THE MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, AND MANTRADE, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARTIN SOUZA, RESPONDENTS.

The Manila Trading &
Supply Company and MANTRADE, Inc.^[1] seek the review, via certiorari, of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 32226-R, holding that, the
true balance of the judgment in Civil Case No. 29049 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila is P2,730.87, and not P9,730.87 as
held by the latter court in its Civil Case No. 49263, filed by the
Manila Trading & Supply Company for the revival of the said judgment.

The undisputed facts of the case, as found and set forth by the
Court of Appeals in the decision appealed from, are as
follows:

“x x x Que no hay cuestion alguna sobre ciertos
antecedentes; el 19 de Octubre,
1954, el demandado otorgo pagare a favor de la demandante
en la suma de P19,000.00 pagadera
a plazos y con intereses de
12% al ado, pero no habiendo
podido saldar ciertas amortizaciones, fue demandado por
la casa acreodera, y esta obtuvo sentencia en la Causa Civil No. 29049 del Juzgado
de la Instancia de Manila por
la suma de P10,035.98 mas los intereses convenidos,
y la cantidad de P3,345.32 por
honorarios de abogado, habiendose fallado el asunto el 18 de Abril, 1956; Exh. A; al quedarse firme la sentencia, la Manila
Trading obtuvo mandamiento
de ejecucion, y consiguio
el embargo de dos camiones del demandado,
que fueron ambos vendidos en subasta publica y el producto de la yenta
se aplico a la sentencia, pero el mismo no era suficiente, y la Manila Trading otra
vez consiguio ejecucion, y el mismo hogar, la casa y el solar en donde
estaba levantada la misma, de Martin Souza, se vendieron
en subasta publics, y el producto
otra vez se aplico a la sentencia; pero otra. vez, la Manila Trading alegando
que la segunda ejecucion tampoco pudo cubrir la totalidad de su reclamacion, pidio una segunda ejecucion,
alias, en la suma de P2,730.87, suma
que segun mocion de su propio
abogado, Exh. 1 quedaba por pagar
a la Manila Trading y el Juzgado accedio
alla mocion y ordeno la expedicion de una segunda ejecucion,
alias, contra Martin por la cantidad
mencionada de P2,730.87, en auto de fecha 9 de Marzo, 1957, Exh. 1, expidiendose luego el mandamiento el 18 del mismo
mas de Marzo, 1957, Exh. 2; pero nada hay en las pruebas que
indique cual haya sido el resultado
de esta segunda ejecucion; lo que si se ve es
que la presente accion se entablo cinco años despues,
para revivir 1a sentencia a favor de la Manila Trading, pero
en la cantidad restante que segun ella,
llegaba a la suma de
P9,730.87, y en la vista, o mejor dicho en la nueva vista,^[2] se le permitio probar un supuesto error de ma­tematicas cometido por su testigo
y contador auxiliar, Sr. Fausto Abad, error que a su vez,
motivo‘ otro error del abogado de la Manila Trading, el Sr. Valladolid en la preparacion de su motion, Exh. 1, pues, la suma de P9, 730.87, dicese que se escribio,
“P2,730.87”, y el Juzgado Inferior con vista del testimonio
del Sr. Abad en la re-apertura
del juicio, dictamino a
favor de la Manila Trading, y esta es la razon porque
en esta alzada, Martin
Souza alega que el mismo habia incurrido
en las siguientes errores:

‘I. That the Lower Court erred in holding that the true balance of
the account of the defendant-appellant with the plaintiff-appellee
was P9,730.87, and not P2,730.87, and
consequently in modifying its decision dated Aug. 22, 1962, in the absence of
convincing proof to support the amendments;

‘II. That the Lower Court erred in considering the allegations made
by the plaintiff in its motion
to set aside judgment and to reopen the
case as sufficient grounds for the reopening of the case, and for not rejecting
the same for want of compliance with the requirements of the rules of court on
the matter;

‘III. That the Lower Court erred in holding that the mistake
allegedly committed by the plaintiff’s counsel in its petition for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution, marked as Exhibit 1, particularly the figures
P2,730.87 to mean P9,730.87, is merely a harmless one or a clerical error,
correctible by a mere motion and not by appeal;'(pp. 1-3, Alegado
del DemandadoApelante) los cuales pueden discutirse
conjuntamente, toda vez que la cuestion
presentada es bien sencilla, y es, si a la luz
de las pruebas aportadas y los escritos de las partes, la ultima decision del Juzgado Inferior debe sostenerse.”

