DOMINGO SERMONIA, JESUS SEMPER, PASTOR SEMIC, ELIAS FAJAMOLIN, EULOGIO TOLENTINO, GIL SAPALARAN AND AMADO SANTIANES, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. JOSE T. SANTACERA, AMADO SIASAT, …

Appeal,
by respondents, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered: (a) declaring petitioners entitled to their
respective positions from which they were removed by respon­dent Mayor Jose T. Santacera, except Jesus Semper
who is not entitled to the position with correspond­ing salaries from the date
they were removed to the date of their reinstatement; (b) Ordering respondent
Mayor Santacera to reimburse the municipality of San
Joaquin, Iloilo for whatever amounts may be paid by it to petitioners pursuant
to this decision; (c) Respondent Mayor is further ordered to pay peti­tioners
attorney’s fees in the sum of P500.00; and to pay the costs.

“Petitioners’
claim for moral and exemplary damages, not having been substantiated by
evidence, the same are hereby denied.”

On the
dates set forth after their respective names, petitioners herein, namely:

were extended temporary appointments as members of the police force of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo.  In view of said appointments, which were duly
attested to by the provincial treasurer of Iloilo and approved by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, pursuant to Section 24(e) of Republic Act No.
2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, petitioners qualified
and assumed the duties of their aforementioned positions, as well as received
the emoluments at­tached thereto, continuously, up to December 31, 1963, when
the newly elected mayor of San Joaquin, respondent Jose T. Santacera,
gave notice of the termination of their services.  As replacements of herein petitioners in the
police force of San Joaquin, Mayor Santacera,
likewise, appointed the other respondents herein, name­ly, Amado
Siasat, Graciano Sandig, Ireneo Salcedo, Quirico Chavez, Eusebio Selibio, Jesus Sardon, Antonio Saquilayan,
Eduardo Baylon and Fermin Egalin, who, accordingly, assumed the positions for­merly
held by the petitioners.  Upon denial by Santacera of their request for reinstatement and payment of
their salaries, petitioners commenced, with the court of first instance of
Iloilo, the present action for quo–warranto
and mandamus with damages, upon the ground that, although not civil service eligibles, they are war vet­erans and, as such, entitled to
preference over Santacera’s aforementioned
appointees, who are neither civil service eligibles
nor war veterans.  After appropriate
proceedings, said court rendered the decision adverted to above.  Hence, this appeal by the respon­dents, who
maintain that the lower court has erred in holding that petitioners:

I.         
“x x
x who are veterans but not civil service eligibles and who were temporarily ap­pointed members of
the police force of San Joa­quin, Province of Iloilo cannot be replaced by
persons who are not civil service eligibles; and

II.       
” x x
x are entitled to receive Back salaries during the
period of their separation from service.

It
should be noted that Jesus Semper, one of the petitioners
in the lower court, who was found not to be a war veteran and, hence, not
entitled to reinstatement, is not involved in this appeal, he hav­ing failed to
seek a review of the decision of said court.

As
regards the other petitioners herein, who, admittedly, are war veterans,
appellants maintain that Section 8 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended by
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 154, reading:

“Sec. 8. For a period of three years from the time of the
passage of this Act, the persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof
shall, all other quali­fications being equal:

“(1) Have
preference in appointments and promo­tions in and to any Government office,
agency, or in­strumentality, or in and to any Government-owned or subsidized
corporation, the provisions of law as to civil service eligibility
notwithstanding: Provided, That in examinations where experience is an element
of qualification the time spent in the military or naval service of the United
States or of the Philippines shall be credited in a veteran’s rating where his
actual em­ployment in a similar vocation to that for which he is examined was
interrupted by such military or naval service.”

does not justify the decision appealed from, inasmuch as: (a) peti­tioners
were merely temporary employees; (b) the preference given to war veterans in
said Section 8, as, amended, refers only to “appointments and
promotions,” not to the retention of the office they hold; and (c) said
preference is good only “for a period of three (3) years from the time of
the passage” of said Republic Act No. 154, on June 14, 1947, so that
petitioners’ separation from the service on December 31, 1963 is beyond the
pale of said legis­lation.

It is
true that “temporary” employees may be removed at any time, in the
absence of a legal provision to the contrary. 
Such pro­vision is found, however, in the above-quoted section 8,
insofar as war veterans are concerned.^[1]

Appellants’
second argument was rejected by this Court in Gonzalez vs. Aldana,1 from which we quote:

x x x the Act
aforementioned speaks of pre­ference in general and x x
x our impression is that the preference contemplated
by the law is not only an appointment whereby a veteran is accepted in the
service of the Government but also his enjoyment of  the benefits, rights and emoluments
accruing from said appointment.  It would
certainly be unjust as well as illogical if after appointing a non-veteran to a
Government position today, he may be replaced and dismissed tomorrow, when
there are non-veterans occupying other and similar positions who could and
should be replaced first. x x x.

“The positions occupied by the petitioners are neither policy
determining, primarily confidential, nor highly technical.  Furthermore, they are not ask­ing for any
promotion or transfer.  All their wish
and desire is that they be allowed to retain their positions and continue
serving the Government.  By interpreting
the law in this manner, namely, giving preference to a veteran, not only in the
appointment but also in keeping the position to which he is appointed, we would
be following and implementing the intention of the Legislature.  As the lower court, x x
x rather vehemently observed:

‘The aforequoted provisions of law should
be given full force and effect.  The
intention of the framers of the law to reward those who have risked their lives
and sacrificed much in order that we could be freed from Japanese domination
should not be implemented with empty promises and hollow gestures.  We should give what is due the veterans as
contemplated by law.  For that is the
only way we could repay and show our gratitude to the heroes of the last world
war.'”

