IN THE MATTER OF THE LOSS OF REGISTERED FOREIGN LETTER NO. 06876676 FROM AUSTRALIA, ADDRESSED TO MRS. MARIA CORONEL, SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT OF THE AFORESAID MRS. MARIA CORONEL…

For determination is the motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated September 12, 1994 issued by this Court dismissing from
service, movant, Benigno Mapilisan for dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct
occasioned by the loss, while in his custody, of registered mail letter no.
06876676, the contents of which were pilfered, as the P25,000-bank draft
contained therein, eventually found its way for encashment with payee bank,
Philippine National Bank.

Movant’s main contentions hinge on the alleged violation of
procedural due process by claiming that there was no formal administrative
complaint filed against him by either complainant Maria Coronel or the Court of
Appeals, in accordance with paragraph (c) of Section 46, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order 292;^[1]
nor was there a formal investigation conducted in conformity with Section 48 thereof.

Paragraph (c) of Section 46
provides:

“x x x                             x
x x                                 x x x

(c) Except when
initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service
official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.” 

x x x                              x x x                                 x x x.”

According to movant, the letter-complaint of Maria Coronel failed
to properly and formally charge the former since the letter-complaint was
neither subscribed nor sworn to by the complainant. Movant argues that the same should not have been given due course
by the Supreme Court for failure to comply with the abovequoted provision of
law.

We disagree with movant. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:

“SEC. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.”

By this power vested in the Supreme Court, it can act on subject
complaint, particularly where, as in this case, an investigation thereon had
already been conducted and concluded by the Court of Appeals prior to its
referral to the Supreme Court, with the recommendation that movant be charged
with gross negligence. The complaint,
though defective as to form has been fully substantiated on the basis of the
accompanying independent Investigation Report and Recommendation submitted to
us. As a matter of fact, the Court even
entertains anonymous complaints where the charge can be fully borne out by the
evidence offered^[2]
or continues proceeding with the administrative case despite withdrawal by
private complainant of his complaint where an investigation thereon had been
made by the Acting Court Administrator prior to the filing of the complaint.^[3]
Thus, what is given paramount importance by this Court in instances when its
power of administrative supervision over court employees is invoked, is the
substantiation of the complaint rather than its conformity with formal
requirements. We, therefore, rule that
there was no violation of paragraph (c) Section 46, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
of Executive Order No. 292.

With regard to movant’s claim that no formal investigation had
taken place in conformity with the provisions of Section 48, again, we rule in
the negative.

Said provision of law reads as follows:

“SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against
Non-Presidential Appointees. – (1) Administrative proceedings may
be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head
of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other
person.

(2) In the case of a
complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his
documentary evidence. If on the basis
of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the
respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be
attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents
submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours
after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath,
together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall
indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation of his answer is not
considered satisfactory. If the answer
is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.

(3) Although a
respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be
conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the
respondent, including the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot
be decided judiciously without conducting such an investigation.

(4) The
investigation shall be held not earlier than five days nor later than ten days
from the date of receipt of respondent’s answer by the disciplining authority,
and shall be finished within thirty days from the filing of the charges, unless
the period is extended by the Commission in meritorious cases. The decision shall be rendered by the
disciplining authority within thirty days from the termination of the
investigation or submission of the report of the investigator, which report
shall be submitted within fifteen days from the conclusion of the
investigation.

(5) The direct
evidence for the complainant and the respondent shall consist of the sworn
statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint or answer, as the
case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence
deemed necessary but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the complaint
or answer, upon which the cross-examination, by respondent and the complainant,
respectively, shall be based. Following
cross-examination, there may be redirect and recross-examination.

(6) Either party may
avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the
compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

(7) The
investigation shall be conducted only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth
and without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial
proceedings. It shall be conducted by
the disciplining authority concerned or his authorized representative.

The phrase “any other party” shall be understood to be a
complainant other than those referred to in subsection (a) hereof.”

The purpose of the abovequoted provision is to simply ensure
observance of procedural due process. However, it has been repeatedly held in many instances that the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side.^[4]
In the present case, movant cannot deny that he was given ample opportunity to
file his comment and memorandum for his defense which he actually availed
of. This was his opportunity to present
evidence in his favor, knowing fully well that he was already under
investigation and was being charged with gross negligence in a show-cause
letter dated June 18, 1993 signed by the Court of Appeals Clerk of Court. Movant cannot now complain that he was not
afforded an opportunity to submit evidence because of lack of formal charges
against him and formal investigation thereon. We reiterate: in administrative
proceedings, we are not bound by rigid rules of procedure or technicalities.

