FELICIDAD UY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPO­LITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI, METRO MANILA; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR …

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the order dated 2 July 1993 of public
respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Makati, Metro Manila, denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss is based on the
failure of the private respondents, as the offended parties therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior
referral of disputes to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the proper barangay.

At the outset, it must be
stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be resolved in the
light of the revised law on katarungang pambarangay provided for in the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992,^[1] this Court would have declined to accept the
invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed
for. We have already ruled that while
it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor may
be directed. There is a hierarchy of
courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a
general determinant of the proper forum
for the application for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner
and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper
Regional Trial Court.^[2]

The antecedent facts as
disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not complicated.

Petitioner subleased from
respondent Susanna Atayde (hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the second floor of a
building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro
Manila. She operated and maintained
therein a beauty parlor.^[3]

The sublease contract
expired on 15 April 1993. However, the
petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and
Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her
remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a
shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing.^[4] The
argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand,
and Atayde and several of Atayde’s employees, including private respondent
Winnie Javier (hereinafter Javier), on the other.

On 21 April 1993, the private respondents had themselves
medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the
petitioner.^[5]

On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with
the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, which was docketed as Barangay Cases
Nos. 1023^[6] and
1024.^[7]

The confrontation of the
parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner
appeared. The barangay captain then
reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.^[8]

On 11 May 1993, the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight
physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 and assigned to Branch 61
thereof.

On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61
ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her
witnesses.

On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required
counter-affidavits.^[9]
In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the
prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo
conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of
Manila.^[10]
She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing conciliation between
Atayde and the petitioner in Barangay Case No. 1023.^[11]

On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-compliance with the requirement
of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and
pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

On 2 July 1993, public
respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss, pertinent
portions of which read:

“The court finds the motion to be without sufficient
merit. In the first place, the offense
subject of these cases occurred in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that
Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had started the conciliation
proceedings between the parties but as of May 18, 1993 nothing has been
achieved by the barangay (Annex “2” of the Counter-Affidavit of the
accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed directly with this court by
the public prosecutor on May 11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses had
already filed their counter-affidavits and documents. At this stage of the proceedings, the court believes that the
accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the
barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering that accused and complainant are
residents of different barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the
Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is about to prescribe.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes, and so
holds, that the complainants may go directly to the court where their complaint
is about to prescribe or barred by statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6
of PD 1508.”^[12]

A motion to reconsider
the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.

Hence this special civil
action for certiorari. The petitioner contends that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private respondents
failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied
in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper because
prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in the case of private
respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays
in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities
or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of
private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied
with the requirement.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with
the petitioner that Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 should be dismissed for non-compliance with Sections
408, 409, 410, and 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to
Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.

The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents
and of the Office of the Solicitor General. The private respondents filed a rejoinder to the petitioner’s reply to
their comment and a reply to the comment of the Office of the Solicitor
General.

In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,
which the petitioner and the private
respondents complied with. The Office
of the Solicitor General, in view of its prior submission, moved that it be
excused from filing a memorandum.

The petition is impressed
with merit.

The law on the katarungang pambarangay was
originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991,
specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof,^[13] revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D. No.
1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of Chapter 7, Title I,
Book III thereof read as follows:

“SEC. 408. Subject
Matter for Amicable
Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a)   Where one party is the government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b)   Where one party is a public officer or
employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

(c)   Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding
one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d)   Offenses where there is no private offended
party;

(e)   Where the dispute involves real properties
located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree
to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f)    Disputes involving parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by appropriate Lupon;

(g)   Such other classes of disputes which the
President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at anytime before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the
lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SEC. 409. Venue. — (a) Disputes between persons actually
residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the lupon of said barangay.

(b)     Those involving actual
residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually
resides, at the election of the complainant.

(c)     All disputes involving
real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d)     Those arising at the
workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where
such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings
before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the
punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be
submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose
ruling thereon shall be binding.

SEC. 410. Procedure for
Amicable Settlement. — x x x

x x x

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. — While
the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive
periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be
interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon
receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation
or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary: Provided, however, That
such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the
complaint with the punong barangay.

x x x

SEC. 412. Conciliation. —
(a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary
or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman
or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may
go directly to court. -­-The
parties may go directly to court in the following instances:

(1)   Where the accused is under detention;

(2)   Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3)   Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property, and support pendente lite; and

(4)   Where
the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

x x x

SEC. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. — ­In
all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person
without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not
lawyers.”

Pursuant to the authority
vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules to implement the revised law on katarungang pambarangay. Sections
8 and 11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part
as follows:

“SECTION 8. Failure
to appear. —

a. Sanctions

The complaint may be dismissed when complainant, after due notice, refuses
or willfully fails to appear without justifiable reason on the date set for
mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Such dismissal ordered by the Punong Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after
giving the complainant an opportunity to explain his non-appearance shall be
certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, and shall
bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action
as that dismissed.

x x x

“SECTION 11. Suspension of prescriptive period
of offenses and cause of action. —
The prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws
shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong
Barangay. The running of the
prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the
Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided,
however, that such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing
of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing
of the case in court or government office for adjudication shall be subject to
the provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII of these Rules.”

It may thus be observed
that the revised katarungang
pambarangay law has at least three new significant features,
to wit:

1.       It increased the
authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D.
No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or
a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

2.       As to venue, it
provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties
are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study,
shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.