With
respect to the expiration of the term fixed in Section 8 of Republic Act No.
65, as amended, it should be noted that, on June
18, 1955, Republic Act No. 1363 took effect. 
Sections 1, 2, 4 and 5 thereof provide:

“Sec. 1.  The policy of
the Government is to give preference, other considerations being approximately
equal, to persons who are veterans under section four of this Act.

“Sec. 2.  Accordingly,
appointing officers shall give preference to veterans when extending appoint­ments
to positions in the government, in semi-govern­ment corporations, and
government-controlled corpor­ations. 
Appointing officers who knowingly violate the provisions of this Act
shall be punished by a fine of one month’s pay for the first violation, and
dismissal from the service for the second violation.

“xxx                           xxx                               xxx.

“Sec. 4.  The term
‘veteran’ as employed in this Act shall refer to: (1) veterans of the
Philippine Revolution as certified to by the Board of Pensions for
Revolutionary Veterans; (2) veterans of World War ll
as certified to by the Philippine Veterans Board; and (3) honorably discharged
soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who have served
therein for at least five years.

“Sec. 5.  In order to
enable a veteran to obtain preference under the provisions of this Act, it must
be shown that he has approximately the same qualifications as other applicants.  It is not intended that a veteran shall have
priority over civil service eligibles unless he
himself is of the same or higher civil, service eligi­bility.”

Herein
petitioners Fajamolin, Semic
and Sermonia were still in office when Republic Act
No. 1363 was approved.  Then, too, said
Act was already in force when petitioners Sapalaran, Tolentino and Santianes were
appointed policemen of San Joaquin.  It is clear, therefore, that these six (6)
petitioners are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No.1363.  Interpreting the same, we held in Sison v. Pajo:1

“Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1363 enacted on June 18, 1955,
provides for the preference to be given to veterans in the matter of
appointment to positions in the government, as follows:

‘Section 1.  The policy of
the Gov­ernment is to give preference, other considerations being approximately
equal, to persons who are veterans under section four of this Act.’

Section 2 penalizes the violation of the
provisions of the Act, while Section 4 defines the term ‘veteran.’ Section 5
provides that in order to enable a veteran to obtain preference, it must be
shown that he has approximately the same qualifications as other ap­plicants,
and further states that it is not intended that a veteran shall have priority
over civil service eligibles, unless he himself is of
the same or higher civil service eligibility.

“The replacement on June 29, 1957 of Bonifacio
Lacanlale, a non-eligible but veteran, by Pablo
Santos, Jr., likewise a veteran and non-eligible is unlawful
(Orals, et al. vs. Ribo, et al., 40 O.G. 538693)
because the former, although appointed in an acting capacity, was entitled,
by reason of the pre­ference established by the law in force at the time of his
appointment (Republic Act No. 65, as amended by Republic Act No. 154), to
keep his position until the availability, of a civil service eligible was duly
certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service. x x
x.

“Neither can the eligibility acquired by Santos, Jr., nor
his temporary reappointment approved on January 17, 1959 by the Executive Secretary
and the Commissioner of Civil Service subject to the result of the present case
cure the invalidity or illegality of Lacan­lale’s
removal or validate Santos’ appointment in his stead.  The former replacement by an eligible must be
made by competent authority and only after the Commissioner of Civil Service
has certified that there is such an eligible available.  (Fernandez, et al. vs. Curata,
et al., G. R. No. L-14392, May 30,
1960; Batungbakal vs. NDC and Manuel Agregado, 49 0.G. 2290, G. R. No. L-5127, May 27, 1953.)”1

The
doctrine laid down in the Sison case is controlling
in the one at bar.  Indeed, petitioners
herein have a stronger case than the petitioner in the Sison
case.  The main respondent therein was
a war veteran.  Yet, not being civil service
eligible his appointment, by Mayor Sison, in lieu of
the incumbent veteran, was declared illegal.  More significant still is the fact that, after
said replacement of the incumbent veteran, who was a non-civil service eligible,
by another veteran, likewise, devoid of civil service eligibility, the latter became
a civil service eligible.  Still, it was
held that this subsequent fact did not “cure the invalidity or ille­gality”
of the incumbent’s removal or “validate” the appointment of his
replacement, prior to the acquisition of the latter’s eligibi­lity under
the Civil Service Law.

Respondents
invoke the cases of Orais v. Ribo1 and Inocente
v. Ribo,2 in support of the theory
that the preference of an incumbent non-eligible veteran over another person
likewise devoid of civil service eligibility, is good only within the three year
period prescribed in Republic Act No. 65, as amended.  Said cases arose and were decided, however,
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1363.  Hence, they are not applicable to the case at
bar.  At any rate, insofar as
inconsistent with the subsequent ruling in Sison v.
Pajo,3
the doctrine laid down
in the Ribo cases and others based thereon must be
deemed modified pro tanto.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against respondents-appellants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

^[1] Orais v. Ribo, 93 Phil.
985, 994-995; Inocente v. Ribo,
94 Phil. 652, 660-662.

1
107 Phil. 754, 757-759.

1
L-18443, May 31; 1965.

1
Underscoring supplied.

1
Supra.

2
Supra.

3
Supra.