IN THE MATTER OF THE LOSS OF REGISTERED FOREIGN LETTER NO. 06876676 FROM AUSTRALIA, ADDRESSED TO MRS. MARIA CORONEL, SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT OF THE AFORESAID MRS. MARIA CORONEL…

Mapilisan versus Coronel

The Case

This is an administrative matter in which the Supreme Court, sitting in its administrative capacity, passed upon the motion for reconsideration of Benigno Mapilisan, a court employee dismissed from service for dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct. The dismissal arose from the loss, while the registered mail letter was in his custody, of a letter from Australia addressed to Maria Coronel, the contents of which were pilfered and the bank draft inside eventually encashed. The case matters because it is the Court's own statement of how its constitutional power of administrative supervision over court personnel relates to the formal requirements of the Administrative Code — a question every examinee on administrative due process must be able to answer.

Procedural History

The complaint of Maria Coronel was investigated and concluded by the Court of Appeals before it was referred to the Supreme Court, with a recommendation that Mapilisan be charged with gross negligence. The Supreme Court then issued a Resolution dated September 12, 1994 dismissing Mapilisan from service for dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct. Mapilisan filed a motion for reconsideration of that Resolution, and it is this motion that the Court resolves in the present decision.

Facts

A registered mail letter from Australia, addressed to Maria Coronel, arrived at the Court of Appeals. It contained a bank draft worth 25,000 pesos drawn in her favor. The letter was received in a mail sack, sack number six, which came into the custody of Benigno Mapilisan, a court employee.

The contents of the letter were pilfered, and the bank draft eventually found its way for encashment with the payee bank, the Philippine National Bank. Mapilisan admitted receiving the sack, but he did not turn it over to his immediate chief, Mr. Aguilar, even though he had no authority to open or break its seal and it was his duty to inform his chief and turn the sack over to him. At the time of the loss, actual possession of the sack remained with Mapilisan.

In his motion for reconsideration, Mapilisan raised two procedural objections and offered what he called newly found evidence pointing to a co-respondent, Dever Catindig, as the real author of the loss. The Court found the new evidence doubtful and stood firm on its Resolution.

Issues

• Whether or not the absence of a written, subscribed, and sworn complaint from Maria Coronel or the Court of Appeals violated paragraph (c) of Section 46 of the Administrative Code and deprived the Court of authority to give the complaint due course.
• Whether or not the absence of a formal investigation under Section 48 of the Administrative Code violated Mapilisan's right to procedural due process.
• Whether or not the Resolution of September 12, 1994 was supported by substantial evidence.
• Whether or not the newly found evidence offered by Mapilisan materially affects that Resolution.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph (c) of Section 46, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order 292, the Administrative Code of 1987, provides:

(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.

Mapilisan invoked this to argue that the unsworn letter-complaint of Maria Coronel should not have been given due course.

Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This is the source of the power the Court used to act on the complaint notwithstanding its defective form.

Section 48 of the Administrative Code provides, in its first two subsections:

SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. - (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.

(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation of his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.

Mapilisan invoked this procedure to argue that no formal investigation had taken place.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court disagreed with Mapilisan. Under its constitutional power of administrative supervision, the Court can act on the complaint, particularly where an investigation had already been conducted and concluded by the Court of Appeals before referral, with a recommendation that Mapilisan be charged with gross negligence. The complaint, though defective as to form, had been fully substantiated by the accompanying independent Investigation Report and Recommendation. The Court noted that it even entertains anonymous complaints where the charge can be fully borne out by the evidence offered, and continues with an administrative case despite withdrawal by the private complainant where an investigation had already been made. What the Court gives paramount importance to, when its power of administrative supervision over court employees is invoked, is the substantiation of the complaint rather than its conformity with formal requirements. There was therefore no violation of paragraph (c) of Section 46.

On the second issue, the Court again ruled in the negative. The purpose of Section 48 is simply to ensure observance of procedural due process, and the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Mapilisan was given ample opportunity to file his comment and memorandum for his defense, which he actually availed of, knowing fully well that he was under investigation and was being charged with gross negligence in a show-cause letter signed by the Court of Appeals Clerk of Court. In administrative proceedings, the Court reiterated, it is not bound by rigid rules of procedure or technicalities.

On the third issue, the Court held that the quantum of evidence in administrative cases is only substantial evidence, meaning such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court stressed Mapilisan's admission of having received sack number six, his failure to turn over custody of the sack to his immediate chief knowing it was his duty to do so, and the fact that actual possession of the sack remained with him at the time of the loss. The totality of these events led the Court to the conclusion that he deliberately detained the sack and also authored the encashment of the bank draft.

On the fourth issue, the Court was unconvinced. The personnel records showed Catindig was absent, the log book pages submitted were mere uncertified xeroxed copies, and the entries supposedly made on February 26, 1991 were actually entered on February 22, 1991, since the number six was merely superimposed on the number two. The Court even consulted its 1991 calendar and found it unbelievable that the Court of Appeals received no correspondence on the intervening Friday and Monday.

Doctrine

First, the Supreme Court's constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel allows it to act on a complaint against a court employee even if the complaint is defective in form, because what is given paramount importance is the substantiation of the complaint rather than its conformity with formal requirements. Second, the essence of procedural due process in administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to be heard or an opportunity to explain one's side; rigid rules of procedure and technicalities do not bind the disciplining authority. Third, the quantum of evidence in administrative cases is only substantial evidence, which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Disposition

The motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, and the Resolution dismissing Benigno Mapilisan from service stood.

Remember This

Memorize the line that in administrative cases the Court gives paramount importance to the substantiation of the complaint rather than its conformity with formal requirements. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional power of administrative supervision, the essence of administrative due process, and the substantial evidence standard.