ROSITA C. TALEON AND MIGUEL SOLIS, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER, PROVINCE OF DAVAO, AND LUCIA O. TOLENTINO…

Petitioner-appellant Rosita Taleon is
the registered owner of a parcel of
land in Lupon, Davao, which she acquired from her
co-petitioner-appellant Miguel Solis who had constructed therein man-made canals and fishpond dikes.

On April 17, 1961, respondent-appellee Lucia Tolentino wrote a letter-complaint to the Secretary of
Public Works stating that several fishpond operators and/or own­ers in Lupon, Davao
have built dams across and closed the Cabatan River,
a public navigable stream, thereby
depriving her and the residents therein of passageway, fishing ground and water
supply.  This letter-complaint was for­mally amended on June 9,
1961, wherein
Tolentino specified appellants Taleon
and Solis, and another neighbor, one Humberto de los Santos, as
those responsible for the clos­ing of the alleged Cabatan River,
on the banks of which their lands abutted. 
On June 13, 1961, Taleon filed her answer denying the existence of the
alleged river and claiming that
the dams were constructed inside her registered property and that her water
source was a man-made canal connected to the sea.

An administrative hearing was
thereafter held.  On July 11,
1961, the
Secretary of Public Works, through the department undersecretary, rendered a
decision finding that appellants were indeed obstructing the Cabatan River,
a public navigable stream which used to pass inside their lands, with the dams
they constructed thereon, and ordering their
demolition.  Appellants filed a motion to
reconsider claiming that the
ruling was contrary to the facts established and that the Secretary had no
jurisdiction over the case.  This was
denied.

Appellants elevated the
case to the Office of the President on October 11, 1961.  After reviewing the records, said office affirmed on November
10, 1961 the decision
of July 11, 1961.  Appellants filed a motion to re­consider
based on an alleged decision of Public Works Secretary Moreno rendered on
November 24, 1961, reversing the former ruling of July 11, 1961.  On January 10, 1962, the Office of the
President denied the motion, on two grounds: 
(1) An official examination of
the records of the case showed
that said decision of Secretary Moreno did not form part thereof, and (2) even if it were
genuine, it had no legal effect
since the Secretary had already lost jurisdiction when appellants filed their appeal to the President.

On February 9, 1962, Taleon was informed by the Dis­trict Engineer of Davao
that her dams would be demolished on February 16, 1962, upon orders of the Executive Secretary,
the administrative decision having
become final and executory.  To stop the threatened demolition, appellants
filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Davao
against the Public Works
Secretary and the Engineer of Davao.  They were able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction on February
15, 1962.

On September
1, 1962, appellants filed a similar pe­tition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary in­junction against the herein respondents-appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila.  After the latters‘ respective answers were filed and the case
in Davao
was dismissed, upon appellants’ motion,
said Manila court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, altho in form a temporary
restraining order with bond.

The issues having been
joined, a pre-trial conference was held and the Court of First Instance
of Manila allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss the petition.  Upon orders of said court, the administrative
re­cords were sent up.  On January 11, 1965, acting on the respective
memoranda submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to the
pending motion to dismiss, the court a quo ruled that appellants were
given a fair hearing in the
administrative case and that the decision therein was supported by the evidence
adduced and dismissed the petition, stating:

“WHEREFORE, finding merit in the respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss, GRANTED.  Let this petition be,
as it is hereby, DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners.

“The temporary restraining order issued on 17 December 1962 is hereby dissolved
and the bond filed by petitioners, cancelled.”

Taking issue with this
ruling, the petitioners instituted the present appeal, raising questions purely
of law.  They submit that the court a
quo erred in dismissing the
case without giving them trial, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to
prove that the alleged extension of the Cabatan River
passing across their property is but a depression and that the decision ren­dered
by Secretary Moreno on November 24, 1961, is genuine.  Appellants also reiterate that the Secretary
of Public Works has no jurisdiction over the case, since the dams and the body
of water in question were located inside registered private property.

Appellants’ contentions are without merit.  First of all, a full trial was not
needed.  The issues raised before the
court a quo were all purely legal and thus
could be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda filed and the administrative records sent up to it.  No necessity
was there for further reception of evidence.

Anent the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Public Works, this
point has been squarely covered in Lovina v. Moreno,
L-17821, November 29, 1963.^[1] There We upheld the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic
Act 2056 to declare as a public navigable stream any alleged
depressions or bodies of water even inside titled properties.  That case involved a creek, located inside a titled
land, which was alleged to be privately
owned.  The Public Works Secretary
declared it as part of a public stream which plaintiffs therein had blocked
with their dams.  In sustaining the
Secretary, We there ruled that such fact-finding power on his part was merely incidental to his duty to clear
all navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions and, hence, its grant did
not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power.  And We remarked there that although the title
was silent as to the existence
of any stream inside the property, that did not confer a right to the stream,
it being of a public nature and not subject
to private appropriation, even by
prescription.

Appellants would offer
affidavits – which are hear say^[2] and testimonies aliunde to show that the alleged Cabatan River inside their property is really a mere depression.  As also enunciated in Lovina v. Moreno, supra, however, there
cannot be a trial de novo in cases of this nature, since a
review of an administrative finding
is limited to the evidence already presented before the administrative body.^[3]
This rule bars presentation of evidence aliunde
and limits the trial court’s functions to determining whether there is evidence
in the administrative records substantial enough to support the findings
therein.  Here, the records of the
administrative case were actually brought up and submitted to the court a quo and
it held that the administrative finding that the alleged depression was really a part
of the navigable Cabatan
River was supported by substantial
evidence.  Said court fully did its duty;
to have gone further would have been exceeding its power.

Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary, its non-existence
has been officially certified by the Chief of the Records Division of the
Department of Public Works, the official custodian.^[4]
This alone is proof enough that there is no such decision.^[5]
But even granting that there is
really such a decision, it
would not help appellants’ cause any. 
Said decision would still be wanting
of legal force and effect since Secretary Moreno had already lost
jurisdiction to revoke the former ruling because of the appeal then already
taken by appellants themselves to the Office of the President, which affirmed
the former ruling.  And even conceding
jurisdiction, the second decision could still affect nothing since it was
actually revoked and reversed by the ruling of the Office of the President,
dated January 10, 1962,
which denied the motion to reconsider filed by appellants wherein they invoked
said new decision.  So, a full trial to
prove the authenticity of the Moreno
decision would be a pointless waste of the court a quo’s time.

It is recognized that the trial court may dismiss a petition for certiorari even after an
answer is filed upon a motion to dismiss, where said petition is found to be
patently without merit.^[6]
But the court a quo did not summarily dismiss the petition.  It conducted a pre-trial conference and even
ordered the records in the administrative case to be elevated to it.  Now the Rules of Court^[7]
authorizes the trial court to render judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice may require, if at
the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which would warrant such judgment.  All the necessary facts being already before
the court a quo, no further trial was required.  Its decision rendered at that stage was there­fore sanctioned by the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against petitioners-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
See also Borja
v. Moreno, L-16487, July 31, 1964.

^[2]
lsmael v. Guanzon, 2
Phil. 347.

^[3]
See also Timbancaya v. Vicente, L-19100, Dec.
27, 1963.

^[4]
Records, p. 221.

^[5]
Sec. 29, Rule 132, Rev. Rules of Court; People v. Que­bral,
68 Phil. 564.

^[6]
Arvisu v. Vergara,
90 Phil. 621; Chan v. Galang, L-21732, Oct.
17, 1966.

^[7]
Sec. 3, Rule 20, Rev. Rules of
Court.