CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO AND VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, PETITIONERS, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City
of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. On 1
October 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T.
Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of
General Services^[1]
of the City Government of San Carlos.

Petitioner Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City
Government who were considered for the position of General Services
Officer. Before her promotion in 1992,
she had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32)
years. She joined the City Government
on 3 January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk. Through the years, she rose from the ranks, successively occupying the
following positions:

(a)  Assistant Chief of the License & Fees
Division, from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1973;

(b)  Chief of the License and Fees Division, from 1
July 1973 to 1 January 1981;

(c)  Cashier, from 2 January 1981 to 30 June 1989;
and

(d)  Cashier IV, from 1 July 1989 to 30 September
1992.^[2]

On 1 October 1992, petitioner Victoria
assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General
Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached
to that position.

On 16 December 1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission
(“Commission”) received a letter^[3] from
Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the
promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.

The Commission directed its Regional Office No. 6-Iloilo City to
submit a report on the appointment of petitioner Victoria.

From the report submitted by Director Jesse J. Caberoy of the
Iloilo City-CSRO No. 6, the Commission found that petitioner Mayor was the
lawful husband of the appointee, petitioner Victoria, the two (2) having been
married sometime in 1964. Director
Caberoy also reported that the appointment papers prepared by the Office of the
City Mayor of San Carlos were submitted to the Bacolod City CSC-Field Office on
28 October 1992, and that the appointment was thereafter approved by Director
Purita H. Escobia of that CSC-Field Office, on 18 November 1992.

Acting on the report of Director Caberoy, the Commission, in its
Resolution No. 93-1427 dated 13 April 1993, recalled the approval issued by
Director Escobia and disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the
position of General Services Officer of San Carlos City upon the ground that
that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.

On 14 June 1993, petitioner Mayor and petitioner Victoria
received a copy of Resolution No. 93-1427 of the Commission.^[4]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory
prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria
as General Services Officer. Petitioners also asserted that the Commission had deprived petitioner
Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her
appointment. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission on 21 July 1993.

In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Mayor and petitioner
Victoria contend that the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in
withdrawing and disapproving petitioner Victoria’s promotional
appointment. Petitioners assert that
Victoria can no longer be removed from the position of General Services Officer
without giving her an opportunity to be heard and to answer the charge of
nepotism.

Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal
reasons when he appointed his wife to the new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified among the
candidates for appointment to that position, she having worked for the City
Government for thirty-two (32) years and being highly recommended by the
OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City.^[5] It is
also claimed by petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the position
was concurred in by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.^[6] He
further avers that he had consulted the Field and Regional Officers of the
Commission in Bacolod City, and raised the question of applicability of the
prohibition against nepotism to the then proposed promotion of his wife in one
of the seminars conducted by the Commission’s Regional Office held in San
Carlos City on 21 and 22 September 1992. According to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C. Agdon, a supervising
personnel specialist in the Commission’s Bacolod Office, informed him that the
promotional appointment was not covered by the prohibition.^[7]

The basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition
against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not
to promotional appointments. They
believe that because petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the City
Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the reason behind the
prohibition no longer applied to her promotional appointment. Petitioners also affirm that petitioner
Victoria deserves to be promoted to General Services Officer, considering her
long and faithful service to the City Government.^[8]

The task before this Court is, accordingly, two-fold:

(1)  to determine whether a promotional appointment
is covered by the legal prohibition against nepotism, or whether that
prohibition applies only to original appointments to the Civil Service; and

(2)  to determine whether the Commission had
gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional
appointment given to petitioner Victoria after the Commission, through Director
Escobia, had earlier approved that same appointment, without giving an
opportunity to petitioner Victoria to explain her side on the matter.

‘I

The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is
set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also
known as E.O. No. 292). Section 59
reads as follows:

“Sec. 59. Nepotism
— (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section the word ‘relative’ and members of the
family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.

(2)     The following are
exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.

The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable
to the case of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any
position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both
husband and wife may be allowed.

(3)     In order to give
immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous appointment which are
in contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer and pending such
transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the
relative or relatives who were appointed in violation of these provisions.”
(Underscoring supplied).

Section 6 of Rule XVIII, of the “Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,” issued on
27 December 1991, implementing, among other things, the abovequoted Section 59,
provides as follows:

“Sec. 6. No appointments
in the national, provincial, city and municipal government or in any branch or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters shall be made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise specifically provided by law, as used in this
Section, the word ‘relative’ and the members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree
either of consanguinity or of affinity.

The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on
nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; (d) members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. Provided, however,
That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made
to the Commission.

The restriction mentioned in the first paragraph of this Section
shall not be applicable to the case of a member of any family who after his or
her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with
someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.

