A.M. No. P-93-781. December 02, 1994
ATTY. NERIO G. ZAMORA, COMPLAINANT, VS. TOMAS A. JUMAMOY AND DOMINGO B. BRUNIDOR, RESPONDENTS.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated 19 January 1993 and addressed to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, the complainant
charged the respondents, who are deputy sheriffs in the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of Tagbilaran City, with gross inefficiency, incompetence, and
malpractice prejudicial to the government service, committed thus:
“for more than two (2) years from now,
the above-named Tomas Jumamoy and Domingo Brunidor, both Deputy Sheriff of the
City Courts of Tagbilaran, who reports [sic] for work at their whims and
caprices, deliberately failed and continue to fail implementing and/or
enforcing writs of execution on the following several cases to wit: Civil Case Nos. 1334, 1388, 1389, 1309,
1308, and Criminal Case No. 3658, to the damage and prejudice to the
undersigned and his clients.
… without authority of the court, said respondents accepts [sic]
compromise payments from the losing party and appropriate for their own benefit
said compromise payments to the further damage and prejudice to the undersigned
counsel and his clients.
… despite repeated warnings, said respondents failed and continue
to fail performing their sworn duties and functions.”
In a 1st Indorsement dated 21 January 1993, then Acting Executive
Judge Antonio H. Bautista of the RTC of Bohol forwarded the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator.
Acting on the memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
of 1 February 1993, this Court required the respondents to comment on the
letter-complaint.[1]
In his Comment/Manifestation dated 24 March 1993,[2]
respondent Tomas Jumamoy denied the charges, alleged that the complaint is a
pure harassment suit, and claimed that he had already returned the writs of
execution in Civil Cases Nos. 1334 (GLY
Lending vs. Juvita Jumamil), 1388 (GLY Lending vs. Trinidad Solis), and 1389 (GLY
Lending vs. Virginio Cuadra) on 16 January 1991, 21 December 1990,
and 20 March 1991, respectively. In the
said returns,[3]
he stated that Jumamil had asked for ample time to look for the necessary
amount to satisfy the judgment debt, but she failed to pay it; that Trinidad
Solis made a partial payment of P500.00 and promised to pay the balance before
the end of December 1990; and that Cuadra promised to pay the judgment debt
before the end of March 1991 but failed to comply with his promise. He stated in the first two returns that they
were made “without prejudice for the plaintiff to moves [sic] for the
issuance of alias writ in order to satisfy the judgment,” and in the
third, that the return is “without prejudice for the sheriff to follow-up
the promise made by defendant Cuadra.”
In his comment dated 29
March 1993,[4] respondent Domingo Brunidor alleged that
partial payments were made by the defendants in Civil Case No. 1308 and Civil
Case No. 1309, and that the accused in Criminal Case No. 3658, Serapio Marapao,
Jr., paid the clerk of court, by way of consignation, the sum of
P1,200.00. He further claimed that the
herein complainant did not file motions for the issuance of alias writs of
execution in the civil cases and that he received the alias writ of execution
in Criminal Case No. 3658 only on 26 February 1993.
On 11 September 1993, the
Court referred this case to Executive Judge Antonio H. Bautista of the RTC of
Bohol for evaluation, report, and recommendation.[5]
In his Report and Recommendation
dated 2 December 1993,[6] Judge Bautista informed the Court that at
the scheduled hearing of this case on the same date, the complainant manifested
that if the respondents would “apologize and promise to perform their
duties as Deputy City Sheriffs faithfully, religiously and diligently he would
withdraw the administrative complaint” and that the respondents “in
open court, on December 2, 1993 apologized to the complainant in the instant
case Atty. Nerio Zamora and promised to perform their duties as Deputy City Sheriffs
faithfully, religiously and diligently.” Forthwith, the complainant
withdrew the complaint and did not any more adduce evidence.
Judge Bautista then recommended that this case be dismissed.
