THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGELIO LABA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This appeal from the decision in criminal case 3422 of the city
court of Cotabato was certified to this Court by the
Court of Appeals per its resolution of July 27, 1967, involving as it does a
single question of law, to wit: 
“The lower court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction to
try and decide the case.”

There is no dispute as to the material facts.  The appellants Rogelio Laba
and Precioso Laba were
charged in the city court of Cotabato with the crime
of theft under articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, in an amended
information which recites “That on or about May 23, 1963, in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, confederating and conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully
and feloniously and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner
thereof, take, steal and carry away …. personal properties …. of the total
value of P2,131.80, Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said owner.  …”

After due trial, the city court, on January 6, 1964, found the
two accused guilty as charged and accordingly sentenced each of them to
“suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months to two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and ten (10) days, and to pay propor­tionate costs.”

The sole legal issue tendered for resolution calls for
interpretation and construction of the provisions of section 78 of Repu­blic
Act 2364 (city charter of Cotabato) in relation to
the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296), as amended,
R.A. 2364 went into effect on June 20,
1959.

Section 78 of R.A. 2364 provides in part as follows:

“Jurisdiction of municipal court.  – The Municipal Court shall have the same
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and the same incidental powers as at
present conferred upon them by law.  It
shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of first instance over all
criminal cases arising under the laws relating to gambling and management of
lotteries, to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident upon
the trial, to larceny, embezzlement and estafa where
the amount of money or property stolen, embezzled or otherwise involved does
not exceed the sum or value of two hundred pesos, to the sale of intoxicating
liquors, to falsely impersonating an officer, to malicious mischief, to
trespass on government or private property, and to threatening to take human
life.  x x x“

Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of
1948 originally read as follows:

“Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.  – Justices of the peace and judges of
municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

*        *           *

“(c)    All offenses in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment;

*        *           *

“Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces may, by
assignment of the respective dis­trict judge in each case, have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by law does
not exceed imprisonment for two years and four months, or a fine of two
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, and, in the absence of the
district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the pro­vince of the Court
of First Instance to hear application for bail.”

One cardinal purpose of the Judiciary Act of 1948 was to enlarge
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, who are all required by the
Constitution to be full-fledged lawyers.^[1]
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 was amended by R.A. 2613 on August 19,
1959 to further enlarge the jurisdiction exercised by justices of the peace and
by municipal courts in the capitals of provinces, concurrently with courts of
first instance, by authorizing them to try offenses for which the penalty
provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than 6 years or a fine of not exceeding P3,000, or
both.  Such cases are to be tried on the
merits, and the decisions rendered therein by municipal or city courts are appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, as the case may be.^[2]

This provision of the Judiciary Act of 1948 was further amended
by R.A. 3828 on June 22, 1963
to read, as it appears in its present form, as follows:

“Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.  – Municipal judges of city courts of
chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

*        *           *

“(c)    Except violations
of election laws all other offenses in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.

*        *           *

“Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and
sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within
their respective jurisdiction, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correctional or imprisonment
for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos, or both,
and in the absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within
the province as the Court of First Instance to hear application for bail.

“All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with municipal
judges of capitals and city court judges shall be tried and decided on the
merits by the respective municipal judges or city judges.  Proceedings had shall be recorded and
decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be.”

The appellants argue “that under section 78 of the Charter
of the City of Cotabato, the concurrent jurisdiction
of the Municipal (now City Court) Court with the Court of First Instance over
crimes of theft is limited to cases where the amount of money or property
stolen does not exceed the sum or value of two hundred pesos, that since in the
case at bar, the value of the property allegedly stolen exceeds two hundred
pesos, it is evident that the court below is without jurisdiction to try and
decide the case.” They further contend “that the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, is a general law; while the Charter of the City of Cotabato is a special law which
specifically fixed under Sec. 78 thereof the jurisdiction of the Municipal (now
city) Court of said City.”

The appellants’ theory finds no basis in the then governing
provisions of law when the instant action was commenced on May 24, 1963.

