare, as a deputy sheriff and later coordinator of a nursing
recruitment for abroad (p. 36, supra). That must be the reason she is not prepared for the work of a
judge.”

Justice Ramirez
concludes that the respondent’s “continuance in office is unmerited”
and recommends that she “be considered resigned from office.”

The findings of Justice Ramirez are fully supported by the
evidence adduced by the complainants which the respondent did not refute for
reasons only known to her and which she wished to keep to herself. Confronted as she was with testimonies which
could not be simply brushed aside as incredible and by her own orders and
decisions which were offered as proof of her gross ignorance of law and
incompetence, we find it strange why the respondent, who had insisted that
there be a hearing or investigation so that the parties could present their
respective evidence, opted at the end not to rebut the complainants’ evidence
and to prove her defenses. She knows or
ought to know that in administrative cases only substantial evidence — not
proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence — is needed to
support a judgment.^[12]

Considering its gravity, we shall first address the issue of
gross ignorance of law or gross incompetence. Inevitably, this issue must be resolved against the respondent because
the evidence discloses not just isolated instances of errors of judgment, but
overwhelming proof of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law,
attributable to unawareness of or sheer inability to comprehend the law, as
demonstrated thus:

1.     
She considered unlawful, aggression as a mitigating
circumstance under paragraph (1), Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code in People vs. Agustin, et al. (Criminal Case No. 3523)^[13] Any first year law student knows that
unlawful aggression is not a mitigating circumstance.

2.     
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she imposed sentences
with indeterminate minimum and maximum limits, such as, (a) “from Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day to Eight (8) Years of prision
mayor as minimum to Twelve
(12) Years and One (1) Day to Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum” in a conviction for
homicide in People vs. Draper (Criminal Case No. 2444);^[14] (b) “Prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or Ten (10)
Years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) years in its minimum to Fourteen (14)
Years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4)
months in its maximum” in a conviction for murder in People vs. Dungganon, et al.
(Criminal Case No. 3221);^[15]
(c) “prision mayor of
six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years minimum to ten (10) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years maximum” in a conviction for homicide in People vs. Agustin, et al. (Criminal Case No. 3523);^[16] and (d) “six (6) years and one
(1) day to eight (8) years as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years as maximum” in a conviction for homicide in People
vs. Noble (Criminal Case No. 4266).^[17] Every judge is expected to know that
in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and
maximum. In In Re: Jose G. Paulin,^[18] this Court censured and reprimanded
a judge for his unfamiliarity with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The respondent should have learned something
from that case.

3.     
She (a) promulgated on 19 December 1991 an order acquitting
the accused in People vs. Resuma (Criminal Case No. 4078)^[19]
although “the decision made in [said] case has not yet been completed, as
to the discussion portion and final typing,” giving as justification for
such promulgation the “Christmas season and … humanitarian reasons,”
and releasing later the decision which was made to appear as having been
prepared and signed on 10 December 1991;^[20]
and (b) informed on 17 July 1991 in open court the accused in People vs. Barayoga (Criminal Case No. 2408) that
“judgment in this case is acquittal for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in the face of
retraction of the prosecution witness Ramon Mondejar,” which pronouncement
she considered as the promulgation of the judgment. She then dictated an order^[21] the
third paragraph of which reads:

“In view of the
acquittal of the accused, the decision is deemed promulgated today without
resetting the reading of the decision in open Court which in our judgment there
is no need to reset promulgation, to avoid wasting the time of all concerned
especially this Presiding Judge who is handling two branches of this
Court. The Branch Clerk of Court is
hereby ordered to mail copies each of the decision to the Public Prosecutor,
the accused and the counsel.”

She later antedated the
judgment to 8 May 1991.^[22]
Every judge knows or ought to know that the Constitution mandates that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,^[23]
and that under the Rules of Court, a judgment must be written in the official language, personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him, shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts proved as admitted by the accused and the
law upon which the judgment is based,^[24] and must be filed with the Clerk of
Court. The filing is the rendition of
the judgment,^[25] as distinguished from the promulgation
thereof. As of the respective dates of
promulgation as aforementioned, the respondent had not yet rendered her
decision; there was then nothing yet to promulgate. Compounding the irregularity was the antedating of the decision
subsequently rendered.

4.  She denied a defendant’s
motion for extension of time to file an answer in Febrero vs. Tarroja (Civil
Case No. 2501) on the ground that the motion, not being signed by a lawyer, is
a mere scrap of paper.^[26] It
is elementary that a party may sue or defend an action pro se. Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 5. Signature
and address. — Every pleading of a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)

5.  She denied due course to
the notice of appeal filed by the
aggrieved parties in Bandoja vs.
Balonon (Civil Case No.
2448)^[27]
and Mayor Bangcaya vs.
Pagunsan (Civil Case No. 2472)^[28] because according to her “appeal is not
a matter of right in civil cases but subject to the sound discretion of the
Court, and denial may be had when applying the law or when it is worthwhile, so
as not to clog the docket of the appellate court,” which is not so, for
while the right to appeal is statutory and not constitutional, once it is
granted by statute, its denial would be a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution.^[29]

