ANTONIO DE LA CRUZ, RODOLFO CALAMBA, AVELINO SILVESTRE, ELADIA DURIA, ANGEL LABAY, ANASTACIA ORTIZ, GENOVEVA ROQUE, REGINA BALAIS, ONOFRE IBARRA, SATURNINO MELIDA, PASTOR CONSIG…

In this special civil
action, the petitioners seek a writ of cer­tiorari to annul two (2) orders of
Honorable Pedro J1. Bautista, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, dated June 19 and July 22,
1967.  Soon after the filing of the petition herein,
we issued an order restraining respondent Judge from enforcing his order of June 19,
1967, and from
acting upon a motion of Perfecto Burgos and Alejandra
Marquez, dated July 11, 1967.

The petitioners herein
were defendants in a forcible entry and detainer case^[1] of the municipal court of Parañaque, Rizal, filed, on
November 4, 1966, by the
spouses Perfecto Burgos and Alejandra Marquez,
hereinafter referred to as respondents. 
In their complaint, the latter alleged that they are lessees of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) “and/or persons entitled to the
possession” of a strip of land, of about 3, 215 square meters, of the Paco-Naic Abandoned Railroad Line, in the Barrio of Sto. Niño, Municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal; and
that, in the evening of September 24, 1966, petitioners herein, through force, intimidation, threats, strategy
and stealth, took possession of portions of said land of about 20 square meters
each, and proceeded to construct thereon make-shift houses, which portions they
refused to vacate despite repeated demands. 
After appropriate proceedings, the municipal court rendered a decision,
on January 5, 1967, commanding petitioners herein to vacate the premises in
question and restore the possession thereof to the herein respondents, as well
as to pay a monthly rental of P40.00 each, from September 24, 1966 until the
premises are vacated, and the sum of P500, by way of attorney’s fees, in
addition to the costs.  Soon thereafter,
this deci­sion was set aside to give petitioners a “last opportunity”
to introduce additional evidence, upon the reception of which, on February 28,
1967, the municipal court reproduced the findings made in its decision of
January 5, and reiterated the dispositive part thereof.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion, dated March 6, 1967, praying, in effect,
that the monthly rentals to be paid by each of them be reduced “and that
the amount of supersedeas bond be correspondingly
based thereon.” Acting upon this motion, which was treated as one for
reconsideration, on March 11, 1967,
the court amended its decision of February
28, 1967, by reducing said monthly rentals from P40 to P10
each.  Two (2) days later, petitioners
moved that they be allowed to appeal as pauper litigants and that the monthly
deposits to be made by them be fixed at the same amount that respondents
“would otherwise pay the Philippine National Railways for the same
lot.” In an order, dated March 16, 1967, petitioners were allowed to
appeal as pauper litigants, without payment of the appellate docket fee and
“the necessary appeal bond,” and the clerk of court was directed to
transmit the records of the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, where
it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2977-P.

Over a month later, or on April
19, 1967, respondents filed, with the latter Court, presided over
by Judge Bautista, a petition for the immediate execution of the appealed
decision, for failure of peti­tioners to file a supersedeas
bond and to deposit the monthly rentals that fell due during the appeal.  Despite petitioners’ opposition thereto, on June 19, 1967, Judge Bautista issued
an order granting said petition and directing the issuance of the corresponding
writ of execution.  On July 11, 1967, petitioners sought a
reconsideration of this order. 
Respondents, in turn, filed a petition, bearing the same date, alleging
that, as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
Francisco Tejones had served upon the petitioners
copies of the writ of execution, issued on June 23, 1967, and given them ten
(10) days to vacate the portions respectively held by them, and that, despite
the expiration of said period, petitioners are still occupying said portions
and show no sign of their intent to
leave the same, and praying, accordingly, that a special order be issued
directing the sheriff to demolish said houses. 
Soon thereafter, or on July 22, 1967, Judge Bautista denied the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration, in view of which, on September 29, 1967,
petitioners commenced the present special civil action against the respondents
and Judge Bautista, as well as deputy provincial sheriff Tejones,
to restrain the enforcement of the decision of the municipal court and annul
the aforementioned orders of June 19 and July 22, 1967.

Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge Bautista has com­mitted
a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of said writ of execution,
because although they had not filed the supersedeas
bond required to suspend the execution of the decision of the municipal court,
this was due to an honest mistake or excusable negligence on their part, for
they had asked the municipal court to fix the amount of said bond and, yet, the
court did not do so, because of which, they entertained the honest belief that
they were relieved from the duty of filing the bond, until its amount shall
have been fixed by the court of first instance.