Cases of previous appointment which are in contravention hereof
shall be corrected by transfer, and pending such transfer, no promotion or
salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who were
appointed in violation of these provisions.” (Underscoring supplied)

It will be noted that the abovequoted
Section 6 of Implementing Rule XVIII essentially tracks the provisions of
Section 59, Book V of E.O. No. 292.^[9]

We turn, therefore, to an analysis of Section 59, Book V of E.O.
No. 292, quoted above. The noteworthy
fact may be pointed out, at the outset, that Section 59 as it exists today has
been in our statute books in substantially identical form and language for at
least thirty (30) years.^[10]

A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the
prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers “all
appointments”, without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds
or types of appointments. Secondly,
Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city
and municipal governments, as well as any branch or instrumentality
thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set
out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list:

(a)  persons employed in a confidential capacity;

(b)  teachers;

(c)  physicians; and

(d)  members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

The list has not been added to or
subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list does not contain words like “and other similar
positions.” Thus, the list appears to us to be a closed one, at least
closed until lengthened or shortened by Congress.

Section 59 of Book V, E.O. No. 292 should, of course, be read in
connection with the Omnibus Implementing Rules. Additional light is shed on the issue we here address by some
provisions of these Rules. Section 1,
Rule V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules reads as follows:

“Section 1. All
appointments in the career service shall be made only according to merit and fitness
to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.

As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress
of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation. All original appointments and personnel
actions shall be in accordance with these Rules and with other regulations and
standards that may be promulgated by the Commission.” (Underscoring
supplied)

Section
1, Rule VII of the same Rules also bears upon our inquiry:

“Section 1. The following constitute personnel
actions: original appointment,
appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, secondment, demotion and separation.”

(Underscoring
supplied)

Under the abovequoted
provisions of the Implementing Rules, both an original appointment and a
promotion are particular species of personnel action. The original appointment of a civil service
employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in
respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
re-employment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of
course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all personnel actions
occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new
appointment to another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such appointment must comply with all
applicable rules and prohibitions,
including the statutory and regulatory prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition
against nepotism to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into
the government service, and to
insulate from that prohibition appointments subsequently issued when personnel
actions are thereafter taken in respect of the same employee, would be
basically to render that prohibition, in the words of Laurel V, etc. v.
Civil Service Commission,^[11]
“meaningless and toothless.”

Inquiry into the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition
against nepotism also strongly indicates that that prohibition was intended to
be a comprehensive one. Section 1, Book
V, E.O. No. 292 sets out the basic policy which pervades all the provisions of
our Civil Service law, including Section 59 thereof:

“Sec. 1. Declaration of
Policy. — The State shall insure
and promote the Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil
Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness; x x x.”
(Underscoring supplied)

Put succinctly, that purpose is to ensure
that all appointments and other personnel actions in the civil service should be
based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how close or intimate an
appointee is to the appointing
power.^[12]

Laurel V, etc. v. Civil Service Commission supra, is instructive in this
connection. In that case, petitioner
Governor of Batangas Province appointed or designated his brother, Benjamin Laurel, who had been holding a promotional
appointment as Civil Security Officer, a position classified as “primarily
confidential” by the Civil Service, to the position of Provincial
Administrator, a position in the Career Civil Service. This Court held that the appointment or
designation as Acting Provincial Administrator was violative of the prohibition
against nepotism, then embodied in Section 49, P.D. No. 807. Moreover, the Court emphatically agreed with
the Civil Service Commission that “although what was extended to Benjamin was
merely a designation and not an appointment, x x x the prohibitive mantle on
nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly,
cannot be done indirectly:”

“We cannot accept petitioner’s view. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and
designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to
circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion
the impact of its violation. The
rule admits of no distinction between appointment and designation. Designation is also defined as ‘an
appointment or assignment to a particular office’; and ‘to designate’ means ‘to
indicate, select, appoint or set apart for a purpose of duty.’ (Black’s
Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 402)

x x x                                                              x
x x                                                                 x
x x

It seems clear to Us that Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not
suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading this section with Section 25 of said
decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either
permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up
because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it
precisely accomplishes the same purpose. Moreover, if a designation is not to be deemed included in the
term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the
prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent it
by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the prohibited
degree to a vacant position in the career service. Indeed, as correctly stated by public
respondent, ‘what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.’“^[13]
(Underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, the Court was unwilling to restrict
and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive.

