PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LINA VELMONTE, RODOLFO CORNEJO AND FELICISIMO Y. GUEVARRA, RESPONDENTS.

Plaintiff Philippine National Bank seeks the review on certiorari
of a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

The main facts are not in dispute.  On June 2, 1953, judgment was rendered in
Civil Case No. 24254 of the Municipal Court of Manila, entitled
“Philippine National Bank vs. Lina Velmonte, Rodolfo Cornejo, and Felicisimo Y. Guevarra“,
sentencing these defendants to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the
sum of P1,001.02, with 9% annual interest thereon from June 3, 1953, plus 10% of the
amount due as attorney’s fees and the costs. 
On January 28, 1964, plaintiff instituted Civil Case No. 117899, of said
court, against the same de­fendants, for the revival of the aforementioned
judgment, upon the ground that the same had not been satisfied, except for the
sum of P150, paid by defendant Cornejo, on July 20,
1956; that this payment interrupted the period of prescription of said
judgment; and that the amount due thereunder, as of
January 15, 1964, was P1,833.39, with the stipulated interest of 9% on P800, from January 16, 1964,
plus attorney’s fees and the costs.  A
decision having been rendered by the Municipal Court dismissing the complaint,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila which, in due
course, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. 
On appeal, taken by the defendants, this judgment of the court of first
instance was reversed by the Court of Appeals, upon the ground of prescription of
action.  Hence, this
petition for review.

The case hinges on whether or not the payment allegedly made by
defendant Cornejo, on July 20, 1956, in partial satisfaction of the judgment of
the Municipal Court in said Case No. 24254, tolls the running of the statute of
limitations for the revival of said judgment. 
In this connection, “(t)he prescription of
actions is interrupted” – pursuant to Article 1155 of our Civil Code –
either “when they are filed before the court”, or (2) “where
there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors”, or (3)
“when there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the
debtor.” In the case at bar, no action was filed in court within 10
years from June 17, 1953,
when the decision of the Municipal Court presumably became final and executory.  Neither
has there been any written extrajudicial demand by plaintiff for the payment of
said judgment.  Plaintiff maintains that,
in the present case, there has been a written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor, in view of the partial payment of P150, allegedly made by defendant Cornejo, on July
20, 1956.  It should be
noted, however, that, although a payment implies an acknowledgment of debt, it
is not necessarily a written acknowledgment thereof.  In this connection, the following
observations made in the annotation to the Civil Code of the Philippines
by Tolentino^[1]
are in point:

“Part payment of a debt, therefore, cannot
interrupt the period of prescription.  A
partial payment before the period has elapsed is undoubtedly an implied
acknowledgment of the debt.  This has
been recognized under the old Civil Code.  It has been so held in Louisiana.  But our present Civil Code requires that
the acknowledgment, in order to interrupt prescription, must be
written, unlike the old Civil Code which did not require a writing;
hence, the legal impossibility of con­sidering payment as an acknowledgment
sufficient to interrupt prescription.”^[2]

Indeed, in PNB v. Osete,^[3]
we said:

“With respect to the alleged partial payments, it is worthy of
notice that, Art. 1973 of the Civil Code of Spain
provided:

‘The prescription of actions is interrupted by the commencement of
a suit for their enforcement, by an extra-judicial demand by the creditor, and
by any act of acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.’

“Under this article, a partial payment could, as an ‘act of
acknowledgment of the debt,’ interrupt the
prescriptive period.  Said provision was
amended, how­ever, by Article 1155 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
to read:

‘The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the court, when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.’

“Under this provision, not all acts of acknowledgment
of a debt interrupt prescription.  To produce
such effect, the acknowledgment must be ‘written’, so that payment, if not
coupled with a communication signed by the payor,
would not interrupt the running of the period of prescription.

“Moreover, the lower court expressed the view that said ‘Art.
1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the tolling of the period of prescription
of the action to col­lect, not to the action to enforce’ – or revive – a
‘judgment’.  Understandably, either an
‘extrajudicial demand’ by the creditor or an ‘acknowledgment of the debt’ may
interrupt the prescription of the action to collect, not based upon a
judgment, since the demand indicates that the creditor has not slept on his
rights – and removes the basis of the statute; of limitation of actions – but,
was vigilant in the enforcement thereof, whereas an acknowledgment by the
debtor provides a tangible evidence of the existence and validity of the
debt.  Who would, however, make an
‘extrajudicial demand’ for the payment of a judgment, when the same may be enforced
by a writ of execution?  And, how could
an acknowledgment or partial payment affect the rights of a creditor, when the
same are based, no longer upon his contract with the debtor or upon law, but
upon no less than a judicial decree, which is final and executory?”

It may not be amiss to note, also, that the payment by defendant Cornejo was sought to be established with a photostatic copy of a receipt
issued, not of the debtor, but by the creditor, namely, plaintiff
herein.

Plaintiff insists that its theory is supported by Article 1151 of
our Civil Code, which provides that:

“x x The time for the prescription of
actions which have for their object the enforcement of obligations to pay
principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or
of the interest.”

This provision is inapplicable to the case at bar.  It refers to the “enforcement of
obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity” where payment
thereof is due at stimulated intervals, in which case, the prescriptive
period begins to run from the “last pay­ment of the annuity or of the
interest.” The sum of P150 paid by Cornejo, on July 20, 1956, was not meant to be in
satisfaction of any “annuity or interest”.  Upon the other hand, an action to revive a
judgment prescribes from the time that the same has become final.  Then, again, the interpretation advocated by
plaintiff would render Article 1151 inconsistent with the last part of Article
1155 and defeat the evident purpose of the framers of our Civil Code, in
modifying the rule incorporated into Article 1973 of the Spanish Civil
Code.  It is a well-settled principle of
statutory construction that the provisions of the same Code should be so
interpreted as to harmonize, instead of creating a conflict between said
provisions, and that in the event of an irreconciliable
inconsistency, the later provision should prevail over the earlier one.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be,
as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Vol. 4, 1956 ed., p. 46.

^[2]
Underscoring supplied.

^[3]
L-24997, July 18, 1968.