Resolving the appeal, the Court of Appeals revoked the appealed
decision of the trial court, dated February
4, 1963, and in its stead, ordered appellant Martin Souza to pay to
the Manila Trading & Supply Company the sum of only P2,730.87
with interest at 12% per annum from November
24, 1956 until fully paid.  
In holding that the balance of the judgment account in Civil Case No.
29049 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is only P2,730.87 and not P9,730.87 as held by
the said court in the subsequent action for the revival of the judgment
aforesaid, the Court of Appeals reasoned out thus:

“CONSIDERANDO:  Que de ser cierto que el restante de la deuda del demandado era la cantidad de P9,730.87 y no la suma
de P2,730.87, justicia es que
se le ordene a aquel a que pague la primera
y correcta cantidad; mas esto no resuelve
el caso; pues no debe perderse de vista que el asunto presente
es accion para revivir una
sentencia; y si bien es verdad
que en la causa de Cia General contra Martinez 29 Phil. 515, dicese que en las
acciones para revivir una sentencia,
cabe cualquiera defensa que tuviese
el deudor, como el pago que se hubiese
verificado despues de quedarse firme la sentencia que se trata de revivir (Y por consiguiente el acreedor a su vez
puede probar el verdadero saldo de la deuda), – si en todo caso, antes de entablarse la nueva demanda, la cantidad alegadamente no satisfecha hasta entonces ya estuviera fijada
por actuacion judicial en
el primer expediente, claro
es que el Juzgado que haya
de conocer de la accion no puede it mas alla
de lo que esta ya determinado en aquel, pues de lo contrario, si en la nueva accion permisible
es pretender y demostrar que la cantidad restante segun hubiese sido fijada
en ese primer expediente
era cantidad erronea, y que la verdadera cantidad que quedaba
por pagar era otra, mas grande
que aquella, – esto daria por
resultado dos expedientes
con actuaciones ambas judiciales, contradictorias entre si; ahora
bien, en la mencionada causa, Civil No. 29049, lo que aparece es que
segun mocio de la demandante, y auto del Juzgado expedido alla por
el 1957, se habia fijado la
cantidad restante en la suma de P2,730.87:  esta suma, pretende
la demandante en el presente
asunto que es un error; pero fuese o no un error, ello es que las
cifras no han lido corregidas en esa Causa Civil No. 29049; y esta
Tribunal no comprende como es que en otra
accion entablada en otra causa el Juzgado
que conociera dela segunda causa
tuviese autoridad y jurisdicion para corregir el error; verdad que el auto mencionada de ser erroneo, pudo haberse
corregido despues, siendo auto interlocutorio, pero la correccion correspondia al Juzgado que lo habia cometido,
no a otro Juzgado como es el Juzgado
Inferior en este, asunto; verdad que una
actuacion de un Juzgado puede tambien corregirse
por otro Juzgado, pero esto
es permisible solamente en los casos en que el auto que haya de ser corregido, merecia correccion precisamente porque el Juzgado que lo haya dictado, se habia extra-limitado de su jurisdiccion al dictarlo, y la falta de su autoridad fuese
manifiesta y estuviere a la
vista con la simple lectura del auto en cuyo caso, seria
un auto nuio (void order) y es
permisible anulario o consequirse declaracion de su nulidad aun
en expediente separado y de
una manera collateral,
Gomez v. Concepcion 47 Phil. 717; pero
el auto de fecha de 9 de Marzo,
1957 y la ejecucion que el Juzgado expidio nueve dias despues
Exh. 1, 2, eran ambos autos
que dicho Juzgado tenia amplio
poder y autoridad para promulgar, con la agravante de que fueron expedidos a petition de la
Manila Trading nada menos; siendo
esto asi como lo es, este
Tribunal es de la opinion de que
en el asunto posterior, es decir, en el presente caso, para revivir
la sentencia dictaminada en
el Causa Civil originaria,
el Juzgado estaba inhibido a pronunciar y dictaminar, que el auto y la ejecucion mecionadas eran incorrectas, y habiendo el Juzgado Inferior en
el presente caso, procedido en contra de este principio fundamental ya mencionado, admitiendo pruevas aportadas por la demandante para establecer al pretendido error para despues declarar que la cantidad adeudada y saldo restante
de la sentencia era cantidad
bien diferente de la cantidad hecho constar judicialmente en la causa originaria, este procedimiento y actuacion era error manifesto, porque
era lo mismo, y equivalia a
corregir las actuaciones del otro Juzgado en la otra causa, y por
consiguiente, una estralimitacion de sus poderes y autoridad;

“CONSIDERANDO:  Que siendo esta
la conclusion del
Tribunal, huelga discutir los otros errores
apuntados, especialmente
el argumento sometido por el demandado-apelante de que la prueba aportada
por la demandante en la segunda vista no debia de haber sido considerada
suficiente para probar el alegado error en la preparacion del
escrito Exh. 1, en vista de
que siendo escrito del propio abogado de la demandante, el Sr. Valladolid,
el mismo y ningun otro, era el testigo competence para declarar que
se habia errado en su preparacion, argumento que por
cierto tiene sus meritors, pues
en todo caso, la conclusion
de este Tribunal en el primer considerando
bastante es, para decidirse esta apelacion;

“EN SU VERTUD, este Tribunal se ve impelido a revocar,
como por la presence revoca, la sentencia apelada, y en su lugar se dicta otra, condenaddo al demandado a que pague a la demandante, la cantidad de P2,730.87 con sus intereses a razon de
12% anuales desde el 24 de Noviembre, 1956 hasta su completo pago; sin pronunciamento especial en cuanto
a las costas.”