In this connection, Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides that “(i)f judgment is
rendered against the defendant” in a forcible entry case, “execution
shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant
to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the peace
or municipal court x x x to
enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment.” It has been
repeatedly held that the requirement of a supersedeas
bond is “mandatory”1 and
cannot be dispensed with by the courts2; that, when
said bond is not filed, the duty of the court to order the execution of the
appealed decision is “ministerial and imperative”3; and that
the execution of the judgment shall then issue “immediately”.4

The cases of Tagulimot v. Makalintal5 and Tolentino v. Court of
First Instance6 cited by the petitioners do not
support their pretense.  In the first, we
declared that, although a court of first instance may, in its discretion,
give the interested party a reasonable time within which to file a supersedeas bond or to replace a defective one1 no abuse of discretion had been committed by the
court in granting the motion for execution, because no such bond had
been filed and appellant had not asked for time to do so.  It is worthy of notice that, subsequently
thereto, the Tagulimots had filed a bond,
which was, however, dis­allowed.  Yet, it
was held that the aforementioned discretion of the appellate court to allow or
disallow therein the filing of a supersedeas bond had
not been abused.  Considering
that, similarly, petitioners herein had not asked Judge Bautista to
grant them time to file a supersedeas bond,
before the issuance of the writ of execution complained of; that, unlike
the Tagulimots, neither had petitioners herein filed
such bond up to now; that they merely asked for time to do so, over two (2)
weeks after the issuance of said writ; and that petitioners have not even
alleged, much less shown, that Judge Bautista had gravely abused his discretion
in denying their motion of July 11, 1967,
it is apparent that the Tagulimot case militates
against their pretense.

In the Tolentino case, there was
a supersedeas bond, except that it was filed with the
court of first instance, instead of the muni­cipal court.  Besides, the issue in that case was whether
the Judge of first instance had abused his discretion in allowing said
bond, and the Supreme Court resolved the question in the negative.  It does not fol­low from this that the Judge
would have committed a grave abuse of discretion reviewable
by certiorari had he disallowed said bond.  Indeed, in the subsequent case of Tagulimot, it was ruled precisely that, since the appellate
court had discretion to allow or disallow the filing of a bond, it
follows that its choice in favor of the second alternative is not an abuse of
discretion.  In fact, such was the view
taken in Clemente v. Court of Appeals.2

Independently of the foregoing, it is not disputed that petitioners
herein had neither paid nor deposited the monthly rentals that had accrued
during the pendency of the appeal.  Hence, it is clear that respondent Judge had
neither abused his discretion nor committed an error of judgment, but merely
complied with his ministerial duty, under Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, in ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution.3

Then, again, contrary to
the allegation in the petition herein, petitioners do not appear to have a
valid defense.  Indeed, their answer in
the municipal court alleges that respondents are not entitled to the possession
of the land in question, because their contract of lease with the PNR had ended
on July 12, 1960.  In their opposition to respondents’ petition
for immediate execution, petitioners averred, however, that respondents had, in
1966, paid the back rentals for six years, which were seemingly accepted by the
PNR, thereby indicating that it had consented to a renewal of the lease
contract.  What is more, petitioners
admitted, in their answer, that respondents had subsequently won in the bidding
for the purchase of the land in question, although the same had not, as yet,
been formally awarded to them (respondents). 
As a consequence, respondents are entitled to the possession of said
land, either as lessees thereof, or as its purchasers, if the award were
eventually formalized.

Regardless of the foregoing, in an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession1.  The legal
right thereto is not essential to the possessor’s cause of action, for no one
may take the law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him
of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable2 or actually disputed in another case3.  In the
present case, both justice and equity are thus in favor of respon­dents herein.

WHEREFORE, the petition herein should be, as it is
hereby dismissed, and the writ prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners.  The restraining order issued by this Court,
on September 30, 1967, is, likewise, set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 1775.

1 Acibo v.
Macadaeg, L-19701, June 30, 1964; Sison v. Bayona, L-13446, Sept.
30, 1960.

2 U.S.T. v. Ocampo, 85 Phil. 144.

3 Prieto
v. Lucidine, L-9673, Aug. 21, 1956; Acibo v.
Macadaeg, supra.

4 Pascua
v. Nable, 71 Phil. 186; Sumintac
v. Court, 71 Phil. 445; Arcilla v. De Constancio, 74 Phil. 445; Cunaan v.
Rodas, 78 Phil. 800; Yu Tiong
Tay v. Barrios, 79 Phil. 597.

5 85 Phil. 40.

6 75 Phil. 282.

1 Zamora v. Dinglasan, 77 Phil. 46; Contreras v. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 42.

2 L-18686, January 24, 1967.

3 Igama
v. Soria, 42 Phil. 11; Tomboc
v. Court, 46 Phil. 851; Guillena v. Borja, 53 Phil. 379; Cura v.
Rodas, 79 Phil. 595; Pañgilinan
v. Peña, 89 Phil. 122.

1 Mediran
v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752; Fuentes v. Justice of the Peace, 67
Phil. 364; Maddammu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230;
Cabal­lero v. Abellana, 15 Phil. 534; Lizo v. Carandang, 73
Phil. 649; Mercado v. Go Bio, 78 Phil. 279; Masallo
v. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134.

2 Pitarque
v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5; Lopez v.
Santiago, 107 Phil. 668; Supia v. Quintero, 59
Phil. 312.

3 De Gaerlan
v. Martinez, 85 Phil. 375.