The Constitution^[3]
expressly vests in Congress “the power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts.” In
determining whether a case lies within or outside the jurisdiction of a court,
resort to the consequent statutory enactment is indispensable.  It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action.^[4]

Does section 78 of R.A. 2364 conflict with the provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended?  We
here declare that there is no conflict between the two laws.  Section 78 (jurisdiction of municipal court)
of R.A. 2364 (creating the city of Cotabato) and the
corresponding provisions of all other laws creating other chartered cities
throughout the Philippines^[5]
delineating the jurisdiction of the municipal courts of these chartered cities,
appear to us to be an adoption and a mere substantial reiteration of the
provisions of sec. 87(c) first par., sub-pars. (1) to (8), of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 as they stood before the amendments to the fourth paragraph of said
section 87(c) were effected by R.A. 2613 and R.A. 3828.  So that when R.A. 2364 was passed, the
legislative intent clearly was that the city court of Cotabato
shall have the same jurisdiction as that already conferred by the Judiciary Act
of 1948 on all municipal and city courts of equal category.  This intent, indeed, is obvious from the
wording of the first sentence of section 78, R.A. 2364,^[6]
to wit:  “The municipal court shall
have the same jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and the same incidental
powers as at present conferred upon them by law.”

It was the unequivocal intention of Congress to make the
Judiciary Act of 1948 applicable to all courts in the Philippines,
including municipal and city courts.  Thus,
section 2 of the said Ju­diciary Act of 1948 makes pointed explicit reference
to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the courts of first instance, the
muni­cipal courts, and the justice of the peace courts.  Section 10 of R.A. 2613, amending sections 87
and 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, specifically refers to the jurisdiction of
all justice of the peace courts in the capitals of provinces and municipal
courts in the Philippines.  There is thus a manifest legislative intent
to give R.A. 2613 universal application to all municipal and city courts in the
Philippines.

When Congress amended sec, 87, par. (c), sub-par. 4, of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 so as to enlarge the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal
courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and city courts, said
amendments were clearly intended to be construed in harmony with the other
provisions of the same Act and with the provisions of other Acts on the same
subject-matter.

In People v. Doriquez,^[7] we held:  “The rule is now beyond all area of
dispute that in view of the latest amendment to section 87(c) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and also taking into account the unaltered provisions of section
44(f) of the same Act, the zone of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal and
city courts and courts of first instance has been considerably widened.  This jurisdictional parity embraces all
offenses for which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months but not exceeding three years (or six years with respect to city
courts and municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces vis-a-vis the courts of first instance), or a fine
of more than two hundred pesos but not exceeding three thousand pesos (or six
thousand pesos in the proper cases), or both such imprisonment and fine.”
It follows, therefore, that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace and municipal courts is confined only to cases where the
prescribed penalty is imprisonment for 6 months or less, or a fine of P200
or less, whereas the exclusive original jurisdiction of the courts
of first instance covers cases where the penalty is incarceration for more than
3 years (or 6 years in the case of city courts and municipal courts in
provincial capitals), or a fine of more than P3,000 (or P6,000 in the proper cases), or both
such imprisonment and fine.  Between
these areas of exclusive jurisdiction lies a zone where the jurisdiction is
confluent.

There is no constitutional impediment to giving two courts of
different levels concurrent jurisdiction over the same offense or
offenses.  To construe section 87(c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, as conferring exclusive original
jurisdiction on justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts over all
the cri­minal cases therein enumerated, would be to nullify pro tanto section 44(f) of the
same Act.  A statute must be so construed
as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

Section 87, par. (c), first par., sub par. (3) of the Judiciary
Act of 1943, as amended, should therefore be so construed in rela­tion to
section 78 of R.A. 2364 (charter of the City of Cotabato)
so as to give the city court of Cotabato, at the time
the present criminal prosecution was commenced, that is, on May 24, 1963, juris­diction
over larceny, embezzlement, and estafa cases where
the value of property involved does not exceed two hundred pesos, irrespective
of the penalty, and, under sec. 87, par. (c), sub par. (4) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended by R.A. 2613, concur­rent jurisdiction with the courts of
first instance over all criminal cases where the penalty provided by law
does not exceed prision correctional or imprisonment for not more than six
years or a fine not exceeding three thousand pesos, or both, irrespective of
the kind of offense charged and the value of the property involved.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, at
appellants’ cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., is on official leave.