6.     
In an injunction case, entitled Mijares vs. Hon. Esclavilla, et al. (Civil Case No. 2449), to enjoin respondents Mayor and the Station
Commander of the INP of San Jose, Antique, from enforcing an order for the
closure of the Punay Pension House because, it is claimed, its permit was only
for a refreshment parlor but it was used as a night club, although in her
decision^[30] granting the injunction she found that the
petitioner was entitled to the relief demanded because the respondents
committed a violation of due process since no warning was given to the
petitioner and the closure order “was coercive and tantamounts [sic] to
non-observance of due process x
x x,” she, nevertheless,
ordered the petitioner to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for the reason that in
addition to operating a refreshment parlor, the petitioner allowed “model
dancing” or “disco dancing” in the premises. She also ordered him to stop immediately the
model dancing, and suggested instead that he “institute other attractions
like dart games, table tennis, billiard and other non-controversial attractions
so as not to bother the sensibilities of the other citizens of [the] small
municipality.” Why she imposed the fine is beyond us. The petitioner was not prosecuted for the
violation of any ordinance punishable by imprisonment or fine. Thus, while with one hand she issued the
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the closure order because the
petitioner had been deprived of due process, thereby manifesting her fealty to
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, with the other hand she flagrantly
violated the selfsame right when she imposed the fine.

7.     
As further disclosed by the records, on 18 June 1991, she
granted an application for bail filed by accused Felix Martinicio and Danilo
Berdin who had been charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 4454 and fixed the
amount of bail at P20,000.00 each. The
grant was made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the
evidence of guilt was strong and without allowing the prosecution to present
evidence in this regard.

In a proceeding for certiorari brought before it by the People, the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 26200),
in a decision promulgated on 20 December 1991,^[31]
set aside and annulled, on the ground of violation of due process, the order
admitting the accused to bail and directed the trial court to set the
application for bail for hearing to enable the prosecution to adduce evidence
to support its claim that the evidence of guilt was strong.

The Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged
with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, no bail could be granted
if the evidence of guilt was strong. And
since no bail was recommended by the prosecution and it objected to the
application for bail, the respondent should have allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence.

In immediately granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for
each of the accused without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence,
the respondent denied the prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many cases^[32]
and had imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail in
capital offenses and in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is
strong.^[33]

The respondent’s unfamiliarity with the constitutional principles
and the substantive and procedural laws involved in the aforementioned cases
evinces ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim
of good faith or excusable negligence.

The respondent committed, as well, grave misconduct when she
antedated her decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 2408 and 4078 which she rendered
long after she “promulgated” the acquittal of the accused.

The respondent’s unfitness and unworthiness to hold her office a
moment longer is thus manifest. Gross
ignorance of law and incompetence are characteristics and quirks impermissible
in a judge.^[34]
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules;^[35] it
is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.^[36]
Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be
“studious of the principles of law”; and Canon 18 mandates that he
“should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law.”

In Aducayen vs. Flores,^[37] this Court observed that judges of
lower courts

“are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules…. [W]hile it becomes hourly
difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum of effort
should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they betray awareness of
well-settled and authoritative doctrines. If such were the case, then resort to us would be less frequent. That way our time could be devoted to questions of
greater significance. Not only that,
there would be on the part of party litigants less expense and greater faith in
the administration of justice if there be a belief on their part that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent deficiency in
their grasp of legal principles.”

Elsewise stated, a judge should be
“industriously devoted to the study of law [for] [h]aving accepted his
position … [he] owes it to the dignity of the court he sits in, to the legal
profession he belongs and to the public who depends on him, to know the law
which he is called upon to interpret and apply.”^[38]
It is, indeed, demanded that a judge strive for excellence. His pursuit of excellence, exceeded only by
his passion for truth, would assure him quintessence of success in his sacred
duty to promote justice; he shall be looked upon as the “personification
of justice and the Rule of Law.”^[39] To
keep the idealism alive and the passion burning, a judge need only remind
himself of this stirring message on who is fit to be a judge:

“A man of
learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting
himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law.

A man who bears himself in his community with
friends but without familiars; almost lonely, devoting himself exclusively to
the most exacting mistress that man ever had, the law as a profession in its
highest reaches where he not only interprets the law but applies it, fearing
neither friend nor foe, fearing only one thing in the world — that in a moment
of abstraction, or due to human weakness, he may in fact commit some error and
fail to do justice. That is the judge.”^[40]

Having earlier reached the conclusion that the respondent must be
dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of law, gross incompetence, and
grave misconduct, it may no longer appear necessary to discuss her treatment of
the court employees. Nevertheless, this
is a matter of far-reaching importance as any discussion thereon will serve as
a guide for other judges.