One of the contentions of petitioner in the case at bar is that
the ratio of the prohibition against nepotism is not applicable here
because petitioner Victoria was already in the government service at the time
petitioners were married in 1964. It is
not disputed that the original 1961 appointment of petitioner Victoria as an Assistant
License Clerk was not a nepotic appointment. Indeed, Section 59 itself states, in the 4th paragraph thereof, that the
prohibition against nepotism is not

“applicable to the case of a member of any
family who, after his or her appointment to any position in any office
or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau,
in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may
be allowed.” (Underscoring supplied)

The subsequent marriage of one to the
other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the original appointment of petitioner Victoria into a prohibited
nepotic one. It is the promotional
appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner
Victoria in 1 October 1982 that is at stake.

Here, the basic argument of petitioners is that to read the
prohibition in Section 59, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as applicable both to
original and promotional or subsequent appointments, would be to deprive the
government of the services of loyal and faithful employees who would thereby be
penalized simply because the appointing or recommending official happens to be
related to the employee within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity.

A major difficulty with petitioners’ argument is that it tends to
prove too much. For the appointee,
whether in an original or a promotional appointment, may in fact be quite loyal
and efficient and hard-working; yet that circumstance will not prevent the
application of the prohibition certainly in respect of the original appointment. The Court is not unaware of the difficulties
that the comprehensive prohibition against nepotism would impose upon
petitioner Victoria and others who maybe in the same position. It is essential to stress, however, that the
prohibition applies quite without regard to the actual merits of the
proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the appointing or
recommending authority, and that the prohibition against nepotism in
appointments whether original or promotional, is not intended by the legislative
authority to penalize faithful service.

The purpose of Section 59
which shines through the comprehensive and unqualified language in which it was
cast and has remained for decades, is precisely to take out of the
discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the matter of
appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. In other words, Section 59 insures the
objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that
objectivity from being in fact tested. The
importance of this statutory objective is difficult to overstress in the
culture in which we live and work in the Philippines, where family bonds
remain, in general, compelling and cohesive.

The conclusion we reach
is that Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain
and ordinary language: it refers to “all
appointments” whether original or promotional in nature. The public policy embodied in Section 59 is
clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither authority nor
inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a
qualification here or a distinction there.

It follows that the
promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria by her husband, petitioner
Mayor, falls within the prohibited class of appointments: the prohibited relationship between the
appointing authority (petitioner Mayor) and the appointee (wife Victoria)
existed at the time the promotional appointment was issued. It is scarcely necessary to add that the
reasons which may have moved petitioner Mayor to issue the prohibited
appointment are, as a matter of law, not relevant in this connection.^[14]

II

We turn to the second issue where petitioners contend that when
the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria was approved by Director Escobia,
CSC Field Office, Bacolod City, that appointment became complete. When petitioner Victoria took her oath of
office and commenced the discharge of the duties of a General Services Officer,
she acquired a vested right to that position and cannot, according to
petitioners, be removed from that position without due process of law.

This argument misconceives the nature of the action taken by the
respondent Commission. That action was not
the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure upon petitioner
Victoria, nor upon petitioner Mayor. There were no administrative charges in respect of which petitioner
Victoria would have been entitled to notice and hearing. The Commission, in approving or disapproving
an appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable
provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. At all events, as the Solicitor General has noted, petitioner
Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Commission and there challenged the disapproval by the
Commission.

The action of the Commission was, in other words, taken in
implementation of Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 and the relevant
Implementing Regulations. Because the
promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of
Section 59, it was null and void as being contra legem. Section 9 of Rule V of the Omnibus
Implementing Regulations sets out the principal legal consequence of an
appointment issued in disregard of the statutory prohibition:

“Sec. 9. An appointment
accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing
authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the
Commission. However, an appointment
may be void from the beginning due to fraud on the part of the appointee or
because it was issued in violation of law.” (Underscoring supplied)

A void appointment cannot give rise to
security of tenure on the part of the holder of such appointment.

The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., promotions.^[15]
Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved
in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and
regulations. Section 20 of Rule VI of
the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear:

“Sec. 20. Notwithstanding
the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the
following grounds:

(a)  Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s
Merit Promotion Plan;

(b)  Failure to pass through the agency’s
Selection/Promotion Board;

(c)  Violation of the existing collective agreement
between management and employees relative to promotion; or

(d)  Violation of other existing civil service
law, rules and regulations.” (Underscoring supplied).

The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which
had been issued by one of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly
lawful and appropriate, the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria
being void “from the beginning.” The approval issued by Director Escobia did
not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that appointment.

We conclude, in respect of the second issue, that petitioners
have not shown any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent Commission.

Petitioners have also complained that the letter of Congressman
Carmona which had precipitated action on the part of respondent Commission, was
not a verified letter. They contend
that the Commission could not or should not have acted upon the charges raised
in that letter.