This
reasoning of the Court of Appeals is now assailed by the Manila Trading &
Supply Company before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:

“I. That the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in revoking the
appealed judgment on a mere technical procedural mistake allegedly committed by
the lower court in receiving the evidence of MANTRADE with a view of establishing
the error in Exhibits 1 & 2 which are motion for execution and writ of
execution respectively.

“II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred
in not disregarding the alleged procedural mistake of the lower court on the
ground that the same is only a harmless one.

“III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred
in not affirming the decision of the lower court on the ground that the said
decision is supported by the evidence.

“IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred
in declaring in effect, that in a revival suit, the lower court has no power to
make pronouncement as to the balance of a judgment account different from the
balance appearing in the first case.

“V. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in revoking the judgment
of the lower court on an issue not
raised and discussed as assignment of error.”

Beneath
this assignment of errors, the main question posed is whether or not the trial
court acted within the legal bounds in granting the motion of the Manila
Trading & Supply Company in the action for the revival of judgment.  (Civil Case No. 49263) “to set aside
judgment and to reopen case” for the purpose of allowing the said company to submit additional evidence to prove the
“mistake” it allegedly committed in the statement of the balance of
the, judgment in its favor in Civil Case No. 29049, when it filed its petition
for the issuance of a second alias writ of execution (Exh.
1) in that case, and, on the basis of the evidence presented, in declaring
thereafter that the true balance of the said judgment sought to be revived is
P9,730.87, contrary to the stated balance of P2,730.87 appearing in the alias
writ of execution (Exh. 2) issued by the trial court
in the first case (Civil Case No. 29049) pursuant to the petition
aforesaid.   The Court of Appeals held that
the lower court exceeded its function and autho­rity in doing so, whereupon, it
revoked the decision of the lower court.

Petitioners’
appeal must be sustained.   The effect of
the decision of the Court of Appeals is to prevent payment of the full amount
of a final and executory judgment and to relieve the
judgment debtor pro-tanto, notwithstand­ing the
proven fact, not seriously denied by the said judg­ment debtor, that the
judgment has not been completely satisfied, simply because the writ of
execution last issued before the judgment became dormant shows a lesser amount
than the judgment, and inspite of proof that the
reduced sum contained in the said last writ is the product of unintentional
error on the part of an employee of the judgment creditor unwittingly
incorporated in the motion for execution of his lawyer.  This ought not to be done; it would amount to
a denial of justice.  To uphold it would be to sacrifice substantial justice at the
altar of procedural niceties entirely devoid of any principle of public policy.
 It would be giving more importance to
the means to attain justice than to the end itself.  To say the least, the decision of the Court of Appeals is extremely technical and
unrealistic.

To be sure, there was not even any error of procedure in the
proceedings in the trial court.   In
allowing a new trial upon motion of appellants and permitting the said
appellants to present evidence of the alleged error in the preparation of the
motion for execution which induced the issuance of the last alias writ of
execution in the amount of only P2,730.87, His Honor
did not by any means modify the judgment appellants were asking to be
revived.   What His Honor corrected was
merely the alias writ of execution.  To
put it the other way, it may be said that what His Honor did was just to
receive evidence as to and to determine what was the actual and truthful unpaid
balance of the judgment it was reviving, and in the process, it considered the
alias writ of execution as only one of the pieces of evidence supporting appellee’s claim regarding the amount of said balance,
which evidence enjoyed, of course, the character of an implied judicial admission
because of its relation to the motion for execution of appellants lawyer, the
probative value of which will be discussed anon.

“The object of the action to enforce a dormant judgment is,
first to revive it and, then, to execute the second judgment reviving it if it
grants the plaintiff any relief.”
(Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236, 241)
Accepting the view that in the last analysis it is only the remaining
unexecuted part of the dormant judgment that is actually to be revived, it does
not necessarily follow that the alias writ of execution issued in relation
thereto contains the conclusive evidence of such unsatisfied part.  Any writ of execution must by all means
conform exactly with the judgment to be enforced.  Anything in it more than what such judgment
requires is void.  On the other hand,
irrespective of what the writ may state, a judgment creditor cannot be
compelled to accept less than his judgment unless the judgment debtor duly
proves satisfaction or waiver of the alleged shortage.  In line with these self-evident propositions,
in De la Costa v. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 606, this Court
said that “it has been repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this
jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has
become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible
or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.” (p. 692) ^[3]

