JOSE A. ARCHES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ANACLETO I. BELLOSILLO AND JAIME ARANETA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

 Petitioner-appellant Jose Arches filed on February 27, 1954 his income tax return for 1953.  Within five years
thereafter, or on February 26, 1959, deficiency
income tax and residence tax assessments were issued against him.

Said assessments not having been disputed, the Repu­blic,
represented by the Bureau of Internal Revenue Regional Director, filed suit on
December 29, 1960, in the municipal court of Roxas City, to recover from petitioner-appellant the sum of P4,441.25 as deficiency income tax and
additional residence tax for 1953.  Arches then moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it did not ex­pressly show the approval of the
Revenue Commissioner, as required
by Section 308 of the Tax Code,
and on the further ground of prescription of the action.

The municipal court denied the motion.  Petitioner-appellant, his motion to reconsider having been denied also, resorted to the Court of First Instance of Capiz on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the order denying his
motion to dismiss.  The trial court dismissed the petition.  Hence, this appeal.

The only question here is the correctness of the dismissal of the
petition by the Court of First Instance. 
The order was predicated
upon the impropriety of the writ.  We find no error committed by said
court.

The municipal court had jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter,
the amount demanded being less than P5,000.00.^[1]
The suit below instituted by the Republic, based on an uncontested assessment,
was one merely for the recovery of a sum of money where the amount demanded
constitutes the jurisdictional test.^[2]

Petitioner-appellant
would make much of the lack of
approval of the Revenue Commissioner. 
First of all, in this case, such requisite is not jurisdictional, but one relating to capacity to sue or
affecting the cause of ac­tion only.^[3] So, in ruling on said
question, whatever error – if any – the municipal court committed, was
merely an error of judgment, not correctible by certiorari.^[4]

Neither was there grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the municipal court in ruling that the
express approval of the Revenue Commissioner himself was not ne­cessary.  The court relied upon Memorandum Order No. V-634
of the Revenue Commissioner, approved
by the Finance Secretary on July 1, 1956, wherein the former’s functions regarding the administration and
enforcement of revenue laws and regulations – powers broad enough to cover the
approval of court actions as required in Section 308 of the Tax Code –
were expressly delegated to the Regional Directors.  This regulation, the issuance of which was authorized
by statute, has the force and effect of law.^[5]
To rely upon it, hence, would not be
tantamount to whimsical, capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment.

The verification by the Regional Director of the complaint
constitutes sufficient approval thereof alrea­dy.  It states, inter alia, that said Director has caused the preparation of the
complaint and that he has read the allegations thereof and they are true and
correct to the best of his knowledge
and belief.  Pleadings are to be
liberally construed.^[6]

Assuming, therefore, in gratia argumenti,
that the suit is being erroneously –
but not invalidly – entertained, for lack of express approval of
the Commissioner or the Regional Director, certiorari would still not lie.  An
order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and the remedy of the unsuccessful movant
is to await the judgment on the merits and then
appeal therefrom.^[7]
And, as the Court of First Instance rightly observed, there was no showing of a
special reason or urgent need to stop the proceedings at such early stage in
the municipal court.

Petitioner-appellant would also raise the question of
prescription.  Again, this is not
jurisdictional.  And, We
have already ruled^[8]
that the proper prescriptive period for bringing civil actions is five years from the
date of the assessment, under Section 332
of the Tax Code.  The three year
period urged by petitioner-appellant under Section 51(d) refers only to the
summary remedies of distraint and levy.  Here, the action was commenced one year, ten
months and three days after the assessments were made; hence, well within the
period.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of appellant’s petition for
certiorari by the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed. 
Costs against petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Sec. 88, Judiciary
Act, as amended by Sec. 10, Rep. Act No.
2613.

^[2]
Ventanilla vs. B.T.A., L-7384,
Dec. 19, 1955; Republic vs. Gamboa, L-16504, Oct. 27, 1961.

^[3]
In this it differs from
petitions for adoption or guardianship, where notice to or consent of specified
persons is jurisdictional, since the latter are special proceedings, in rem, whereas the suit for collection in question is a simple
money claim.

^[4]
Gala vs. Cui, 25 Phil. 522; Villa Rey
Transit vs. Hon. Bello, L-18957, Apr. 23, 1963; J.R.S.
Business Corp. vs. Imperial
Insurance, L-19891, July 31, 1964.

^[5]
Art. 7, Civil
Code; Re Huttman, 70 Fed. 669; Re Weeks, 82 Fed.
729; Gratiot vs.
U.S., 4 How. 80; U.S. vs.
Elliason, 16 Pet. 291.

^[6]
Rule 6, Sec. 15, Rev. Rules of Court.

^[7]
Harrison Foundry & Machinery vs. Harrison Foundry Work­ers’ Assn.,
L-18432, June 20, 1963; Bautista
vs. de la Cruz, L-21107, Dec. 24,
1963; 3 Moran, 1953 ed., pp. 152-153.

^[8]
Republic
vs. Ledesma, L-18759, Feb. 28, 1967.