The duties and responsibilities of a judge are not strictly
confined to judicial functions. In
multi-sala trial courts, he should be ever aware of the fact that he has to
deal with his fellow judges. He and the
others are looked upon as the living symbols of justice in their territorial
jurisdiction. Therefore, they owe each
other utmost respect; anything less than that would diminish the public’s
confidence in the ability of the court to administer justice. With respect to his own sala, he is the head
of the office tasked with supervising employees who by their functions are to
assist him in the performance of his judicial duties. As to his employees, he should be a good manager. Recognizing such role, Canon 8 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics provides that a judge “should organize his court with a
view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its business and he should not tolerate
abuses and neglect by clerks, sheriffs and other assistants who are sometimes
prone to presume too much upon his good-natured acquiescence by reason of
friendly association with him.”

To be a good manager, one must be a good leader. One cannot be a good leader unless, among
other things, he knows himself and his objectives, ever cognizant of the fact
that he is dealing with beings endowed by God with human dignity and
self-respect, each of whom is different from the other, is able to earn the
trust and confidence of his subordinates and motivate them toward creativity,
achievement, and success, and is able to marshal their potentials and the
resources of his office for the effective performance of its functions and
duties. His conduct and example must create
an atmosphere of cordiality conducive to industry, dedication, and commitment
to excellence.

The evidence adduced in this case convinces us that even with her
fellow judges she could not exercise the restraint needed of a judge. In Dionisio vs. Nacer (Agrarian Case No. 2008) on the simple
matter of which branch should take cognizance thereof, she accused a colleague
of having acted in “an underhanded manner” and of being
“deceitful.”^[41] She
does not, as well, possess the virtues, qualities, temperament, aptitude, and
skill of a good manager of court employees. As aptly described by Justice Ramirez, she is “tyrannical.” It
is no surprise then that most of the court employees were constrained to file
this complaint because they could no longer bear the indignities they were
suffering. In the end, the reputation
of and the respect due the court were placed in serious jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge MARVIE R. ABRAHAM SINGSON is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any branch, instrumentality,
or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This dismissal is effective upon her receipt of a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, and Bidin, JJ.,
on leave.

Bellosillo, J., no part.

---

^[1]
Atty. Ernesto Estoya, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 10; Atty. Roy Murallon,
Clerk of Court, Branch 13; Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, Clerk of Court; Mr.
Robert Minguez, Provincial Probation and Parole Officer; Assistant Public
Prosecutors Salvador Pe, Jr. and Juan Mission; Atty. Napoleon Abiera, Citizens
District Attorney (PAO); and Citizens Attorneys Juan Baldestamon and Rolando
Vedeja.

^[2]
Legal Researchers, Court Interpreters, Stenographic Reporters, Staff Assistants
(I and II), Deputy Sheriffs, Process Servers, and Clerical Aides.

^[3]
Rollo, 81-82.

^[4]
Id., 40-41.

^[5]
Rollo, 209-217.

^[6]
Rollo, 230-231, 256, 262-263.

^[7]
Resolution of 2 March 1993; Id; 228.

^[8]
Rollo, 229.

^[9]
Id., 352.

^[10]
Report, 3.

^[11]
Id., 5.

^[12]
Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

^[13]
Annex “F” of letter-complaint of 28 January 1992, Rollo, 53;
paragraph (c), page 2 of Exhibit “L,” Id., 511).

^[14]
Exhibit “L-12,” Rollo,
560-571.

^[15]
Exhibit “L-1,” Id.,
520-537.

^[16]
See note 14.

^[17]
Exhibit “L–13,”
Rollo, 572–583.

^[18]
101 SCRA 605 [1980].

^[19]
Exhibit “L-2,” Rollo,
538.

^[20]
Exhibit “L-3,” Id.,
539-544.

^[21]
Exhibit “L-6,” Id., 549.

^[22]
Exhibit “L-7,” Id.,
550-555.

^[23]
Section 14, Article VIII.

^[24]
Section 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

^[25]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. II,
Sixth Revised Ed. [1989], 368.

^[26]
Exhibit “L-5,” Rollo, 548.

^[27]
Exhibit “L-8,” Id., 556.

^[28]
Exhibit “L-9,” Id., 557.

^[29]
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 144
[1977].

^[30]
Exhibit “L-4,” Rollo, 545-547.

^[31]
Rollo, 71-74.

^[32]
People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522
[1968]; People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA
512 [1969]; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369 [1973]; People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 [1981]; People vs.
Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 [1989];
People vs. Calo, 186 SCRA 620
[1990]; Carpio vs. Maglalang, 196 SCRA
41 [1991]; Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; also Pico vs. Combong, 215 SCRA 421 [1992].

^[33]
e.g., Libarios vs. Dabalos, supra note 32; Pico vs. Combong, supra note 32.

^[34]
Garganera vs. Jocson, 213 SCRA
149 [1992].

^[35]
Aducayen vs. Flores, 51 SCRA 78
[1973]; Libarios vs. Dabalos, supra note 32.

^[36]
Ajeno vs. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Lim vs. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258
[1993].

^[37]
Supra note
35. See also Ubongen vs. Mayo, supra note 36.

^[38]
RUPERTO C. MARTIN, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Eighth ed. [1984], 322.

^[39]
Circular No. 13, 1 July 1987; Cuaresma vs. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].

^[40]
Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War of the United States of America during World
War I, quoted in GEORGE A. MALCOLM, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1949 ed., 200.

^[41]
Exhibit “L-10,” Rollo,
558.