It is not proper, much less practical, to equate writs of
execution with judgments as regards their conclusiveness.   The firmly final and immutable character of
a judgment is founded on the principle that were the rule otherwise, there
would be no end to a litigation.   On the other hand, the writ of execution is
only a means of carrying a judgment into effect or to make the winning parties
realize the fruits thereof.  
Understandably, the circumstances surrounding actual compliance with the
judgment may vary from time to time, according as to how the losing party tries
to satisfy it.  Accordingly, the state of
facts on which a writ of execution may issue is always subject to proof.  At best, as already indicated, the contents
of a writ of execution may serve as evidence only of the unsettled portion of a
judgment, and no principle of public policy or even plain expediency is violated
by not according to such evidence the same conclusive­ness as a judgment has.

In the present case, it
is true that the last alias writ of execution was issued upon a motion of
appellants’ counsel stating the amount of P2,730.87 as the balance of the
judgment to be enforced, but even if such an allegation could be considered as
a judicial admission which under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
(Revised) “do not require proof and can not be contradicted,” this
provision is immediately followed by the excepting clause, “unless
previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.” And
precisely, appellants claim there was such mistake in this case.

Anent this point of mistake, the Court of Appeals held as may be
seen in the above-quoted “considerandos” of
its decision, that such mistake if truly existing had already been embodied in
the alias writ of execution, hence it could be cured only by the same court
that issued said writ, the error thus committed by the said court, not being
one in excess of jurisdiction but, rather, within its authority, with the
aggravating circumstance that it was induced by the appellants themselves.

This holding may be true as a general rule.  Generally, a court may not interfere with or
review the judgment, orders and other actuations of another court.  In the present case, however, We are not exactly dealing with such a situation.  What We have here is
an action of revival.  Whatever can be said of this kind of an action
as being a new one distinct and different from the previous one, the judgment
in which is being revived, none can deny that the two are so interrelated in
the sense that in factual reality, if not in a legal sense, the second is just
a continuation of the first, albeit such continuation has for its sole purpose
the execution of or the procedure to satisfy the judgment in the first action.  Of course, all matters litigated in the first
action and which gave rise to the judgment can no longer be reopened or
subjected to review, but when it comes to matters not litigated therein and
which are related only to the execution of the judgment, it would be to the
better interests of justice and more consistent with the very purpose of the
remedy that the records of the first case be placed within the reach of the
jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance of the second case, as to all
matters therein related to such execution. 
Since the objective of the action of revival is to make possible the
full satisfaction of the judgment despite the passage of time and to that end,
it is indispensable to determine the outstanding balance or unsatisfied part of
the judgment, it stands to reason
that the records showing the prior efforts undertaken to enforce the judgment
and the results thereof should be allowed to be examined and reviewed with such
fullness as to preclude the possibility of illegality, injustice and inequity,
in exactly the same manner as if it were the original court that were going
over it.  After all, whether it be by
motion or by an action of revival that a judgment is executed, elementary justice demands that the execution be
neither for more nor less than the judgment and any technicality of procedure,
not founded on public policy and not conducive to such result, must be
disregarded.

All that have been said above do not confer upon this Court the
authority to determine in this appeal whether or not, as a matter of fact, the
alleged mistake about the real amount of the unpaid balance of the judgment in
ques­tion, does exist.   This matter should have been passed upon squarely,
and not merely conceded hypothetically, by the Court of Appeals.

IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and this case is returned to said court for further proceedings and judgment
consistent with this decision, with costs
against appellee.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur

Concepcion, C.J., and Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
The petition in this case was originally filed by the Manila Trading said motion & Supply Company
alone; but it appearing from the manifestation and motion subsequently filed by
its counsel that the Manila Trading was dissolved and in lieu thereof Mantrade, Inc. was organized, took over and acquired all
its rights, this Court, on Nov. 8, 1968, resolved that Mantrade,
Inc. be joined with the Manila Trading & Supply Company as petitioners.

^[2]
After judgment was rendered by the trial court for only P2,730.87
as principal, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the
said amount of P2,730.87, was, as claimed by them at the trial and by reason of
which they moved to be allowed to present a rebuttal witness to prove, a
mistake, but the trial court had denied the permission requested; this motion
for reconsideration was denied.  Subsequently,
appellants filed a motion to set aside judgment and to reopen case, on the same
ground of mistake, and as there was
no objection on the part of appellee, the court
granted said motion.  (Pp. 12-26, R. on A.)

^[3]
Although actually this holding speaks of modification of the judgment, it
actually means that it is the writ of execution that must be made to conform to
the altered condition of things.  It is
only in this sense that, perhaps, the
judgment being executed may be deemed modified.