In the resolution of 1 June 1994,[7] the
Court referred back this case to Judge Bautista for investigation, report, and
recommendation, inviting his attention to the ruling in Sy vs. Academia[8] that a complaint for misconduct,
malfeasance, or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be
withdrawn at any time by the complainant simply because he has lost interest in
the prosecution of the case and that public interest and the need to maintain
the faith and confidence of our people in the Government and its agencies and
instrumentalities demand that proceedings in administrative cases against
public officers and employees should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses; hence,
regardless of their motion to dismiss or to withdraw the complaint, the
proceedings therein may continue.
Judge Bautista then conducted an investigation in this case. The complainant and the respondents
testified.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 27 June 1994,[9]
Judge Bautista explicitly states:
“The charges preferred by the complainant Atty. Nerio Zamora
were admitted, under oath, in open court, on the testifical chair by the
respondents Domingo Brunidor and Tomas Jumamoy who have shown remorse and
repentance of what they have done as observed by the Court in their deportment
and behavior on the testifical chair.
The charges, as admitted by the respondents, under oath, and in
open court, are conclusively serious.”
He then recommends “the suspension
of the respondents Tomas Jumamoy and Domingo Brunidor from office for two
months without pay.”
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends the approval of
the recommendation of Judge Bautista considering that the “respondents’
plea for forgiveness appears sincere and proceeds from a voluntary admission of
the charges from a repentant heart, and considering further that this is the
first time that they had been administratively charged.”
The Court finds the above recommendation to be well-taken. The respondents having thus admitted the
charges in open court and while they were under oath, no further evidence was
necessary for holding the respondents liable for gross inefficiency,
incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Their own comments readily show that they
withheld the due implementation of the writs of execution on the mere pleas of
the judgment debtors for time to raise funds or to pay them on installments,
and that they then returned the writs unsatisfied or partially satisfied,
hoping, nevertheless, that the prevailing party would ask for alias writs of
execution. In short, they deliberately
failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of their duty to obtain
satisfaction of the judgments. There is
no proof that the judgment debtors had no property exempt from execution;
accordingly, the respondents should have complied with Section 15, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. They should not
have simply folded their arms and waited for the fulfillment of the promises of
the judgment-debtors. A delay in the
execution of a judgment may prejudice the judgment creditor, for such delay may
provide an opportunity for scheming judgment debtors to bring their property
beyond the reach of the writs. It may
be that the respondents were moved by compassion and sympathy, but such
personal feelings must never be allowed to compromise the public-trust
character of their office which binds them to a continuing accountability to
the people. The respondents should not
have forgotten the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility.[10]
The Court does not look with favor upon the actuation of the
complainant in offering to withdraw the complaint provided that the respondents
would apologize to him and promise to be more diligent in the performance of
their duties. His grievances against
the respondents relate to their public duty and not to a purely personal matter
and, therefore, transcend the complainant’s personal pique or pride. After this Court had taken cognizance of
this case, the complaint can no longer be withdrawn just because the
respondents have apologized or repented. Such a withdrawal by the complainant could only invite suspicion that he
was not really sincere in bringing the complaint. In any event, this Court cannot be bound by the unilateral act of
a complainant in a matter which may involve its disciplinary authority.
WHEREFORE, for gross
inefficiency, incompetence, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, respondents TOMAS JUMAMOY and DOMINGO BRUNIDOR are each SUSPENDED from office for TWO (2) MONTHS, without pay. The suspension
shall take effect upon notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
[1]
Resolution of 17 February 1993.
[2]
Rollo, 17.
[3]
Annexes “A,” “B,”
and “C” of Comment.
[4]
Rollo, 22.
[5]
Id., 37.
[6]
Id., 61.
[7]
Rollo, 130.
[8]
198 SCRA 705 [1991].
[9]
Rollo, 159 et seq.
[10]
Jereos vs. Reblando, 171 SCRA 126 [1976]; Sy vs. Academia, supra
note 8.