^[1]
Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 837.

^[2]
Esperat vs. Avila,
L-25922, June 30, 1967; Andico vs. Roan, et al., L-26563, April 16, 1968; Le Hua Sia vs. Reyes,
L-21686, April 16, 1968.

^[3]
Sec. 2, Article VIII.

^[4]
People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715; Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, L­23848,
Oct. 31, 1967; Aquisap vs. Basilio,
L-21293, Dec. 29, 1967; People vs. Paderna,
L-28518, Jan. 29, 1968.

^[5]
See Rep. Act 3700, sec. 82 (Angeles); Com. Act 326, sec. 21 (Bacolod); Rep. Act 4382, sec. 78 (Bago); Chapter 61, Rev. Adm. Code, secs.
2540-2574 (Baguio); Rep. Act 288, sec. 31 (Basilan);
Rep. Act 523, sec. 78 (Butuan); Rep. Act 526, sec. 77
(Cabanatuan); Rep. Act 521, sec. 78 (Cagayan de Oro); Rep. Act 328,
sec. 78 (Calbayog); Rep. Act 3278, sec. 86 (Caloocan); Rep. Act 3445, sec. 78 (Canlaon);
Com. Act 547, sec. 76 (Cavite); Com. Act 58, sec. 40
(Cebu); Rep. Act 2364, sec. 78 (Cotabato);
Rep. Act 170, sec. 77 (Dagupan); Rep. Act 3028, sec. 84 (Danao);
Rep. Act 3811, sec. 80 (Dapitan); Com. Act 51, sec.
18 (Davao); Rep. Act 327, sec. 77 (Dumaguete); Rep. Act
2668, sec. 78 (Gingoog); Rep. Act 525, sec. 78 (Iligan); Com. Act 158, sec. 56 (Ilo­ilo); Rep. Act 4585,
sec. 81 (La Carlota); Rep. Act 4584, sec. 80 (Laoag);
Rep. Act 3134, sec. 84 (Lapu-Lapu); Rep. Act 4586,
sec. 86 (Laurel); Rep. Act 306, sec. 77 (Legas­pi);
Rep. Act 162, sec. 77 (Lipa); Rep. Act 3271, sec. 78
(Lucena); Rep. Act 409, sec. 41 (Manila); Com. Act
592, sec. 20 (Dansalan)(Marawi);
Rep. Act 305, sec. 77 (Naga); Rep. Act 4645, sec. 84
(Olongapo); Rep. Act 179, sec. 77 (Ormoc); Rep. Act 321, sec. 77 (Ozamis);
Rep. Act 4475, sec. 27 (Palayan); Rep. Act 183, sec.
78 (Pasay); Com. Act 502 (Quezon);
Rep. Act 4413, sec. 82 (Rajah Buayan); Rep. Act 603,
sec. 77 (Roxas); Rep. Act 2643, sec. 78 (San Carlos);
Rep. Act 4487, sec. 77 (San Carlos)(Panga­sinan);
Com. Act 520, sec. 77 (San Pablo); Rep. Act 1621, sec. 78 (Silay); Rep. Act 760, sec. 78
(Tacloban); Com. Act 338 (Tagaytay);
Rep. Act 2688, sec. 84 (Toledo); Rep. Act 981, sec. 24 (Trece
Martires); Com. Act 39, sec. 18 (Zamboanga).

^[6]
See also the first sentence of the section on jurisdiction of muni­cipal courts
in each of the laws creating chartered cities throughout the Philippines.

^[7]
L-24444 and L-24445, July 29, 1968,
24 SCRA 168.