We are not aware of any law or regulation requiring the letter
written by the Congressman to be subscribed under oath before the Commission
could act thereon. Under its own rules
and regulations, the Commission may
review motu proprio personnel actions involving the
position of a Division Chief or above, such as the position of General Services
Officer.^[16]
We hold that the respondent
Commission had authority, indeed the duty, to recall on its own initiative the
erroneous initial approval of the promotional appointment extended to
petitioner Victoria, and to review the same de novo.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition
for Certiorari must be DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., on leave.

---

^[1]
An office created by the Local
Government Code of 1991; Sections 454 and 490, R.A. No. 7160.

^[2]
Annex “C,” Rollo, p. 29.

^[3]
Annex “J,” Rollo, p. 36.

^[4]
In this Resolution, the Commission had also instructed Director Caberoy “to
formally charge Mayor Rogelio R. Debulgado for violation of the law on
nepotism, conduct the formal investigation, if necessary, and submit [his]
report and recommendation to the Commission immediately.” It appears that the
criminal complaint against petitioner Mayor was later withdrawn in Resolution
No. 93-3320 of the Commission; Annex “A,” Petitioners’ Reply, Rollo, pp.
119-120.

^[5]
Annex “D,” Rollo, p. 30.

^[6]
Annex “F,” Rollo, p. 32.

^[7]
Annex “H,” Rollo, p. 34.

^[8]
The minimum qualifications of a General Services Officer are prescribed in
Section 490 of the Local Government Code of 1991:

“Sec. 490. Qualifications, Powers and Duties. —
(a) No person shall be appointed general services officer unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned,
of good moral character, a holder of a college degree on public
administration, business administration and management from a recognized college
or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in general
services, including management of supply, property, solid waste disposal, and
general sanitation for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or
city general services officer, and three (3) years in the case of the
municipal general services officer.

The appointment for a general
services officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments.

x x x                                         x
x x                                         x
x x”

(Underscoring supplied)

^[9]
On 10 September 1993, the Commission issued its Memorandum Circular No. 38,
Series of 1993, entitled “Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and other
Personnel Actions” published in the Manila Standard, 6 October 1993; text in
“Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (published by the
Commission). Part VII of Memorandum
Circular No. 38 reads in relevant part as follows:

“VII. PROHIBITIONS ON APPOINTMENTS

x x x                                                 x x x                                         x x x

2. No
appointment in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in
any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. [Nepotism]

x x x                                                 x x x                                         x x x

c. The
following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism:

– persons
employed in a confidential capacity

–
teachers

–
physicians

–
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

d. the
nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments be they original, promotional,
transfer or reemployment regardless of status.

x x x                                         x
x x                                         x
x x”

(Underscoring
supplied)

We note that paragraph 2 (d), above
underscored, was added by the Commission after the controversy here involved
had begun and after the promotional appointment to General Services Officer had
been issued to petitioner Victoria. The
Court will not, of course, rely upon this paragraph in resolving the first
issue here presented. Moreover, it is
necessary to settle the question of whether Part VII, 2(d) of Memorandum
Circular No. 38, Series of 1993 is itself valid or whether it has expanded the
scope of the statutory norm in Section 59, something which an implementing
regulation obviously cannot do.

Paragraph 2(d) of Memorandum
Circular No. 38 is quoted above basically to point out that it sets out the
understanding of the Commission of the scope and reach of Section 59, Book V of
E.O. No. 292 and that that understanding has been cast in a form of a general
regulation applicable to subsequent appointments and not limited to the
particular appointment of petitioner Victoria Debulgado.

^[10]
See Section 30, R.A. No. 2260, as amended effective 19 June 1959 known as the
Civil Service Law of 1959; and Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 dated 6 October 1975,
known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.

^[11]
203 SCRA 195 (1991).

^[12]
Teologo v. Civil Service Commission, 19 SCRA 238 (1990); Meram v.
Edralin, 154 SCRA 238 (1987).

^[13]
203 SCRA at 208-209.

In Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong v. Malik
(226 SCRA 193 [1993]), respondent Judge appointed his nephew (son of his older sister)
to the position of janitor in his court, and later promoted him first as MTC
Aide and later as Process Server. The
Court held that he had violated the prohibition against nepotism found in
Section 59, book VI of E.O. no. 292 for which offense, among others, respondent
was dismissed from the service. The
Court did not seek to distinguish between the original appointment of
respondent Judge’s nephew as janitor from his subsequent promotional
appointments.

^[14]
It also follows that subparagraph 2(d) of Part VII, Memorandum Circular No. 38,
Series of 1993 (quoted in footnote 8, supra) does not unduly
expand the scope of the statutory norm but, to the contrary, merely faithfully
reflects the scope and reach thereof. Subparagraph 2(d) must hence be held valid and effective.

^[15]
Section 12(14), Chapter 3, Book V of E.O. No. 292.

^[16]
See Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1991, dated 12 November 1991.