ROSITA C. TALEON AND MIGUEL SOLIS, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER, PROVINCE OF DAVAO, AND LUCIA O. TOLENTINO…

Taleon versus Secretary of Public Works

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, brought by Rosita Taleon and Miguel Solis against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the District Engineer of Davao, and Lucia Tolentino. The petitioners own land in Lupon, Davao, on which they built fishpond dikes and man-made canals, and they ask the courts to stop the government from demolishing those structures. The case matters because it fixes the reach of the Secretary of Public Works over bodies of water found inside registered private land, and because it marks the narrow limits of a court's review of an administrative finding.

Procedural History

Lucia Tolentino filed a letter-complaint with the Secretary of Public Works, later amended to name Taleon, Solis, and a neighbor, Humberto de los Santos. After an administrative hearing, the Secretary of Public Works, acting through the department undersecretary, rendered a decision on July 11, 1961, finding that the petitioners were obstructing the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, and ordering the demolition of their dams. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. They elevated the case to the Office of the President, which affirmed the decision on November 10, 1961, and denied their motion for reconsideration on January 10, 1962. The petitioners first sued in the Court of First Instance of Davao and obtained a writ of preliminary injunction, but that case was later dismissed upon their own motion. On September 1, 1962, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila. That court, after a pre-trial conference and after ordering the administrative records elevated to it, granted the respondents' motion to dismiss on January 11, 1965, holding that the petitioners had been given a fair hearing and that the administrative decision was supported by the evidence. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, raising questions purely of law.

Facts

Rosita Taleon is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Lupon, Davao, which she acquired from her co-petitioner Miguel Solis. Solis had constructed man-made canals and fishpond dikes on the land. On April 17, 1961, Lucia Tolentino wrote the Secretary of Public Works complaining that several fishpond operators had built dams across and closed the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, depriving her and the residents of passageway, fishing ground, and water supply. Her amended complaint of June 9, 1961 named Taleon, Solis, and Humberto de los Santos as responsible, their lands abutting the river's banks.

Taleon answered, denying the existence of the alleged river. She claimed the dams stood inside her registered property and that her water source was a man-made canal connected to the sea. After an administrative hearing, the Secretary of Public Works decided on July 11, 1961 that the petitioners were indeed obstructing the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream that used to pass inside their lands, and ordered the demolition of the dams. Reconsideration was denied, and the Office of the President affirmed on November 10, 1961.

The petitioners then invoked an alleged later decision of Secretary Moreno, dated November 24, 1961, reversing the earlier ruling. On January 10, 1962, the Office of the President denied their motion for reconsideration on two grounds: the official records showed that the Moreno decision did not form part of the case, and even if genuine it had no legal effect, since the Secretary had already lost jurisdiction when the petitioners appealed to the President. Told that the dams would be demolished on February 16, 1962, the petitioners went to court, and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the dismissal of their petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without a full trial, thereby depriving the petitioners of the chance to prove that the alleged extension of the Cabatan River is a mere depression and that the Moreno decision is genuine.
• Whether or not the Secretary of Public Works has jurisdiction over the case, given that the dams and the body of water are located inside registered private property.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on Republic Act 2056, which the Court reads as the source of the Secretary's power to declare an alleged depression or body of water a public navigable stream even inside titled property. The Court describes that power in these terms:

There We upheld the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to declare as a public navigable stream any alleged depressions or bodies of water even inside titled properties.

That grant of fact-finding power is what answers the jurisdictional objection.

On the review of administrative findings, the Court states the governing rule:

There cannot be a trial de novo in cases of this nature, since a review of an administrative finding is limited to the evidence already presented before the administrative body.

This rule bars evidence aliunde, meaning evidence from outside the administrative record, and confines the court to asking whether the record contains substantial evidence.

On the alleged second decision, the Court applies the rule on official records:

This alone is proof enough that there is no such decision.

The official certification of the records custodian is treated as sufficient proof of non-existence.

Finally, on procedure, the Court cites the rule allowing judgment at pre-trial:

The Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to render judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice may require, if at the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which would warrant such judgment.

This provision sanctions the dismissal even without a full trial.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that a full trial was not needed. The issues raised before the court below were all purely legal and could be resolved on the pleadings, the memoranda, and the administrative records. The court did not summarily dismiss the petition; it conducted a pre-trial conference and ordered the administrative records elevated to it. All the necessary facts being already before it, no further trial was required, and its decision at that stage was sanctioned by the Rules.

On the second issue, the Court held that the jurisdictional point was squarely covered by its earlier ruling in Lovina versus Moreno. There the Court upheld the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to declare as a public navigable stream any alleged depression or body of water even inside titled properties. That fact-finding power is merely incidental to the Secretary's duty to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions, and its grant does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power. The Court added that although the title was silent as to the existence of any stream inside the property, that silence conferred no right to the stream, it being of a public nature and not subject to private appropriation, even by prescription.

The Court also rejected the offer of affidavits, which it called hearsay, and of testimonies aliunde to show that the alleged river is a mere depression. A review of an administrative finding is limited to the evidence already presented before the administrative body, and the trial court's function is confined to determining whether the administrative records contain evidence substantial enough to support the findings. Here the records were brought up and the court held that the finding was supported by substantial evidence; to have gone further would have been exceeding its power.

As to the alleged Moreno decision, the Court held that its non-existence had been officially certified by the Chief of the Records Division of the Department of Public Works, the official custodian, and that this alone was proof enough that there is no such decision. Even granting its existence, it would be wanting in legal force, since Secretary Moreno had already lost jurisdiction to revoke the former ruling because of the appeal the petitioners themselves had taken to the Office of the President. And even conceding jurisdiction, the second decision could affect nothing, since it was actually revoked and reversed by the ruling of the Office of the President dated January 10, 1962.

Doctrine

First, the Secretary of Public Works may declare as a public navigable stream any alleged depression or body of water even inside registered private property. This fact-finding power is incidental to the duty to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions and is not an unlawful delegation of judicial power. A torrens title silent as to a stream inside the property confers no right to that stream, which is public and not subject to private appropriation, even by prescription.

Second, there is no trial de novo in the review of an administrative finding. Review is limited to the evidence already presented before the administrative body; evidence aliunde is barred, and the court asks only whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence to support the findings.

Third, an official certification by the records custodian that a document does not exist in the records is proof enough of its non-existence. A decision rendered by an administrative officer after an appeal has been taken to the Office of the President is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Fourth, the trial court may render judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment at pre-trial where the facts warrant it, and may dismiss a petition for certiorari even after an answer is filed where the petition is patently without merit.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, with costs against the petitioners, and the dismissal of the petition stood.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the Secretary of Public Works may declare a body of water inside titled land a public navigable stream, and the courts will not retry that finding but will only check it for substantial evidence. Examiners use this case on the extent of the Secretary's jurisdiction over waters inside private property and on the prohibition against a trial de novo in the review of administrative findings.