Then, too, the quantum of evidence required deviates from the
usual norm demanded in ordinary litigations undergoing a trial-type of
hearing. In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required. Substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings merely requires
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.^[5]
It is by such standard that we arrived at our conclusion in the questioned
Resolution of Sept. 12, 1994 dismissing movant. In said Resolution we emphasized:

“We lay stress on the following:

1) Respondent
Mapilisan’s admission of having received sack No. 6 which contained the mail
matter in question;

2) Respondent
Mapilisan’s failure to turn over custody of said mail sack to his immediate chief,
Mr. Aguilar, knowing fully well that, not having the authority to open or break
the seal, it was his duty to inform his chief and turn over the mail sack to
him.

3) That at the time of loss, actual
possession of sack No. 6 remained with respondent Mapilisan.

The totality of these events unfolds before us a picture of
respondent Mapilisan, deliberately detaining said mail sack, obviously
interested in its contents, thus leading us to the irresistible conclusion that
he also authored the encashment of the P25,000-bank draft.”

Movant cannot accuse this Court of issuing the Resolution of
September 12, 1994 which is lacking in factual and evidentiary basis. The above-enumerated facts and reasoning
constitute substantial evidence necessary for this Court to order movant’s
dismissal.

Neither can the newly-found evidence proferred by movant
materially affect the Resolution of September 12, 1994. According to movant, he had later on
discovered that Mr. Dever Catindig, his co-respondent during the investigation
before the Court of Appeals was present on February 26, 1991, the day subject
mail matter was received, contrary to Catindig’s claim that he was absent; that
as a matter of fact, the latter entered in his own handwriting registered mail
received on February 26, 1991, on pages 59 to 65 of the log/record book of
mails in the Mailing and Delivering Section; that Catindig, in Administrative
Case No. 14-92-M was “warned and directed to be extra careful in receiving
mails, particularly registered mails from the Central Post Office.”
Movant, in effect, is telling this Court that the combination of these
circumstances will point the finger of suspicion on Dever Catindig as the real
author of the unaccounted mail matter.

We are simply unconvinced. This “newly found evidence” fails to impress us. First, it was established during the
investigation before the Court of Appeals that Mr. Catindig was absent and the
records of the personnel department corroborate this fact. Second, pages 59 to 65 of the log book
submitted to us were mere xeroxed copies which were not certified xerox
copies. Third, we find no credence in
the purpose for which they were presented to us, i.e. that Dever Catindig was
indeed present on February 26, 1991 for, in fact, he had made entries in his
own handwriting on page 59 on said date. Page 59 reflects only two kinds of
entries: those made on February
21, 1991 and February 26, 1991. On its face, however, it is quite obvious that the entries supposedly
entered on February 26, 1991 were actually entered on February 22, 1991 because
it is clear to the naked eye that the number six (6) was merely superimposed on
number two (2). Moreover, since it is
quite unlikely that entries on February 21, 1991 were actually reflected on the
same page as those entries made on February 26, 1991, what with the five-day
difference, the court consulted its 1991 calendar. The court discovered that February 21, 1991 was a Thursday,
February 22, a Friday and February 26, a Tuesday. It is quite unbelievable that the Court of Appeals did not
receive any correspondence on February 22, a Friday and February 25, a Monday.

With this plainly doubtful evidence relied upon by movant for his
plea of reconsideration, this Court has no recourse but to stand firm on its
Resolution dismissing movant.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug
JJ., concur.

Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., no part.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.

^[2]
Anonymous Complaint against District Judge Gibson A. Araula, Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch X, Adm. Matter No. 1571-CFI, February 7,
1978, 81 SCRA 483.

^[3]
Arban v. Borja, Adm. Matter No. R-281-RTJ, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
634.

^[4]
Salvador Jaculina v. National Police Commission, et al., G.R. No. 68491,
August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 489; Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v.
Achacoso, No. L-81805, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 732; Tajonera v. Lamaroza,
Nos. L-48907 and 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438; Cebu Institute of
Technology v. Minister of Labor, et al., No. L-50238, March 29, 1982,
113 SCRA 257.

^[5]
Office of Court Administrator v. Ramon G. Enriquez, Adm. Matter No.
P-89-290, January 29, 1993.