3.       It provides for the
suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from
some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods “shall
resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary.”
What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of
the complaint is unclear; obviously, it could have
been a drafting oversight. Accordingly,
in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the
Secretary of Justice, the phrase “the complaint or”
is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive
period shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate
of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the pangkat
secretary. Such
suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.

The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of
the lupon and if the mediation and conciliation process at that level
would be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice
would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships among
protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace and order
therein enhanced.

The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section
409 of the Local Government Code, also broadens the authority of the lupon
in the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents
occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate
venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the
parties. Procedural rules including
those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient hearing to
the parties with complete justice
between them as a result.^[14] Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison
d’etre of the rule on venue.

The third feature is
aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration process. It discourages any
intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the
prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the
reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each
other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential
ingredients in the resolution of their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell
the difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive
litigation between the parties.

While P.D. No. 1508 has
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built
thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to
the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

In Peregrina
vs. Panis,^[15]
this Court stated:

“Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de
Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the
conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing
of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance
with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or
the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, lacking
which the case can be dismissed.

The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No.
1508. They are actual residents in the
same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted
cases.” (citations omitted)

Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This
Court said so in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:^[16]

“In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-­compliance
with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject
matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of
such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first
taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.

x x x

The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement
of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with
the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.” (citations omitted)

There were, of course,
cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably
invoke non-referral to the appropriate lupon operated as a
waiver thereof.^[17] Furthermore, when such defect was initially
present when the case was first filed in the trial court, the subsequent
issuance of the certification to file action by the barangay, which constituted
substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured the defect.^[18]

On 15 October 1991, this
Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.^[19] Section 18 thereof provides:

“SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring
referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed
without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have
been complied with. This provision shall not apply to
criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.”

In the proceedings before
the court a quo, the petitioner and the respondents had in mind only P.D. No.
1508. The petitioner further invoked
the aforequoted Section 18. None knew
of the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the petitioner
invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. However, the private
respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since
they did refer their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the
decree, changed tack. In their Comment,
they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde “filed a complaint against
petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in
compliance with the requirements of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local
Government Code.”^[20] Yet, in a deliberate effort to be cunning or
shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they
assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the
petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same
city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the
said cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.

The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire
from the private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before
filing the informations.

Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, more
specifically on the provisions on the katarungang
pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial notice
thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of “the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines.” We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.^[21]
He should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under
the Local Government Code of
1991. Had he done so, this petition
would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could
have been devoted to more important cases.

In view of the private respondents’ failure to appear at the first
scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26
May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with
the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the
said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section
412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have
granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of
1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action
is about to prescribe. This is because,
as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty
days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints
with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of
barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from
disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of
the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation
hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court
cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay
conciliation system.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the
alleged physical injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only
be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, considering that per the medical certificates^[22]
the injuries sustained by the private respondents would “heal” in
nine days “in the absence of complication” and there is no showing
that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor or would require medical
attendance for such period. The penalty
therefor would only be “arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure.” These
penalties are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal
Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April
1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months
thereafter. Nevertheless, its running
was tolled by the filing of the private respondents’ complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically
suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be
reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification
to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six
days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such
offense. Evidently, there was no basis
for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in
paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

Neither are we persuaded by  
the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner “had already
waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of
Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays.” The
petitioner did not waive the reconciliation
proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati;
she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April
1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her
counter-affidavit.^[23]

Nor would this Court
accept the contention of the private respondents that the parties could not
agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to
issue a certification to file action.^[24] The request is dated 23 June 1993,^[25]
or nearly one and a half months after
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their
contention in the said court that, in any event, there was substantial
compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private
respondents, after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long
after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a
certification to file action.

The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.

Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the
vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice
at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and
in effectively preventing or reducing
expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies
provided by that law, government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in
ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose
the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 1452334, both entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad
Uy” are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge
is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
decision.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Section 536, R.A. No. 7160.

^[2]
People vs. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415 [1989]; Defensor-Santiago vs.
Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 [1993].

^[3]
Annex “H” of Petition; Rollo, 34.

^[4]
Annex “G” of Petition; Rollo, 29.

^[5]
Annexes”1″ and “1-A,” Comment of private respondents; Id.,
77-78.

^[6]
Annex “2,” Id.; Id., 79.

^[7]
Annex “A” of petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion, dated 29 December
1993; Id., 110.

^[8]
Id.

^[9]
Rollo, 29-38.

^[10]
Id., 29-31.

^[11]
Id., 33.

^[12]
Rollo, 22-23.

^[13]
Sections 399 to 422.

^[14]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523 [1911].

^[15]
133 SCRA 72, 75 [1984].

^[16]
162 SCRA 504, 511 [1988].

^[17]
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 [1984]; Ebol vs.
Amin, 135 SCRA 438 [1985]; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 289
[1987].

^[18]
Millare vs. Hernando, 151 SCRA
484 [1987].

^[19]
Effective 15 November 1991.

^[20]
Rollo, 65 (emphasis supplied).

^[21]
Aducayen vs. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199
SCRA 48 [1991].

^[22]
Annexes “D” and “E” of Petition; Rollo, 26-27.

^[23]
Annex “G” of Petition; Rollo, 29-31.

^[24]
Comment, 5; Id., 66.

^[25]
Annex “3” of Petition; Id., 80-81.